Garong vs. People

A public employee who, without taking advantage of his official position, simulates a court order by issuing a certified copy of a non-existent original is guilty of falsification by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to paragraph 7 of Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code; the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office is not appreciated where the crime could have been committed without the office.

Petitioner Alberto Garong y Villanueva was a court interpreter in the Regional Trial Court in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. Silverio Rosales sought judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40361 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro, and Ricar Colocar assisted him. The Revised Penal Code distinguishes falsification by public officers under Article 171 from falsification by private individuals under Article 172, with Article 171 supplying the enumerated modes of falsification.

On September 18, 1989, Silverio Rosales and Ricar Colocar went to the home of Alberto Garong y Villanueva, then a court interpreter, to seek his help in the judicial reconstitution of Silverio’s Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40361 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Oriental Mindoro. Garong agreed to help and instructed Silverio to prepare the certified survey plan, technical description of the property, tax declaration, and certification from the Register of Deeds. He fixed the processing fee at ₱5,000.00, later reduced to ₱4,000.00. Silverio and Ricar produced the amount and submitted the requested documents.

On September 21, 1989, Garong delivered to Ricar a copy of a court order, marked as Exhibit B, captioned as indicated in the Information. Exhibit B bore the stamp mark “ORIGINAL SIGNED” above the printed name of Judge Mario de la Cruz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and the words “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” with a signature but no printed name beneath the signature. Upon Garong’s instruction, Silverio and Ricar brought Exhibit B to the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40361. Ricar handed Exhibit B to Meding Nacional, the person-in-charge of receiving court orders in the Register of Deeds.

On September 26, 1989, Nacional informed Ricar that Atty. Ricardo Legaspi, chief of the Office of the Register of Deeds, had returned Exhibit B because he had found some sentences thereof erroneous. She told him to return the next day. When he returned as told, Nacional instructed him to go back to the RTC and look for Atty. Luningning Centron, the Clerk of Court. Ricar went back to the RTC but did not find Atty. Centron. As he was going home from the RTC, he encountered Garong, who inquired about the developments. Ricar apprised him about the problem and told him that he had returned Exhibit B to the RTC. Garong got angry and reproved him for bringing Exhibit B back to the RTC without his knowledge. On September 27, 1989, Ricar and Garong went to the Register of Deeds. Garong argued with Nacional on the defects of Exhibit B. Later, he told Ricar to retrieve Exhibit B from the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC because it had problems. Upon returning to the Office of the Clerk of Court the next day, Ricar conferred with Atty. Centron, who informed him that Exhibit B appeared to be falsified because it referred to a “ghost petition” because its docket number pertained to the petition of Emerenciano Sarabia instead of to the petition of Silverio Rosales. After Ricar reported his findings to Silverio, the latter advised him to forthwith demand the refund of the processing fee from Garong. When Ricar went to see Garong, Garong only promised to personally process the reconstitution of title legally.

Realizing that what had transpired with Garong was illegal, Ricar filed a complaint in the office of Atty. Victor Bessat of the National Bureau of Investigation, who assigned the investigation to Atty. Ricson Chiong. The investigation ultimately resulted in the filing of the criminal charge in court for falsification of a public document. The Information alleged that on or about September 21, 1989, and dates prior and subsequent thereto, in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Garong, being a government employee and taking advantage of his official position as Court Interpreter, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously caused, prepared, and issued a Court Order dated August 11, 1989, entitled “IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-40361, PETITION NO. 12,701, SILVERIO ROSALES, Petitioner,” making it appear that the order was duly issued by the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 40, when in truth Petition No. 12,701 referred to a Petition for the Issuance of a new Owner’s Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3436, wherein Emerenciano Sarabia was the petitioner, and a corresponding Court Order was duly issued by then Presiding Judge Mario de la Cruz, thereby affecting the integrity and changing the meaning and effect of the genuine Court Order.

