Go, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

In an unlawful detainer case based on tolerance, the plaintiff’s alleged tolerance must be present from the very start of the defendant’s possession; where the defendant’s entry was clandestine or without the owner’s consent, the possession is illegal at inception and the action is one for forcible entry, which must be filed within one year from the forcible entry. After the one-year period, the owner must pursue accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioners are the children and only surviving heirs of the late spouses Florentino, Sr. and Lucila Go, in whose name a parcel of land in Caloocan City is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-32110. Private respondent Aurora I. Perez occupied the parcel and claimed a preferential right to acquire it from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation and its successor, the National Housing Authority. The dispute concerns whether the heirs may recover possession through a summary ejectment action under Rule 70 or must resort to a plenary action for recovery of possession or ownership.

Petitioners Florentino Go, Jr., Ma. Luzviminda Go, Leonida Go, Felipe Go, Marietta Go, Roberto Go, Estrelita Go, Antonio Go, Alberto Go, Baby Lucila Go, and Manuel Go are the children and only surviving heirs of the late spouses Florentino, Sr. and Lucila Go, who died intestate on June 10, 1973 and January 22, 1988, respectively. A parcel of land in Caloocan City was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-32110 in the name of the late spouses. Private respondent Aurora I. Perez occupied that parcel and, in her answer, claimed that she had been occupying it since 1963 through permission of the security guards of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation; that she cleared the land and constructed houses for her family; and that she applied for its acquisition with the PHHC and its successor, the National Housing Authority. She further claimed that she learned only in December 1994, when Estrelita Go demanded that she vacate, that the land had been titled in the name of Lucila Go in 1980; that Lucila Go acquired the title through false statements in her PHHC application; and that she had a preferential right to acquire the property.

In their complaint for ejectment filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 22172, petitioners alleged that Perez had been allowed to occupy the parcel temporarily through the mere tolerance of their mother and, after her death, of petitioners themselves, on the condition that she would vacate once asked. In December 1994, petitioners asked Perez to vacate because they needed another residence for a growing family; the demand was repeated several times, but Perez did not heed it. Petitioners sought the help of the barangay office, and several conciliation meetings were held without settlement, resulting in a Certification to File Action. The complaint, filed on June 27, 1995, sought attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and P2,000.00 per month for the reasonable use and occupancy of the premises from January 1995 until Perez vacated.

The MTC heard the case under the Rules on Summary Procedure and decided it on the position papers and the oral and documentary evidence. The evidence included the affidavit of Luzviminda Go, who stated that sometime in 1964 she accompanied her mother to the parcel and saw a lone house occupied by a certain “Attorney,” whom her mother said was allowed to stay there temporarily; that in early 1977 she saw Aurora Perez, then known as Baby Sansano, residing in the same house; and that she heard from her mother that the “Attorney” was a relative of Perez. At the pre-trial conference on February 29, 1996, Ms. Go confirmed that their mother did not allow Perez to build a house on the lot and that they simply saw Perez’s house standing there. Counsel for petitioners also stated that the mother had, in a way, tolerated Perez’s stay by not taking steps to eject her.

The MTC found that the plaintiffs had not substantiated their claim of tolerance and that the case could not be treated as one for forcible entry because it had not been filed within one year from the alleged forcible entry. The Court of Appeals agreed that the alleged tolerance was not established, that the permission allegedly given to the “Attorney” was not permission given to Perez, and that petitioners’ own pre-trial statements showed their mother did not allow Perez to build on the lot. The evidence further showed that Perez started to occupy the lot and built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and, before them, their mother, and that Luzviminda Go first saw Perez on the lot in 1977.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioners argued that ejectment was the appropriate remedy because private respondent’s occupancy was by mere tolerance and became illegal upon demand; the complaint sufficiently alleged prior demand and was filed within one year from the December 1994 demand.
• Tolerance: Petitioners maintained that their mother and later they tolerated Perez’s occupancy, and that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting this claim on hearsay grounds.
• Forcible Entry and One-Year Period: Petitioners raised the subsidiary issue whether the action was commenced within the one-year jurisdictional period under Section 1, Rule 70, and argued that if the case were for forcible entry, the period should be counted from the demand or discovery of the clandestine entry, not from 1977.
• Title and Ancillary Claims: Petitioners raised for resolution whether their certificate of title could be collaterally attacked, whether Perez could claim reimbursement for improvements, and whether they were entitled to reasonable compensation for use and occupancy.

• Occupancy Since 1963: Private respondent Aurora I. Perez maintained in her answer that she had occupied the subject land since 1963 through permission of the security guards of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation.
• Acquisition and Improvements: She claimed that she cleared the land, constructed houses for her family, and applied for its acquisition with the PHHC and its successor, the National Housing Authority, giving her a preferential right to acquire the property.
• Title and Fraud: She alleged that she learned only in December 1994 that the land had been titled in the name of Lucila Go in 1980, and that Lucila Go acquired the title through false statements in her PHHC application.

• Nature of Ejectment Action: Whether an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for the recovery of possession of the subject property or whether a vindicatory action is the proper remedy.
• One-Year Period: Whether the ejectment action was commenced within the jurisdictional one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Tolerance: Whether private respondent’s occupancy of the property in controversy, prior to the demand to vacate, was by mere tolerance of petitioners’ mother and by their own tolerance.
• Hearsay: Whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the hearsay rule in rejecting the submission that private respondent’s occupancy was merely tolerated.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Whether petitioners’ certificate of title may be collaterally attacked.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Whether private respondent can validly claim reimbursement for her alleged expenses on improvements made on the subject property.
• Reasonable Compensation: Whether petitioners are entitled to reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject property by the private respondent.

