Gloriosa v. Valarao

The appointment of a special administrator, whether one or more, is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the probate court, and the existence of conflicting interests among heirs does not establish an absolute right to demand the appointment of a co-administrator representing each faction. A special administrator enjoys primary and independent discretion to take possession of the estate's properties and documents to preserve them for regular administration, and such possession is not merely subsidiary to the heirs' possessory rights.

Felicidad C. Pascual died at seventy-one years of age, femme sole, leaving a substantial inheritance to five groups of collateral relatives: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz, including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her late brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon; and (e) the decedent's surviving siblings, including respondent Conrado C. Pascual. The heirs were divided into two scrappy factions, and the estate's administration became the subject of dispute between them.

Felicidad C. Pascual died at seventy-one years of age, femme sole, leaving a substantial inheritance to five groups of collateral relatives. The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs were: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz, including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her late brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon; and (e) the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the latter being one of the respondents.

On 27 May 1998, petitioner Valarao initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City special proceedings docketed as SP No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over the estate. On 29 September 1998, respondent Pascual and some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz, filed with the same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP No. 98-0124, of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two special proceedings were consolidated. On 26 January 1999, by agreement of the parties, petitioner Valarao and respondent Diaz were appointed joint administrators of the estate. On 8 February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of Parañaque City rendered a Decision dismissing SP No. 98-0124, denying probate of the alleged holographic will and giving due course to the intestate settlement of the estate.

On 22 March 2000, respondent Pascual appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal. On 2 May 2000, in view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. On 9 May 2000, respondent Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-administrator alongside petitioner. On 10 May 2000, the motions were heard, wherein petitioner opposed the request of respondent Diaz on the ground that he had allegedly neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator of the estate.

On 7 June 2000, the probate court issued an Order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, observing that the heirs on her side represented a numerical majority of the legal heirs and that it would be to the best interest of the estate if she were appointed. On 29 June 2000, the probate court approved petitioner's bond of ₱500,000.00, and on 6 July 2000 she took her oath of office as special administratrix. On 19 July 2000, respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection, contesting the allegation that he had been remiss in his duties and citing as examples of his services the collection of rentals, the payment of estate taxes, and the deposit of about ₱4,000,000.00 in a joint bank account held in trust for the estate. He further alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of heirs be represented in the management of the estate.

On 11 September 2000, the probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the heirs to respect the authority of petitioner as special administratrix, especially by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate. The probate court found that respondent Diaz had not disputed the charges of nonfeasance beyond making a mere general denial, and that the best interest of the estate would be best protected if only one administrator were appointed to avoid conflicting interests. On 25 September 2000, respondents moved for reconsideration, arguing that petitioner as special administratrix was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties absent proof of dissipation, and that her possessory right had already been exercised "constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf.

On 10 October 2000, while the motion for reconsideration was pending, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, to reverse the Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 insofar as the probate court appointed only petitioner as special administratrix, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz as special co-administrator. On 15 May 2001, the probate court cited respondents for indirect contempt for refusing to turn over documents covering properties belonging to the estate and ordered their arrest until compliance; the warrant was subsequently lifted after respondents promised to deliver the documents. On 13 June 2001, respondents filed a supplemental petition for certiorari seeking permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders.

On 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7 June 2000 appointing petitioner as lone special administratrix, although the fallo was silent on whether the probate court should also appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator. The appellate court explained that since the heirs were divided into two factions, justice and equity demanded that both factions be represented in the management of the estate, citing Matias vs. Gonzales, Corona vs. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit vs. Ramolete.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner claimed that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it rejected respondent Diaz's application for appointment as special co-administrator because of his indubitable uncooperative attitude towards effective administration of the estate.
• Discretionary Appointment: Petitioner argued that diverse interests among different groups of heirs do not give each of them the absolute right to secure the appointment of a co-administrator from within their ranks, since it remains the discretion of the probate court to designate the administrators of an estate.
• Authority Over Documents: Petitioner asserted that as special administratrix of the estate she possesses the authority to demand the surrender of documents pertinent to the estate insofar as necessary to fulfill her mandate.

• Absence of Special Reasons: Respondents alleged the absence of special reasons to justify a review of the assailed Decision and the partiality of the trial judge in favor of petitioner.
• Constructive Possession: Respondents argued that their possession of the documents allegedly in behalf of petitioner was already the equivalent of "constructive possession" constituting full compliance with the possessory powers of petitioner as special administratrix under Sec. 2 of Rule 80.
• Non-Finality of Order: Respondents contended that they could not disobey the order appointing petitioner as special administratrix because it had not become final and executory due to a pending motion for reconsideration.
• Right to Representation: Respondent Diaz alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of heirs be also represented in the management of the estate.

• Jurisdiction of the Probate Court: Whether the probate court retained jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix after respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Appointment: Whether the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing only petitioner Valarao as special administratrix and rejecting respondent Diaz's application as special co-administrator.
• Possessory Powers of the Special Administrator: Whether the special administratrix was authorized to demand the surrender of estate documents from the heirs and whether respondents' refusal justified the contempt citation.
• Effect of Pending Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the order appointing petitioner as special administratrix was enforceable despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.