In his defense, Garong stated that Silverio and Ricar had sought his assistance in the judicial reconstitution of Silverio’s title; that he asked them to produce certain documents but informed Ricar that he would be endorsing them to Monica Sigue, the court stenographer, because he lacked knowledge of the process of judicially reconstituting titles; that he went to the RTC and requested Sigue to attend to Silverio and Ricar; and that he did not know what transpired between them afterwards until Ricar went to his house and turned over Exhibit B already bearing the stamp mark “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” but without any signature. According to Garong, Ricar then asked him to sign on top of the stamp mark, but he refused and advised Ricar to bring Exhibit B instead to Atty. Felix Mendoza, the Branch Clerk of Court; because Ricar was insistent, he signed Exhibit B with hesitation. He denied receiving ₱4,000.00 as processing fee. He insisted that he had signed Exhibit B only to prove that it was a copy of the original; that he did not take advantage of his position as a court interpreter; that he had no knowledge of the petition filed by Emerenciano Sarabia; and that it was Sigue who had placed the docket number “Petition No. 12,701” on Exhibit B.

The RTC found that Ricar and Silverio were strangers to Garong but that he volunteered to help them; that he delivered the court order in question to Ricar; that he admitted having signed and certified the court order as pertaining to Petition No. 12,701, thereby attesting to its existence; that his testimony that he saw the original of the court order bearing the signature of Judge Dela Cruz was false because the case pertained to another litigant; and that there was no original document to speak of in the first place. The RTC stated it was morally convinced that Garong prepared and was the author of Exhibit B. The CA affirmed the factual findings, finding Ricar’s testimony straightforward and categorical, with no evidence of ill motive, and noting that Garong offered only bare denial and an inconsistent version; it observed that if Garong had verified the original, he could have discovered that Petition No. 12701 had Emerenciano Sarabia as petitioner and not Silverio Rosales.

• Failure to Present Original: Petitioner argued that the Prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the failure to present the original of the document in question.
• No Taking Advantage of Public Position: Petitioner insisted that he did not take advantage of his position as a court interpreter; that he signed Exhibit B only to prove that it was a copy of the original; that he had no knowledge of the petition filed by Emerenciano Sarabia; and that it was Monica Sigue who had placed the docket number “Petition No. 12,701” on Exhibit B.
• Denial of Authorship and Receipt of Fee: Petitioner stated that he merely endorsed the documents to Monica Sigue because he lacked knowledge of judicial reconstitution; that Ricar later turned over Exhibit B already bearing the “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” stamp but without any signature; that he initially refused to sign and advised Ricar to bring it to Atty. Felix Mendoza; and that he signed only with hesitation because Ricar was insistent. He denied receiving ₱4,000.00 as processing fee.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Failure to Present Original: Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the alleged failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly because the original of the document in question was not presented.
• Characterization of Falsification: Whether the acts of the petitioner constitute falsification by a private individual under Article 172 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 171, as found by the RTC and CA, or in relation to paragraph 7 of Article 171, as the Supreme Court held.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Taking Advantage of Public Position: Whether the petitioner’s position as court interpreter should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty and Subsidiary Imprisonment: Whether the CA correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty and fine, and whether subsidiary imprisonment should be imposed in case of insolvency.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Failure to Present Original: No. The conviction was affirmed; the failure to present the original did not negate guilt because no original existed, and the petitioner’s authorship of Exhibit B was established by his delivery of the document and his admission that he had seen the alleged original.
• Characterization of Falsification: Falsification by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to paragraph 7 of Article 171, not paragraph 2. Exhibit B was a simulated court order purporting to be a copy of an original that did not exist.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Taking Advantage of Public Position: No. The aggravating circumstance was not appreciated because the falsification could have been committed without the petitioner’s public position; he had no duty to prepare the court order and no custody of it.
• Penalty and Subsidiary Imprisonment: Penalty affirmed with subsidiary imprisonment restored. The CA’s failure to justify the limits was an oversight, but the limits were upheld; subsidiary imprisonment is mandatory under Article 39.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Failure to Present Original: The Court applied the elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public under Article 171 and of falsification by a private individual under paragraph 1, Article 172. The Information charged falsification by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2. The petitioner admitted having seen the original of the court order issued in Petition No. 12,701 bearing the signature of Presiding Judge Dela Cruz, and he was the individual who delivered Exhibit B to Silverio and Ricar. These circumstances established his sole authorship of Exhibit B, as unanimously found by the RTC and the CA. The RTC was morally convinced that he prepared and authored Exhibit B, and the CA affirmed the factual findings, crediting Ricar’s straightforward testimony and finding no ill motive, while noting that the petitioner offered only bare denial and an inconsistent version. The failure to present the original did not negate guilt because no original of the court order existed. Thus, guilt beyond reasonable doubt was established.

