Go-Yu vs. Yu

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code requires a grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable personality disorder that renders a party unable to perform essential marital obligations; a psychiatric report lacking adequate factual and clinical basis cannot sustain a nullity petition, and a Rule 65 certiorari petition challenging the denial of a demurrer to evidence is not mooted by the trial court’s continuation of the principal case.

Mary Christine C. Go-Yu and Romeo A. Yu were married on June 11, 1999, without a prenuptial agreement, and their property relations were governed by the absolute community of property under the Family Code. The marriage became the subject of a petition for declaration of nullity and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The statutory backdrop includes Article 36 of the Family Code, which allows nullity for psychological incapacity, and Article 48, which prohibits judgments based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment in such cases.

Mary Christine C. Go-Yu and Romeo A. Yu were married on June 11, 1999, after having been introduced by petitioner’s mother and after a period of exclusive dating. Petitioner had finished college at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, returned to the Philippines, worked in various companies, and eventually joined the family business, rising from secretary to Senior Vice President in charge of the day-to-day operations of a company with at least 700 employees. The parties had no prenuptial agreement and lived at respondent’s family home.

On October 21, 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 12, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property. She alleged that she had been well provided for and taken care of by her parents and had grown into a self-assured, independent, and confident person; that after the wedding she had to contend with her mother-in-law’s constant meddling and intrusion into their privacy; that respondent promised they would eventually move out but never fulfilled the promise; that she made many adjustments and sacrifices, gave up luxuries when respondent’s financial resources dwindled, limited her social life, became withdrawn, maintained only a small circle of friends, and single-handedly ran the household and made decisions while respondent was busy with personal and social activities outside the house; that their sexual activity decreased considerably; that she was unable to conceive and tried to convince respondent to undergo in vitro fertilization, which he refused; and that the parties grew apart and lived separate lives even while under the same roof. She further alleged that she was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which existed before the marriage, and that because she was comfortable with her behavior and saw nothing wrong with it or the need to change, treatment was improbable.

In his Amended Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent denied the material allegations. He stated that he offered his love and affection for petitioner and desired reconciliation to save the marriage in the spirit of love, forgiveness, and Christian values on marriage. He contended that petitioner was not suffering from psychological incapacity or a personality disorder; her problem was behavioral, in that she had difficulty adjusting to married life and dealing with his relatives, especially his mother. As to the dissolution of the absolute community of property, he claimed that the properties mentioned by petitioner were not community property but were merely held by him in trust for his siblings and relatives, and that petitioner had executed an attestation admitting that the properties were owned by his siblings and other relatives.

The case proceeded to trial, where petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence consisting of her own testimony and the testimonies of her friend, her secretary, and the psychiatrist who examined her. After petitioner rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that petitioner’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which supposedly rendered her psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, was not supported by clear evidence. The RTC denied the demurrer, holding that petitioner had adduced substantial evidence to show that she was suffering from a personality disorder and that respondent needed to adduce controverting evidence. Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

The CA later found that the evidence presented by petitioner, through the psychological report and supporting testimonial evidence, failed to establish any proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital obligations. It characterized what petitioner admitted to be afflicted with or materially manifesting in her marriage as an obvious refusal, if not neglect, to perform her marital obligations.

• Mootness of the Certiorari Petition: Petitioner contended that respondent’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA had been mooted and overtaken by the proceedings in the trial court, where the RTC ordered the petition for declaration of nullity submitted for decision after respondent had submitted his own controverting evidence and rested his case.
• Sufficiency of the Totality of Evidence: Petitioner argued that, contrary to the CA’s ruling, which was based only on the evidence presented at the time of the demurrer, the totality of evidence she presented was not patently lacking and satisfactorily supported the case for declaration of nullity of marriage, and was not effectively controverted by respondent’s own evidence.
• Primacy of the Trial Court on Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner maintained that the presence or absence of psychological incapacity is a factual matter requiring examination and determination of the totality of evidence, and that the trial court should have primacy in that determination.
• Admissions in the Original Answer: Petitioner contended that respondent admitted the allegations in the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in his original Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner asserted that the CA had no factual and legal basis to rule that her Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that petitioner’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which supposedly rendered her psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, was not supported by clear evidence.
• No Psychological Incapacity: Respondent contended that petitioner was not suffering from psychological incapacity and a personality disorder; her problem was behavioral, in that she had difficulty adjusting to married life and dealing with his relatives, especially his mother.
• Property Ownership: Respondent claimed that the properties petitioner sought to include in the absolute community were not community property but were merely held by him in trust for his siblings and relatives, and that petitioner had executed an attestation admitting that the properties were owned by his siblings and other relatives.
• Desire for Reconciliation: Respondent denied the material allegations of the Petition and stated that he offered his love and affection for petitioner and desired reconciliation to save the marriage in the spirit of love, forgiveness, and Christian values on marriage.
• Capacity to Perform Marital Obligations: Respondent maintained that petitioner’s documentary and testimonial evidence proved that she was fully aware of and had performed the essential obligations of a married individual.

