Go vs. Echavez

A final and executory judgment becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law, unless it falls under specific exceptions: (1) correction of clerical errors; (2) making of nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice; (3) attack against a void judgment; or (4) supervening events rendering execution unjust and inequitable. A judgment dismissing a complaint against a defendant while awarding that defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff does not contain conflicting rulings where the causes of action are independent, and the counterclaim is permissive rather than compulsory.

Karen Go, doing business as Kargo Enterprises, entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase with Nick Carandang, manager of her General Santos City Branch, over a Fuso Dropside Truck. The contract prohibited assignment of rights to third persons. When Carandang defaulted on payments and sold the truck to Lamberto Echavez instead of returning it, Go filed a Complaint for Replevin against Carandang and John Doe. The truck was seized from Echavez, who claimed to be a buyer in good faith and filed a counterclaim for actual damages based on unrealized income.

• Karen Go, engaged in business as Kargo Enterprises, appointed Nick Carandang as Manager of its General Santos City Branch.
• On December 20, 1996, Kargo Enterprises and Carandang executed a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase over a Fuso Dropside Truck, stipulating five equal monthly installments of P78,710.75 and prohibiting assignment of rights to third persons.
• Carandang failed to pay the installments and, instead of returning the truck, sold it to Lamberto Echavez without Go's knowledge or consent.
• On April 30, 1997, Go filed a Complaint for Replevin against Carandang and John Doe before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-271.
• On May 17, 1997, the sheriff seized the truck from Echavez pursuant to the Writ of Replevin.
• On August 5, 1997, Echavez filed his Answer with Cross-Claim and Counterclaim, alleging he purchased the truck in good faith and for value through Carandang, and claiming actual damages of P10,000.00 per week for unrealized income from his business from the date of seizure.
• Carandang was declared in default for failure to file an answer despite receipt of summons.
• On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against Echavez, ruling that Echavez was a buyer in good faith and that Go was estopped from denying Carandang's authority to sell, and awarding damages to Echavez including P10,000.00 per week as actual damages from May 17, 1997.
• On April 17, 2000, the RTC modified the judgment to hold Carandang liable to Go for the truck's value plus damages, but preserved the award of damages to Echavez.
• On May 5, 2000, pending appeal, Go delivered another truck to Echavez as substitute for the seized vehicle pursuant to partial execution of the judgment.
• On June 4, 2002, the CA dismissed Go's appeal (CA-G.R. No. CV-68814) for failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the appellant's brief; the dismissal became final on June 19, 2002.
• On April 8, 2003, Echavez moved for execution of the RTC judgment, prompting Go to file a Motion for Clarification arguing that the P10,000.00 weekly award was excessive, speculative, and would result in unjust enrichment.

• The February 11, 2000 Judgment, as modified by the April 17, 2000 Order, contains materially conflicting rulings because it simultaneously held Carandang liable for breach of the lease contract (thereby upholding the prohibition on assignment) and awarded Echavez's counterclaim (thereby recognizing the validity of the sale to Echavez), rendering the judgment unenforceable without clarification.
• The award of P10,000.00 per week as actual damages from May 17, 1997 is inequitable and speculative, assumes the truck was continually hired without maintenance for nearly three years, and will result in unjust enrichment of Echavez since the total amount would roughly be P1,600,000.00, more than double the truck's value.
• The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Execution on a judgment that is allegedly vague and contains conflicting rulings.
• The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion.

• The RTC Judgment does not contain materially conflicting rulings; the complaint against Carandang (based on the lease contract) is separate and independent from the complaint against Echavez (as possessor of the truck) and from Echavez's counterclaim against Go.
• The petition seeks an impermissible "recalibration" of the RTC's findings of fact and law, which is not allowed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
• The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
• The judgment became final and executory, and the award of damages was specifically prayed for and proven by evidence during trial, hence cannot be modified.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting execution and denying the Motion for Clarification.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the February 11, 2000 Judgment, as modified by the April 17, 2000 Order, contains materially conflicting rulings that render it unenforceable.
  • Whether the award of actual damages of P10,000.00 per week can still be modified after the judgment has become final and executory.

