Gaviola vs. People of the Philippines

A claim of good faith or ownership does not negate intent to gain in theft where the accused has judicially admitted or been conclusively adjudged that the property belongs to another; animus furandi is presumed from the taking of another’s personal property without consent and may be rebutted only by an honest, bona fide belief, not by a mere pretense.

Alfonso Gaviola and Cleto Mejarito traced their claims to adjacent cadastral lots in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Biliran: Gaviola inherited Lot 1311 from his father Elias Gaviola, while Mejarito inherited Lot 1301 from his father Eusebio Mejarito. Prior litigation, Civil Case No. 111 and Civil Case No. B-0600, had already fixed Lot 1301 as belonging to Mejarito’s predecessor and Lot 1311 as the Gaviola property. The present criminal case arose under Articles 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which define theft and qualify it when coconuts are taken from the premises of a plantation.

On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the then Court of First Instance of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title with injunctive relief over a 40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut land in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as Cadastral Lot 1301 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 743. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 111. Eusebio claimed ownership over the property. On July 29, 1955, the trial court dismissed the complaint and declared Eusebio the lawful owner; the decision became final and executory. On September 3, 1955, the trial court ordered the sheriff to place Eusebio in possession, and the sheriff complied on December 19, 1958. Eusebio died intestate survived by his son Cleto; Elias also died intestate survived by his son Alfonso.

Almost 30 years later, in October 1985, Cleto filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for recovery of possession of a parcel of land and execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The property involved was located north of Lot 1301 and covered by TD No. 1546; the case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-0600. Cleto alleged that the defendants’ houses were located on property adjudicated to his father, Eusebio, in Civil Case No. 111. The defendants answered that the property where their houses stood was different from that adjudicated to Eusebio. Because the parties could not agree on the identification and metes and bounds of the parcels, the court appointed Bienvenido Ricafort, Officer-in-Charge of the sub-office of the Provincial Assessor, as Commissioner to resurvey the property. The Commissioner prepared a sketch indicating Cleto’s Lot 1301 and the parcel where Alfonso’s house stood, Lot 1311, and reported that the property adjudicated to Eusebio in Civil Case No. 111 was Lot 1301, while that belonging to Elias Gaviola was Lot 1311; Alfonso’s old one-storey house was located on Lot 1311. Alfonso did not object to the report.

On May 4, 1990, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0600 and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the parcels occupied by the defendants, including Lot 1311, were different from the property adjudicated to Eusebio in Civil Case No. 111, which was Lot 1301, and that Cleto had no cause of action for execution because the Civil Case No. 111 decision had long been enforced. An appeal was taken to the CA, which on September 18, 1992 affirmed the RTC. The CA declared that Alfonso’s house was located in Lot 1311, covered by TD 1611 under the name of Elias Gaviola. Cleto filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied due course in a Resolution dated March 24, 1993; the CA decision became final and executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution, a copy of which Sheriff Ludenilo S. Ador served on the defendants on August 5, 1993. In the meantime, Cleto left the Philippines and stayed in the United States of America; he entrusted the land to the care of his nephew, Rafael Lozano.

At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto and a barangay councilman, saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola, and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees in Lot 1301. Under the supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees. The Officer-in-Charge of the Maripipi Police Station filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the spouses Gaviola and those who gathered the coconuts in the municipal trial court. The coconuts were entrusted to the care of the barangay captain. On February 6, 1998, an Information was filed with the RTC of Naval, Biliran, against the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft, alleging that on or about September 6, 1997, at around 9:00 a.m. in Barangay Calbani, Maripipi, Biliran, they conspired and, with intent to gain, unlawfully took, harvested, and gathered 1,500 coconut fruits from Cleto Mejarito’s plantation without his consent, to his damage and prejudice in the amount of P3,000.00.

Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions but insisted that the trees from which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his father, Elias Gaviola, and that Cleto’s Lot 1301 was adjacent. He testified that the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff on August 5, 1993, and that since then he had gathered coconuts every three months without being confronted or prosecuted by anybody. He insisted that his claim was based on the RTC decision in Civil Case No. B-0600, affirmed by the CA. On April 13, 2000, the RTC convicted Alfonso of qualified theft. The trial court ruled that he took the coconuts from coconut trees planted on Cadastral Lot 1301, owned by Cleto Mejarito, and not on his own Lot 1311. It found his claim of honest belief barren of probative weight, noting that in Civil Case No. B-0600 he had admitted that Cleto’s property was separate from his; that his land was residential while Cleto’s was coconut land; that there were no coconut trees on his lot and no evidence he planted coconut trees on Cleto’s property; and that he failed to corroborate his claim that he had gathered coconuts from Cleto’s property three times a year before September 6, 1997. The CA affirmed the RTC on October 1, 2003, and denied reconsideration.

• Intent to Gain (Animus Lucrandi): Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction; he had taken coconuts from the property in broad daylight three times a year since August 5, 1993 on an honest belief that he owned the land where the coconut trees were planted, and was charged only after the September 6, 1997 taking.
• Ownership and Good Faith: Petitioner maintained that his honest belief that he owned the land negated intent to steal; the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 declared him owner of the property where the coconut trees were planted, the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff, and since then he had planted bananas and gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.
• Damages: Petitioner raised the issue of whether he is liable for exemplary and liquidated damages.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Office of the Solicitor General averred that the RTC decision, affirmed by the CA, is in accord with the evidence on record.
• Ownership of Lot 1301: The OSG maintained that under the CFI decision in Civil Case No. 111, the RTC decision in Civil Case No. B-0600, and the CA decision affirming the RTC, the owner of Lot 1301, from which the coconuts were taken, was Eusebio Mejarito, the private complainant’s father.

• Intent to Gain: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction.
• Damages: Whether petitioner is liable for exemplary and liquidated damages.

• Intent to Gain: Yes. Intent to gain was established; animus furandi is presumed from the taking of another’s personal property without the owner’s consent and was not rebutted by petitioner’s claim of good faith, which the courts found to be a mere pretense. Article 308, Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: Yes, as to exemplary damages. The petition was denied, leaving the CA affirmance of the RTC awards undisturbed; the Court expressly found factual and legal basis for the P20,000.00 exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code because petitioner was guilty of qualified theft.

• Intent to Gain: Article 308 defines theft as taking personal property of another, with intent to gain, without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, and without the owner’s consent. Its elements are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with intent to gain; (4) the taking is without the owner’s consent; and (5) the taking is accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Article 310 qualifies theft when the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. Intent to steal (animus furandi) is the intent to deprive another of ownership or lawful possession of personal property, apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent essential to a felony of dolo. It is a state of mind provable by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the manner and conduct of the accused before, during, and after the taking. General criminal intent is presumed from the wrongful act; animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the accused took the property under a bona fide belief that he owned it. Open and notorious taking without concealment or denial, but with avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption of no animus furandi; however, if the claim is dishonest or a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker, and the belief must be honest and in good faith. Here, the trial court found petitioner’s claim of honest belief barren of probative weight. Petitioner had admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private complainant’s property was separate from his; a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof, except when shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was in fact made. In his memorandum in Civil Case No. B-0600, petitioner categorically stated that the three parcels were distinct, covered by different sets of tax declarations, and denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311, and 1303. His land was residential, while the private complainant’s was coconut land; there were no coconut trees on his lot, and there was no evidence that he planted coconut trees on the private complainant’s property. He also failed to corroborate his claim that he had gathered coconuts from the private complainant’s property three times a year before September 6, 1997. United States vs. Villacorta, which the Court found on all fours, held that after a court of competent jurisdiction had decided ownership against the defendant, he could no longer claim ownership of the land from which he took the paddy and must have known that the paddy did not belong to him. The findings of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive absent evidence that they ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts of substance warranting modification or reversal; no such justification appeared. Petitioner’s claim of good faith was thus a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
• Damages: Article 2230 of the New Civil Code allows exemplary damages in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; such damages are separate and distinct from fines and are paid to the offended party. Petitioner was guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified theft. The Court therefore found factual and legal bases for the award of P20,000.00 exemplary damages. The denial of the petition left the CA decision, which affirmed the RTC’s award of P3,000.00 liquidated damages, undisturbed; the Court’s express discussion addressed only exemplary damages.

