Garcia-Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan; Solis vs. Sandiganbayan

A private person may be charged and convicted under Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when the information alleges conspiracy with a public officer, and co-conspirators are liable collectively and equally for the common design of their criminal acts regardless of the degree of their participation.

Florencia Garcia-Diaz is a private person who claimed a large tract of land in Laur and Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, tracing her title to a Spanish-era possessory information title in the name of Melecio Padilla. Jose G. Solis was the Administrator of NAMRIA, the government agency attached to the DENR responsible for conducting geophysical surveys and managing resource information. Fort Magsaysay, established by Presidential Proclamation No. 237 dated December 19, 1955, is a military reservation covering portions of the public domain in Nueva Ecija and Quezon Province. The case turns on Section 3(g) of RA 3019, which penalizes a public officer's entering into a contract grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, and Article 171(4) of the RPC, which penalizes making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

In 1976, Florencia Garcia-Diaz's predecessor-in-interest, Flora L. Garcia, filed an application for registration of a 16,589.84-hectare property located in Laur and Palayan City, Nueva Ecija before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Garcia based her application on the supposed title of her predecessor, Melecio Padilla, as evidenced by Possessory Information Title No. 216 issued during the Spanish regime. The property was surveyed and its technical description provided in Bureau of Lands Plan II-6752. Garcia further alleged that she had been in possession of the property for 26 years, as of the filing of her application, in addition to the possession and enjoyment of her predecessors, which had lasted for more than 80 years. The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 853, LRC-Record No. N-51127. The Republic of the Philippines opposed Garcia's application mainly on the ground that the property sought to be registered formed part of Fort Magsaysay per Presidential Proclamation No. 237 dated December 19, 1955, and that the property formed part of the public domain and was inalienable. Despite the Republic's opposition, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija granted Garcia's application for registration. This led to the Republic's filing of an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 22217. During the pendency of the appeal, Garcia died and was substituted by her heirs, among them Garcia-Diaz.

In its February 26, 1992 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and dismissed Garcia's application for registration. It cited as basis the 1975 case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, which likewise involved an application for registration of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752, the same property Garcia was seeking to register. In Director of Lands, this Court found that no "Melecio Padilla" appeared in the list of holders of información posesoria titles in then Santos, now Laur, Nueva Ecija. The name "Melecio Padilla" appeared in the list for Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija but it only involved a land of smaller area. This Court in Director of Lands concluded that the possessory information title under the name of Padilla was unreliable; hence, it ordered the application for registration dismissed. Garcia-Diaz's co-heirs then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. They went on to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, entitled Flora L. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al. and docketed as G.R. No. 104561, but it was likewise denied in this Court's April 8, 1992 Resolution for lack of reversible error in the challenged decision. The Motion for Reconsideration of the April 8, 1992 Resolution was denied with finality on June 15, 1992. As for Garcia-Diaz, she did not join her co-heirs in appealing before this Court.

Instead, during the pendency of her own motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Garcia-Diaz chose to amicably settle with the Republic. Through her counsel, then Atty. Fernando A. Santiago, who later retired as a Court of Appeals Justice, Garcia-Diaz submitted a draft Compromise Agreement dated May 16, 1997 to then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III. In relation to the compromise being negotiated, representatives from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the one hand, and Garcia-Diaz and then Atty. Santiago as her counsel on the other, entered into an Agreement dated October 22, 1997. Under the Compromise Agreement, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority was authorized to conduct the final preliminary evaluation survey and to clarify the technical description of the reservation in Proclamation No. 237, specifically, to determine which portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 coincided with the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay. Salvador V. Bonnevie, Executive Assistant to then NAMRIA Administrator Solis, chaired the meeting with Virgilio I. Fabian, Jr., Assistant Director of NAMRIA's Remote Sensing and Resource Data Analysis Department, serving as co-chair. Solis then issued a Travel Order dated January 29, 2018, directing Senior Remote Sensing Technologists Ireneo T. Valencia and Arthur J. Viernes to proceed to Laur, Nueva Ecija and "relocate the tie points and corners 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation." Valencia and Viernes were to survey the area from January 30 to February 3, 1998 and were given transportation allowance and per diems. They were likewise allowed to hire emergency laborers for the survey. As directed by Solis and with the assistance of some personnel from the City Environment and Natural Resources Office of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Valencia and Viernes proceeded to Laur and conducted the survey. In their Summary Report, they confirmed that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of corners 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay. They found that the Bureau of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as earlier computed and plotted in the topographic map referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Attached to the Summary Report were the sketch map of Fort Magsaysay, and Valencia and Viernes' Field Notes or Traverse Computations.

