Garcia vs. Sesbreño

Conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude where the attendant circumstances demonstrate baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to justice and good morals, warranting disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; mere commutation of sentence, as distinguished from absolute and unconditional pardon, does not restore the privilege to practice law.

Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia married Virginia Alcantara in 1965, with whom he had two daughters, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. The couple separated in 1971, and Garcia subsequently practiced dentistry in Cabanatuan City while Virginia obtained an annulment of the marriage in 1992. In 2005, while Garcia was residing in Japan, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño initiated a support action on behalf of Garcia's adult daughters (then aged 39 and 35) against Garcia and his sister. The case was dismissed, but upon Garcia's return to the Philippines in 2007, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia thereafter discovered that Sesbreño had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for homicide and was released on parole, prompting Garcia to file twin complaints for disbarment alleging that Sesbreño continued to practice law despite a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.

• The Homicide Conviction: In Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City initially found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Supreme Court downgraded the conviction to homicide and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law. Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of parole conditions on 10 July 2001.
• The Shooting Incident: The homicide arose from an incident on 3 June 1993 wherein Sesbreño, without provocation, emerged from his house and fired his rifle at Luciano Amparado and Christopher Yapchangco, who were merely walking past his residence. Eyewitness testimony established that the victims were approximately five meters from Sesbreño's gate when he aimed and fired his weapon repeatedly, hitting Amparado who fell dead in the street while Yapchangco fled. Witness Rizaldy Rabanes observed Sesbreño firing rapidly as the victims ran away, with bullets striking Rabanes' house.
• Executive Clemency: Sesbreño obtained an Order of Commutation reducing his sentence to an indeterminate term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment, without mention of accessory penalties. The Final Release and Discharge stated that accessory penalties not expressly remitted shall subsist.
• Procedural Posture: Garcia filed twin disbarment complaints alleging that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by practicing law despite his conviction and parole status. Sesbreño countered that Garcia acted out of malice and retaliation for representing Garcia's daughters in the support action.

• Moral Turpitude: Garcia maintained that homicide constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude per se, rendering Sesbreño unfit to continue practicing law pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Status as Parolee: Garcia argued that Sesbreño remained under parole status and had not fully served his sentence, aggravating his disqualification from the practice of law.
• Retaliatory Motive Denied: Garcia alleged that Sesbreño's representation of his adult daughters in the support action was improper and that his complaints were founded on legitimate grounds of protecting the integrity of the legal profession rather than personal vengeance.

• Nature of the Crime: Sesbreño contended that homicide does not inherently involve moral turpitude, distinguishing his case from Soriano v. Atty. Dizon on factual grounds.
• Effect of Executive Clemency: Sesbreño argued that the commutation of his sentence, coupled with the deletion of the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law," operated as a restoration of his full civil and political rights, citing In re Atty. Parcasio. He maintained that any disqualification applied only during the term of the original sentence.
• Good Faith and Cessation: Sesbreño asserted that he acted in good faith in representing Garcia's daughters pro bono and had since ceased acting as private prosecutor in other cases against Garcia, with Garcia allegedly withdrawing the complaints.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude warranting disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Moral Turpitude: The conviction involved moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime and surrounding circumstances. Here, the unprovoked attack upon unarmed men who were merely passing by Sesbreño's residence demonstrated extreme arrogance, vindictiveness without cause, and cruelty reflecting a misplaced sense of superiority. The victims had not wronged Sesbreño; they were simply "at the wrong place and time." Such conduct constituted baseness and depravity contrary to the high moral standards required of the legal profession. Furthermore, the grant of executive commutation merely reduced the penalty and partially extinguished criminal liability without restoring full civil and political rights, as distinguished from an absolute and unconditional pardon which wipes out the crime. The Order of Commutation herein made no mention that the pardon was absolute and unconditional or that it restored full civil rights, and the Final Release and Discharge explicitly preserved accessory penalties not expressly remitted. Consequently, the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from the right to suffrage and other civil rights, including the privilege to practice law, subsisted.

• Moral Turpitude Defined — Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Whether a particular conviction involves moral turpitude depends on the surrounding circumstances and degree of the crime, not merely its classification as malum in se or malum prohibitum.
• Homicide and Moral Turpitude — Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the attendant circumstances. The presence of moral turpitude is determined by examining the factual context of the killing, including the presence of provocation, the relationship between parties, and the degree of cruelty or depravity exhibited.
• Commutation versus Pardon — Commutation is a reduction of penalty that partially extinguishes criminal liability, whereas pardon (when absolute and unconditional) wipes out the crime and restores full civil and political rights. Commutation does not remit accessory penalties unless expressly stated, and it does not restore the privilege to practice law which requires possession of good moral character.
• Practice of Law as Privilege — The practice of law is not a right but a privilege granted only to those possessing good moral character. Violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies imposition of penalties including disbarment.

• "Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
• "Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances."
• "The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude... Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted... Respondent's inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession."
• "Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty... Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability... The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character."

• International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993 — Established that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime and surrounding circumstances; followed in determining that moral turpitude is a question of fact based on judicial inclusion or exclusion.
• Soriano v. Atty. Dizon, 515 Phil. 635 (2006) — Cited by IBP-CBD as controlling precedent for disbarment following conviction for frustrated homicide involving moral turpitude; distinguished by Sesbreño but applied by the Court in principle regarding the standard of conduct required of lawyers.
• In re Atty. Parcasio, 161 Phil. 437 (1976) — Held that absolute and unconditional pardon restores full civil and political rights; distinguished because Sesbreño received only commutation, not absolute pardon.
• Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, 24 July 2012 — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; applied as the statutory basis for disbarment.
• Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — Grants the President power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction by final judgment; cited to distinguish the four acts of executive clemency.
• Article 94, Revised Penal Code — States that commutation partially extinguishes criminal liability; applied to establish that commutation does not wipe out the crime or restore full rights.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and Francis H. Jardeleza.