Garcia vs. Perez

A quo warranto petitioner seeking title to a public office must show entitlement to the office itself; one who merely asserts a preferential right to be appointed has no cause of action. The one-year period under Section 16, Rule 66 runs from the accrual of the cause of action and is not suspended by an administrative protest.

Purificacion V. Garcia and Angelo Perez were both employees of the Fiscal Management and Budget Division of the Court of Appeals; Garcia held a Senior Clerk item, while Perez was Cash and Payroll Clerk in the same division. The contested position was another Senior Clerk item in that division, identified as Item No. 104, Page No. 2473, Republic Act No. 4164 for FY 1964-65. The dispute is governed by the civil service appointment process and the quo warranto remedy under Rule 66.

In September 1964, the position of Senior Clerk in the Fiscal Management and Budget Division of the Court of Appeals, with an authorized salary of P4,800 per annum, became vacant. Garcia, then occupying another Senior Clerk position in the same division at P3,400 per annum, filed with the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals a written application for the vacant position, stating her qualifications.

On September 12, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court of Appeals, the Presiding Justice appointed Perez to the vacant position at P4,200 per annum, effective September 14, 1964. At that time, Perez was holding the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk in the same division at P3,960 per annum.

On September 21, 1964, Garcia filed with the Civil Service Commission a protest against Perez's appointment on the ground that she was next in rank, better qualified, and entitled to preferential appointment. The Commissioner of Civil Service indorsed the protest to the Court of Appeals for comment. In a second endorsement, the Presiding Justice recommended approval of Perez's appointment. In a separate communication to the Commissioner, the Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Division stated that the recommendation for approval was made after carefully studying the records and efficiency ratings of the ranking employees in the division where the vacancy existed, and that Garcia, although occupying an item in the division, never worked therein and had no knowledge or experience about the nature or kind of work performed there. The First Deputy Clerk of Court and Administrative Officer of the Court of Appeals also informed the Commissioner that the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk was considered next in rank to the position of Senior Clerk to which Perez was appointed, based on the hierarchical organization of the division, the degree of relationship between the positions, and the similarity in the nature of their duties.

On August 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Civil Service approved Perez's appointment as Senior Clerk at P4,200 per annum. Upon being informed of the approval, Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision denying her protest. On October 7, 1966, the Commissioner denied the motion for reconsideration.

To the position of Cash and Payroll Clerk vacated by Perez, the Presiding Justice appointed Virginia Soriano. On November 23, 1966, Garcia sent the Commissioner a protest against Soriano's appointment on the ground that it violated the Civil Service Rules on Promotion, stating that a formal protest would follow. On November 25, 1966, Garcia commenced the present action; three days later, on November 28, 1966, she sent her formal protest against Soriano's appointment, praying that it be disapproved and that she be appointed to the position.

The CFI found that Garcia did not claim to be entitled to the contested position but merely asserted a preferential right to be appointed thereto, and that Perez had been appointed effective September 14, 1964 and immediately discharged the duties of the position; the complaint was filed only on November 25, 1966.

• Right to Institute Quo Warranto: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in denying her right to institute the quo warranto petition.
• One-Year Period: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in holding that the action should have been commenced within one year from Perez's appointment; she argued that her cause of action arose only after notice of denial of her motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision on her protest, and that the pendency of the protest suspended the one-year period, citing Grospe vs. Sec. of Public Works and Communication, the dissenting opinion in Tumulak vs. Egay, and Agcaoile vs. Saguitan.
• Validity of Appointment and Next-in-Rank: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in not declaring Perez's appointment null and void and in not declaring her the employee next in rank to the position and eligible and qualified for appointment.
• Dismissal: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in dismissing her petition instead of granting her prayer.

• Abandonment of Claim: Respondent advanced the theory, raised in his Motion to Dismiss, that Garcia abandoned her claim to the contested Senior Clerk position because, three days after filing the petition, she protested the appointment of Virginia Soriano to the Cash and Payroll Clerk position vacated by Perez and prayed that she be appointed to that position instead.

• Right to Institute Quo Warranto: Whether Garcia, who merely asserted a preferential right to be appointed to the contested Senior Clerk position rather than an entitlement to the office, had a cause of action to question Perez's appointment by quo warranto.
• One-Year Period: Whether Garcia's quo warranto action was barred for having been filed more than one year from Perez's appointment, notwithstanding her protest before the Civil Service Commission and the denial of her motion for reconsideration.
• Validity of Appointment and Next-in-Rank: Whether Perez's appointment should be declared null and void and Garcia declared next in rank, eligible, and qualified for appointment.

• Right to Institute Quo Warranto: No. A quo warranto petitioner must show entitlement to the office; one who merely asserts a preferential right to be appointed has no cause of action.
• One-Year Period: Yes. The action was barred; the one-year period under Section 16, Rule 66 ran from Perez's appointment and was not suspended by the administrative protest.
• Validity of Appointment and Next-in-Rank: No. Garcia did not overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of the appointment; the SC also noted Perez's higher salary and actual work in the division.