Solis then wrote Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, who by then had replaced Solicitor General Bello. In his February 12, 1998 Letter, Solis essentially stated that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay did not match with the technical description as provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Specifically, the team that surveyed the military reservation, headed by Valencia and Viernes, supposedly found corner points 6 and 7 in the technical description "misleading" and that "the [tie point] cannot be located, hence comparison with BL Plan II-6752 cannot be effected." Solis then recommended that Presidential Proclamation No. 237 be amended accordingly. However, it appears that three drafts of the February 12, 1998 Letter were prepared. Two of the drafts, both signed by Solis, explicitly provided that "the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237." Attached to the drafts was a survey plan, which plotted corner points 6 and 7 bounding Fort Magsaysay and showed the technical description of a portion of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 that was located outside the military reservation. Thus, Solis recommended in those two drafts that Presidential Proclamation No. 237 be amended and that the plotting of the military reservation with corner points 6 and 7 be completed and finalized. The third draft was not signed by Solis but was initialed by Fabian. It did not state that the existence of the tie point was verified by a survey team. This draft had no attachments. The draft that reached Solicitor General Galvez was one of the two drafts declaring that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay did not conform with the technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. This draft was signed by Solis but did not reflect Fabian's initials.

Based on the findings stated in the February 12, 1998 Letter, the Republic, through Solicitor General Galvez, and Garcia-Diaz, through her counsel, then Atty. Santiago, signed and jointly filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999. In the Compromise Agreement, Garcia-Diaz agreed to withdraw her application for registration of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 that was within Fort Magsaysay in exchange for the Republic's withdrawal of its opposition to the registration of the portion outside the reservation, a portion which was supposedly comprised of 4,689 hectares. Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Assistant Executive for Legal Affairs, and Bonnevie served as witnesses. In its June 30, 1999 Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement and rendered judgment based on the compromise. On January 12, 2000, Solicitor General Galvez filed a Manifestation and Motion before the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, in its March 9, 2000 Resolution, the Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered and directed the Land Registration Authority to hold in abeyance the processing and issuance of the registration decree and certificate of title covering the 4,689-hectare property until Garcia-Diaz commented on the January 12, 2000 Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. In the meantime, Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Antonio Cerilles directed the new NAMRIA Administrator, Isidro S. Fajardo, to form a team to investigate the alleged anomaly involving the Compromise Agreement. The Investigating Committee then submitted a Memorandum to the Administrator dated April 12, 2000, where they declared inaccurate the statement of then Administrator Solis in his February 12, 1998 Letter that a portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was outside the technical description of Fort Magsaysay as provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. The Investigating Committee based its findings, among others, on Map SP 203, a plotting of technical description provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, which showed that the entire property described in BL Plan II-6752 was within the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay. A Motion to Set Aside Compromise Settlement dated June 5, 2001 was then filed before the Court of Appeals.

