Gerunda vs. People

An accused charged as a principal in an Information may be validly convicted as an accomplice when the evidence shows a lesser degree of participation, and the failure to prove conspiracy does not preclude accomplice liability where the accused knowingly cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

Gerunda was an Administrative Aide III at the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Negros Oriental; Atty. Diamante was its Acting Registrar. Atty. Cabilao was legal counsel of Toyota Motors Cebu, which had purchased a parcel of land and was processing the issuance of a second owner’s copy of a lost title and the transfer of the certificate of title. The charge was direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically the second type, which penalizes a public officer who accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present in consideration of the execution of an act connected with the performance of official duties.

On September 6, 2012, Atty. Federico C. Cabilao, Jr., legal counsel of Toyota Motors Cebu, went to the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Negros Oriental to process the issuance of a second owner’s copy of a lost title over a parcel of land purchased by Toyota. Being an acquaintance, he approached Gerunda, who was an employee at the Registry of Deeds, and Gerunda introduced him to Atty. Aurelio M. Diamante, Jr., then the Acting Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Negros Oriental.

On September 12, 2012, Atty. Cabilao had a meal with Atty. Diamante, during which the latter disclosed his need of a service vehicle and asked whether Atty. Cabilao could assist him in procuring one from Toyota. Atty. Cabilao contacted the sales office of Toyota to inquire about payment arrangements for a Toyota Vios. He then informed Atty. Diamante that the downpayment was PHP 151,000.00; Atty. Diamante said he could not afford that amount and offered a lower sum of PHP 100,000.00. Atty. Cabilao proposed that he would cover the remaining balance of PHP 51,000.00, subject to the condition that Atty. Diamante would facilitate the transfer of the certificate of title. At that time, Atty. Cabilao was already processing the transfer of the certificate of title to Toyota’s name.

The next day, September 13, 2012, Atty. Cabilao sent a text message to Atty. Diamante inquiring about the status of the transfer; Atty. Diamante replied, “kumusta na vios ko?” Atty. Cabilao asked if he could obtain the new certificate of title that day, but Atty. Diamante replied that he would release it only if the owner of Toyota called him. On September 14, 2012, Atty. Cabilao transmitted PHP 50,000.00 to Gerunda, intending the money for Atty. Diamante, and instructed Gerunda not to release the funds until he had verified that the title had been signed by Atty. Diamante. Upon learning from Gerunda that the title had not yet been signed, Atty. Cabilao directed Gerunda to return the funds, which Gerunda did on September 15, 2012.

Following a series of text messages, Atty. Cabilao again inquired about the status of the title on September 20, 2012. Atty. Diamante assured him that it would be released before September 21, 2012, and sent another text message: “Bigay mo na kay [Gerunda] and sabi mo ngayon na wag mo ipitin.” On the same day, Atty. Cabilao again transmitted PHP 50,000.00 to Gerunda. Upon receipt, Gerunda handed the money to Atty. Diamante. Atty. Cabilao then sought updates, but Atty. Diamante failed to issue the certificate, citing incomplete documents. Atty. Cabilao asked whether Atty. Diamante had deceived him into sending the funds without first signing the certificate; Atty. Diamante replied: “I did not say I will sign blindly hindi ako gaga gaya ng taga BIR. ok ka lang, di ko ginalaw pera mo [na] kay cimafranca nbi head.” The certificate of title was never signed by Atty. Diamante; it was signed by his successor only after Atty. Cabilao took the initiative to process it again.

Atty. Diamante denied receiving the money and asserted that Atty. Cabilao attempted to bribe him by leaving the money in an envelope on his table, which he declined to accept; he maintained that Atty. Cabilao recovered the money upon his refusal and disputed the authenticity of the text messages. Gerunda, for his part, admitted that Atty. Cabilao transmitted PHP 50,000.00 to him, which he personally delivered to Atty. Diamante; he claimed that he was simply obeying orders and had no other alternative because Atty. Diamante was his superior and Atty. Cabilao was a friend of the Regional Director of the Registry of Deeds.