• Mootness of the Rule 65 Petition: Whether respondent’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA was rendered moot and academic by the RTC’s continuation of proceedings, including receipt of respondent’s controverting evidence and submission of the case for decision.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Psychological Incapacity: Whether the CA correctly held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence because petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Primacy of the Trial Court: Whether the determination of psychological incapacity is a factual matter requiring the trial court’s primacy in assessing the totality of evidence, such that the CA erred in reversing the denial of the demurrer.
• Judicial Admissions from the Original Answer: Whether respondent’s original Answer contained admissions that could establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity despite the filing of an Amended Answer.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time.

• Mootness of the Rule 65 Petition: No. A Rule 65 certiorari petition is an original action independent of the principal case and is not necessarily mooted by continuation of proceedings in the court of origin; the RTC’s observance of judicial courtesy did not render the CA petition moot.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Psychological Incapacity: No. The CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion in the RTC’s denial of the demurrer because petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to establish the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability required for psychological incapacity.
• Primacy of the Trial Court: The trial court was given primacy and denied the demurrer, but a demurrer to evidence only requires the court to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof; its denial may be corrected by certiorari upon grave abuse of discretion.
• Judicial Admissions from the Original Answer: No. The Amended Answer superseded the original Answer, and even if an admission existed, Article 48 of the Family Code prohibits a judgment based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Not reached. Having affirmed the CA on the main issue, the Court found no need to discuss the other assigned errors.

• Mootness of the Rule 65 Petition: A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action, independent from the principal action and not a part or continuation of the trial that produced the judgment complained of. Its principal office is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, a certiorari petition pending before a higher court does not necessarily become moot and academic by the continuation of proceedings in the court of origin. Section 7, Rule 65 provides that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, and the public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten days from filing absent such relief. Here, the RTC continued the trial and allowed the parties to complete their evidence, but it stopped short of rendering a decision even though the case had been submitted for resolution as early as July 1, 2015, following the rule on judicial courtesy. Judicial courtesy applies only where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund by the continuation of the lower court proceedings; it remains the exception rather than the rule. The RTC correctly adhered to it because the issue before the CA—whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence—would be rendered moot by the continuation of the proceedings. The CA petition was therefore not mooted.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Psychological Incapacity: A demurrer to evidence is an objection or exception by one party that the evidence produced by the adversary is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or support a verdict. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and shall not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion. While the general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a demurrer to evidence, an exception exists where the denial is attended by grave abuse of discretion, as recognized in Ong, et al. vs. People of the Philippines. Here, the RTC was given primacy and denied the demurrer, but the CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion because petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to show that she had the right to the relief she sought. Under Castillo vs. Rep. of the Phils., et al., psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage, and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Molina guidelines require, among others, that the root cause be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; that the incapacity exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage; and that it be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Expert opinion is not a condition sine qua non, but the totality of evidence must sustain the finding. The psychiatric report of Dr. Agnes S. Borre-Padilla devoted only one page to the purported Narcissistic Personality Disorder, contained an incomprehensible enumeration of manifestations without detailed factual narration, and mainly relied on petitioner’s own accounts; no psychological testing was conducted. This was the kind of credibility or reliability gap condemned in Suazo vs. Suazo. The OSG also observed that no other competent and credible proof showed that the disorder was grave enough to bring about disability or that it was permanent or clinically incurable. Petitioner’s own evidence showed the opposite: she was concerned about the decrease in sexual activity, wanted to have a baby and understood procreation as a purpose of marriage, made adjustments and sacrifices when respondent’s finances dwindled, and helped manage their finances and household. These acts demonstrated full knowledge and performance of essential marital obligations. Her disappointment and disillusionment were not sufficient grounds for nullity.

