Primary Holding
A judge is not liable for gross ignorance of the law where dismissal of an appeal taken out of time and execution of the judgment were authorized by the Rules and were unaccompanied by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. The assailed orders were found consistent with existing law and jurisprudence, with any error at most a good-faith clerical inaccuracy insufficient for administrative sanction.
Background
Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko, doing business under the names Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, Noah's Ark Sugar Holdings, Noah's Ark Merchandising, and Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, were defendants in Civil Case No. 98-791 for a sum of money filed by International Exchange Bank before RTC-Br. 150, Makati City, presided over by respondent Judge Zeus C. Abrogar. Atty. Gregorio D. Cañeda Jr. acted as Go's lawyer of record. The underlying judgment held Go solidarily liable with Looyuko for the unpaid principal obligation with interest, penalty, and costs.
History
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RTC-Br. 150, Makati City, 7 October 1999 — rendered Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 holding Go solidarily liable with Looyuko for P96,000,000.00 plus 12% penalty per annum and costs
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RTC-Br. 150, 17 December 1999 — denied Go's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for lack of merit
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RTC-Br. 150, 8 February 2000 — dismissed Go's notice of appeal for having been taken out of time
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RTC-Br. 150, 14 February 2000 — ordered issuance of writ of execution to implement the 7 October 1999 Decision
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Court of Appeals, 15 May 2000 — promulgated Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 denying Go's petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition and affirming in toto respondent Judge's orders
Facts
Complainant Jimmy T. Go received copy of the 7 October 1999 Decision in Civil Case No. 98-791 on 20 October 1999. On 5 November 1999 he moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, which respondent Judge denied on 17 December 1999 for lack of merit. On 3 January 2000 plaintiff International Exchange Bank moved for execution against Go, alleging that the fifteen-day reglementary period to perfect appeal had already expired on 4 November 1999, a day before the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed. On 5 January 2000 Go filed his notice of appeal and opposed the motion for execution. In the meantime, co-defendant Alberto T. Looyuko, who had appealed on 4 November 1999, withdrew his notice of appeal on 8 February 2000 prior to transmittal of the original record to the Court of Appeals and expressed conformity to execution against his properties.
On 8 February 2000 respondent Judge dismissed Go's appeal for having been taken out of time, finding that copy of the Decision was served on Go's counsel of record on 20 October 1999 and that the period to appeal expired on 4 November 1999, rendering the 5 November 1999 motion a day late. On 14 February 2000 respondent Judge ordered issuance of a writ of execution to implement the Decision against the goods and chattels of the defendants and, in case of insufficiency, against their real property for sale as provided by law. Pursuant thereto, 81,566 shares in China Banking Corporation registered in the name of Alberto T. Looyuko were levied upon, and on 15 February 2000 Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora issued a notice of sale scheduling public auction on 21 February 2000.
On 18 February 2000 Go moved to quash the writ on the ground that the Decision was not final and executory as to him and that the writ issued without hearing, but set the hearing for 3 March 2000, fourteen days after filing. Complainants also filed a third-party adverse claim under Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure over one-half of the 81,566 shares calendared for sale. The sale on execution proceeded as scheduled with plaintiff bank buying the shares for P64,000,000.00. Atty. Cañeda, as new counsel, did not attend the 3 March 2000 hearing on the motion to quash; respondent Judge reset it to 8 March 2000, but on 7 March 2000 complainants filed a Manifestation seeking cancellation of the hearing as moot in view of the completed sale.
While the third-party claim and motion to quash were pending, complainants filed a complaint for annulment of the auction sale with damages and injunction with RTC-Br. 154, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 67806. On 4 March 2000 they also filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57572, assailing the writ of execution and the orders denying reconsideration and/or new trial, dismissing the notice of appeal, and authorizing execution. On 19 April 2000 respondent Judge issued a second writ directing levy on Go's properties to satisfy the Decision in full. On 15 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the assailed orders, notably the final and executory character of the Decision and the validity of the writ, with the motion for reconsideration said to be still pending. In his Comment, respondent Judge asserted that the 14 February 2000 writ was intended only against Looyuko, who had withdrawn his appeal, and that the reference to defendants instead of defendant was a clerical mistake.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Authority to Dismiss Appeal and Order Execution: Petitioner argued that respondent Judge did not possess authority to dismiss the appeal from the Decision nor to rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the same being reserved to the Court of Appeals.
- Non-Finality and Judicial Courtesy: Petitioner maintained that the judgment against Go was not yet final and executory in view of the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition assailing dismissal of the appeal, invoking the principle of judicial courtesy as explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals and Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.