• Defective Information / Right to be Informed: Gerunda contended that the Information is fatally defective because it does not contain the ultimate facts alleging the specific acts that would hold him guilty as an accomplice.
• Absence of Accomplice Requisites: Gerunda contended that the requisites to hold him liable as an accomplice are wanting, so he is entitled to acquittal.
• Obedience to Superior’s Orders: Gerunda claimed that he was merely obeying orders and had no other alternative because Atty. Diamante was his superior and Atty. Cabilao was a friend of the Regional Director.

• Validity of the Information / Right to be Informed: Whether the Information charging Gerunda as a principal in direct bribery is fatally defective for failing to allege the ultimate facts that would hold him liable as an accomplice.
• Accomplice Liability: Whether the CA erred in ruling that Gerunda is guilty of direct bribery as an accomplice.

• Validity of the Information / Right to be Informed: No. An accused may be validly convicted as an accomplice under an Information charging him as a principal; the greater responsibility includes the lesser, and the variance in participation does not violate the right to be informed.
• Accomplice Liability: No. The CA correctly held Gerunda liable as an accomplice; he knew of Atty. Diamante’s criminal design and cooperated by receiving and delivering the PHP 50,000.00, acts related to the principal’s direct bribery.

• Validity of the Information / Right to be Informed: The SC rejected the claim that the Information was fatally defective. In Vino vs. People, the SC held that an accused can be lawfully convicted as an accomplice or accessory despite being charged as a principal in the Information; the greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. Saldua vs. People reiterated that the variance in the degree of participation of an accused is not sufficient to entitle him to acquittal. Here, the Information charged Gerunda as a principal in direct bribery, but the evidence showed only accomplice participation; he can still be held accountable as an accomplice without violating his right to be informed of the charges against him.
• Accomplice Liability: The SC agreed with the CA that conspiracy was not established because there was no evidence of a prior agreement or an overt act showing a community of intention. However, under People vs. Ballesta, the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy does not eliminate criminal liability; where the doubt is whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice, it is resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability—that of an accomplice. Article 18 of the RPC defines accomplices as persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. People vs. Galicia requires: (1) a community of design; (2) cooperation in the execution by a previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice. People vs. De Vera distinguishes conspirators, who decide that a crime should be committed, from accomplices, who merely concur in it after the principals have reached the decision and cooperate in its accomplishment. Here, Gerunda admitted receiving PHP 50,000.00 from Atty. Cabilao and delivering it to Atty. Diamante; Official Receipt No. 001186 dated September 20, 2012 corroborated the remittance. He knew the money was consideration for the release of a new certificate of title in Toyota’s name. He knowingly cooperated by receiving and delivering the money, and his acts were intertwined with Atty. Diamante’s direct bribery. His defense of obeying orders fails because he could have rejected the money or reported the matter to the proper authorities. On penalty, because Gerunda is an accomplice, the penalty is one degree lower than that for the principal under Article 52. Article 210, paragraph 2, as amended, imposes prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of the gift if the desired act was not accomplished. Under Article 75, the fine is reduced by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without changing the minimum; the maximum prescribed fine was PHP 100,000.00, so the maximum imposable fine is PHP 75,000.00, while the minimum remains PHP 50,000.00. Under Article 66, the SC imposed PHP 50,000.00.