• Characterization of Falsification: The RTC and CA characterized the acts as falsification by a private individual by causing it to appear that persons had participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate, under paragraph 2 of Article 171. The Court held this characterization erroneous. In producing Exhibit B, signing beneath the words “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY” stamped on it, and presenting it to Ricar and Silverio, the petitioner made Exhibit B appear like a true copy of the signed original order issued in Petition No. 12,701 by Presiding Judge Dela Cruz. But Petition No. 12,701, which supposedly involved the judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40361 in the name of Silverio Rosales as reflected on Exhibit B, had no relevance to the signed original order issued in the proceeding for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3436 in the name of Emerenciano Sarabia. Exhibit B was therefore a simulated court order, and the proceeding relating to it was non-existent in the docket of the court. The simulation of a public or official document like a court order, done in such a manner as to easily lead to error as to its authenticity, constitutes falsification; it was not essential that the falsification be made in a real public or official document. The petitioner thus committed falsification by a private individual under paragraph 7 of Article 171, which covers issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Taking Advantage of Public Position: The RTC appreciated the petitioner’s being a court interpreter as the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1, reasoning that his public position facilitated the commission of falsification and that he used the influence, prestige, or ascendancy of his office. The CA disagreed, citing People vs. Sumaoy for the rule that if the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The Supreme Court upheld the CA. The falsification could have been committed without taking advantage of the petitioner’s public position as court interpreter; his work for the court that supposedly issued Exhibit B was of no consequence to his criminal liability, because the crime could have been committed by any other individual, including one who did not work in the court in any official capacity. He committed the simulation despite not having the duty to make, prepare, or otherwise intervene in the preparation of court orders. The formulation cited in the decision states that an offender takes advantage of his official position when he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document, or when he has official custody of the document he falsifies. The petitioner had neither duty nor custody. Hence, the aggravating circumstance was not appreciated.

• Penalty and Subsidiary Imprisonment: The penalty for falsification committed by a private individual is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00. Having determined that taking advantage of public office should not be appreciated, the CA fixed the indeterminate penalty at two years and four months of prision correccional as minimum to four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional as maximum, and a fine of ₱5,000.00. The CA thereby imposed the limit of the medium period of imprisonment and the maximum of the fine. The Court noted that the CA should have tendered a justification for imposing the limits of the compound penalty under the seventh rule of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which mandates that courts determine, within the limits of each period, the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. Without such justification, the floor of the penalties would be warranted; otherwise, the CA would be seen as arbitrary. Nonetheless, the omission was an obvious oversight that the Court rectified as a matter of course to conform to the law. The simulation manifested the petitioner’s abject disregard of his responsibility as an employee of the Judiciary and revealed a perversity indicative of the greater extent of the evil produced by the crime. Upon due consideration, the Court still upheld the CA, finding that he deserved the limits of the compound penalty. In addition, although the RTC imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case the petitioner should be unable to pay the fine due to insolvency, the CA did not reimpose it without explaining why. Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code states that if the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability. To conform with the provision, the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment was necessary in order not to trivialize the prescription of the fine as part of the compound penalty for falsification. Accordingly, subsidiary imprisonment was restored.