- Reliance on Sheriff: Petitioner argued that respondent Judge was incompetent for merely relying upon the opinion of Deputy Sheriff Renato Flora in giving the go-signal to proceed with the auction sale of Go's supposed properties.
- Refusal to Postpone Sale: Petitioner maintained that respondent Judge should have postponed the auction sale despite the pendency of the motion to quash the writ of execution and the third-party adverse claim.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Writ Directed Only Against Co-Defendant: Respondent countered that the 14 February 2000 writ of execution was directed only against defendant Alberto T. Looyuko, who had withdrawn his notice of appeal and acquiesced to execution against his properties.
- Clerical Error: Respondent argued that the reference of the writ to defendants was a mere clerical mistake for defendant that was not corrected when issued, made in good faith.
- Scope of Levy: Respondent maintained that as intended, the writ was enforced to cover only the 81,566 shares registered in the name of Looyuko, not any property of complainant Go.
- Affirmance by Appellate Court: Respondent argued that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 affirming in toto the assailed orders absolved him of the charge.
Issues
- Authority to Dismiss Appeal: Whether respondent Judge possessed authority to dismiss Go's appeal for having been taken out of time prior to transmittal of records to the appellate court.
- Finality and Execution: Whether respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law in treating the Decision as final and executory and issuing the writs of execution.
- Judicial Courtesy: Whether the principle of judicial courtesy barred respondent Judge from authorizing execution and issuing the writs, particularly the second writ of 19 April 2000.
- Competence and Reliance on Sheriff: Whether respondent Judge displayed incompetence by allegedly relying on the opinion of the deputy sheriff to proceed with the auction sale.
- Effect of Terceria and Motion to Quash: Whether the filing of a third-party adverse claim under Sec. 16, Rule 39 and a motion to quash required postponement of the scheduled auction sale.
Ruling
- Authority to Dismiss Appeal: Yes. Dismissal was authorized under Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prior to transmittal of the original record, and was made on 8 February 2000 within the period reserved by the rules.
- Finality and Execution: No violation was committed. The judgment was already final and executory when execution was authorized, the appeal having been dismissed on 8 February 2000 before the 14 February 2000 order and writ and the 21 February 2000 sale, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
- Judicial Courtesy: No. Judicial courtesy did not bar execution because no petition was pending when execution was authorized, and Sec. 7, Rule 65 provides a petition does not interrupt the principal case absent a restraining order or injunction.
- Competence and Reliance on Sheriff: No. No substantial evidence proved incompetence or dependence on the sheriff's advice, the transcripts showing only expected coordination, and seeking non-confidential staff input is recommendatory only.
- Effect of Terceria and Motion to Quash: No stay was required. Complainants were not strangers or third persons entitled to terceria under Sec. 16, Rule 39, and the motion to quash raised unmeritorious grounds already resolved, delayed by complainants themselves.
Ruling Rationale
- Authority to Dismiss Appeal: Prior to transmittal of the original record to the appellate court, dismissal of an appeal taken out of time is expressly permitted under Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Applied here, service on Go's counsel on 20 October 1999 caused the appeal period to expire on 4 November 1999, making the 5 November 1999 motion for reconsideration and/or new trial a day late and the 5 January 2000 notice of appeal out of time. Dismissal on 8 February 2000 therefore fell within the trial court's retained authority.
- Finality and Execution: A judgment becomes subject to execution once the appeal therefrom is dismissed and no timely appeal remains. Because dismissal preceded the 14 February 2000 execution order and writ and the execution sale, authorization of execution was proper as far as respondent Judge was concerned. This conclusion was reinforced by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57572 affirming the final and executory character of the judgment and the validity of the assailed orders.
- Judicial Courtesy: Under Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued. Judicial courtesy applies only where there is strong probability that issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund by continuation below, per Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. Here, no petition was pending when execution processes were made available, the appellate petition having been filed only on 4 March 2000, and any ill-effects of the 19 April 2000 second writ were remediable by restitution or reparation under Sec. 5, Rule 39, with the appellate proceedings in fact uninterrupted.
- Competence and Reliance on Sheriff: Administrative liability requires proof, not bare allegation. The only evidence — transcripts of Sheriff Flora's testimony in Civil Case No. 67806 — revealed discussion and coordination on the execution sale inherent in their common duties, not ineptitude or surrender of decision-making. Even an effort to seek advice or opinion on a non-confidential matter from staff is recommendatory only, with final decision remaining the judge's prerogative, and thus not a badge of incompetence.