• Primacy of the Trial Court: Petitioner insisted that psychological incapacity is a factual matter requiring the trial court’s primacy in evaluating the totality of evidence. The RTC was in fact given the opportunity and primacy to determine the merits of the demurrer and ruled in petitioner’s favor by denying it. However, in a demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the case. The trial court’s denial is not insulated from review where it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The CA therefore did not err in reversing the denial upon finding that petitioner’s evidence was patently insufficient.

• Judicial Admissions from the Original Answer: Respondent’s original Answer was amended. The rule is that pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings, and cease to be judicial admissions; where an amended answer is complete in itself, it supersedes the original answer, which no longer remains part of the record. Even if respondent had admitted that petitioner was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, such admission could not be used as basis for judgment because Article 48 of the Family Code provides that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. Petitioner still had to prove the nullity of the marriage by evidence other than such admission, and she failed to do so.

• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Having ruled that the CA did not err in reversing and setting aside the June 20, 2013 Order of the RTC and in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property, the Court found no need to discuss the other assigned errors, including the alleged error on the timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36, Family Code — Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage. It must be characterized by (a) gravity, meaning the party is incapable of carrying out ordinary marital duties; (b) juridical antecedence, meaning the incapacity is rooted in the party’s history before the marriage, even if manifestations emerge later; and (c) incurability, meaning the illness is incurable or the cure is beyond the party’s means. The Court applied these requisites and found petitioner’s evidence insufficient.

• Molina Guidelines — In Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid down definitive guidelines for psychological incapacity cases: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff, and doubts are resolved in favor of the marriage; (2) the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, proven by experts, and explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must exist at the time of the marriage’s celebration; (4) it must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) it must be grave enough to disable the party from assuming essential marital obligations; (6) the essential marital obligations are those in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code; (7) interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines should be given great respect; and (8) the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. The Court used these guidelines to assess and reject petitioner’s evidence.

• Expert Opinion in Nullity Cases — Expert opinions are highly advisable but are not conditions sine qua non for a declaration of nullity; if the totality of evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, actual medical or psychological examination need not be resorted to. However, the expert report must have adequate factual and clinical basis. The Court found Dr. Padilla’s report deficient because it devoted only one page to the alleged disorder, lacked detailed factual narration, relied mainly on petitioner’s accounts, and did not conduct psychological testing.

• Demurrer to Evidence — A demurrer to evidence is an objection or exception that the adversary’s evidence is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof. The grant or denial is left to the trial court’s sound discretion and shall not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the CA’s finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the demurrer.

• Certiorari under Rule 65 as an Independent Action — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action, independent from the principal action and not a part or continuation of the trial that produced the judgment complained of. It is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A certiorari petition pending before a higher court does not necessarily become moot by the continuation of proceedings in the court of origin. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioner’s mootness argument.

• Judicial Courtesy — A lower court may suspend proceedings despite the absence of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund by the continuation of the lower court proceedings. Judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule. The Court found that the RTC correctly observed judicial courtesy by continuing trial but not rendering a decision while the CA certiorari petition was pending.

• Amended Pleadings Supersede Original Pleadings — Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings, and cease to be judicial admissions. Where an amended answer is complete in itself, it supersedes the original answer, which no longer remains part of the record. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner’s reliance on respondent’s original Answer.

• Article 48, Family Code — No Judgment Based on Stipulation or Confession — In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. Even if respondent had admitted petitioner’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder, petitioner still had to prove nullity by evidence other than such admission. The Court found she failed to do so.

• Marriage as an Inviolable Institution; Burden of Proof on Plaintiff — The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time of celebration, the Court must uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. The Court applied this doctrine in denying the petition.

• "Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." — This passage states the canonical requisites of psychological incapacity under Article 36 and supplies the standard against which petitioner’s evidence was measured.

• "A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.'" — This definition anchors the Court’s ruling that the RTC was only required to ascertain whether there was competent or sufficient proof, and that its contrary finding amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

• "It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an original action, independent from the principal action, and not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of." — This passage is the ratio for rejecting petitioner’s claim that the CA certiorari petition was mooted by the RTC’s continuation of trial.