In the Information dated March 17, 2004, public officers Solicitor General Galvez, NAMRIA officials Solis, Fabian, Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes, and private person Garcia-Diaz were charged for violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 27974 alleged that the accused, "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, together with Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private person," entered into a Compromise Agreement dated May 18, 1999 wherein the Republic, as represented by Solicitor General Galvez, withdrew opposition to the registration in the name of Garcia-Diaz of a portion of BL Plan II-6752 with an area of 4,689 hectares, which contract was grossly disadvantageous to the government. In another Information of the same date, Solis, Fabian, Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes were further charged with falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Garcia-Diaz filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information, contending that private persons cannot be charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its August 2, 2006 Resolution. As for Solicitor General Galvez, he died during the pendency of the case, and the charge against him was dismissed. The case then proceeded to arraignment during which all the accused, except Fabian, who was and still remains at large, pleaded not guilty to the charges.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Garcia-Diaz and Solis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution established the following elements of the crime: first, that the accused is a public officer; second, that he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and, third, that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. With respect to the first issue, it was undisputed that accused Solis, Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes were public officers as they were officials of the NAMRIA, an agency attached to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. While it is true that Garcia-Diaz was a private person, the Sandiganbayan nevertheless held that a private person may be held liable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act if he or she acts in conspiracy with a public officer. As for the second element, the Sandiganbayan found that Solicitor General Galvez, in conspiracy with Solis and Garcia-Diaz, entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the government. On the third element, the Sandiganbayan discussed how entering into the Compromise Agreement was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, where this Court found that Padilla's purported possessory information title, from which Garcia-Diaz ultimately derived her title to the property described in BL Plan II-6752, was an unreliable evidence of title. In addition, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22217 found that the entire property covered by BL Plan II-6752 was within Fort Magsaysay. The execution of the Compromise Agreement would have led to the loss of 4,689 hectares in public land, to the disadvantage of the government. For the Sandiganbayan, Garcia-Diaz could not claim good faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement; it held that violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is malum prohibitum where good faith is not a defense. The Sandiganbayan noted that the execution of the Compromise Agreement would not have been possible if not for Solis' false representation in his February 12, 1998 Letter that 4,689 hectares of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was located outside Fort Magsaysay. Solis could not dispute his liability, according to the Sandiganbayan, for even assuming that Fabian prepared the letter, Solis admitted on direct examination that he had examined it and its attachments. Further, the Sandiganbayan disbelieved Solis' claim that he only perfunctorily signed the letter because it was a product of several negotiations. Solis knew the purpose and importance of his recommendation to Solicitor General Galvez: the Republic's withdrawal of opposition to the registration in favor of Garcia-Diaz of a portion of Fort Magsaysay.

The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes. It found that Bonnevie, who was then the executive assistant of Solis, only followed the orders of his superior, Solis, when he presided over the meeting where the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Garcia-Diaz agreed to a re-survey of Fort Magsaysay. It ruled that Bonnevie's signing as witness to the Compromise Agreement did not prove that he had a hand in its execution. As for Valencia and Viernes, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence that they were part of the conspiracy to register in Garcia-Diaz's name 4,689 hectares of land within Fort Magsaysay. Valencia and Viernes re-surveyed the property only in compliance with the Travel Order issued by their superior, Solis. Further, in their Summary Report, they never represented that a portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was located outside Fort Magsaysay. All they said was that they conducted a survey and they were able to retrieve the tie points and relocate the actual ground positions of corners 6 and 7 referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Aside from the graft charge, Solis was found guilty of falsification by a public officer punished under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan found that the February 12, 1998 Letter of Solis to Solicitor General Galvez was a public document, having been written and transmitted in Solis' official capacity. Solis had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated in the letter. Not only did he head the country's central mapping agency, he also knew that his letter would be the basis for approval of the Compromise Agreement. Lastly, the statement that 4,689 hectares of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 were outside Fort Magsaysay described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237 was absolutely false. The contention that corners 6 and 7 were misleading was likewise false and was contrary to Valencia and Viernes' findings in their Summary Report that they were able to relocate corners 6 and 7 as computed and positioned based on the topographic map of the reservation. Further, superimposing BL Plan II-6752 on the already available topographic map of Fort Magsaysay easily revealed that the whole property claimed by Garcia-Diaz was within the military reservation. As for Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes, the Sandiganbayan said that "[t]here is a dearth of evidence as to [their] participation . . . in the falsification." They were, therefore, acquitted.

• Private Person Under Section 3(g): Petitioner Garcia-Diaz argued that she cannot be charged and convicted under Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because Section 3 refers to "corrupt practices of public officers" and she is not a public officer; a private person may be penalized under the statute only under Section 4(b), of which she was not charged.
• No Fault in Compromise: Petitioner Garcia-Diaz added that she could not be faulted for entering into a compromise with the Republic considering that its alleged ownership of Fort Magsaysay was not yet finally decided.
• Invalid CA Decision: Petitioner Garcia-Diaz pointed out that then Court of Appeals Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the ponente of the Court of Appeals February 26, 1992 Decision that reversed the land registration court, was the solicitor general who represented the Republic before the land registration court, and thus had no authority to render the Court of Appeals Decision.
• Not a Party to Compromise: Petitioner Solis maintained that he cannot be charged of violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because he was not a party to the Compromise Agreement; he had already resigned from his position as NAMRIA Administrator at the time of its execution; it is unfair that he be presumed to be involved in the execution and signing of the compromise agreement.
• No Conspiracy: Petitioner Solis argued that his February 12, 1998 Letter was drafted by his subordinate, Fabian, and that he merely signed it on the assumption that everything was in order; the absence of his participation in the conspiracy is very evident; he had never met Solicitor General Galvez, the solicitor general who entered into the Compromise Agreement; he only dealt with Solicitor General Bello, who requested for his opinion; and there was nothing on record to prove that he knew Garcia-Diaz so as to establish conspiracy.
• No Legal Obligation to Disclose Truth: Petitioner Solis argued that he should not have been convicted of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code because the second element of the felony is absent; he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the narration of facts in his February 12, 1998 Letter; at best, what he said was an "inexact, inaccurate or erroneous" interpretation of the Summary Report of Valencia and Viernes.

