Garcia vs. HRET

A petitioner in quo warranto before the HRET must pay the fixed P5,000.00 cash deposit together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed, and the HRET acts within its jurisdiction — not with grave abuse of discretion — when it summarily dismisses the petition for non-payment and declines to reinstate it after a late payment made only following the dismissal.

Petitioners Perla Garcia, Paz Cruz, and Geraldine Padernal are registered voters of the 3rd District of Manila; respondent Harry Angping was proclaimed duly elected Representative of that district in the 1998 elections. The HRET is the constitutional tribunal that acts as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Under the 1998 HRET Rules, a quo warranto petitioner must pay a filing fee and, in addition, a fixed P5,000.00 cash deposit under Rule 32, while Rule 21 governs the summary dismissal of election contests and Rule 33 addresses the effect of failure to make the cash deposit.

On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten-day period from respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners Perla Garcia, Paz Cruz, and Geraldine Padernal, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. They questioned Angping's eligibility to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives, claiming he was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement, and prayed that he be declared ineligible to assume or hold office and that the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes be proclaimed the winner. Upon filing, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee, but they did not pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules.

On June 10, 1998, the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the cash deposit. After receiving a copy of the Resolution, petitioners rectified their inadvertence: on June 26, 1998, they paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit and, on the same day, filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached the corresponding receipt. The HRET nonetheless denied the motion in view of Rule 32, which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.

Petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari on August 14, 1998, charging the HRET with grave abuse of discretion for strictly and literally construing its rules despite actual, albeit late, payment, and for dismissing the petition on a mere technicality even though the documents attached allegedly showed Angping's ineligibility. On September 24, 1998, Angping filed his Comment; earlier, on September 18, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was not required to comment on behalf of the HRET under the SC's August 25, 1998 Resolution, which the SC noted on October 13, 1998. On October 15, 1998, petitioners filed their Reply, invoking Rule 21 of the 1998 HRET Rules and asserting that the Alien Certificate of Registration attached to their petition, being a public document, was admissible without need of proof of authenticity and due execution.

• Liberal Construction of HRET Rules: Petitioners argued that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition despite actual payment (albeit late) of the required P5,000.00 cash deposit, thereby strictly and literally construing the HRET Rules in contravention of Rule 2 of the same Rules, which enjoins a liberal construction thereof.
• Rule 21 Covers Only Election Protests: Petitioners stressed that under Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, summary dismissal for non-payment of the required cash deposit within the prescribed time may be ordered only in election protest cases and not in quo warranto proceedings.
• Merit of the Quo Warranto Petition: Petitioners asserted that the SC could resolve the merits of their quo warranto petition because the Alien Certificate of Registration attached to it, being a public document, is admissible as proof of Angping's ineligibility to hold office without need of proof as to its authenticity and due execution.

• Clear and Unambiguous Rules: Respondent Angping argued that no grave abuse of discretion was committed because the dismissal of the petition below was based on clear and unambiguous provisions of the HRET Rules which leave no room for liberal construction.
• Exclusive Jurisdiction of the HRET: Respondent argued that the SC is not a trier of facts and that all election contests lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

• Jurisdiction of the SC: Whether the SC can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's dismissal of a quo warranto petition.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto for non-payment of the P5,000.00 cash deposit and in refusing to reinstate it even after the deposit was paid.

• Jurisdiction of the SC: Yes. The constitutional grant to the HRET of sole jurisdiction over election contests does not bar the SC from entertaining petitions charging the HRET with grave abuse of discretion, under the expanded judicial power in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The HRET's dismissal was a judgment call clearly authorized under its Rules, and as long as the exercise of discretion rests on well-founded factual and legal bases, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.

• Jurisdiction of the SC: Under the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members, but this does not bar the SC from entertaining petitions charging the HRET with grave abuse of discretion. In Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the SC explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may intervene in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion — following Robles vs. HRET, Morrero vs. Bocar, and Co vs. HRET. This power to inquire follows from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expanded judicial power to include the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules requires each petitioner in quo warranto to make a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees. Although Rule 21 on summary dismissal mentions a period for cash deposits only "in case of protests," the SC reasoned that the quo warranto deposit is fixed at P5,000.00 — it does not vary nor can it be varied — and is required to be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed; this distinguishes it from protests and counter-protests, whose deposit amounts depend on the number of ballot boxes and election documents to be collected and are therefore given specified payment periods. Petitioners did not initially pay the deposit and paid it only on June 26, 1998, after the dismissal and after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight days. The SC held that in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly, and certainly within its jurisdiction, and that this was a judgment call clearly authorized under its Rules; as long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal bases, no abuse of discretion can be imputed. Because the quo warranto charge — that Angping is not a natural-born citizen — is serious and delicate, the observance of the HRET Rules must be taken seriously, and litigants appearing before the HRET are duty bound to comply with its procedural requirements without being formally ordered to do so; they cannot impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal for dismissing their petition for non-observance of those requirements. Certiorari under Rule 65 prospers only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction — a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power — and it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment; since no such showing was made, the SC saw no reason to annul the HRET's decision or substitute it with its own judgment.

