Gaudan vs. Degamo

The condonation doctrine remains good law for elective officials reelected before April 12, 2016, the date the abandonment of the doctrine in Ombudsman Carpio Morales vs. CA attained finality; such officials acquire a vested right not to be removed from office for prior-term administrative misconduct. The Court of Appeals may also issue injunctive writs against Ombudsman decisions or orders as an ancillary remedy to its certiorari jurisdiction.

Degamo was an elective local official of Negros Oriental, while Gaudan was the complainant before the Ombudsman. The dispute implicated the Ombudsman’s disciplinary jurisdiction over elective officials, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman on finality and execution of administrative decisions, and the condonation doctrine under which reelection may cut off administrative liability for prior-term misconduct. It also required reconciliation of the Court of Appeals’ ancillary injunctive power with the Ombudsman’s authority to execute its decisions pending appeal.

In the May 2010 elections, Degamo won a seat as Provincial Board Member of Negros Oriental. Due to the sudden deaths of Governor-elect Emillio C. Macias II on June 13, 2010 and Vice Governor-elect Agustin Perdices on January 5, 2011, Degamo, as the Provincial Board Member who garnered the highest number of votes, assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession. As then incumbent Governor, Degamo requested from the Office of the President the release of calamity funds for fiscal year 2012 for the rehabilitation, repair, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructures in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong and a magnitude 6.9 earthquake that struck the Province in December 2011 and February 2012.

On June 5, 2012, the Department of Budget and Management Regional Office No. VII issued Special Allotment Release Order No. ROVII-12-0009202 to the Province in the amount of P961,550,000.00, drawn from the Calamity Fund under the 2012 General Appropriations Act. Two days later, P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the total amount of the SARO, was released and deposited to the bank account of the Provincial Government. In a Letter dated June 19, 2012, DBM Undersecretary Mario L. Relampagos informed Degamo of the immediate withdrawal of the SARO for noncompliance with existing DPWH guidelines on large-scale fund releases for infrastructure projects amounting to P10,000,000.00 or higher, particularly DPWH Department Order No. 16, Series of 2012. Consequently, DBM Regional Office No. VII, through Director Carmela S. Fernan, issued SARO No. ROVII-12-00122081, a negative SARO withdrawing the release of funds. Director Fernan also sent a Letter dated July 10, 2012 to Degamo demanding the return of P480,775,000.00 to the National Treasury.

Degamo wrote a Letter dated July 16, 2012 to Undersecretary Relampagos questioning the validity of the negative SARO and refusing to comply with the DBM’s directive to return the funds already released to the Province. In the meantime, the Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government held a special meeting for a pre-procurement conference for infrastructure projects to be implemented out of the Calamity Fund released under SARO No. ROVII-12-0009202. Thereafter, Degamo, through Negotiated Procurement in Emergency Cases, awarded eleven infrastructure project contracts and released the total amount of P143,268,441.59, representing 15% of the contract price as advanced payment, to the respective project contractors. On October 9, 2012, the Commission on Audit issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. NegOr 2012-019 questioning these disbursements for lack of the required certificate of availability of funds. After audit, the COA issued Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2012-139-100-(12) to 2012-149-100-(12) dated November 29, 2012, disallowing the advanced payments made to the project contractors due to the lack of available funds as a result of the DBM’s withdrawal of SARO No. ROVII-12-0009202.

Degamo ran and won as Governor of the Province in the May 2013 elections. On October 29, 2013, Gaudan filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Ombudsman against Degamo and several others for (a) Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as OMB-V-C-13-0348; and (b) Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Abuse of Authority, docketed as OMB-V-A-13-0331, in connection with their refusal to return the amount of P480,775,000.00 to the National Treasury as a consequence of the negative SARO. The Complaint-Affidavit also charged Bids and Awards Committee Chairman Danilo C. Mendez and Provincial Treasurer Teodorico G. Reyes for allegedly authorizing the illegal expenditure and falsely certifying that the allotments had been obligated and were supported by complete documents.

