Garcia vs. Domingo

A criminal trial held in the judge's chambers, with the conformity of the accused and without objection, does not violate the constitutional right to a public trial where there is no showing that the public was excluded and the accused could have friends, relatives, and counsel present; any objection to the place of trial is deemed waived by failure to object. The absence of the fiscal from the proceedings does not affect the court's jurisdiction.

Petitioner Gregorio N. Garcia was the City Court of Manila judge presiding over Branch I, before whom eight criminal cases involving private petitioner Francisco Lorenzana and Manila police officers Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel were pending. The constitutional guarantee of a public trial, then embodied in the 1935 Constitution and now in the present Constitution, supplies the backdrop, along with the settled exception allowing exclusion of the public when the evidence is offensive to decency or public morals under Rule 119, Section 14 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Felix Domingo was the Court of First Instance of Manila judge whose order is the subject of the petition.

On January 16, 1968, eight criminal informations were filed in Branch I of the City Court of Manila, presided over by petitioner Judge Gregorio N. Garcia. The charges grew out of an altercation and the manner in which private petitioner Francisco Lorenzana was arrested for a traffic violation by Manila police officers Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, producing charges and counter-charges. Against Calo, on Lorenzana's complaint, the informations were for slight physical injuries and maltreatment, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. F-109192 (two entries) and F-109193. Against Carbonnel, also on Lorenzana's complaint, the charges were maltreatment, slight physical injuries, and light threats, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. F-109197, F-109196, and F-109198. Against Lorenzana, on complaints of Calo and Carbonnel, the charges were violation of Section 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer) and slander, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. F-109201 and F-109200.

At the insistence of Calo and Carbonnel, who as suspended police officers wanted the cases terminated as soon as possible, the parties and the court arranged that the joint trial be held on Saturdays because the usual criminal trial days—Monday, Wednesday, and Friday—were crowded. Hearings were conducted on fourteen dates between March 4 and August 10, 1968: March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20; May 4 and 11; June 1, 15, 22, and 29; and August 3 and 10. All the dates except March 4, March 18, and April 17 fell on a Saturday. With the conformity of the accused and their counsel, the trial was held in the air-conditioned chambers of Judge Garcia rather than in the courtroom.

Throughout the fourteen hearing days, the accused were represented by their respective counsel, who also acted as prosecutors for the accusations their clients had filed. Atty. Rafael Consengco, counsel for Calo and Carbonnel, was absent only on April 20, 1968; at Carbonnel's insistence, however, the trial proceeded and Carbonnel cross-examined a witness for the adverse party. No objection was made by Calo or Carbonnel to the proceedings. After the hearings, the accused, through counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and Carbonnel, through Consengco, filed a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations to the transcript, seeking their exoneration and the conviction of Lorenzana on their countercharges. The memorandum discussed the evidence and the merits and did not object to or point out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings.

Promulgation of judgment was first scheduled for September 23, 1968. It was postponed to September 28, 1968 at the instance of Consengco, and then to October 1, 1968 at 11:00 a.m. at the instance of Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh, who had meanwhile entered his appearance for Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded on any alleged defect or irregularity.

Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, through Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge Felix Domingo issued a restraining order that deferred the promulgation of judgment. After proceedings, he issued an order declaring that the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial, noting that the trial lasting several weeks had been held exclusively in chambers and not in a courtroom open to the public. He ordered the city court judge to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered in the criminal cases until further orders. The motion for reconsideration was unavailing, and the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court. The record contained no evidence that any person interested in observing the trial had been excluded from the chambers.

• Public Trial: Petitioners maintained that the trial in the city court judge's chambers did not violate the constitutional right to a public trial, because the arrangement had been agreed to beforehand by the accused, the hearings were conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection, and there was no evidence that any interested person was excluded from the premises.
• Waiver: Petitioners argued that any objection to the place of trial was waived by the respondents' failure to object during the fourteen hearings, and that the proceedings were devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.
• Fiscal's Non-Intervention: Petitioners contended that the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of control over the prosecution did not affect the jurisdiction of the city court, since only the People of the Philippines could complain and the accused could not be deemed an offended party for such alleged failure of official duty.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners asserted that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing the chamber trial as violative of the right to a public trial and in restraining the city court judge from promulgating judgment.

