Go vs. National Police Commission

Summary dismissal of an INP member without formal investigation is valid only if the respondent is first furnished a copy of the written complaint with supporting sworn statements and given a reasonable opportunity to answer. The dispensing with formal investigation refers only to direct examination of witnesses, not to the twin minimum requirements of notice of charges and chance to defend, without which the dismissal denies due process.

Pat. Edgar M. Go had served as a member of the Olongapo City Police Department since April 18, 1974. Respondent National Police Commission was the appellate disciplinary authority over members of the Integrated National Police. At the time, P.D. No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1707, authorized summary dismissal without formal investigation when the charge was serious and the evidence strong, implemented by NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circulars requiring service of the complaint and opportunity to answer.

Pat. Edgar M. Go had been a member of the Olongapo City Police Department since April 18, 1974. According to the Summary Dismissal Board, on January 21, 1983 at about 9:00 in the evening, a team of military personnel led by Lieutenant Paterno Ding raided petitioner's house at No. 28 Murphy St., Pag-asa, Olongapo City and apprehended fifteen persons inside, including his wife Minda Go, confiscating P1,000.00, assorted papelitos, a ballpen and a calculator allegedly used in the operation of jai-alai bookies. A second raid was allegedly conducted on June 16, 1983, with Major Jaime Garcia, Deputy Commander of the Olongapo Metrodiscom Command, reporting in writing that petitioner together with his brother Lolito Go were involved in jai-alai bookies committed in petitioner's residence, with Rodolfo Ablaza and Rolando dela Fuente allegedly admitting they were collectors of petitioner and Lolito Go.

The board further found that after the first raid a criminal complaint had been filed before the City Court of Olongapo City against petitioner's wife and brother, but petitioner approached the Metropolitan Commander to seek dismissal of the case with the promise that jai-alai activities in his residence would stop once and for all, and the fiscal later dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence for failure of the raiding team to prosecute. When the second raid was conducted, illegal jai-alai activities were allegedly still ongoing in the residence. The board stated that despite several notices petitioner failed to appear to refute the charges, that hearings were postponed for four months to allow him and his witnesses to appear, and that his non-appearance was deemed a waiver, leading to a finding that it would be inconceivable that petitioner, a policeman, would not know what was going on inside his own residence.

Petitioner, for his part, asserted denial of due process. He claimed no copy of the complaint with supporting affidavits was served as required by NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 81-01 and that he was simply ordered by radio to appear. He alleged he attended on May 9, 1983 but neither complainant nor witnesses were present and Chairman Colonel Cinco advised him to secure counsel; that the hearing on September 6 or 9, 1983 was unattended by board members, complainant and witnesses; that the September 21, 1983 hearing was postponed for absence of board members; and that he was not notified of an alleged October 19, 1983 hearing and heard nothing until informed of his dismissal, receiving a copy of the decision only on February 20, 1984. He maintained that cross-examination would have shown Ablaza and dela Fuente later executed affidavits saying they were misled into signing prior statements, invoked his 11 years of service and awards, and argued dismissal should have taken effect only on February 20, 1984, praying exoneration, reinstatement with back salaries, and other relief.

• Lack of Written Charges and Supporting Affidavits: Petitioner maintained that he was not served written charges with supporting affidavits and informed of their nature as required by NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 81-01, but was merely ordered by radio to appear before the summary dismissal board.
• Absence of Hearing and Opportunity to Be Heard: Petitioner argued that no hearing was actually held and he was not heard, recounting three appearances where complainant, witnesses, or board members were absent and non-notification of the alleged October 19, 1983 hearing, and that cross-examination would have exposed retractions by Ablaza and dela Fuente who said they were misled into signing prior statements.
• Effectivity of Dismissal and Reinstatement: Petitioner argued that in any event dismissal should have taken effect only upon receipt of the decision on February 20, 1984 and not on December 16, 1983, citing 11 years of service and awards and praying exoneration, reinstatement with back salaries from dismissal to reinstatement, and other relief.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Participation: Respondent countered through the NAPOLCOM decision that operation of jai-alai bookies in petitioner's occupied house, apprehension of his wife and brother in two successive raids, and his intercession for dismissal of the resulting case were tangible proofs he was an accessory if not a principal in the gambling operation.
• Compliance with Due Process and Ex Parte Proceedings: Respondent countered that petitioner was not deprived of due process because the board sent notices on several occasions requiring appearance and presentation of evidence which he ignored, prompting ex parte investigation.
• Knowledge Imputed from Appearance: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that petitioner could not have failed to inquire what the charges were because he admits he appeared before the board as ordered.

• Due Process – Written Notice and Opportunity to Answer: Whether summary dismissal without furnishing petitioner a copy of the written complaint with sworn statements and supporting documents and without giving him reasonable opportunity to answer violates due process despite authorization for dismissal without formal investigation when the charge is serious and evidence is strong.
• Due Process – Hearing on Disclosed Evidence: Whether petitioner was denied the right to be heard where the board's decision rested on an undisclosed report and unwritten testimonies not contained in the record and where no hearing with opportunity to confront witnesses was shown.

• Due Process – Written Notice and Opportunity to Answer: Yes. Dismissal without service of written charges with supporting affidavits and without reasonable opportunity to answer violates the minimum requirements of due process and cannot be justified by seriousness of charge and strength of evidence.
• Due Process – Hearing on Disclosed Evidence: Yes. Denial of hearing was established, the decision not having been rendered on evidence contained in the record and disclosed to petitioner and no effective hearing or subsequent cure having been shown.