In its Joint Resolution dated January 12, 2016, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Degamo and his co-respondents for 11 counts of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification under Article 217, in relation to Articles 171 and 48, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. It found that their unilateral act of ignoring DBM’s authority was indicative of evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and/or gross inexcusable negligence which caused undue injury to the Government in the amount of P143,268,441.59. On the administrative aspect, the Ombudsman found Degamo and his co-respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed dismissal with accessory penalties, but applied the condonation doctrine to Degamo because of his reelection as Provincial Governor in 2013. Upon Gaudan’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in its Joint Order dated May 16, 2016, amended its earlier ruling and dismissed Degamo from the service, taking into consideration the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio Morales. The Court of Appeals later found no clear and convincing evidence that Degamo’s refusal to return the Calamity Fund had been made for personal or selfish ends, or that he acted in a capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary manner with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice.

• Injunctive Relief Against Ombudsman Orders: Gaudan postulated that the Court of Appeals cannot encroach upon the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman through the issuance of injunctive writs preventing execution pending appeal, citing Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, Office of the Ombudsman vs. de Chavez, Villasenor vs. Ombudsman, and Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valencerina, and invoking specialis derogat generali under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
• Scope of Carpio Morales: Gaudan claimed that Carpio Morales is inapplicable because it is limited to injunctive writs as an ancillary remedy against preventive suspension orders issued by the Ombudsman, and not to cases where the penalty of dismissal from the service has already been imposed.
• Procedural Objections to Degamo’s CA Petition: Gaudan objected to the lack of affidavit and proof of service of Degamo’s Petition to the OSG, the wrongful impleading of courts and agencies, the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies given Degamo’s alleged failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and the inclusion of an appeal on the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause in the criminal case.
• Condonation and Succession: Gaudan asserted that the condonation doctrine should not apply to Degamo because he first assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession, not by election to that office.
• Constitutionality of Condonation: Gaudan raised the issue of whether the condonation doctrine is unconstitutional since it has no statutory or constitutional basis.

• Illegality of DBM Withdrawal: Degamo argued that he could not be held liable for the disbursements in relation to the Calamity Fund released to the Province because the DBM’s withdrawal of SARO No. ROVII-12-0009202 was illegal.
• Condonation by 2013 Reelection: Degamo argued that, given the prospective application of Carpio Morales, his reelection in 2013 as Governor of the Province effectively condoned any administrative liability that he incurred for acts allegedly committed in 2012.
• Procedural Compliance and Propriety of CA Petition: Degamo pointed out that copies of his Petition for Review were duly served upon Gaudan’s counsel, the DILG, and the Ombudsman; that the inclusion of the Ombudsman as respondent was justified in view of his application for a preliminary injunctive writ; that he had actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Hold Filing of Information with the Ombudsman; and that the Court of Appeals may entertain an appeal of the Ombudsman’s ruling in criminal cases if it is consolidated with an administrative case.

• Procedural Objections to the CA Petition: Whether Degamo’s Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals should be dismissed for lack of affidavit and proof of service to the OSG, wrongful impleading of courts and agencies, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and inclusion of an appeal on the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause in the criminal case.
• Injunctive Relief Against the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: Whether the condonation doctrine justified the Court of Appeals’ issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the Ombudsman’s Joint Order dated May 16, 2016.
• Condonation and Succession: Whether the condonation doctrine is applicable to Degamo, who first assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession.
• Degree of Misconduct: Whether Degamo is liable only for simple misconduct instead of grave misconduct.
• Immediate Executory Nature of the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: Whether the Ombudsman’s Joint Order, which dismissed Degamo from the service, was immediately executory.
• Constitutionality of the Condonation Doctrine: Whether the condonation doctrine is unconstitutional since it has no statutory or constitutional basis.
• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: Whether the condonation doctrine is applicable to Degamo.