- Effect of Terceria and Motion to Quash: Sec. 16, Rule 39 remedies of terceria and independent vindication actions belong to strangers or third persons, defined as persons other than the judgment debtor or his agent. Go, as party-judgment debtor solidarily liable, had no standing; per Tillson vs. Court of Appeals, a party has no business filing a third-party claim over property in the same action, his remedy being to seek relief from the court against the sheriff's alleged errors. The quashal grounds — non-finality, lack of opportunity to oppose, and need for new trial on liability — were already resolved as unmeritorious and contradicted by the record showing several opportunities to contest execution, per Valenzona vs. Court of Appeals. Moreover, complainants set the supposedly urgent motion fourteen days after filing, postponed it seven more days, then cancelled it on one day's notice, evidencing lack of bona fide intent.
Doctrines
- Gross Ignorance of the Law — Liability requires that the judge's order or actuation in official duties be not only contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more importantly, attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, per Yasin vs. Felix. Applied here, absence of legal error and of fraud or dishonesty precluded liability, with good-faith clerical error insufficient for penalty.
- Dismissal of Appeal Before Transmittal of Records — Under Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court retains authority to dismiss an appeal taken out of time prior to transmittal of the original record to the appellate court. The dismissal of Go's late appeal was sustained on this basis.
- Non-Interruption by Certiorari Petition and Limited Judicial Courtesy — Under Sec. 7, Rule 65, a petition does not interrupt the principal case absent a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Judicial courtesy, as construed in Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, applies only where continuation below would render issues before the higher court moot and moribund, and does not indiscriminately bar execution.
- Restitution Upon Reversal of Executed Judgment — Under Sec. 5, Rule 39, where an executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may on motion order restitution or reparation as equity and justice warrant. This remedy negated the claim that the second writ would irreparably moot appellate review.
- Third-Party Claim Available Only to Strangers — Under Sec. 16, Rule 39, terceria and the companion independent action belong only to a stranger or third person, meaning any person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. A party to the action, such as solidarily liable defendant Go, lacks standing and must instead seek relief from the executing court against the sheriff's errors, excesses, or irregularities, following Tillson vs. Court of Appeals.
- Forum Shopping — Simultaneously pursuing substantially the same relief to set aside execution orders through a third-party claim, motion to quash, separate annulment and injunction action, and certiorari petition violates the rules against forum shopping. Complainants' multiple filings seeking reversal of the execution were condemned on this ground.
Key Excerpts
- "the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." — States the textual limit under Sec. 7, Rule 65 invoked to reject indiscriminate application of judicial courtesy to stay execution.
- "no business filing a third-party claim over property involved in that action and which he himself claims to belong to him." — Recalls the Tillson vs. Court of Appeals formulation denying a party-litigant standing to file terceria over property involved in his own case.
- "that the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but more importantly must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption." — Defines the elements of gross ignorance of the law whose non-proof compelled dismissal of the administrative complaint.
Precedents Cited
- Eternal Gardens Memorial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50054, 17 August 1988, 164 SCRA 421 — Cited by complainants for judicial courtesy and construed by the Court as applying only where continuation below would render higher-court issues moot and moribund; held inapplicable here.
- Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88705, 11 June 1992, 209 SCRA 738 — Cited by complainants alongside Eternal Gardens for judicial courtesy; rejected as basis to stay execution absent the required mootness probability and injunctive order.
- Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106858, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA 552; Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51283, 7 June 1989, 174 SCRA 145 — Followed to define stranger or third person under Sec. 16, Rule 39 as any person other than the judgment debtor or his agent, excluding Go.
- Tillson vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89870, 28 May 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 605 — Followed to hold that a party has no standing to file a third-party claim in the same action and must instead move in the executing court for relief from the sheriff's acts.
- Valenzona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106895, 10 September 1993, 226 SCRA 306 — Followed to reject quashal grounds already resolved as unmeritorious and insufficient to defer execution of a final decision.
- Yasin vs. Felix, A.M. No. RTJ-94-1167, 4 December 1995, 250 SCRA 545 — Controlling definition of gross ignorance of the law requiring bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in addition to legal error; non-fulfillment led to dismissal.
Provisions
- Sec. 13, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Authorizes the trial court to dismiss an appeal taken out of time before transmittal of the original record; applied to sustain dismissal of Go's late appeal on 8 February 2000.
- Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a certiorari petition does not interrupt the principal case absent a restraining order or preliminary injunction; applied to allow execution despite the later appellate petition.
- Sec. 16, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates remedies of a third person or stranger claiming levied property; held unavailable to Go as party-judgment debtor and misapplied through simultaneous annulment suit and terceria.
- Sec. 5, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Allows restitution or reparation upon reversal or annulment of an executed judgment; cited to show second writ's effects were remediable and would not moot appellate review.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred. No separate concurring reasoning of significance was set forth.