• Public Trial Violation: Respondents justified the Court of First Instance finding that the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been violated and that their right to a free and impartial trial was adversely affected, because the trial was held exclusively in chambers and not in a courtroom open to the public.
• Fiscal's Control: Respondent Judge sought to support the challenged order by arguing that an assistant fiscal had abdicated control over the prosecution.
• Jurisdictional Defects: Respondents alleged jurisdictional defects in the city court proceedings as grounds for certiorari and prohibition.

• Public Trial: Whether the holding of the trial inside the chambers of the city court judge, with the conformity of the accused and without objection during fourteen hearings, violated the constitutional right to a public trial.
• Waiver: Whether any objection to the place of trial was waived by the accused's failure to object during the fourteen hearings.
• Fiscal's Non-Intervention: Whether the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of control over the prosecution affected the jurisdiction of the city court or justified the Court of First Instance's order.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the November 29, 1968 order and restraining the promulgation of judgment.

• Public Trial: No. The trial remained public where no interested person was excluded and the accused could have friends, relatives, and counsel present; holding it in chambers did not per se violate the guarantee.
• Waiver: Yes. Any objection to the place of trial was deemed waived by the failure to object during the fourteen hearings, following United States vs. Mercado.
• Fiscal's Non-Intervention: No. The alleged failure of the fiscal to intervene did not affect the city court's jurisdiction; only the People could complain, and no jurisdictional defect was incurred.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The Court of First Instance order was issued with grave abuse of discretion and was nullified; prohibition was granted.

• Public Trial: The guarantee is not ambiguous and is to be given literal application: the trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so; there is no ban on attendance, and the observer's being a stranger to the litigants or lack of relationship to the parties is of no moment. The safeguard protects the accused against arbitrariness and is embraced in procedural due process. The usual courtroom setting with a posted calendar allows the public to attend, subject to the recognized exception under Rule 119, Section 14, allowing exclusion when the evidence is offensive to decency or public morals. Here, the trial was held in the air-conditioned chambers of the city court judge for the convenience of the parties and the judge. There was no showing that the public was excluded. The size of the room may have reduced the number who could be present, but courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions and this fact alone is not indicative of any transgression. In re Oliver states that it suffices if the accused could have friends, relatives, and counsel present. Moreover, at least fourteen hearings were held in chambers without objection from the respondent policemen. The challenged order was therefore far from invulnerable.
• Waiver: The failure to object to the place of trial during the fourteen hearings waived any objection. The accused were represented by counsel, participated in the hearings, cross-examined witnesses, and submitted a memorandum on the merits without raising any irregularity. The Court cited former Chief Justice Moran's statement that in United States vs. Mercado, where the trial was held in Bilibid prison and the accused offered no objection to the place, the right to a public trial was deemed waived. The respondents' later objection came too late.
• Fiscal's Non-Intervention: The respondent Judge's reliance on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of control over the prosecution did not support the order. If any party could complain, it is the People of the Philippines, for whom the fiscal speaks and acts; the accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such alleged failure to comply with official duty. Even assuming the respondent policemen could raise the grievance, no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court judge. Cariaga vs. Justo-Guerrero held that a case commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation, or participation of the fiscal or any deputy did not affect the court's jurisdiction, although the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The respondent Judge's concern to assure the reality, as against the mere possibility, of a truly public trial was commendable; otherwise the right could be reduced to a barren form of words. But further reflection should have shown the fear to be unjustified. An objective appraisal of municipal or city courts—crowded daily calendars, the nature of civil and criminal cases, relaxed adherence to procedural rules, and the greater attendance of the general public—would have dispelled the misgivings. The judges of such courts are drawn from a portion of the bar attuned to public life, and an accused would not rationally expect to be denied the solace of a judge alert to his demeanor and rulings. The trial's being held in air-conditioned chambers rather than the usual place did not change matters. The Court of First Instance order was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Right to a Public Trial — The constitutional guarantee means the trial must be public; it is public when anyone interested in observing the manner the judge conducts the proceedings may attend. No relationship to the parties need be shown, and the observer's being a stranger is of no moment. The right protects the accused against arbitrariness and is part of procedural due process. Applied: the trial in chambers did not violate the right absent proof of exclusion.
• Trial in Chambers Not Per Se Violation — Holding trial in the judge's chambers does not automatically violate the public-trial guarantee. The size of the room may reduce attendance, but courtrooms vary in size; it suffices that the accused could have friends, relatives, and counsel present. Applied: no showing that the public was excluded.
• Waiver of Public Trial by Failure to Object — The right to a public trial may be waived by failure to object to the place of trial. Applied: fourteen hearings were held without objection, following United States vs. Mercado.
• Exclusion for Offensive Evidence — Under Rule 119, Section 14, the court may on its own motion exclude the public if the evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals. Recognized as the exception to the public-trial guarantee; not applicable in this case.
• Fiscal's Non-Intervention and Jurisdiction — The absence or non-participation of the fiscal in a criminal case does not affect the court's jurisdiction; only the People of the Philippines may complain, and the court should cite the public prosecutor to intervene. Applied: the alleged abdication did not justify the Court of First Instance's order.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — The Court of First Instance order was declared bereft of legal force for being issued with grave abuse of discretion in declaring a public-trial violation where none was shown.