• Procedural Objections to the CA Petition: No. The Petition complied with Section 5, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; proof of service was made on Gaudan’s counsel, the DILG, and the Ombudsman; the Ombudsman was properly impleaded; Degamo filed a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman; and the Court of Appeals correctly limited its review to the administrative aspect of the consolidated case.
• Injunctive Relief Against the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: Yes. The Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order or injunctive writ against Ombudsman decisions and/or orders as an ancillary remedy to its certiorari jurisdiction under Section 9(1), Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
• Condonation and Succession: Yes. The condonation doctrine applies to Degamo even though he first assumed the Governorship by succession, because he was elected Governor in 2013 by the same electorate that elected him as Provincial Board Member in 2010, before April 12, 2016.
• Degree of Misconduct: Unnecessary to resolve. The administrative complaint was dismissed as moot and academic on condonation grounds, so the Court did not pass upon whether Degamo was liable only for simple misconduct instead of grave misconduct.
• Immediate Executory Nature of the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: Yes, but subject to injunctive relief. Ombudsman administrative decisions are executory pending appeal under its rules, yet the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order or injunctive writ to preserve the status quo.
• Constitutionality of the Condonation Doctrine: Not resolved. Because the doctrine applied to Degamo and the administrative complaint was dismissed as moot and academic, the Court found no occasion to rule on the doctrine’s constitutionality.
• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: Yes. Degamo was reelected in 2013, before the April 12, 2016 finality of Carpio Morales; under Madreo vs. Bayron, the doctrine applies to officials reelected before that date, and Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016 was null and void.

• Procedural Objections to the CA Petition: Under Section 5, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal is taken by filing a verified petition for review with proof of service on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The records showed that copies of Degamo’s Petition for Review were served upon Gaudan’s counsel, the DILG, and the Ombudsman. The inclusion of the Ombudsman as respondent was justified because Degamo applied for a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin the Ombudsman’s Joint Order dated May 16, 2016. Gaudan’s non-exhaustion claim failed because Degamo had actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Hold Filing of Information with the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman’s Joint Order was already a disposition of the parties’ motions for reconsideration. As to the criminal aspect, the Court of Appeals may entertain an appeal of the Ombudsman’s ruling in criminal cases if it is consolidated with an administrative case; because this case involved such a consolidation, Degamo had the option to file a Rule 43 petition with the Court of Appeals or a Rule 65 petition with the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals correctly set aside the challenge to the criminal aspect for lack of jurisdiction and focused its review solely on Degamo’s administrative liabilities.
• Injunctive Relief Against the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: Gaudan relied on Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, Office of the Ombudsman vs. de Chavez, Villasenor vs. Ombudsman, and Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valencerina to argue that decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court held that Carpio Morales had already unequivocally ruled that the Court of Appeals has the authority to issue injunctive writs against the Ombudsman’s decisions and/or orders. Although Carpio Morales involved injunctive relief against a preventive suspension, the Court did not limit the Court of Appeals’ authority to such cases. That authority is ancillary to the Court of Appeals’ certiorari jurisdiction under Section 9(1), Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and coincides with its inherent power to issue auxiliary writs under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction are incidents of the main action, issued solely to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. Here, the Court of Appeals granted the temporary restraining order on grounds of extreme urgency and grave and irreparable damage, ruling that execution of the Joint Order would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they had chosen. Although the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution was issued after the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio Morales, the Court of Appeals did not err in considering the doctrine’s application to Degamo as sufficient basis for provisional injunctive relief, because the abandonment was prospective and the condonation doctrine remained good law prior to its abandonment.
• Condonation and Succession: The condonation doctrine was established in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, which held that reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Aguinaldo vs. Santos reiterated the doctrine but clarified that it cannot be applied to criminal acts committed during a previous term, while Atty. Salumbides Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman held that it does not apply to appointive officials. In Ombudsman Carpio Morales vs. CA, the Court abandoned the condonation doctrine as obsolete and bereft of legal bases, but applied the abandonment prospectively. Crebello vs. Office of the Ombudsman later explained that the prospective application should be reckoned from April 12, 2016, the date the Court denied with finality the Ombudsman’s motion for clarification. In Madreo vs. Bayron, the Court clarified that the abandonment meant the doctrine does not apply to public officials reelected after its abandonment; the doctrine applies to those officials who were reelected prior to its abandonment. Degamo won as Provincial Board Member in May 2010, assumed the Governorship by succession, and ran and won as Governor in May 2013. Because his reelection occurred in 2013, before April 12, 2016, the condonation doctrine applied. The fact that he was elected as Provincial Board Member and not as Governor in May 2010 was of no consequence. Under Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Vergara, a public official need not be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election for the condonation doctrine to apply; the doctrine can apply to a public officer elected to a different position if the body politic electing the person to another office is the same. Degamo was elected Governor in 2013 by the same electorate that voted for him as Provincial Board Member in 2010. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the condonation doctrine. Degamo acquired the vested right, by virtue of the condonation doctrine, not to be removed from office on account of his alleged administrative misconduct committed in 2012, notwithstanding the subsequent abandonment of the doctrine in Carpio Morales.
• Degree of Misconduct: With the dismissal of the administrative complaint, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the issue regarding Degamo’s administrative liabilities, including whether he was liable only for simple misconduct instead of grave misconduct.
• Immediate Executory Nature of the Ombudsman’s Joint Order: The Ombudsman rules provide that in all other cases the decision becomes final after ten days from receipt unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari is filed. Gaudan argued that this made the Joint Order immediately executory and immune from injunctive relief. The Court rejected that position because the Court of Appeals’ authority to issue auxiliary writs is statutory and inherent; a temporary restraining order may preserve the status quo pending review. Thus, while the Ombudsman may execute its decisions pending appeal, the Court of Appeals can enjoin execution in a proper case.
• Constitutionality of the Condonation Doctrine: The Court did not reach the constitutionality of the condonation doctrine. Because Degamo was reelected before April 12, 2016, the doctrine applied, and the administrative complaint was dismissed as moot and academic. The Court instead declared Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016 null and void for conflicting with Madreo vs. Bayron.
• Applicability of the Condonation Doctrine: Under Madreo vs. Bayron, the condonation doctrine is still considered good law in all administrative cases involving public officials whose reelections occurred before April 12, 2016, regardless of the dates of filing of the administrative cases or the status of said cases when the Carpio Morales ruling attained finality. Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016, which stated that the Ombudsman would no longer honor the condonation doctrine from April 12, 2016 onwards regardless of when the infraction was committed, the complaint was filed, or the official was reelected, was declared null and void. Because Degamo was reelected in 2013, before April 12, 2016, the condonation doctrine applied, and the administrative complaint filed against him with the Ombudsman was dismissed as moot and academic.

