Gil Miguel vs. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons

Murder is a heinous crime for purposes of the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law, disqualifying persons charged with and/or convicted thereof from its benefits; and the thirty-year computation of perpetual penalties under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code does not cap reclusion perpetua at thirty years but serves only as a basis for the three-fold rule and eligibility for pardon.

Gil Miguel was a person deprived of liberty committed to the National Bilibid Prison after conviction for Murder, while the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, now Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, is the respondent custodian. The governing statutes are Republic Act No. 10592, the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law, its 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, and Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

On February 26, 1991, Gil Miguel was charged with the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18506. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Miguel guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to his conviction, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on January 15, 1994. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Decision dated March 7, 1996.

Alleging that his continued detention no longer held legal basis in view of Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law, Miguel filed the present petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 19, 2015. He claimed that, applying the GCTA Law, he had served a total of thirty-eight years, ten months, and one day. He also posited that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty years. Having served thirty-eight years, which he asserted was eight years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concluded that he had fully served his sentence and that his detention no longer held legal basis.

The respondent Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed his Comment dated January 28, 2016. In response, Miguel filed his Reply dated May 11, 2018. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2020, the Supreme Court required the parties to file their respective Memoranda. Respondent filed his Memorandum dated February 9, 2021, while Miguel failed to file his Memorandum.

The Court noted that Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. Therefore, as of August 15, 2021, he had only served a total of twenty-seven years and seven months of his sentence. This factual finding underpinned the conclusion that, having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention was valid and justified.

• GCTA Law Benefits: Petitioner argued that, applying Republic Act No. 10592, he had served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day," and that his continued detention therefore no longer held legal basis.
• Article 70 Cap: Petitioner maintained that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years, and that having served more than that period, he had fully served his sentence.
• Restoration of Liberty: Petitioner prayed for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to restore his liberty.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the Supreme Court may entertain a petition for habeas corpus filed directly before it despite concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, absent special and important reasons.
• GCTA Law Coverage: Whether a person charged with and/or convicted of murder is disqualified from the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592 as a person charged with a heinous crime.
• Article 70 Computation: Whether Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code caps the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty years, entitling the convict to release after serving thirty years.
• Issuance of the Writ: Whether the Writ of Habeas Corpus may be issued.

• Hierarchy of Courts: No. The trial court, appellate court, and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction over habeas corpus, but mere concurrency does not afford absolute freedom to choose the forum; direct resort to the Supreme Court requires special and important reasons, which were not shown.
• GCTA Law Coverage: No. Murder is a heinous crime because it is mandatorily punishable by death under Republic Act No. 7659, and the GCTA Law and its 2019 Revised IRR exclude persons charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes from its benefits.
• Article 70 Computation: No. Article 70 does not cap reclusion perpetua at thirty years; the thirty-year computation applies only in applying Article 70's rules, such as the three-fold rule, and makes the convict eligible for pardon, not release.
• Issuance of the Writ: No. Continued detention is valid and justified because petitioner is disqualified from GCTA benefits and has not completed reclusion perpetua; he failed to show illegal confinement.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The Court preliminarily pointed out that Miguel failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. Under Cruz vs. Gingoyon, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first-level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter with the Court of Appeals; a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance may grant the writ of habeas corpus, but this concurrency of jurisdiction does not grant a party absolute freedom to file the petition with the court of his choice. Miguel should have filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court, absent any showing of special and important reasons warranting direct resort to the Supreme Court. Despite this procedural lapse, the Court still resolved the petition on the merits.

• GCTA Law Coverage: The last paragraph of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 10592 provides that recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of the Act. The 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 echo this disqualification in several provisions, excluding persons deprived of liberty charged with or convicted of heinous crimes from good conduct time allowance during preventive imprisonment and service of sentence, as well as from Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring, release, and Special Time Allowance for Loyalty. The 2019 Revised IRR defines heinous crimes as crimes that are grievous, odious, and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity, are repugnant and outrageous to common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society, including crimes mandatorily punishable by death under Republic Act No. 7659 and those specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code to punish Murder by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated therein. The Court concluded that Murder is mandatorily punishable by death under the Death Penalty Law, falls within the definition of heinous crimes in the 2019 Revised IRR, and is therefore considered a heinous crime. Persons charged with and/or convicted of Murder are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the GCTA Law. On this point alone, the petition should already fail.

• Article 70 Computation: Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in applying the provisions of the rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years. This provision does not state that perpetual penalties, such as reclusion perpetua, are capped at thirty years. It only provides that in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years. In People vs. Mendoza, the accused were guilty of five murders and each was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each murder, although the duration of the aggregate penalties would not exceed forty years; after serving one reclusion perpetua, computed at thirty years, the accused would serve ten years more, and all other penalties would not be served. In People vs. Reyes, Article 70 was further explained: the imputed duration of thirty years for reclusion perpetua is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. In People vs. Baguio, the Court similarly held that reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. Guided by these precedents, the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires imprisonment of at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, and not for release. Miguel's claim that a convict meted with reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty years is therefore wrong.