• "An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves." — This passage encapsulates the Court’s policy-driven conclusion that marital disappointment and irreconcilable differences do not constitute psychological incapacity.

• Ong, et al. vs. People of the Philippines, 396 Phil. 546 (2000) — Recognized the exception that a denial of a demurrer to evidence may be assailed through certiorari where attended by grave abuse of discretion; applied to justify the CA’s review.
• Tadeo vs. People, 300 SCRA 744 (1998) — Stated the general rule that denial of a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory, not appealable, and not subject to certiorari absent grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction.
• Cruz vs. People, 303 SCRA 533 (1999) — Held that the general rule against certiorari may be excepted when the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Gutib vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 365 (1999) — Declared that denial of a motion to dismiss tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed on certiorari.
• Castillo vs. Rep. of the Phils., et al., 805 Phil. 209 (2017) — Reiterated that psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina — Laid down the definitive guidelines in psychological incapacity cases; citation not provided in the text.
• Ting vs. Velez-Ting — Held that expert opinions are highly advisable but not conditions sine qua non in nullity cases, and that the totality of evidence may suffice; citation not provided in the text.
• Suazo vs. Suazo — Condemned credibility or reliability gaps in expert opinion evidence and held that a methodology lacking depth and comprehensiveness cannot support a finding of psychological incapacity; citation not provided in the text.
• Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387 (1988) — Explained the principle of judicial courtesy, under which a lower court should refrain from ruling on a matter pending before a higher court.
• Go vs. Judge Abrogar, 446 Phil. 227 (2003) — Qualified and limited judicial courtesy to cases where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot by continuation of the lower court proceedings.
• Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil. 804 (2006) — Further held that judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule, to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65.
• Yasuda vs. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 594 (2000) — Held that a special civil action for certiorari is an original action, independent from the principal action and not a continuation of the trial.
• Sps. Diaz vs. Diaz, 387 Phil. 314 (2000) — Held that a petition for certiorari pending before a higher court does not necessarily become moot and academic by continuation of proceedings in the court of origin.
• Choa vs. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002) — Defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection that the adversary’s evidence is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or sustain the issue.
• Te vs. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 127 (2000) — Held that the grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and shall not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 28 (2000) — Held that pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings, and cease to be judicial admissions.
• Reynes vs. Compañia General de Tabacos, 21 Phil. 416 (1912) — Held that where an amended answer is complete in itself, it supersedes the original answer, which no longer remains part of the record.
• So vs. Valera, 606 Phil. 309 (2009) — Held that being tired of one’s situation or giving up on one’s spouse is not necessarily a sign of psychological illness, and falling out of love cannot be so labeled.
• Alcazar vs. Alcazar, 618 Phil. 616 (2009) — Held that Article 36 of the Family Code is not a divorce law and that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity.
• Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin, et al., 754 Phil. 158 (2015) — Held that the burden of proof in nullity cases lies with the plaintiff and that the indissolubility of the marital tie must be upheld absent clear evidence of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time of marriage.
• Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank, et al., 575 Phil. 384 (2008) — Explained that certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited in Alcazar vs. Alcazar for the principle that irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides the ground of psychological incapacity for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court construed it strictly and held that petitioner failed to prove the required gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
• Article 48, Family Code — Provides that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The Court applied it to hold that even an admission by respondent could not substitute for petitioner’s evidence.
• Articles 68 to 71, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations of husband and wife. The Court referenced these provisions through the Molina guidelines in assessing whether petitioner’s alleged disorder disabled her from performing those obligations.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Define parental obligations and are included among the essential marital obligations under the Molina guidelines. The Court referenced them in the same framework.
• Section 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, and that the public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten days from filing absent such relief. The Court applied it in discussing the RTC’s continuation of trial and its observance of judicial courtesy.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action for certiorari as an original action to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court used it to reject petitioner’s mootness argument.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari. It was the procedural vehicle for petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court.
• Constitution (family protection policy) — The Court invoked the constitutional policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage as an inviolable institution. No specific article was identified in the text.

Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang, JJ., concur. Carandang, J., was designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.