• Condonation doctrine — The reelection of an elective official operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him or her for that misconduct. The doctrine does not apply to criminal acts committed during a previous term, nor to appointive officials. It may apply to an elective official elected to a different position, provided that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same. In Ombudsman Carpio Morales vs. CA, the Court abandoned the doctrine as obsolete and without legal basis, but applied the abandonment prospectively. Under Madreo vs. Bayron, the doctrine remains good law for officials reelected before April 12, 2016; it no longer applies to officials reelected on or after that date. In this case, Degamo was reelected in 2013, before April 12, 2016, so the doctrine applied and the administrative complaint was dismissed as moot and academic.
• Prospective application of judicial decisions (lex prospicit, non respicit) — Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system until authoritatively abandoned, and a new doctrine overruling an old one is generally applied prospectively. Reliance on the old doctrine is protected, and the retroactive application of a new rule may divest vested rights or impair obligations. The Court applied this principle to the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio Morales, reckoning prospectivity from April 12, 2016, and declared Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016 null and void for disregarding the temporal cutoff.
• Court of Appeals’ ancillary injunctive authority over Ombudsman orders — The Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against decisions and/or orders of the Ombudsman as an ancillary remedy to its certiorari jurisdiction under Section 9(1), Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and under its inherent power to issue auxiliary writs under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. This authority is not limited to injunctive relief against preventive suspension orders; it extends to Ombudsman orders imposing dismissal, and the Ombudsman’s rules on execution pending appeal do not eliminate the Court of Appeals’ power to preserve the status quo.
• Moot and academic — When the condonation doctrine applies, the administrative complaint is dismissed as moot and academic, and the Court need not resolve related issues such as the degree of administrative misconduct or the constitutionality of the condonation doctrine.