• Issuance of the Writ: Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. As of August 15, 2021, he had only served a total of twenty-seven years and seven months of his sentence. Having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He utterly failed to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty. Accordingly, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be issued, and the discharge of Miguel from imprisonment should not be authorized.

• Hierarchy of Courts — Even when the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court have concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs, including habeas corpus, parties are not absolutely free to choose the court with which to file their petitions. Petitions for extraordinary writs against first-level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In this case, Miguel should have filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court, absent any showing of special and important reasons warranting direct resort to the Supreme Court.

• GCTA Law Exclusion for Heinous Crimes — Republic Act No. 10592 excludes recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons charged with heinous crimes from its coverage. The 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations define heinous crimes as crimes that are grievous, odious, and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity, are repugnant and outrageous to common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society, including crimes mandatorily punishable by death under Republic Act No. 7659 and those specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court. Murder, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances and is therefore mandatorily punishable by death under the Death Penalty Law. It falls within the definition of heinous crimes and disqualifies persons charged with and/or convicted thereof from GCTA Law benefits.

• Article 70 Computation of Perpetual Penalties — The provision in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code that the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years is not a cap on reclusion perpetua. It applies only in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, and serves as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, not for release.

• Habeas Corpus Requires Illegal Confinement — The writ of habeas corpus may issue only when the petitioner is illegally confined or deprived of liberty. Where the petitioner's detention is valid and justified under a final judgment of conviction, and the petitioner has failed to show entitlement to release, the writ may not be issued.

• "Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act." — This is the GCTA Law's exclusionary clause, which the Court used to disqualify Miguel from the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592 because he was charged with and convicted of Murder.

• "From the discussion above, it is evident that the crime of Murder is one that is mandatorily punishable by death, in accordance with the Death Penalty Law. Being a such, it falls within the definition of "heinous crimes" in the 2019 Revised IRR and is therefore considered as a heinous crime." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that Murder is a heinous crime for purposes of the GCTA Law, thereby disqualifying persons charged with and/or convicted thereof from its benefits.

• "The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties x x x." — This excerpt, quoting People vs. Reyes, explains that Article 70's thirty-year computation is not a cap on reclusion perpetua but only a basis for pardon eligibility or the three-fold rule.

• "Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, and not for release." — This is the Court's ratio on the duration of reclusion perpetua, rejecting Miguel's claim that he was entitled to release after thirty years.

• Cruz vs. Gingoyon, 674 Phil. 42 (2011) — Cited for the hierarchy of courts; the Court explained that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
• In Re: In the Matter of the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of inmates Raymundo Reyes and Vincent B. Evangelista vs. BuCor Chief Gerald Bantag, G.R. No. 251954, June 10, 2020 — Cited for the rule that mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed; petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts.
• People vs. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950 — Cited to illustrate the application of Article 70; the accused were sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each of five murders, but the aggregate penalties would not exceed forty years, and after serving one reclusion perpetua computed at thirty years, the accused would serve ten years more.
• People vs. Reyes, 287 Phil. 446 (1992) — Cited for the explanation that the imputed duration of thirty years for reclusion perpetua is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
• People vs. Baguio, 273 Phil. 704 (1991) — Cited for the holding that reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 10592 (Good Conduct Time Allowance Law) — Its last paragraph excludes recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons charged with heinous crimes from the coverage of the Act. Applied to disqualify Miguel because he was charged with and convicted of Murder.
• Rule III, Section 3; Rule IV, Sections 1 and 2; Rule V, Section 2; Rule VI, Section 2; Rule VII, Section 2, 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 — These provisions disqualify persons deprived of liberty charged with or convicted of heinous crimes from good conduct time allowance during preventive imprisonment and service of sentence, as well as from Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring, release, and Special Time Allowance for Loyalty. Applied to show that Miguel, charged with and convicted of Murder, is excluded from these benefits.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law), amending Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated therein. The Court relied on this provision to conclude that Murder is mandatorily punishable by death and therefore a heinous crime under the 2019 Revised IRR.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Its last paragraph provides that in applying the provisions of the rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years. The Court held that this is not a cap on reclusion perpetua but only a computation for applying Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, and for determining eligibility for pardon.
• Section 2, Rule 102, Rules of Court — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the Court of First Instance. The Court cited this provision to note the concurrent jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions, but held that the hierarchy of courts still governs the proper forum.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Inting, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concur. Rosario was designated as an additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021.