• Greater Responsibility Includes the Lesser — An accused charged as a principal may be convicted as an accomplice or accessory if the evidence shows a lesser degree of participation; this does not violate the right to be informed of the charges. Applied to Gerunda despite the Information charging him as a principal.
• Accomplice Liability — Under Article 18 of the RPC, accomplices are persons who, not included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The requisites from People vs. Galicia are: (1) community of design; (2) cooperation by a previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) a relation between the acts of the principal and those attributed to the accomplice. Applied: Gerunda knew of Atty. Diamante’s criminal design and received and delivered the bribe money.
• Conspiracy vs. Accomplice — Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed and are its authors; accomplices merely concur after the principals have reached the decision, assent to the plan, and cooperate in its accomplishment, performing acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. Applied: no prior agreement or overt act showed conspiracy; Gerunda only concurred and cooperated.
• Failure to Prove Conspiracy Does Not Absolve Accomplice — Where conspiracy is not proven, the accused may still be liable as an accomplice; doubt as to whether he acted as principal or accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder liability. Applied to Gerunda.
• Direct Bribery, Second Type — The elements are: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (c) the offer or promise accepted or gift or present received is with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust; and (d) the act agreed to be performed or executed is connected with the performance of official duties. Applied to Atty. Diamante as principal; Gerunda was held liable as an accomplice.
• Penalty for Accomplice and Fine Reduction — An accomplice suffers the penalty one degree lower than that of the principal. Under Article 75 of the RPC, a fine reduced by one degree is reduced by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without changing the minimum. Applied: maximum fine PHP 75,000.00, minimum PHP 50,000.00; the SC imposed PHP 50,000.00.

• “An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.” — The SC used this ruling from Vino vs. People to reject Gerunda’s claim that the Information was fatally defective for charging him as a principal.
• “The failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not eliminate any criminal liability on the part of the appellant. Although he cannot be convicted as a co-principal by reason of the conspiracy, he can still be liable as an accomplice. Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability—that of a mere accomplice.” — The SC quoted People vs. Ballesta to hold that Gerunda remained liable as an accomplice despite the failure to prove conspiracy.
• “Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.” — The SC used this distinction from People vs. De Vera to characterize Gerunda’s participation as that of an accomplice.
• “In order that a person to be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (1) that there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by a previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.” — The SC quoted People vs. Galicia for the requisites of accomplice liability and applied them to Gerunda’s receipt and delivery of the bribe money.

• Vino vs. People, 258-A Phil. 404 (1989) — Controlling precedent; held that an accused charged as a principal may be convicted as an accomplice or accessory because the greater responsibility includes the lesser.
• Saldua vs. People, 845 Phil. 44 (2018) — Reiterated Vino; held that the variance in the degree of participation does not warrant acquittal.
• People vs. Ballesta, 588 Phil. 87 (2008) — Held that failure to prove conspiracy does not eliminate criminal liability; the accused may still be liable as an accomplice, and doubt as to participation is resolved in favor of the milder liability.
• People vs. De Vera, 371 Phil. 563 (1999) — Distinguished conspirators from accomplices.
• People vs. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021 — Enumerated the requisites of accomplice liability.
• Mangulabnan vs. People, G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020 — Cited for the elements of the second type of direct bribery.
• De los Angeles vs. People, 103 Phil. 295 (1958) — Explained Article 75 on the reduction of fines by degrees; the basis is the maximum amount prescribed by law for the consummated crime, not the already reduced maximum.

• Article 210, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871) — Defines direct bribery and penalizes the officer who accepts a gift in consideration of an act not constituting a crime but unjust, or connected with official duties; if the desired act is not accomplished, the penalty is prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of the gift. Applied: Atty. Diamante was the principal; Gerunda was an accomplice; the penalty was lowered one degree and the fine was based on PHP 50,000.00.
• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as persons who, not included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Applied to Gerunda’s receipt and delivery of the bribe money.
• Article 52, Revised Penal Code — The penalty for an accomplice is one degree lower than that for the principal. Applied to reduce Gerunda’s imprisonment and fine.
• Article 75, Revised Penal Code — When reducing a fine by one or more degrees, the fine is reduced by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without changing the minimum. Applied: the maximum fine was reduced from PHP 100,000.00 to PHP 75,000.00; the minimum remained PHP 50,000.00.
• Article 66, Revised Penal Code — Courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the wealth or means of the culprit. Applied: the SC imposed a fine of PHP 50,000.00.