• Jurisdiction of the Probate Court: Yes. The probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner as special administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal, because the appeal was one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required, and the probate court retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding for purposes of further remedies.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Appointment: No. There was nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator, as the Orders clearly stipulated the grounds for rejection and the probate court weighed the evidence before concluding not to designate him.
• Possessory Powers of the Special Administrator: Yes. The special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession but the primary and independent discretion of keeping the estate's properties so they may be preserved for regular administration, and respondents were under obligation to turn over the documents whenever the special administratrix required their actual delivery.
• Effect of Pending Motion for Reconsideration: No. An interlocutory order is not instantly appealable, and a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction; the appointment of a special administrator being an interlocutory order must be obeyed as the proceedings progress.

• Jurisdiction of the Probate Court: The appeal taken by respondent Pascual from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will was one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required, pursuant to Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Sec. 39 of BP 129. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Appointment: The probate court's Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulated the grounds for rejecting respondent Diaz's application, and the records manifest that the probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants before concluding not to designate him because he was found to have been remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator. The process of decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle, unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of certiorari. The extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings, since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional issues.

• Possessory Powers of the Special Administrator: The powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed." There is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to take possession of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties of the estate. The law explicitly authorizes him to take possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. The right of possession whether characterized as actual or constructive invariably empowers the special administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the estate. The partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator under the Rules of Court, and the possession of portions of the estate by respondents as heirs necessarily excludes the possessory right over the same properties inherent in the mandate of a special administrator. The combination of the words "possession" and "charge" in Sec. 2 serves to highlight the fact that a special administrator must be able to subject the properties of the estate to his control and management when in his good judgment such action is needed.

• Effect of Pending Motion for Reconsideration: An interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration. It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction. The appointment of a special administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress. The Court quoted PAFLU vs. Salvador, reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation vs. Oca, emphasizing that when judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed, and a party dissatisfied may ask for reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to a higher tribunal, but as long as the orders stand unmodified, they must be faithfully complied with.

• Discretion of the Probate Court in Appointing Special Administrators — The appointment of a special administrator, whether one or more, is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the probate court. The existence of conflicting interests among heirs does not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. The cases of Matias vs. Gonzales, Corona vs. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit vs. Ramolete constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate, but whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.

• Possessory Powers of a Special Administrator — Under Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a special administrator has the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed." The special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration. The right of possession, whether actual or constructive, empowers the special administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the estate. The partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator under the Rules of Court.

• Interlocutory Orders and Their Enforceability — An interlocutory order is not instantly appealable, and a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction. The appointment of a special administrator, being an interlocutory order, is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress. As long as the orders stand unmodified, they must be faithfully complied with, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds.

• "The powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to 'take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed.'" — This passage defines the statutory basis for the special administrator's possessory powers and is central to the Court's ruling that the special administrator has primary and independent discretion over the estate's properties.

• "Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to take possession of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties of the estate which are in their possession." — This statement rejects the respondents' interpretation that a special administrator's possession is merely subsidiary and establishes that the law authorizes possession in whatever state the properties are found.

• "When judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed; what they ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to higher tribunal. As long as the orders stand unmodified, however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds be faithfully complied with." — This quotation from PAFLU v. Salvador, reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation v. Oca, underscores the binding effect of interlocutory orders and the duty of parties to comply with them while they stand unmodified.

• Matias vs. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852 (1957) — Distinguished. The Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, considered a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal; the case hinged on factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs.

• Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 201 Phil. 782 (1982) — Distinguished. The Court gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator," considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will; the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator.

• Vda. de Dayrit vs. Ramolete, 202 Phil. 937 (1982) — Distinguished. The Court justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because she owned one-half of the conjugal properties and was a compulsory heir, making it unfair to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will.

• Fule vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-40502, 29 November 1976, 74 SCRA 189 — Cited to emphasize the special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate, as the widow has more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate.

• Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413 — Cited to recognize the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator, counseling that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."

• De Guzman vs. Guadiz, No. L-48585, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 938 — Cited for the proposition that the partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator under the Rules of Court.

• PAFLU vs. Salvador, No. L-29471, 28 September 1968, 25 SCRA 393 — Cited for the principle that orders of judicial tribunals must be obeyed while they stand unmodified, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds.

• Republic Commodities Corporation vs. Oca, No. L-24995, 27 May 1970, 33 SCRA 24 — Cited to reiterate the principle from PAFLU vs. Salvador regarding obedience to judicial orders.

• Rivera vs. Santos, No. L-24563, 29 November 1966, 18 SCRA 871 — Cited for the proposition that the appointment of special administrators is a matter left to the sound discretion of the probate court.

• Fernandez vs. Maravilla, No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416 — Cited for the proposition that the appointment of special administrators is a matter left to the sound discretion of the probate court.

• De Gala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104 (1929) — Cited for the proposition that the appointment of special administrators is a matter left to the sound discretion of the probate court.

• De Borja vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 872 (1955) — Cited for the holding that the Rules of Court precludes a party from appealing from an order appointing a special administrator because such appointment is only for a limited time and for a specific purpose.

• Medina vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-34760, 28 September 1973, 53 SCRA 206 — Cited for the proposition that a special administrator is an officer of the court subject to its supervision and control.

• Sec. 2, Rule 80, Rules of Court — The provision vesting upon a special administrator the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed." The Court interpreted this provision to grant the special administrator primary and independent discretion to take actual custody of the estate's properties for preservation purposes.

• Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The provision governing appeals where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. The Court applied this provision to hold that the probate court retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies, including the appointment of a special administrator.

• Sec. 39, BP 129 — Cited in connection with the mode of appeal applicable to the case, supporting the Court's conclusion that the probate court retained jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix despite the pending appeal.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred.