Garcia vs. Mata

A provision in a general appropriation act that is not germane to the subject of appropriating funds for government operation is unconstitutional as a "rider" and violates the one-subject rule, rendering it inoperative and incapable of conferring any rights.

Petitioner Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) until his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960. He sought reinstatement based on a special provision in Republic Act No. 1600, the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-1957, which prohibited the reversion of reserve officers with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service. The respondents, the Secretary of National Defense and the AFP Chief of Staff, contended that the provision was an unconstitutional rider in the appropriation bill.

Petitioner Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2334. At the time of his reversion, he held the rank of Captain. His reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings. Prior to his reversion, while he was still on active duty, Republic Act No. 1600 was enacted on July 11, 1956. As of this date, the petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months, and 5 days.

Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Republic Act No. 1600 provided that reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who were still on active duty at the time of the approval of the Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request. Relying on this provision, the petitioner filed petitions with the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President for his reinstatement, but received a reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General.

On September 17, 1969, the petitioner brought an action for mandamus and recovery of a sum of money in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to compel the respondents to reinstate him, readjust his rank, and pay all emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion. The trial court dismissed the petition on December 2, 1970, ruling that paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions in Republic Act No. 1600 was invalid, unconstitutional, and inoperative for being a rider in an appropriation bill.

• Violation of Statutory Protection: Petitioner argued that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 violated paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in Republic Act No. 1600, which prohibited the reversion of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service.

• Unconstitutional Rider: Respondents contended that the challenged provision had no relevance or pertinence to the budget or any appropriation item contained therein, and was therefore proscribed by the constitutional inhibition against "riders" in the general appropriation act.
• One-Subject Rule Violation: Respondents argued that the provision violated the constitutional requirement that no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title, as it dealt with policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive status rather than appropriating funds.

• Constitutionality of the Provision: Whether paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Republic Act No. 1600 is unconstitutional for being a rider in an appropriation bill and for violating the one-subject rule.
• Right to Reinstatement: Whether the petitioner has a clear legal right to be reinstated, promoted, and paid back emoluments based on the challenged provision.

• Constitutionality of the Provision: Yes. The provision was declared unconstitutional, invalid, and inoperative for being a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure and for not being germane to the subject expressed in the title of the act.
• Right to Reinstatement: No. Because the provision was unconstitutional, it conferred no right and afforded no protection, precluding the petitioner from compelling reinstatement and payment of back emoluments.

• Constitutionality of the Provision: The subject of Republic Act No. 1600, as expressed in its title, was restricted to appropriating funds for the operation of the government. Paragraph 11, which dealt with the fundamental government policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive status of reserve officers, was not fairly included in this restricted subject nor properly connected therewith. Under Article VI, Section 19, paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution, no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Furthermore, under Article VI, Section 21, paragraph 1, no bill shall embrace more than one subject expressed in its title. The provision was a rider not germane to the subject-matter of the bill, thus it was inoperative.
• Right to Reinstatement: An unconstitutional law confers no right and affords no protection; in legal contemplation, it is as though it had never been passed. Since the provision relied upon by the petitioner was unconstitutional, he failed to show a clear legal right to the position to which he desired to be restored. Consequently, mandamus did not lie to compel the respondents to reinstate him, promote him, or pay back emoluments.

• Rider Rule in Appropriation Bills — A provision or enactment in a general appropriation bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein, and its operation must be limited to such appropriation. A provision that is not germane to the subject of appropriating funds for government operation is considered a "rider" and is unconstitutional. The Court applied this by finding that paragraph 11 of R.A. 1600, which dealt with AFP reserve officer reversion policies, was a non-appropriation item improperly inserted in the Appropriation Act.
• One-Subject/One-Title Rule — No bill enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of validity, but provisions clearly not embraced in the subject expressed in the title are inoperative. The Court found that the title of R.A. 1600 was restricted to appropriating funds, and the provision on AFP reserve officers was not fairly included in that subject.
• Effect of an Unconstitutional Law — An unconstitutional law confers no right and affords no protection; in legal contemplation, it is as though it has never been passed. The Court applied this to deny the petitioner's claim for reinstatement and back pay, as his claim was based solely on the unconstitutional provision.

• "Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never been passed." — This passage articulates the legal effect of a statute declared unconstitutional, explaining why the petitioner's claim for reinstatement and back emoluments must fail.
• "The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill." — This defines the constitutional prohibition against riders, which is the central basis for declaring the challenged provision invalid.

• Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288 — Cited to explain that compliance with the one-subject rule is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that subject.
• Alalayan, et al., vs. National Power Corporation and Administrator Economic Coordination, L-24396 — Cited for the definition of a rider as a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.
• Municipality of Matabang, et al., vs. Benito, et al., L-28113 — Cited for the doctrine that an unconstitutional law confers no right and affords no protection, as if it had never been passed.
• Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599 — Cited for the principle that a statute contrary to the Constitution is null and void.
• Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 — Cited for the proposition that courts of justice may step in to nullify the effectiveness of a law that infringes upon the fundamental law.

• Article VI, Section 19, paragraph 2, 1935 Constitution — Prohibits provisions or enactments in the general appropriation bill unless they relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Applied to strike down paragraph 11 as an unconstitutional rider.
• Article VI, Section 21, paragraph 1, 1935 Constitution — Requires that no bill enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title. Applied to invalidate paragraph 11 for not being germane to the title of R.A. 1600, which was restricted to appropriating funds.
• Republic Act No. 1600 (Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1956-1957) — The law containing the challenged paragraph 11 in its Special Provisions for the AFP.
• Republic Act No. 1382 — An earlier law providing security of tenure to reserve officers with at least ten years of active commissioned service, which the petitioner did not qualify for at the time of its enactment.
• Republic Act No. 2334 — The law pursuant to which the petitioner was reverted to inactive status, mandating the reversion of reserve officers on active duty for more than two years.

• Makalintal, C.J.
• Fernando
• Makasiar
• Esquerra
• Muñoz Palma
• Aquino
• Concepcion, Jr.
• Martin
• Barredo, J. (concurring opinion): Concurred with the majority but added that even assuming the Special Provision was constitutional, the petitioner's reversion was proper under Republic Act No. 2334, which mandated the reversion of reserve officers on active duty for more than two years and impliedly repealed the prior provision. He also noted that no member of the army has a vested right in his employment, status, or rank, and the legislature has the power to adjust the tours of duty of reserve officers.