Gomez vs. Ventura

A statute's provision penalizing physicians who illegally prescribe opium is constitutional under the one-subject rule where it is a means germane to the Act's general purpose of regulating opium use, and mandamus will not lie to compel or control the exercise of discretionary quasi-judicial powers vested in administrative boards.

Dr. Dominador Gomez was a licensed physician and surgeon in the Philippine Islands whose certificate of registration was revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners pursuant to Section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, which penalized physicians or dentists who prescribed opium for patients whose physical condition did not require the drug. The Board's decision was confirmed or acted upon by the Secretary of the Interior, Honorio Ventura. The Philippine Legislature's authority to legislate on opium derived from the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, which authorized legislation for the protection of the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people, an exercise of police power. The regulatory framework for medical licenses had evolved through Act No. 310, Act No. 1761, Act No. 2381, Act No. 2493 (incorporated into the Administrative Code as Section 780), and Act No. 3111, which amended Section 780 by enumerating specific acts constituting "unprofessional conduct."

Dr. Dominador Gomez was a licensed physician and surgeon practicing in the Philippine Islands. Administrative charges were preferred against him before the Board of Medical Examiners by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, alleging that Gomez had illegally prescribed opium for patients whose physical condition did not require the drug, in violation of Section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law. The Board conducted an investigation and, on March 30, 1926, rendered a decision forever revoking Gomez's license to practice medicine and surgery.

Gomez thereafter filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Honorio Ventura, Secretary of the Interior, and the Board of Medical Examiners, praying for the annulment of the investigation proceedings and the Board's decision, his restoration to his prior status, and the issuance of a new license. The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed for dismissal of the complaint. After trial, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint with costs against Gomez, prompting the present appeal.

• Authority of the Fiscal: Petitioner argued that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners, and that the Board therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the proceedings.
• Constitutionality of Section 9: Petitioner contended that Section 9 of Act No. 2381 was null and void for unconstitutionality, as it was foreign to the subject of the Act in violation of Section 3 of the Jones Law, which prohibited the enactment of any bill embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title.
• Repeal of Section 9: Petitioner maintained that even assuming Section 9 was valid, it had been repealed — first by Act No. 2493, which was complete and "covered the field" regarding the practice of medicine and causes for revocation of medical licenses, and later by Section 780 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3111, which enumerated specific acts constituting "unprofessional conduct" and thereby excluded all others.
• Propriety of Judgment and New Trial: Petitioner asserted that the lower court erred in rendering judgment for the defendants and in denying the motion for avoidance and new trial.

• Quasi-Judicial Character of Board Powers: Respondent argued, through the Attorney-General, that the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration, and the authority granted the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or reverse the Board's decision, partake of a quasi-judicial character involving the use of discretion, and therefore cannot be reviewed by mandamus — the true nature of the action on its merits.

• Authority to File Charges: Whether Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila had the authority and personality to institute administrative proceedings before the Board of Medical Examiners, such that the Board acquired jurisdiction over the charges.
• Constitutionality of Section 9: Whether Section 9 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law) is unconstitutional for violating Section 3 of the Jones Law's one-subject rule on the ground that its provision penalizing physicians who illegally prescribe opium is foreign to the Act's subject.
• Repeal of Section 9: Whether Section 9 of Act No. 2381 was repealed, expressly or impliedly, by Act No. 2493 or by Section 780 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3111.
• Availability of Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to review or control the discretionary quasi-judicial acts of the Board of Medical Examiners and the Secretary of the Interior.

• Authority to File Charges: Yes. Section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, permits any person — including a public officer — to prefer charges before the Board of Medical Examiners; the fiscal's filing of charges did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction.
• Constitutionality of Section 9: No, the provision is not unconstitutional. The penalty imposed on physicians and dentists who prescribe opium unnecessarily is a means germane to the Act's general purpose of regulating opium use, not a separate subject, and need not be expressed in the title.
• Repeal of Section 9: No. There was no express repeal, and implied repeal cannot arise because Section 9's provisions are neither contrary to nor incompatible with Section 780 of the Administrative Code as amended; the enumeration of specific acts of "unprofessional conduct" in Act No. 3111 was by way of example and did not exclude other grounds for revocation.
• Availability of Mandamus: No. The Board's and the Secretary of the Interior's powers are quasi-judicial and discretionary in character; mandamus will not lie to compel or control the exercise of such discretion.

• Authority to File Charges: Section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, provides that proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by filing written charges, which "may be preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation," or by the Board's own executive officer when so directed. The law does not require that charges be preferred by a public officer or any specified person. From the broad wording, the Court inferred that any person, including a public officer such as a fiscal, may prefer charges. The fact that the charges were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix therefore did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction.

• Constitutionality of Section 9: The appellant contended that Section 9 of Act No. 2381 was foreign to the subject of the Act, violating Section 3 of the Jones Law. The Court rejected this, reasoning that the penalty for physicians or dentists who prescribe opium for patients not requiring it was one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the Act's purpose — prohibiting unnecessary use of opium — and was a detail subordinate to that purpose, not an independent subject. The Legislature exercised police power expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of health, comfort, and general welfare. Citing Cooley on Constitutional Limitations and Sutherland on Statutory Construction, the Court held that the constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details; provisions germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be included. The violation of the one-subject rule must be substantial and manifest to warrant invalidation, which was not the case here. The validity of the Opium Law had already been upheld in United States vs. Wayne Shoup and United States vs. Jao Li Sing.

• Repeal of Section 9: The Court found no express repeal of Section 9. As to implied repeal, the provisions of Section 9 were neither contrary to nor incompatible with Section 780 of the Administrative Code as amended. The Court adopted the trial judge's reasoning: Act No. 2493 (Administrative Code, Section 780) was a mere reenactment of Act No. 310, which provided for revocation for "unprofessional conduct" without defining the term; the reenactment did not repeal Section 9 of the Opium Law. Act No. 3111 amended Section 780 by adding five enumerated examples of "unprofessional conduct," but the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies only as a means of discovering legislative intent and does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. If unspecified "unprofessional conduct" can still be grounds for revocation, then the criminal use of opium — a specific statutory cause — remains valid grounds.

• Availability of Mandamus: The Court agreed with the Attorney-General that the powers of the Board of Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate, and the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or reverse the Board's decision, are quasi-judicial in character and involve the exercise of discretion. As a rule of general application, mandamus will not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers and boards in matters as to which they are vested with discretion, even where the exercise of that discretion requires statutory construction. The complaint's terms revealed the action to be in the nature of mandamus, which was therefore an improper remedy.

• One-Subject Rule (Single-Subject Rule) — A statute must embrace only one subject, which must be expressed in its title. The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the Act. Provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title — having a natural connection and not being foreign to it — may properly be included. Means and details conducive to the ultimate purpose of the Act need not be separately stated in the title. The violation must be substantial and manifest to warrant invalidation. In this case, the penalty on physicians who illegally prescribe opium was held germane to the Opium Law's general purpose of regulating opium use.

• Implied Repeal — Repeal by implication is not favored. It requires that the provisions of the later statute be contrary to or incompatible with those of the earlier. Where the later law is a mere reenactment of a prior law, it does not repeal provisions of other statutes. The enumeration of specific examples of "unprofessional conduct" did not impliedly repeal a specific statutory ground for revocation, because the enumeration was by way of example, not exclusion.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — This maxim should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example or to remove doubts.

• Mandamus Against Discretionary Acts — Mandamus will not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers and boards in respect of matters as to which they are vested with discretion. Public officials exercising discretion cannot be compelled to act or render a decision in any particular way, even where the exercise of discretion requires the construction and interpretation of statutes. Their conclusions, though disputable, are impregnable to mandamus.

• "The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. The subject must be single; the provisions, to accomplished the object involved in that subject, may be multifarious." — This passage articulates the Court's ratio on the one-subject rule, distinguishing between a statute's subject and its implementing details, and is the canonical formulation of why Section 9 of the Opium Law was constitutional.

• "It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed 'unprofessional' conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts." — This passage, adopted from the trial judge, defines the limits of the expressio unius maxim and explains why the enumeration in Act No. 3111 did not impliedly repeal Section 9 of the Opium Law.

• "Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus." — This passage states the rule that mandamus cannot control discretionary quasi-judicial acts of administrative boards, the basis for affirming dismissal of the complaint.

• United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil. 56 — Controlling precedent upholding the validity of the Opium Law (Act No. 2381) as an exercise of police power authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905; followed in this case to reject the constitutional challenge.
• United States vs. Jao Li Sing, 37 Phil. 211 — Followed as subsequent authority sustaining the validity of the Opium Law.
• Posadas vs. Menzi, U.S. Supreme Court, May 15, 1929 — Cited for the proposition that to warrant setting aside a statute for failure to express its subject in the title, the violation must be substantial and plain.

• Section 3, Jones Law — Prohibited the enactment of any bill embracing more than one subject, which must be expressed in the title. Applied to test the constitutionality of Section 9 of Act No. 2381; held not violated because the penalty on physicians was germane to the Act's single subject.
• Section 9, Act No. 2381 (Opium Law) — Penalized physicians or dentists who prescribed opium for patients whose physical condition did not require the drug, and provided for revocation of medical licenses. Held constitutional, not repealed, and a valid basis for the Board's revocation.
• Section 780, Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111 — Governed proceedings for revocation of certificates of registration, permitting any person to prefer charges and enumerating specific acts constituting "unprofessional conduct." Applied to determine that the fiscal had authority to file charges and that the enumeration did not impliedly repeal Section 9.
• Act of Congress of March 3, 1905 — Authorized the Philippine Legislature to adopt legislation on opium for the protection of health, comfort, and general welfare; the source of police power underlying the Opium Law.

Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.

• Villamor, J. — Reserved his vote, expressing no explicit reasoning on record.