• "The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown." — This passage states the Court's canonical definition of a public trial and the scope of permissible attendance.
• "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." — Quoted from In re Oliver, this formulation was adopted to show that a trial may remain public even if held in chambers, so long as the accused's friends, relatives, and counsel may be present.
• "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived." — This passage supplies the waiver rule applied against the respondent policemen, who failed to object during fourteen hearings.
• "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." — Quoted from Cariaga vs. Justo-Guerrero, this passage establishes that the fiscal's non-intervention does not oust the court of jurisdiction and did not support the challenged order.

• In re Oliver, 333 US 257 (1948) — Cited as the leading United States Supreme Court case tracing the historical roots of the public-trial guarantee and defining it; the Court adopted its statement that it suffices if the accused could have friends, relatives, and counsel present.
• United States vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304 (1905) — Cited for the rule that an accused who fails to object to the place of trial waives the right to a public trial; the Court applied it to the chamber trial.
• Cariaga vs. Justo-Guerrero, L-24494, June 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 1061 — Cited for the rule that the fiscal's non-intervention or non-participation does not affect the court's jurisdiction, although the court should cite the public prosecutor to intervene.
• Duncan vs. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968) — Cited in the footnote as a reference for treating the public-trial guarantee as embraced in procedural due process.

• 1935 Constitution, Article III, Section 1, paragraph 17 — Guaranteed the accused the right to a speedy and public trial; the Court noted it was in force at the time of the antecedents and expressly enumerated the right.
• Present Constitution, Article IV, Section 19 — Guarantees the accused the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial; the Court noted the same guarantee under the present dispensation.
• Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (Jones Law), Section 3 — Earlier statutory expression of the right to a public trial; cited historically.
• Philippine Bill of 1902, Section 5 — Earlier organic-law expression of the right; cited historically.
• Rule 119, Section 14, Rules of Court — Allows the court, on its own motion, to exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals; recognized as the exception to the public-trial guarantee.
• Revised Ordinances of Manila, Section 887 — The provision under which Lorenzana was charged with resisting an officer; one of the eight criminal charges.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurred. Castro, J., did not take part. Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., were on leave.