Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

The prescriptive period for bigamy commences upon discovery of the crime by the offended party, who is the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable, not the State. The Court held that because petitioner discovered the prior marriage in 1974, the 15-year prescriptive period expired in 1989, rendering the 1992 information time-barred.

Private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos contracted a second marriage with petitioner Jose G. Garcia on or before February 2, 1957, without her prior marriage to Reynaldo Quiroca having been dissolved. In 1974, during their separation, petitioner learned from an acquaintance that his wife had been previously married to a man named "Rey." Petitioner reiterated this discovery in a sworn complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission on October 16, 1991, stating that he discovered the facts in 1974. On August 28, 1991, petitioner filed an affidavit of complaint for bigamy against private respondent.

• The Marriages: Private respondent was previously married to Reynaldo Quiroca on December 1, 1951. Without this marriage being dissolved, she contracted a second marriage with petitioner on or before February 2, 1957.
• Discovery of the Prior Marriage: In 1974, during their separation, petitioner learned from Eugenia Balingit that his wife was previously married to a man named "Rey." Petitioner later reiterated this discovery in his sworn complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission on October 16, 1991, stating: "These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 where they separated from each other..."
• Filing of the Criminal Case: On August 28, 1991, petitioner filed an affidavit of complaint for bigamy against private respondent. On January 8, 1992, an information for bigamy was filed with the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272. The information alleged the crime was "discovered in 1989."
• Motion to Quash: On March 2, 1992, private respondent filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of prescription, arguing that petitioner discovered the offense in 1974. Because bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty prescribing in 15 years, the crime prescribed in 1989.
• Interruption of Prescription: Petitioner claimed private respondent's numerous trips abroad interrupted the prescriptive period under Article 91 of the RPC. The Bureau of Immigration certified these trips, which occurred between 1977 and 1988.

• Petitioner maintained that bigamy is a public offense, thus the State is the offended party; consequently, the prescriptive period should commence from the time the State discovered the offense (August 28, 1991), not when the private complainant discovered it.
• Petitioner argued that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the allegations in the information, which stated the crime was discovered in 1989.
• Petitioner contended that the factual bases of the motion to quash (his testimony in a civil case and his CSC complaint) were inconclusive and vague; the term "discovered" merely referred to unconfirmed, raw hearsay information.
• Petitioner asserted that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the private respondent's numerous trips abroad, invoking the second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC.

• Respondent countered that the prescriptive period commenced in 1974 when the petitioner discovered the offense, as evidenced by his own testimony and sworn CSC complaint.
• Respondent argued that because 15 years had lapsed since 1974, the crime had prescribed before the filing of the information in 1992.
• Respondent maintained that the private respondent's brief trips abroad did not constitute "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" that would toll the prescriptive period.

• Procedural Issues: Whether a motion to quash may rely on facts outside the information to prove the extinction of criminal liability by prescription.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the prescriptive period for bigamy commences upon discovery by the State or by the private offended party. Whether the private respondent's trips abroad interrupted the prescriptive period.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that a motion to quash may invoke facts outside the information when the ground is extinction of criminal liability, such as prescription. The revised Rule 117, Section 2 allows motions to quash based on "factual and legal grounds." The trial court properly admitted evidence of prescription without objection from the prosecution.
• Substantive: The Court held that the prescriptive period for bigamy commences upon discovery by the offended party, not the State. Under Article 91 of the RPC, the rule makes no distinction between public and private crimes. The offended party is the person against whom the offense was committed and to whom the offender is civilly liable. In bigamy, the first or second spouse can be the offended party. Because petitioner discovered the prior marriage in 1974, the 15-year prescriptive period expired in 1989. Furthermore, the private respondent's brief trips abroad did not constitute "absence from the Philippine Archipelago" under Article 91, as she always returned to the Philippines, and these trips occurred long after the prescriptive period had already begun running.

• Offended Party in Public Crimes — The offended party in a crime, whether public or private, is the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, and to whom the offender is civilly liable under Article 100 of the RPC. In bigamy, the first or second spouse may be the offended party depending on the circumstances. The State is not the offended party for purposes of discovering the crime and commencing the prescriptive period.
• Prescription of Bigamy — The prescriptive period for bigamy, which is punishable by prision mayor (an afflictive penalty), is 15 years pursuant to Articles 91 and 92 of the RPC. This period commences from the day the offended party discovers the crime.
• Facts Outside the Information in a Motion to Quash — A motion to quash may rely on facts outside the information when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, such as prescription. This is permitted under Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which allows "factual and legal grounds."
• Interruption of Prescription by Absence — The prescriptive period is interrupted when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Brief trips abroad where the offender returns to the Philippines do not constitute the "absence" contemplated by Article 91 of the RPC.

• "Article 91 of the RPC provides that '[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . . .' This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the 'offended party, the authorities, or their agents.'"
• "More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
• "It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds."

• People v. Alagao, 16 SCRA 879 (1966) — Cited for the general rule that a motion to quash is resolved based on the facts alleged in the information, but exceptions exist for extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy.
• People v. De la Rosa, 98 SCRA 190 (1980) — Followed. Held that additional facts not alleged in the information may be invoked in support of a motion to quash when admitted or not denied by the prosecution. This case formed the basis for the "factual and legal grounds" provision in the revised Rule 117.
• People v. Nepomuceno, 64 SCRA 518 (1975) — Cited for the proposition that in bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances.
• Lerum v. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950) — Cited in conjunction with Nepomuceno regarding who may be the offended party in bigamy.

• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. Applied to determine that prescription commenced in 1974 when the petitioner discovered the crime, and that brief trips abroad did not interrupt the period.
• Article 92, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the periods for prescription of penalties based on their classification. Applied to determine that bigamy, punishable by prision mayor (an afflictive penalty), prescribes in 15 years.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Applied to support the conclusion that the offended party is the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable.
• Section 12, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Defines the offended party as the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed. Applied to identify the petitioner as the offended party.
• Section 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that a motion to quash shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor. Applied to justify the admission of evidence outside the information to prove prescription.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ.