Gayon vs. Gayon

Heirs may be sued as owners of an aliquot interest in inherited property without a prior judicial declaration of heirship, provided no special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate is pending, because succession takes place by operation of law from the moment of death. Additionally, the compromise requirement under Article 222 of the Civil Code applies only to suits between members of the same family as enumerated in Article 217—spouses, parents and children, other ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters—and does not extend to siblings-in-law or uncles and nieces or nephews.

Pedro Gayon, the brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, sought consolidation of ownership over a parcel of unregistered land in Cabubugan, Guimbal, Iloilo, which had originally been sold by Silvestre and his wife Genoveva de Gayon to Pedro Gelera under a conditional sale with a right of redemption. Silvestre Gayon died on January 6, 1954, before the complaint was filed on July 31, 1967. The dispute centered on whether Genoveva, as the surviving widow, could properly be sued in the absence of a declaration of heirship and whether the suit between a brother-in-law and a sister-in-law required prior earnest efforts at compromise under Article 222 of the Civil Code.

On October 1, 1952, the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon executed a deed of sale whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of ₱500.00, a parcel of unregistered land located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to the right of redemption within five years, or no later than October 1, 1957. That right of redemption was never exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, notwithstanding the expiration of the redemption period.

Thereafter, on March 21, 1961, Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso sold the same land to Pedro Gayon—the brother of Silvestre Gayon—for the sum of ₱614.00. Since 1961, Pedro Gayon introduced improvements on the property worth ₱1,000.00 and fully paid the taxes thereon up to 1967. Relying on Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, which require a judicial decree for the consolidation of title in land acquired through a conditional sale, Pedro Gayon filed a complaint on July 31, 1967, praying for an order consolidating his ownership over the property.

Silvestre Gayon had died on January 6, 1954, well before the institution of the case. In her answer, Genoveva de Gayon alleged that the deed of sale attached to the complaint as Annex "A" was fictitious, the signature purporting to be hers being a forgery, and that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed any document in the plaintiff's favor. She further contended that the complaint was malicious, that the heirs had incurred attorney's fees of ₱500.00 and expenses of at least ₱200.00, and that Pedro Gayon, being the brother of the deceased, had not exerted efforts toward an amicable settlement before filing suit. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, stressing the necessity of amending the complaint to reflect the genuine facts on record, including the death of Silvestre Gayon.

On September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order of dismissal, reasoning that Silvestre Gayon was the absolute owner of the land and that his widow Genoveva had nothing to do with the property. Pedro Gayon's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present appeal.

• Consolidation of Title: Pedro Gayon argued that Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of title in land acquired through a conditional sale, and accordingly prayed for an order consolidating his ownership over the property.
• Propriety of the Defendant: Pedro Gayon maintained that Genoveva de Gayon, as the widow and compulsory heir of Silvestre Gayon, had an interest in the property in question and was a proper party to the suit.

• Fictitious Deed: Genoveva de Gayon countered that Annex "A" to the complaint was fictitious, the signature thereon purporting to be hers being a forgery, and that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed any document of whatever nature in the plaintiff's favor.
• Malicious Complaint: Respondent argued that the complaint was malicious and had embarrassed her and her children, causing them to incur attorney's fees of ₱500.00 and expenses of at least ₱200.00.
• Failure to Seek Compromise: Respondent maintained that Pedro Gayon, being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, did not exert efforts for an amicable settlement before filing the complaint.
• Necessity of Declaration of Heirship: Respondent argued that the heirs cannot represent the dead defendant unless there is a declaration of heirship, and stressed the necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record.

• Propriety of Dismissal: Whether the lower court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that Genoveva de Gayon had no interest in the land subject of the complaint.
• Declaration of Heirship: Whether heirs of a deceased person may be sued as defendants without a prior judicial declaration of heirship.
• Compromise Requirement: Whether Article 222 of the Civil Code, requiring earnest efforts toward a compromise before filing suit between members of the same family, applies to a suit between a brother-in-law and a sister-in-law, or between an uncle and his nieces or nephews.

• Propriety of Dismissal: No. The lower court erred in holding that Genoveva de Gayon had nothing to do with the land, she being the widow and compulsory heir of Silvestre Gayon with a concomitant interest in the property.
• Declaration of Heirship: No prior declaration of heirship is required. Heirs may be sued as owners of an aliquot interest in inherited property without such declaration, provided no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending, because succession operates by operation of law from the moment of death.
• Compromise Requirement: No. Article 222 does not apply because the relationship between the parties—brother-in-law and sister-in-law, uncle and nieces or nephews—does not fall within the enumeration of family relations in Article 217 of the Civil Code, which must be construed strictly as an exception to the general rule.

