Gimenez vs. Nazareno

An accused who, after arraignment and with notice, escapes from custody and fails to appear at trial is deemed to have waived the rights to present evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the court retains jurisdiction over his person and must render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented.

Six individuals, including private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by respondent Judge Ramon E. Nazareno. The prosecution was handled by fiscals Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado, the petitioners. The case arose under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which first introduced the constitutional authorization for trial in absentia in the Philippines, providing that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio, and private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. were charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by respondent Judge Ramon E. Nazareno. On August 22, 1973, all six accused were arraigned and each pleaded not guilty. Following the arraignment, the hearing was set for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and all accused, including de la Vega, Jr., were duly informed of the schedule, as evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court.

Before the scheduled hearing date, de la Vega, Jr. escaped from his detention center, a fact established by a certified copy of the police blotter. On September 18, 1973, he failed to appear in court. The fiscals handling the case — petitioners Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado — filed a motion to proceed with the hearing against all accused, praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia pursuant to Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The lower court granted the motion and proceeded with the reception of prosecution evidence in the absence of de la Vega, Jr., but indicated it would give him the opportunity to take the witness stand should he reappear.

After due trial, on November 6, 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five co-accused while holding the proceedings against de la Vega, Jr. in abeyance. The dispositive portion ordered that the proceedings against de la Vega, Jr., who had escaped on August 30, 1973, "shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person." The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on November 16, 1973, arguing that the disposition rendered nugatory the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. The motion was denied by the lower court on November 22, 1973, the respondent judge expressing the view that de la Vega, Jr. did not lose his right to cross-examine and present evidence, and that jurisdiction over his person was lost upon his escape.

• Effect of Trial in Absentia: Petitioners argued that the lower court's suspension of proceedings against de la Vega, Jr. rendered nugatory the constitutional provision on trial in absentia, since the very purpose of the provision was to prevent indefinite delays caused by the non-appearance of the accused.
• Duty to Render Judgment: Petitioners maintained that upon termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented, and need not await the accused's reappearance to present his defense.

• Retention of Accused's Rights: Respondent judge argued that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, de la Vega, Jr., who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his evidence.
• Loss of Jurisdiction: Respondent judge maintained that jurisdiction over de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped from custody, and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired.
• Presumption of Innocence: Respondent judge contended that all accused should be presumed innocent under the same constitutional provision, and that rendering judgment against an absent accused would violate this presumption.

• Jurisdiction Over Escapee: Whether a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who, after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law.
• Rights of Accused Tried in Absentia: Whether an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains the right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

• Jurisdiction Over Escapee: No. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused, once acquired through voluntary appearance at arraignment, is not lost upon the accused's escape and continues until the termination of the case.
• Rights of Accused Tried in Absentia: No. An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives the right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him, and the court must render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented.

• Jurisdiction Over Escapee: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused in a criminal case is acquired either by arrest or by voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment, as de la Vega, Jr. did on August 22, 1973. Citing established jurisprudence — Lat vs. Phil. Long Co., Tuvera vs. de Guzman, and the Abadilla habeas corpus case — the Court reaffirmed the principle that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. Escape from custody does not divest the court of jurisdiction already properly obtained.

• Rights of Accused Tried in Absentia: The constitutional provision on trial in absentia under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution requires three requisites: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. All three were present: de la Vega, Jr. was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, he was notified of the scheduled hearings as evidenced by his signature, and his escape was unjustified — a fact even the trial court acknowledged. Upon termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented; it need not await the accused's reappearance. To allow such delay would render the constitutional provision ineffective, contrary to the framers' intent to remedy the abuse of proceedings being stayed indefinitely due to the defendant's non-appearance. The respondent judge's contention that the presumption of innocence would be violated was rejected, as a judgment of conviction must still be based on evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and due process was satisfied by the opportunity to be heard. The rights to confrontation and cross-examination and to present evidence are personal rights that may be waived; by failing to appear at a trial of which he had notice, de la Vega, Jr. virtually waived these rights. This conclusion was further buttressed by Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which expressly provides that an accused under custody who has been notified of the trial date and escapes is deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.

• Jurisdiction Once Acquired is Not Lost — In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused, once acquired through arrest or voluntary appearance (including appearance at arraignment), is not lost upon the accused's escape from custody but continues until the case is terminated. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that de la Vega, Jr.'s escape did not divest the lower court of jurisdiction over his person.

• Requisites of Trial in Absentia — Under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (and its counterpart, Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution), trial in absentia may proceed when the following requisites concur: (1) the accused has been arraigned; (2) the accused has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) the accused's failure to appear is unjustified. All three requisites were found present in this case.

• Waiver of Rights by Escape — The rights of the accused to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence on his own behalf are personal rights that may be waived. An accused who, after arraignment and with notice, escapes from custody and fails to appear at trial is deemed to have waived these rights. The court must render judgment on the basis of the evidence already adduced, without awaiting the accused's reappearance.

• "jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on the persistence of jurisdiction over the accused despite escape, forming the ratio decidendi on the first issue.

• "an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him." — This is the Court's definitive formulation of the holding on the second issue, synthesizing the constitutional, doctrinal, and procedural bases for the waiver-by-escape rule.

• "What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied." — Quoted from constitutional commentator Enrique M. Fernando, this passage explains the policy rationale behind the trial in absentia provision and underscores the legitimate interest of society and the offended party in the prompt administration of justice.

• Lat vs. Phil. Long Co., 69 SCRA 425 (1975) — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine that jurisdiction once acquired over the person of the accused is not lost and continues until the case is terminated.
• Tuvera vs. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 (1965) — Cited in support of the same jurisdictional principle.
• People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986) — Cited as authority for the holding that an escapee tried in absentia waives the rights to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
• U.S. vs. Anastacio, 6 Phil. 413; U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil. 426; U.S. vs. Binayon, 35 Phil. 23; U.S. vs. Golanco, 11 Phil. 575 — Cited as early jurisprudence establishing that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination is a personal right that may be waived.

• Section 19, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — The constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia, providing that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The Court found all three requisites present and held that the lower court correctly proceeded with trial but erred in suspending proceedings and withholding judgment.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Noted by the Court as containing a similar provision on trial in absentia to the 1973 Constitution.
• Section 1(c), Rule 115, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that an accused under custody who has been notified of the trial date and escapes is deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. The Court cited this rule as reflective of the framers' intent and as buttressing the holding on waiver by escape.

Chief Justice Teehankee, and Justices Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, and Griño-Aquino concurred.