Global Incorporated vs. Hon. Commissioners Diego D. Atienza, Geronimo Q. Quadra and Cleto T. Villatuya, and Clarita Rosal

Overtime pay must be denied absent sufficient factual and legal basis, while backwages are due where a preventive suspension is unjustified under Sec. 4, Rule XIV of the Ministry of Labor's Implementing Regulations and the employer fails to comply with a final reinstatement order.

Clarita Rosal was employed by Global Incorporated as a sales clerk beginning February 1970. Their employment relationship was governed by the Ministry of Labor's regulations on termination and preventive suspension, particularly Sec. 4, Rule XIV of the Implementing Regulations, which permits preventive suspension only when the employee's continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees.

Clarita Rosal began employment with Global Incorporated in February 1970 as a sales clerk earning P450.00 a month. On November 11, 1976, Global filed with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, an application for clearance to terminate her services, alleging that she violated company rules and regulations by incurring repeated absences and tardiness (Case No. T-IV-11-7480-76). Global placed her under preventive suspension on November 16, 1976, pending resolution of the clearance application.

On December 3, 1976, Rosal filed her opposition to the clearance application and a counter-complaint against Global for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, and premium pay (Case No. RB-IV-9962-77). On February 3, 1977, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., officer-in-charge of Regional Office No. 4, Ministry of Labor, lifted her preventive suspension, finding the suspension not warranted, and reinstated her to her former position without loss of rights and with full backwages from the time of preventive suspension up to actual reinstatement. Leogardo reasoned that Rosal's continued presence did not pose a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees; her tardiness did not pose such threat, and as a sales clerk required to prepare and submit reports before closing, she managed to comply without prejudice to the company's interest.

The hearings on the termination issue and the counter-complaint for illegal dismissal were consolidated and jointly held before Labor Arbiter Miguel P. Soriano, Jr., docketed as NLRC Case Nos. RB-IV-9962-77 and RB-IV-1154-77. On May 31, 1978, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime compensation, and premium pay for lack of merit and granted the clearance for Rosal's termination.

Rosal appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On June 28, 1979, Commissioners Diego Atienza and Geronimo Quadra modified the Labor Arbiter's decision by ordering Global to pay Rosal overtime pay at the rate of one hour everyday starting November 1, 1974 to November 16, 1976, and backwages from December 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978, while affirming the grant of clearance to terminate her services. Commissioner Cleto T. Villatuya voted to affirm the Labor Arbiter's decision.

The evidence on overtime showed that Global's office hours were from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a noon break from 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. No employee was authorized to work after office hours, during Sundays or holidays, unless required by a written memorandum from the General Manager. During the period from November 1, 1974 to November 16, 1976, no employee was required to work after 5:00 p.m., and none was required to work during Sundays or holidays except on November 1, 1976, when Rosal was requested to work through a written memorandum signed by the General Manager; Rosal admitted this and that she was properly compensated for that work (Exh. "10"). Rosal's claim of overtime was not substantiated; her time records showed no time-in and time-out during Sundays and holidays, and except for some records with no afternoon time-outs, she regularly left the office at or a few minutes after 5:00 p.m. The missing time-outs were explained by a mechanical defect in the office bundy clock, and the same omission appeared in other employees' records, but only Rosal complained.

• Preventive Suspension and Backwages: Petitioner argued that if both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found absenteeism and tardiness to be valid and just causes to terminate Rosal's employment, then the preventive suspension on the same grounds was likewise just and valid; if the suspension was just and valid, she was not entitled to backwages. It noted that under the Rules of the Ministry, an employee placed unjustly under preventive suspension is entitled to be paid her wages even if she does not work during that period.
• Overtime Pay: Petitioner contended that the grant of overtime pay at one hour everyday from Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976 was not justified because nothing in the record except Rosal's bare allegations showed that she truly and actually rendered overtime work; it was highly improbable, if not impossible, for her to have rendered continuous overtime services for two years, including Sundays and holidays.
• Relief Sought: Petitioner prayed that the NLRC decision be reversed or declared null and void, that the Labor Arbiter's decision be affirmed in toto, that Rosal pay P2,000 as attorney's fees, and that costs be imposed.