• Animus furandi in theft — Theft requires intent to gain, and animus furandi is the intent to deprive another of ownership or lawful possession of personal property, apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent essential to a felony of dolo. It is a state of mind provable by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the manner and conduct of the accused before, during, and after the taking. General criminal intent is presumed from the wrongful act, and animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a bona fide belief of ownership, but the belief must be honest and in good faith, not a mere sham or pretense. The Court applied this doctrine against petitioner because his claim of good faith was found to be a mere pretense in light of his judicial admissions and the prior adjudication.
• Qualified theft for coconuts taken from a plantation — Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified when the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. The Court applied this provision because petitioner caused the taking of 1,500 coconuts from Lot 1301, which was coconut land owned by the private complainant.
• Judicial admission — A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof, except when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was in fact made. The Court relied on petitioner’s admissions in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the lots were separate and distinct to show that he could not have honestly believed he owned Lot 1301.
• Findings of fact of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court — Such findings are conclusive on the Supreme Court absent evidence that the trial and appellate courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal. The Court found no justification to modify or reverse the findings that petitioner took coconuts from Lot 1301 and that his claim of good faith was false.
• Exemplary damages in criminal offenses — Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; they are separate and distinct from fines and are paid to the offended party. The Court found factual and legal bases for the P20,000.00 exemplary damages because petitioner was guilty of qualified theft, not merely simple theft.
• Open and notorious taking — An open and notorious taking, without any attempt at concealment or denial, but with an avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption that there is no animus furandi. However, if the claim is dishonest or a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker. The Court cited this principle but found petitioner’s claim dishonest and a mere pretense.

• "The animo being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of the accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General criminal intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to have willed the natural consequences of his own acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property." — This passage states the ratio on intent to gain: animus furandi is presumed from the taking and may be rebutted only by a bona fide belief of ownership.
• "In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker." — Quoted from Black vs. State, this defines the limits of the good-faith defense: an honest claim of title negates larceny, but a dishonest or pretended claim does not.
• "In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner’s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the private complainant’s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability." — This is the Court’s conclusion on the central issue, rejecting petitioner’s defense of good faith.
• "We rule that there is factual and legal bases for the award of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, the petitioner is guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified theft." — This passage sustains the exemplary damages award and ties it to the qualified nature of the theft.

• United States vs. Villacorta, 30 Phil. 108 (1915) — The Court described this case as on all fours and relied on it to hold that after a final court ruling declared the complainant the owner of the land, the defendant could no longer claim ownership of the land or the paddy taken, supporting the rejection of petitioner’s good faith.
• Black vs. State, 3 So. 814 (1888) — Cited for the rule that an open and notorious taking without concealment or denial, but with avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption of no animus furandi, yet a dishonest claim or mere pretense does not protect the taker.
• Charles vs. State, 18 So. 369 (1895) — Cited for the requirement that the accused’s belief of ownership must be honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.
• Atillo III vs. C.A., 266 SCRA 596 — Cited for the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof, except when shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was in fact made.

• Article 308, Revised Penal Code — Defines theft as the taking of personal property of another, with intent to gain, without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, and without the owner’s consent. The Court applied it to establish the elements of theft and the presumption of animus furandi from the taking.
• Article 310, Revised Penal Code — Qualifies theft when the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. The Court applied it because petitioner caused the taking of 1,500 coconuts from Lot 1301, a coconut plantation owned by the private complainant.
• Article 2230, New Civil Code — Allows exemplary damages in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; such damages are separate and distinct from fines and are paid to the offended party. The Court applied it to sustain the P20,000.00 exemplary damages because petitioner was guilty of qualified theft.
• Article 530, Spanish Penal Code — Cited as the source of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; the Court used it only to trace the definition and elements of theft, not as an independent basis for liability.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN (Chief Justice, Chairperson), CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, and MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO concurred. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.