Gementiza vs. COMELEC

A protestee who files a demurrer to evidence in an election protest impliedly waives the right to present evidence, regardless of whether the demurrer is granted or denied, because the summary and expeditious nature of election proceedings precludes the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure allowing the presentation of evidence after a denied demurrer.

Gelacio P. Gementiza and Victorio R. Suaybaguio, Jr. vied for the vice-gubernatorial seat of Davao del Norte in the May 11, 1998 elections. Gementiza was proclaimed the winner by a margin of 1,123 votes. Suaybaguio filed an election protest with the COMELEC alleging fraud and irregularities. After ballot revision, Suaybaguio waived testimonial evidence and rested solely on documentary evidence. Gementiza subsequently filed a demurrer to evidence, asserting the protest lacked basis and that no justification existed to require him to present his own evidence.

• The Election and Protest: Gementiza and Suaybaguio were rival candidates for Vice-Governor of Davao del Norte in the May 11, 1998 elections. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Gementiza the winner with 109,985 votes against Suaybaguio's 108,862. Suaybaguio filed an election protest with the COMELEC, alleging padded votes, erroneous reading and recording of votes, intimidation of watchers, and invalidation of valid votes.
• Revision and Demurrer: A revision of contested ballots from 624 protested precincts was conducted. On August 5, 1999, Suaybaguio waived testimonial evidence and formally offered his documentary evidence. Gementiza filed a demurrer to evidence on September 6, 1999, arguing that the protest was baseless and negated by the protestant's own evidence, and that there was no legal justification to require him to present countervailing evidence.
• COMELEC Division Rulings: On October 11, 1999, the COMELEC Second Division denied the demurrer, ruling that it could ascertain the electorate's will from the existing evidence and that filing a demurrer in an election protest constitutes an implied waiver of the right to present evidence. Gementiza's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 29, 1999, the Division holding that the October 11 order was interlocutory and could not be certified to the COMELEC En Banc.

• Applicability of Civil Procedure Rules: Petitioner argued that under Section 1, Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of a demurrer to evidence grants the defendant the right to present evidence, citing Northwest Airlines v. Court of Appeals.
• Finality of the Order: Petitioner maintained that the October 11, 1999 order denying the demurrer was a final order, thereby requiring his motion for reconsideration to be certified and elevated to the COMELEC En Banc pursuant to Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

• Implied Waiver in Election Cases: Public respondent countered that the rule on demurrer in civil cases does not apply to election cases; filing a demurrer in an election protest implies a waiver of the right to present evidence to prevent procedural delays.
• Interlocutory Nature of the Order: Public respondent argued that the October 11, 1999 order was interlocutory because it did not finally dispose of the case on the merits, and therefore could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.

• Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the filing of a demurrer to evidence in an election protest carries with it an implied waiver of the protestee's right to present evidence.
• Nature of the Order: Whether the COMELEC Division's order denying a demurrer to evidence is a final order that should be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.

• Demurrer to Evidence: The filing of a demurrer to evidence in an election protest carries an implied waiver of the right to present evidence. The rule in civil cases (Rule 33, Section 1) does not apply to election cases, even suppletorily, because election cases are summary and expeditious. Allowing a protestee to present evidence after a denied demurrer would cause delays that frustrate the will of the electorate. The protestee's categorical assertions in the demurrer that there was no reason to present evidence further cemented this waiver.
• Nature of the Order: The order denying the demurrer is interlocutory, not final. An order is final if it completely disposes of the case; interlocutory if there is something more to be done. Because the election protest itself remained unresolved, the order was interlocutory. Under the Constitution (Art. IX-C, Sec. 3) and COMELEC Rules (Rule 3, Sec. 5[c]), only motions for reconsideration of final decisions of a Division are decided by the COMELEC En Banc. Motions on interlocutory orders are resolved by the Division that issued them.

• Implied Waiver of Right to Present Evidence in Election Protests — In an election protest, the protestee who files a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence after the protestant rests their case impliedly waives the right to present evidence, regardless of the ruling on the demurrer. This is because election proceedings are summary and expeditious, and allowing the presentation of evidence after a denied demurrer would cause delays that could extend the case throughout the term of the office, defeating the will of the electorate.
• Interlocutory vs. Final Orders in COMELEC — An order is final if it completely disposes of the entire case, whereas it is interlocutory if there is something more to be done. Only motions for reconsideration of final decisions of a COMELEC Division may be elevated to and decided by the COMELEC En Banc. Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are resolved by the Division that issued them.

• "In an election protest proceeding, however, which is a summary one, and in which the periods are short and fatal, and trials rapid and preferential as the peremptory nature of the litigation so requires, the motion for dismissal at that stage of the proceeding must be considered as a demurrer to the evidence presented by the protestant, with implied waiver by the protestee to present his evidence, whatever may be the ruling, whether adverse or favorable, either in the first instance or on appeal, the court of origin or appellate court having the power to definitely decide the protest." — Articulates the doctrinal rule that the ordinary civil procedure on demurrer does not apply in election cases due to the need for expeditious resolution.

• Demetrio v. Lopez, 50 Phil. 45 (1927) — Controlling precedent establishing the doctrine that a demurrer to evidence in an election protest constitutes an implied waiver of the right to present evidence.
• Jardiel v. COMELEC, 124 SCRA 650 (1983) — Followed and reiterated the Demetrio doctrine.
• Calabig v. Villanueva, 135 SCRA 300 (1985) — Quoted with approval and applied the Demetrio doctrine as a doctrinal rule.
• Enojas, Jr. v. COMELEC, 283 SCRA 229 (1997) — Emphatically reaffirmed the Demetrio doctrine, holding that a motion to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of evidence in an election protest is a demurrer carrying an implied waiver.
• Northwest Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 408 (1998) — Distinguished/inapplicable; sets the rule on demurrer in ordinary civil cases, which does not apply to election cases.
• Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 (1969) — Cited for the principle that election cases are special and expeditious, and their early resolution should not be hampered by unnecessary observance of procedural rules.

• Section 1, Rule 33, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that if a demurrer to evidence is denied, the defendant shall have the right to present evidence. Held inapplicable to election cases, even suppletorily, due to the distinct and expeditious nature of election proceedings.
• Section 4, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — States that the Rules of Court shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Held not applicable because applying the demurrer rule would not be practicable or convenient.
• Section 1, Rule 41, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character.
• Section 5, Rule 19, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Requires the Clerk of Court to notify the Presiding Commissioner upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a Division's ruling, which shall then be certified to the En Banc. Construed to apply only to motions for reconsideration of final decisions.
• Section 5(c), Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that motions to reconsider interlocutory orders of a Division shall be resolved by the Division which issued the order, while motions on decisions are resolved En Banc.
• Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that motions for reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division shall be decided by the Commission En Banc. Interpreted to mean only final decisions, excluding interlocutory orders.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs in the result.