• "the CA has the authority to issue injunctive writs against the Ombudsman's decisions and/or orders." — This statement anchors the Court’s rejection of Gaudan’s argument that the Ombudsman’s rules on execution pending appeal barred Court of Appeals injunctive relief.
• "when Carpio-Morales ruled that the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is applied prospectively, it meant that the said doctrine does not apply to public officials reelected after its abandonment. Stated differently, the doctrine applies to those officials who have been reelected prior to its abandonment." — This passage from Madreo vs. Bayron, quoted by the Court, supplies the temporal test for the prospective abandonment of the condonation doctrine.
• "the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position, provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same." — The Court used this Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Vergara formulation to hold that Degamo’s election as Governor in 2013 condoned misconduct from his prior term even though he had earlier been elected only as Provincial Board Member.
• "the condonation doctrine is no longer an available defense to a public official who is reelected on or after April 12, 2016. In other words, the reelection of a public official on or after April 12, 2016 would no longer absolve him or her from any administrative liability arising from a previous misconduct that he or she had committed during a prior term." — The Court reiterated this cutoff while holding that Degamo, reelected in 2013, fell on the protected side of the date.

• Ombudsman Carpio Morales vs. CA, 772 Phil. 672 (2015) — Abandoned the condonation doctrine as obsolete and without legal basis, applied the abandonment prospectively, and ruled that the Court of Appeals has authority to issue injunctive writs against Ombudsman decisions and/or orders.
• Madreo vs. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 237330 & 237579, November 3, 2020 — Clarified the prospective application of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine: the doctrine does not apply to officials reelected after its abandonment, but applies to those reelected prior to it; basis for declaring Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016 null and void.
• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Vergara, 822 Phil. 361 (2017) — Held that a public official need not be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election for the condonation doctrine to apply, provided the body politic electing the person to another office is the same.
• Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959) — Immortalized the condonation doctrine, ruling that reelection operates as condonation of previous misconduct and cuts off the right to remove the officer.
• Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 287 Phil. 851 (1992) — Reiterated the condonation doctrine but clarified that it cannot be applied to criminal acts committed during a previous term.
• Atty. Salumbides Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 633 Phil. 325 (2010) — Held that the condonation doctrine does not apply to appointive officials.
• Crebello vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019 — Explained that the prospective application of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio Morales is reckoned from April 12, 2016.
• Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, 646 Phil. 445 (2010) — Cited by Gaudan for the rule that Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal; the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ injunctive authority under Carpio Morales.
• Cortes vs. Office of the Ombudsman (VISAYAS), 710 Phil. 699 (2013) — Cited for the rule that the Court of Appeals may entertain an appeal of the Ombudsman’s ruling in criminal cases if it is consolidated with an administrative case.
• Duyon vs. Former Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, 748 Phil. 375 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases only, not in criminal or non-administrative cases.

• Section 9(1), Chapter I, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Confers on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; basis for the Court of Appeals’ authority to issue injunctive relief against Ombudsman orders.
• Section 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court — Provides that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed; basis for the Court of Appeals’ ancillary injunctive power.
• Section 5, Rule 43, Rules of Court — Requires an appeal to be taken by filing a verified petition for review with proof of service on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo; Degamo complied with this requirement.
• Section 12, Rule 43, Rules of Court — States that the appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise; cited by Gaudan but the Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ power to direct otherwise through injunctive relief.
• Section 7, Rule III, Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07 — Governs finality of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman; in all other cases, the decision becomes final after ten days from receipt unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari is filed; cited by Gaudan on immediate execution pending appeal.
• Article 8, Civil Code — Provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines; basis for treating the condonation doctrine as good law prior to its abandonment.
• Article 4, Civil Code — Provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided; basis for the maxim lex prospicit, non respicit and the prospective application of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine.
• Article 217, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 171 and 48 — Defines and penalizes malversation of public funds through falsification; the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Degamo and co-respondents under these provisions.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Prohibits causing undue injury to the Government through evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence; the Ombudsman found probable cause for violation.
• Ombudsman Office Circular No. 17, Series of 2016 — Stated that the Ombudsman would no longer apply the condonation doctrine from April 12, 2016 onwards regardless of when the infraction was committed, the complaint was filed, or the official was reelected; declared null and void by the Court.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, Lopez, M., Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and Lopez, J., JJ., concurred.