• Propriety of Dismissal: The lower court's finding that Genoveva de Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint" was manifestly erroneous. As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs under Article 87(3) of the Civil Code and accordingly has an interest in the property in question. Her own motion to dismiss indicated merely a necessity of amending the complaint to include the other successors in interest of Silvestre Gayon as defendants, rather than Silvestre himself. The dismissal was therefore unwarranted.

• Declaration of Heirship: Genoveva de Gayon argued that "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship." This argument was rejected because succession takes place by operation of law from the moment of the death of the decedent, pursuant to Articles 774 and 777 of the Civil Code, and the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death, under Article 776. If the heirs were included as defendants, they would be sued not as representatives of the decedent but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property, even if the precise extent of their interest remained undetermined. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

• Compromise Requirement: Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. The phrase "members of the same family" must be construed in light of Article 217, which enumerates family relations as those between husband and wife, parent and child, other ascendants and their descendants, and brothers and sisters. Genoveva de Gayon is the plaintiff's sister-in-law, and her children are his nephews and nieces. None of these relationships is included in the enumeration in Article 217, which must be construed strictly as it constitutes an exception to the general rule. Since Silvestre Gayon is necessarily excluded as a party due to his death, the suit does not fall within the purview of Article 222, and the plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the action.

• Succession by Operation of Law — Succession takes place from the moment of the death of the decedent, by operation of law, and the inheritance includes all property, rights, and obligations of the decedent not extinguished by death. Because heirs acquire their interest by operation of law and not by judicial declaration, they may be sued as owners of an aliquot interest in inherited property without a prior declaration of heirship, provided no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Genoveva de Gayon and the other heirs of Silvestre Gayon could be properly named as defendants.

• Strict Construction of the Compromise Requirement (Article 222) — The requirement under Article 222 that earnest efforts toward a compromise be made before filing suit applies only to suits between "members of the same family," a phrase that must be construed in light of the enumeration in Article 217: husband and wife, parent and child, other ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters. Because Article 222 is an exception to the general rule, it must be strictly construed. The Court held that the relationship between a brother-in-law and a sister-in-law, or between an uncle and nieces or nephews, does not fall within the enumeration, and thus the compromise requirement did not bar the suit.

• "if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as 'representatives' of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the declaration-of-heirship issue, establishing that heirs derive their interest by operation of law and may be sued as owners without prior judicial declaration of heirship.

• "Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the scope of Article 222, holding that the compromise requirement is strictly limited to the family relationships enumerated in Article 217 and does not extend to siblings-in-law or uncles and nieces or nephews.

• Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 — Cited in support of the proposition that succession takes place by operation of law from the moment of death, alongside Articles 774 and 777 of the Civil Code.
• Cuevas vs. Abesamis, 71 Phil. 147 — Cited as additional authority for the operation of succession from the moment of death.
• Hernandez vs. Padua, 14 Phil. 194 — Cited as supporting authority for the rule that heirs may be sued without a prior declaration of heirship when no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending.
• Aznar vs. Duncan, L-24365, June 30, 1966 — Cited among the line of cases supporting the proposition that succession operates from the moment of death.

• Article 222, Civil Code — Provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the parties' relationship did not fall within the enumeration in Article 217.
• Article 217, Civil Code — Enumerates family relations as those between husband and wife, parent and child, other ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters. The Court construed this provision strictly as an exception to the general rule, limiting the scope of Article 222.
• Articles 774 and 777, Civil Code — Establish that succession takes place by operation of law from the moment of the death of the decedent. The Court relied on these provisions to hold that heirs acquire their interest without need of a judicial declaration of heirship.
• Article 776, Civil Code — Defines the inheritance as including all property, rights, and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by death. The Court used this provision to support the conclusion that heirs may be sued as owners of an aliquot interest in inherited property.
• Article 87(3), Civil Code — Identifies the surviving spouse as a compulsory heir. The Court cited this provision to establish that Genoveva de Gayon, as widow, had an interest in the property in question.
• Articles 1606 and 1616, Civil Code — Require a judicial decree for the consolidation of title in land acquired through a conditional sale. The plaintiff invoked these provisions as the basis for his complaint seeking consolidation of ownership.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concurred. Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., were on leave.