• Due Process – Written Notice and Opportunity to Answer: While Section 8-A authorizes summary dismissal without formal investigation when the charge is serious and evidence is strong, the Decree and implementing rules still require furnishing respondent a copy of the complaint with sworn statements and notification to submit counter-statements, and requiring answer within three days before ex parte investigation. Construed in light of Government Service and Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals on an analogous civil service provision, the statute cannot dispense with informing the employee of charges by furnishing a copy thereof and affording reasonable opportunity to present defenses and evidence. Here the INP record transmitted to the Court showed no formal complaint or supporting affidavits, and neither the board, Director General, nor NAPOLCOM decisions referred to any such complaint, with petitioner's assignment of error receiving only passing mention or mere rehash without effort to address it.
• Due Process – Hearing on Disclosed Evidence: What the board did was simply receive a report on the two raids and alleged admissions, yet the report if in writing was not in the transmitted record and the decision disclosed no basis for the supposed report, repeatedly stating only investigation reveals and further discovered during investigation, indicating reliance on findings of some other group rather than its own investigation. This violated the administrative due process rule that the decision must be rendered on evidence in the record disclosed to the party affected. Petitioner's thrice-appearance claim was never specifically denied beyond saying it was belied by the record, with nothing in the INP record to show a hearing, and the Solicitor General's imputed-knowledge argument failed because details and alleged witness statements were never in the record. Subsequent appeal could not cure the defect where charges and evidence were not in the record, petitioner's submission of retraction affidavits having been possible only because the board decision mentioned the witnesses, and seriousness of charge and superior's view of strong evidence could not compensate for the procedural shortcut.

• Minimum requirements of due process in summary dismissal — The filing of charges and allowance of reasonable opportunity to answer constitute the minimum requirements of due process that a statute cannot dispense with. Applied here, P.D. No. 971 as amended by P.D. No. 1707, though permitting removal without formal investigation when the charge is serious and evidence strong, was construed to still require furnishing a copy of charges and opportunity to defend, following Government Service and Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals.
• Scope of dispensed formal investigation — In summary dismissal proceedings, the formal investigation dispensed with refers to presentation of witnesses by direct examination, not to notification of charges and chance to defend. Applied here, written specification of charges with attached supporting affidavits was held mandatory because they take the place of direct examination and are the only means to bring adverse evidence to respondent's knowledge absent other fully effective means.
• Decision on evidence of record disclosed to party — In administrative proceedings the decision must be rendered on evidence contained in the record and disclosed to the party affected, per Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations. Applied here, reliance on an undisclosed raid report and untaken or unrecorded witness statements violated this rule and left petitioner with no way to defend himself.
• Cure by subsequent reconsideration — Denial of initial hearing may be satisfied by subsequent motion for reconsideration only if charges and evidence are set forth in the record. Applied here, petitioner's appeals did not cure the defect because the complaint, affidavits, and raid report were absent from the INP record.

• "The filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the charges constitute the minimum requirements of due process." — States the controlling due process floor applied to save summary-dismissal authority from unconstitutionality and to void petitioner's dismissal.
• "In summary dismissal proceedings, unless other fully effective means for implementing the constitutional requirement of notice and hearing are devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge." — Defines the mandatory written-notice requirement that replaces direct examination in summary proceedings.
• "the decision must be rendered on the evidence contained in the record and disclosed to the party affected." — Recites the Ang Tibay rule violated when the board relied on an undisclosed investigation and unrecorded testimonies.
• "It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment." — Explains why seriousness of charge and claimed strength of evidence cannot compensate for procedural shortcut in police cleanup.

• Government Service and Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 661 (1991) — Followed as controlling analogy; construed Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 authorizing summary dismissal without formal investigation to still require notice of charges and reasonable opportunity to defend, saving it from unconstitutionality.
• Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635, 643 (1940) — Applied for the cardinal administrative due process requirement that decision be based on evidence of record disclosed to the affected party, which the board violated.
• Saint Thomas Aquinas Academy vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-12297, April 22, 1959; Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977); Rubenecia vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 640 (1995) — Cited for the proposition that subsequent reconsideration may satisfy hearing requirements, but distinguished as inapplicable where charges and evidence were not in the record.

• Section 8-A, P.D. No. 971 as amended by P.D. No. 1707 — Authorizes summary dismissal without necessity of formal investigation when charge is serious and evidence is strong; construed to still preserve rights to copy of complaint and to answer within three days.
• Section 5(b), Memorandum Circular No. 6, Sept. 15, 1980 — Requires hearing officer or INP Director to furnish respondent copy of complaint with sworn statements and notify him to submit sworn counter-statements or evidence, otherwise recommend summary removal on evidence on hand; held uncomplied with.
• Section 2, Memorandum Circular No. 81-01, Sept. 18, 1981 — Requires furnishing respondent copy of complaint or charges with three days to answer with supporting documents, failing which authority shall conduct ex parte investigation; held uncomplied with as no complaint or affidavits appeared in record.
• Section 40, P.D. No. 807 — Civil service provision similarly allowing summary dismissal without formal investigation when charge serious and evidence strong; discussed through cited jurisprudence to establish twin minimum rights applicable by analogy.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.