• Overtime Pay: Whether the NLRC erred in awarding Clarita Rosal overtime pay at the rate of one hour everyday from Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976.
• Backwages: Whether the NLRC erred in awarding Clarita Rosal backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978.

• Overtime Pay: No. The award of overtime pay was deleted for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis; the evidence did not show that Rosal actually rendered overtime work during the claimed period.
• Backwages: No. The NLRC's award of backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978 was affirmed because the preventive suspension was unjustified under Sec. 4, Rule XIV and the reinstatement order had become final and executory.

• Overtime Pay: The Court agreed with the Labor Arbiter that overtime should be denied for want of sufficient factual and legal basis. The office hours were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with a noon break from 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. No employee was authorized to work after office hours, during Sundays or holidays, unless required by written memorandum from the General Manager. During the claimed period, no employee was required to work after 5:00 p.m., and none was required on Sundays or holidays except on Nov. 1, 1976, when Rosal was requested through a written memorandum and was properly compensated. Rosal's claim was unsubstantiated. Her time records showed no time-in and time-out on Sundays and holidays; except for some records with no afternoon time-outs, she regularly left at or a few minutes after 5:00 p.m. The missing time-outs were explained by a mechanical defect in the bundy clock, and the same omission appeared in other employees' records, but only Rosal complained. Thus, no overtime pay.
• Backwages: The NLRC ordered backwages from Dec. 2, 1976 to May 31, 1978. The Court agreed. The reinstatement decision had not been complied with and was not appealed by petitioner, so it became final and executory. To exempt petitioner from backwages would give premium to blatant disregard of Ministry of Labor orders, and compassionate justice supported payment during the period Rosal was supposed to be reinstated. The only ground for preventive suspension under Sec. 4, Rule XIV is that continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees; Leogardo found Rosal's continued presence never posed such threat. Thus, backwages were proper.

• Preventive Suspension — Under Sec. 4, Rule XIV of the Implementing Regulations of the Ministry of Labor, an employer may place an employee under preventive suspension only if the continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees. Any preventive suspension before the filing of the application shall be considered worked days and shall be paid if the continued presence does not pose a serious threat. The Court applied this rule through Leogardo's finding that Rosal's continued presence did not pose such threat, making her suspension unjustified and supporting the award of backwages.
• Overtime Pay — Overtime pay requires sufficient factual and legal basis showing that overtime work was actually rendered. Bare allegations, time records showing regular departure at or after 5:00 p.m., absence of time entries on Sundays and holidays, and an explained mechanical defect in the bundy clock do not establish entitlement. The Court denied the award for failure of proof.
• Final and Executory Judgment — A decision that is not appealed becomes final and executory, and non-compliance with it cannot be rewarded. The Court held that exempting petitioner from backwages would give premium to disregard of Ministry of Labor orders, so backwages were affirmed for the period the employee was supposed to be reinstated.

• "The claim of Clarita Rosal that she rendered overtime work from Nov. 1, 1974 to Nov. 16, 1976 has not been substantiated by adequate evidence." — This states the ratio for denying the overtime award: the employee's bare claim did not meet the evidentiary burden.
• "The employer may place the employee concerned under preventive suspension only if the continued employment of the employee poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of the co-employees." — This is the controlling rule from Sec. 4, Rule XIV, which the Court used to evaluate the suspension.
• "To exempt petitioner from the payment of backwages would be to give premium to the blant disregard of orders of the Ministry of Labor." — This articulates the rationale for affirming backwages despite the clearance to terminate.
• "As aptly held by Asst. Secretary Leogardo Jr. (Officer-in-charge of Regional Office No. IV of the Ministry of Labor), the continued presence of Clarita Rosal never posed a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees as would warrant her preventive suspension." — This applies the preventive-suspension rule to the facts and supports the backwages award.

• Sec. 4, Rule XIV, Implementing Regulations of the Ministry of Labor — The only ground for preventive suspension is that the employee's continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-employees. Any preventive suspension before filing of the application shall be considered worked days and paid if the continued presence does not pose a serious threat. Applied: Rosal's continued presence did not pose such threat, so her preventive suspension was unjustified and backwages were proper.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.