Go-Tan vs. Tan

Parents-in-law who conspire with the husband to commit acts of violence against the wife may be included as respondents in a petition for protective order under RA 9262, as the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC applies suppletorily to special laws pursuant to Section 47 of RA 9262 and Article 10 of the RPC.

The case involves a marital dispute where the wife sought protection from her husband and his parents (her parents-in-law) under the newly enacted RA 9262. The law was enacted to protect women and children from violence, defining specific relationships covered and providing for protective orders. The legal issue arose regarding the scope of "offenders" under the law—specifically whether the statutory enumeration of relationships in Section 3 excluded parents-in-law even if they allegedly participated in the abuse through conspiracy with the husband.

• Petitioner Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married on April 18, 1999, and had two female children: Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise.
• On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents).
• Petitioner alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004).
• Specific allegations included giving insufficient financial support, harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home, and repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally, and physically.
• The RTC granted the TPO on January 25, 2005.
• Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by RA 9262.
• On March 7, 2005, the RTC dismissed the case as to respondents, applying the rule "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" based on Section 3's enumeration of covered relationships (wife, former wife, sexual or dating relationship, common child).
• Petitioner filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the interests of substantial justice and due process.
• On July 11, 2005, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that to include respondents would be a strained interpretation of the law.

• RA 9262 must be understood in light of Section 47 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be applied suppletorily to RA 9262.
• Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving insufficient financial support, harassing and pressuring her to leave the family home, and repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally, and physically.
• Respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for the complete resolution of the case.
• The doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

• They are not covered by RA 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship, and parents-in-law are not included in this enumeration.
• Allegations regarding conspiracy require factual determination which cannot be done by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of RA 9262.
• Petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadens the provisions of RA 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim is an essential condition for the application of the law.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Supreme Court could properly consider the inclusion of respondents in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 given that conspiracy involves factual determinations, and whether respondents constitute indispensable or necessary parties.
• Substantive Issues: Whether parents-in-law may be included in a petition for the issuance of a protective order under RA 9262 despite not being enumerated in Section 3 as persons covered by the definition of "violence against women and their children."

• Procedural: The Court ruled that while conspiracy is an evidentiary matter that should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since the Court is not a trier of facts, the pure question of law regarding whether respondents may be included under RA 9262 through the application of the principle of conspiracy is properly justiciable. The Court declined to rule on whether respondents are actually indispensable or necessary parties as it would be an exercise in superfluity given the ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to RA 9262.
• Substantive: The Court granted the petition and reversed the RTC's dismissal of the case as to respondents. It held that while Section 3 defines violence against women as acts committed by specific persons related to the victim, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Section 47 of RA 9262 expressly provides for suppletory application of the RPC, and Article 10 of the RPC states that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provides the contrary. The Court cited precedents applying RPC provisions suppletorily to special laws where the latter were silent on particular matters. Additionally, Sections 5 and 8 of RA 9262 expressly recognize that acts of violence may be committed "personally or through another" or "directly or indirectly." Applying Section 4's mandate for liberal construction to promote protection of victims, the Court rejected the RTC's strict application of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" as merely an ancillary rule of statutory construction that should not defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.

• Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code — Under Section 47 of RA 9262 and Article 10 of the RPC, general provisions of the RPC may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws where the special law is silent on a particular matter. The Court applied this to allow the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to apply to RA 9262.
• Conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC — When conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each becomes secondary, since all conspirators are principals.
• Liberal Construction of Protective Laws — Section 4 of RA 9262 mandates that the Act be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. Legislative intent must be effectuated by the courts to attain the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit.
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The maxim that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is merely an ancillary rule of statutory construction, not of universal application, and neither conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.

• "Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC... Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter."
• "Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals."
• "It must be remembered that this maxim is only an 'ancillary rule of statutory construction.' It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature."
• "It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts."

• People v. Moreno — Applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to violations of Act No. 3992 (Revised Motor Vehicle Law), noting the special law did not contain any provision for subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
• People v. Li Wai Cheung — Applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC to multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
• People v. Chowdury — Applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices," and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) because said words were not defined therein.
• Yu v. People — Applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law), noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in the special law.
• Ladonga v. People — Applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "violence against women and their children" and enumerates the relationships between offender and victim covered by the law (wife, former wife, sexual or dating relationship, common child).
• Section 4, Republic Act No. 9262 — Mandates that the Act be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims.
• Section 5, Republic Act No. 9262 — Enumerates acts of violence against women and their children, including conduct committed "personally or through another."
• Section 8, Republic Act No. 9262 — Provides for protection orders including prohibitions against the respondent committing acts "personally or through another" or communicating "directly or indirectly."
• Section 47, Republic Act No. 9262 — Provides for suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy and proposal to commit felony; establishes that when conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all.
• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — States that the RPC shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter specially provide the contrary.