• Judicial review of HRET resolutions — Although the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the House, its judgments are not absolutely beyond judicial scrutiny: the SC may review them under its extraordinary jurisdiction upon a showing that the Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as when there is a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power constituting a denial of due process. Applied here, the SC entertained the certiorari petition but found no such abuse.
• Cash deposit in quo warranto before the HRET — The P5,000.00 cash deposit for quo warranto petitions is fixed and unvarying, and unlike protest or counter-protest deposits (which are computed from the number of precincts whose ballot boxes and paraphernalia must be brought to the Tribunal and are payable within ten days or in installments), it must be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. Petitioners' payment twenty-eight days after filing — and only after dismissal — was too late.
• Strict observance of electoral tribunal procedure — Because quo warranto attacks on a member's qualification are serious and delicate charges, the HRET's Rules of Procedure must be observed strictly to attain their objective of the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate; litigants and their lawyers are duty bound to comply with the Tribunal's procedural requirements without being formally ordered to do so and cannot impute abuse of discretion when the Tribunal dismisses their petition for non-observance.
• Requisites of certiorari under Rule 65 — Certiorari avails only upon the concurrence of: (a) the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment or misappreciation of facts and evidence, which are correctible by appeal or petition for review under Rule 45.

• "x x x while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only `in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, ... upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion...'" — From Libanan vs. HRET, quoted to define the narrow scope of the SC's review over HRET resolutions.
• "Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation." — The SC's answer to the charge that the HRET dismissed the petition on a mere technicality, justifying strict compliance with the Tribunal's procedural rules.
• "As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal." — The operative standard by which the SC measured the HRET's summary dismissal and found it a valid judgment call.
• "In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari." — Quoted from People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals to state the limits of the certiorari remedy invoked by petitioners.

• Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 129783, 283 SCRA 520 (1997) — Controlling precedent followed in defining when the SC may assume jurisdiction over HRET-related election cases.
• Robles vs. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 — Followed as the source of the rule that HRET judgments are reviewable only for excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
• Morrero vs. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 — Followed for the rule that the electoral tribunal's power is beyond judicial interference except upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power constituting a denial of due process.
• Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 — Followed for the rule that the SC does not correct perceived errors of independent branches of government but comes in only to vindicate a denial of due process or correct grave abuse of discretion.
• Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998 — Cited for the essential requisites of certiorari as a special civil action.
• People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the rule that certiorari corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
• National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 283 SCRA 275 (1997) — Cited for the rule that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 prospers only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction.

• Section 17, Article VI, Constitution — Provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives; the SC applied it in determining whether its review of the HRET's dismissal was permissible.
• Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution — Expands judicial power to include the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government; the SC relied on it to justify taking cognizance of the petition.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action for certiorari; the SC applied its requisites in concluding that the petition could not prosper absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
• Rule 32, 1998 HRET Rules — Requires a cash deposit in addition to filing fees — P5,000.00 in a petition for quo warranto; the SC applied it in holding that the deposit is fixed and payable with the filing fee at the time of filing.
• Rule 21, 1998 HRET Rules — Lists the grounds for summary dismissal of election contests, including non-payment of the filing fee and, in case of protests, non-payment of the cash deposit within ten days; the SC construed it against petitioners' claim that it covered only election protests.
• Rule 33, 1998 HRET Rules — Provides that if a party fails to make the cash deposits within the prescribed time, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petition for quo warranto, or take such action as it may deem equitable under the circumstances; the SC applied it in upholding the HRET's judgment call to dismiss.
• Rule 2, 1998 HRET Rules — Enjoins liberal construction of the HRET Rules; petitioners invoked it, but the SC found the HRET's strict application of its Rules did not amount to grave abuse of discretion.