• Procedural:
  • The Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution because the judgment had become final and executory, and the execution of a final and executory judgment is a matter of right. The RTC also did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Clarification where the judgment was clear and the relief sought would effectively modify the final judgment.
• Substantive:
  • The Judgment does not contain materially conflicting rulings. The RTC recognized four independent causes of action: (1) Go's complaint against Carandang based on the lease contract; (2) Go's complaint against Echavez as possessor; (3) Echavez's counterclaim against Go; and (4) Echavez's cross-claim against Carandang. The dismissal of the complaint against Echavez while awarding his counterclaim against Go are not incompatible because the counterclaim is permissive, not compulsory; had Go's complaint against Echavez been sustained (establishing her right to possession), then awarding the counterclaim would have been contradictory.
  • The award of actual damages can no longer be modified. The judgment became final and immutable on June 19, 2002. The exceptions to immutability do not apply: (1) it is not a clerical error because the award was deliberately prayed for and proven; (2) it is not a nunc pro tunc entry because the requested modification would supply new findings of fact not included in the original judgment and would prejudice Echavez's vested rights; (3) the judgment is not void as it complies with all requisites of a valid decision and due process; and (4) there are no supervening events altering the parties' situation to render execution inequitable, as the delivery of a replacement truck did not compensate for the unrealized income from the date of seizure.

• Immutability and Inalterability of Final Judgments — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted by the court that rendered it or by the highest Court of the land.
• Exceptions to Immutability of Judgments — A final judgment may only be altered under four recognized exceptions: (1) correction of clerical errors (mistakes due to inadvertence or negligence in failing to correctly represent the court's decision); (2) making of nunc pro tunc entries (to record an act performed but omitted from the record, causing no prejudice); (3) collateral attack against a void judgment (which has no legal effect and is susceptible to attack at any time, provided the judgment is utterly void upon its face); and (4) supervening events (circumstances transpiring after finality rendering execution unjust, which must alter the parties' situation and be established by competent evidence).
• Independent Causes of Action in a Single Case — Where multiple defendants are sued under different theories (e.g., one based on contract, another based on possession), and a counterclaim is filed, these constitute independent causes of action. The dismissal of the main complaint against one defendant does not preclude the grant of that defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff where the counterclaim is permissive and arises from different facts.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — The capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of jurisdiction in a manner contrary to law and jurisprudence, which was not present in the RTC's execution of a final judgment and denial of a motion seeking impermissible modification.

• "To 'clarify' is to free the mind of confusion, doubt or uncertainty, or to make something understandable."
• "A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not divest rights and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally worthless."
• "A void judgment or order is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
• "It is not enough for the party seeking the nullity to show a mistaken or erroneous decision; he must show to the court that the judgment complained of is utterly void."
• "Considering that the judgment is already final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted by the court that rendered it or by the highest Court of [the] land."

• Navarro v. Metrobank — Cited for the principle that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
• Abrigo v. Flores — Cited for enumerating the four exceptions to the immutability of judgments: correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, attack against void judgments, and supervening events.
• Reyes, et al. v. Datu — Cited for the requirement that to collaterally attack a void judgment, the party must show that the judgment is utterly void upon its face, not merely mistaken or erroneous.
• El Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca — Cited for the characterization of void judgments as "lawless things" that can be treated as outlaws and slain at sight.
• Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals and Mocorro v. Ramirez — Cited for the definition and scope of nunc pro tunc entries, which are intended to make the record speak the truth but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken.
• FGU Insurance Corp. v. Sarmiento Trucking, Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and Candelario v. Caizares — Cited for the doctrine on supervening events as an exception to immutability, requiring circumstances that render execution unjust and inequitable, established by competent evidence.
• Nunal v. CA — Cited for the rule that a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect.
• National Power Corporation v. CA — Cited by the RTC in its original judgment as basis for the award of damages.

• Constitution, Article VIII, Section 14 — Requires that no decision shall be rendered without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, cited as a requisite for a valid judgment.
• Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 1 — Defines parties, stating that the term "plaintiff" may refer to the counterclaimant and "defendant" may refer to the defendant in a counterclaim.
• Rules of Court, Rule 6, Section 6 — Defines counterclaim as any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
• Rules of Court, Rule 36, Section 1 — Mandates that judgments determining the merits of the case must be in writing, personally prepared by the judge, stating clearly the facts and law, signed, and filed with the clerk.
• Rules of Court, Rule 36, Section 2 — Provides that if no appeal is filed within the prescribed time, the judgment becomes final and shall be entered in the book of entries of judgments.
• Rules of Court, Rule 50, Section 1 — Governs the dismissal of appeals for failure to file required briefs or documents.

• Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ. — Joined the majority opinion without separate concurring opinions.