• Falsification by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, Revised Penal Code — The elements are: (1) the offender is a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) the offender committed any of the acts mentioned in Article 171; and (3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. The Court applied this provision because the petitioner, although a public employee, did not take advantage of his official position and falsified a public document.
• Falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public under Article 171, Revised Penal Code — The elements are: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171. The Court did not apply this provision because the petitioner did not take advantage of his official position.
• Taking advantage of official position in falsification — An offender takes advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The petitioner, a court interpreter, had no duty to prepare court orders and no official custody of the falsified document, and the crime could have been committed by any other individual.
• Simulation of a public or official document — The simulation of a public or official document like a court order, done in such a manner as to easily lead to error as to its authenticity, constitutes falsification; it is not essential that the falsification be made in a real public or official document. The Court applied this doctrine because Exhibit B simulated a court order in a proceeding that was non-existent in the court’s docket.
• Issuing an authenticated copy of a non-existent original under paragraph 7, Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Falsification is committed by issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original. The petitioner signed and certified Exhibit B as a true copy even though no original existed, bringing his act under this mode.
• Subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of fine under Article 39, Revised Penal Code — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability. The Court restored subsidiary imprisonment because the CA omitted it without explanation, and the fine was part of the compound penalty for falsification.
• Justification for penalty limits under Article 64, Revised Penal Code — The seventh rule requires courts to determine, within the limits of each period, the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. The CA should have justified the limits it imposed; its omission was an oversight, but the Court upheld the limits given the circumstances.

• "A court interpreter who simulated a court order purportedly issued in a non-existent judicial proceeding of the court he worked for was guilty of falsification by a private individual. The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public office as a court interpreter could not be appreciated against him because his public office did not facilitate the commission of the crime." — This passage states the core ruling of the case: the crime is falsification by a private individual, and the public office held by the petitioner did not aggravate the offense.
• "In short, Exhibit B was a simulated court order. Considering that the proceeding relating to Exhibit B was non-existent in the docket of the court, the acts of the petitioner constituted falsification. Indeed, the simulation of a public or official document like a court order, done in such a manner as to easily lead to error as to its authenticity, constitutes falsification; and it was not essential that the falsification should have been made in a real public or official document." — This is the ratio decidendi for the recharacterization of the crime under paragraph 7 of Article 171, and it defines simulation of a public or official document as falsification.
• "The falsification by the petitioner could have been committed without taking advantage of his public position as the court interpreter. His work for the court that had supposedly issued Exhibit B was of no consequence to his criminal liability, for the crime could have been committed even by any other individual, including one who did not work in the court in any official capacity." — This passage explains why the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position was not appreciated.
• "The offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies." — This is the canonical formulation applied by the Court to determine whether public office was used to facilitate falsification.

• Regidor, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244, 263 — Cited for the elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public under Article 171.
• Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 233, 247 — Cited for the elements of falsification by a private individual under paragraph 1, Article 172.
• United States vs. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 — Cited in the RTC’s finding, quoted in the decision, for the rule that a document is public because it was created, executed, or issued in response to the exigency of the public service.
• People vs. Sumaoy, G.R. No. 105961, October 22, 1996 — Cited by the CA, and upheld by the Supreme Court, for the rule that if the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position.
• People vs. Santiago Uy, 53 O.G. 7236 and United States vs. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376 — Cited in the quoted expert formulation for when an offender takes advantage of official position: duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of the document, or official custody of the document falsified.
• United States vs. Corral, 15 Phil. 383 (1910) — Cited for the rule that simulation of a public or official document in a manner that easily leads to error as to authenticity constitutes falsification, even if not made in a real public or official document.
• People vs. Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016 — Cited in relation to the application of penalties under Article 64, Revised Penal Code.

• Article 172, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by a private individual and use of falsified documents; imposes prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00. Applied: the petitioner was convicted under this provision.
• Article 171, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The RTC and CA used this mode, but the Supreme Court held that this characterization was erroneous.
• Article 171, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original. Applied: the petitioner issued Exhibit B as a certified true copy although no original existed.
• Article 14, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. Not appreciated because the public office did not facilitate the commission of the crime.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of penalties containing three periods; the seventh rule requires the court to determine the extent of the penalty within the limits of each period according to the number and nature of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime. Applied: the CA should have justified the limits it imposed; the Court upheld the limits despite the omission.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code — Subsidiary personal liability if the convict has no property with which to meet the fine. Applied: subsidiary imprisonment was restored because the CA omitted it without explanation.

Chief Justice Sereno, Justice Leonardo-De Castro, and Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurred. Justice Caguioa was on leave.