• Right to Institute Quo Warranto: The SC held that a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office must show entitlement to the office; absent that element, the petition must be dismissed. It relied on Acosta vs. Flor, which held that no individual can bring a civil action relating to usurpation of a public office without averring a right to the same, and that the action may be dismissed at any stage if the individual has no right. It also followed Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz, which held that one who does not claim to be entitled to the office but merely asserts a right to be appointed cannot question the officeholder's title by quo warranto. Garcia's claim was precisely that she had a preferential right to be appointed, not that she was entitled to the office, so she had no cause of action. The SC added that if the action were treated as one for mandamus, the appointing power, the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, was not impleaded, and Garcia had no clear legal right to the position. It also noted that three days after filing the petition, Garcia protested Soriano's appointment to the position vacated by Perez and prayed that she be appointed there; the SC found this showed her own conviction in the weakness of her claim to the contested position.

• One-Year Period: The SC held that under Section 16, Rule 66, the quo warranto action had to be filed within one year from the accrual of the cause of action. It rejected Garcia's reliance on Grospe vs. Sec. of Public Works and Communication because that case was one of mandamus, on the dissenting opinion in Tumulak vs. Egay because a dissent is not binding, and on Agcaoile vs. Saguitan because it was expressly abandoned in Torres vs. Quintos. Torres vs. Quintos held that the pendency of an administrative remedy does not suspend the period for filing quo warranto; administrative remedies are neither prerequisite to nor a bar to the action, and public interest requires that the right to public office be determined as speedily as practicable. The SC applied this to the admitted facts: Perez's appointment was made on September 12, 1964, effective September 14, 1964; Perez assumed office and received the corresponding salary; and Garcia filed the petition only on November 25, 1966, more than one year after her claimed right arose. The action was therefore barred.

• Validity of Appointment and Next-in-Rank: The SC stated that it was unnecessary to take up the other assigned errors in detail. It held that Garcia did not overcome the presumption of regularity and legality in official actions regarding the appointment by the Presiding Justice and its approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Even on equity, the SC could not disregard that Perez was receiving a higher salary than Garcia at the time of the disputed appointment, and that Perez, as Cash and Payroll Clerk, had always worked in the division to which the contested position pertained, while Garcia had never worked therein although her item was that of Senior Clerk in the same division; this gave Perez higher potentiality for, if not actually greater, competence for the duties and responsibilities of the position.

• Quo Warranto Requires Entitlement to the Office — In a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office, the petitioner must show entitlement to the office itself; a mere assertion of a preferential right to be appointed is not enough. The SC applied this to Garcia, who only claimed she was next in rank, better qualified, and entitled to preferential appointment, not that she was entitled to the office.
• Administrative Protest Does Not Suspend the One-Year Quo Warranto Period — Under Section 16, Rule 66, a quo warranto action must be filed within one year from the accrual of the cause of action; the pendency of an administrative protest does not suspend the period, and administrative remedies are neither prerequisite to nor a bar to the action. The SC applied this to bar Garcia's petition filed more than one year after Perez's appointment.
• Presumption of Regularity in Official Appointments — Official acts, including appointments and their approval by the Civil Service Commission, are presumed regular; the party challenging them must overcome that presumption. The SC held that Garcia failed to do so, and it also considered Perez's higher salary and actual experience in the division.

• "Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office, must be able to show that he is entitled to said office. Absent such an element, the petition must be dismissed." — The SC states the foundational requirement for quo warranto and uses it to dismiss Garcia's claim because she asserted only a preferential right to appointment.
• "one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another, but who "merely asserts a right to be appointed" thereto, cannot question the latter's title to the same by quo warranto." — The SC quotes Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz and applies it to Garcia, whose claim was only a right to be appointed.
• "We denied said supplemental action in a minute resolution, the effect of which is of course to reject the theory that the pendency of an administrative remedy suspends the period within which a petition for quo warranto should be filed." — The SC cites Torres vs. Quintos to reject Garcia's argument that her Civil Service Commission protest suspended the one-year period.
• "Public interest requires that the right of public office should be determined as speedily as practicable ..." — The SC gives the policy reason for the strict one-year period and for not allowing administrative remedies to delay the quo warranto action.

• Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18, 22 — Controlling precedent; laid down that a quo warranto petitioner must aver a right to the office, and the action may be dismissed if no right is shown.
• Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 1147 — Followed; held that one who merely asserts a right to be appointed, not entitlement to the office, cannot question the officeholder's title by quo warranto.
• Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436, 439 (1951) — Controlling precedent; held that the pendency of an administrative remedy does not suspend the one-year period for quo warranto.
• Sison vs. Pangramoyen, L-40295, 31 July 1978, 84 SCRA 364 — Reiterated the strict rule on the one-year period.
• Grospe vs. Sec. of Public Works and Communication, L-11090, January 31, 1959 — Distinguished; it was a mandamus case, not a quo warranto case.
• Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil. 828 — Distinguished; the cited passage was a dissenting opinion and not binding.
• Agcaoile vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil. 676 — Distinguished; expressly abandoned in Torres vs. Quintos.

• Section 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court — The SC applied the one-year reglementary period for quo warranto, counting from the accrual of the cause of action, and held that Garcia's petition filed on November 25, 1966 was barred because Perez's appointment was effective September 14, 1964.