• Nature of Ejectment Action: No. The summary ejectment action was not the proper remedy for recovering the real right of possession or ownership; because tolerance was absent and the entry was clandestine, petitioners must pursue accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the Regional Trial Court.
• One-Year Period: No. If the action is for forcible entry, it must be filed within one year from the date of forcible entry; petitioners knew of Perez’s occupancy as early as 1977 but filed only in 1995.
• Tolerance: No. Tolerance must be present right from the start of possession; the evidence showed Perez entered and built on the lot without the permission or consent of the owners, so her possession was illegal at inception.
• Hearsay: Not reached. The Court resolved the case on the absence of tolerance and the nature of the action, and expressly found it unnecessary to pass upon the remaining issues.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.
• Reasonable Compensation: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.

• Nature of Ejectment Action: Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, and the only issue is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are distinct: in forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and possession is illegal from the beginning; in unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The complaint alleged tolerance, which would make it unlawful detainer, but tolerance was not established. Since Perez’s entry was illegal at inception, the action was actually one for forcible entry. Because petitioners knew of the occupation as early as 1977 but filed only in 1995, the one-year period had lapsed. The proper remedy is accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the Regional Trial Court, not summary ejectment.
• One-Year Period: In forcible entry, the action must be filed within one year from the date of forcible entry. The complaint alleged tolerance and demand in December 1994, but the evidence showed Perez’s entry was clandestine and occurred before 1977. Petitioners came to know of the occupation in 1977 but filed only in 1995, beyond the one-year period. Thus, the action could not be maintained as a summary ejectment case.
• Tolerance: One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. But in unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. Here, the alleged tolerance was unsubstantiated. The evidence showed Perez started to occupy the lot and built a house without the permission and consent of petitioners and their mother. The permission allegedly given to the “Attorney” was not permission given to Perez. The pre-trial statements of Ms. Go confirmed that their mother did not allow Perez to build on the lot. Hence, possession was illegal at inception, not merely tolerated.
• Hearsay: Not reached. The Court stated that in view of its disposition, it was unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.
• Reimbursement for Improvements: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.
• Reasonable Compensation: Not reached. The Court expressly declined to pass upon this issue.

• Ejectment as Summary Proceeding; Possession de Facto Only — Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, and the only issue is who is entitled to physical or material possession de facto. The Court applied this by refusing to resolve ownership and by treating the case as a possession action governed by Rule 70.
• Forcible Entry vs. Unlawful Detainer — Forcible entry is when one is deprived of physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; possession is illegal from the beginning, and the basic inquiry is prior possession de facto. Unlawful detainer is when one unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied; possession was originally lawful but became unlawful, and the issue is rightful possession. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the complaint, though alleging tolerance, was not unlawful detainer because tolerance was absent; the clandestine entry made it forcible entry.
• Tolerance Must Be Present from the Start — In unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. The Court applied this by finding that Perez’s entry was without permission and therefore illegal at inception, not merely tolerated.
• Clandestine Entry as Possession by Stealth — Under Article 537 of the Civil Code, acts merely tolerated and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. The Court applied this by categorizing Perez’s entry, made without the owners’ knowledge or consent, as possession by stealth, which is forcible entry.
• After One Year: Accion Publiciana or Reivindicatoria — After the lapse of the one-year period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, in an accion publiciana. If the owners were unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession, they should present their claim in the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not in a summary ejectment proceeding. Even an owner cannot wrest possession from another who has been in physical or material possession for more than one year by resorting to summary ejectment. The Court applied this by directing petitioners to the plenary action.
• Review of Findings of Fact — The Supreme Court does not review findings of fact by the Court of Appeals unless the findings are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings of the trial court of origin. The Court applied this by deferring to the MTC and Court of Appeals findings that tolerance was unsubstantiated.

• “The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.” — This states the narrow scope of ejectment proceedings and explains why the Court refused to resolve title or ownership in the summary action.
• “It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.” — This is the ratio decidendi for rejecting the unlawful detainer claim: tolerance cannot be inferred after an illegal entry.
• “Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry.” — This applies Article 537 and the forcible entry definition to the facts, converting the alleged tolerance case into one of stealth.
• “For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.” — This states the jurisdictional limitation on summary ejectment and directs owners to the proper plenary remedy.

• Guballa vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 518 (1988) — Cited for the rule that ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property.
• University Physicians Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 86 (1994) — Cited for the rule that the only issue in ejectment cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.
• Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 (1995) — Cited for the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer and for the rule that after the one-year period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.
• Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 (1994) — Cited for the rule that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave.
• Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 512 (1998) — Cited for the standard that the Supreme Court does not review findings of fact by the Court of Appeals unless they are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the trial court’s findings.
• Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 216 (1992) — Cited for the rule that tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as unlawful detainer rather than forcible entry.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines forcible entry and unlawful detainer and fixes the one-year period for filing the action. The Court applied it by treating the complaint as one for unlawful detainer based on the allegation of tolerance, but because tolerance was absent and the entry was clandestine, the action was actually one for forcible entry and was barred by the one-year period.
• Article 537, Civil Code — Provides that acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. The Court applied it by holding that Perez’s clandestine entry without the owners’ knowledge did not create tolerance; it was possession by stealth.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.