• Procedural Defect: Respondent People of the Philippines argued that Garcia-Diaz's appeal should have been dismissed outright because she solely impleaded the Sandiganbayan as respondent, contrary to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which states that the lower court that rendered the assailed decision should not be impleaded as respondent in the Petition.
• Private Person Liability: Respondent countered that it has long been settled that a private person may be convicted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act if he or she acted in conspiracy with a public officer, citing Go vs. Sandiganbayan, Meneses vs. People, Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan, Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, Singian, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, and United States vs. Ponte; considering that Garcia-Diaz was found to have conspired with Solicitor General Galvez and Solis in entering into the Compromise Agreement that caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the government, she was validly convicted of violating Section 3(g).
• Solis' Liability: Respondent maintained that Solis was correctly convicted of violating Section 3(g); he cannot hide behind the fact that he was not a signatory to the Compromise Agreement because he issued the very basis for its execution, his February 12, 1998 Letter; it does not matter that Solis did not know personally Solicitor General Galvez or Garcia-Diaz, because all that is required is unity of purpose for there to be conspiracy, which here was to give the proposed compromise settlement a semblance of propriety and legitimacy.
• Falsification: Respondent argued that Solis cannot put the blame on Fabian, who allegedly prepared the February 12, 1998 Letter; during his direct examination, Solis testified that he reviewed its contents; the Letter did not pass through the usual procedure as it did not bear the signatures of the Director and Assistant Director of NAMRIA's Remote Sensing Resources Data Analysis Department and that of the Deputy Administrator; and Solis had the legal obligation to disclose the truth that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was within Fort Magsaysay because of the functions of NAMRIA, of which he was the Administrator.

• Private Person Under the Anti-Graft Law: Whether a private person may be charged and convicted of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Conspiracy and the Second Element: Whether conspiracy exists even if the public officer is not a party to the contract or transaction that caused a gross and manifest disadvantage to the government.
• Falsification — Legal Obligation to Disclose Truth: Whether Jose G. Solis violated a legal obligation to disclose the truth when he executed his February 12, 1998 Letter.

• Private Person Under the Anti-Graft Law: Yes. A private person may be charged and convicted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 when the information alleges conspiracy with a public officer, consistent with the statute's policy of repressing corrupt practices of public officers and private persons alike.
• Conspiracy and the Second Element: Yes. A finding of conspiracy means all accused are deemed to have adopted the offense of the others; co-conspirators are answerable collectively and equally regardless of the degree of their participation, and Solis' recommendation was indispensable to the second element.
• Falsification — Legal Obligation to Disclose Truth: Yes. Solis had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated in his February 12, 1998 Letter, which was a public document, and the narration was absolutely false.

• Private Person Under the Anti-Graft Law: Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act speaks of corrupt practices of public officers, but "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer." This is consistent with the policy behind the statute, which is "to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." The reason private persons may be charged with public officers is "to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows, therefore, that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may also be convicted jointly with them." When an information alleges that a public officer "conspires," "confederates," "connives," or "colludes" with a private person, or when the "allegation of basic facts constituting conspiracy [between the public officer and the private person is made] in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended," then a private person may be convicted under Section 3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 27974 provides that the public officers, "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, together with Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private person," executed the Compromise Agreement. It obviously contains an allegation of conspiracy against Garcia-Diaz. Having been charged and tried under a valid Information, Garcia-Diaz was validly convicted despite being a private person.
• Conspiracy and the Second Element: Solis disregards the essence of conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all. A finding of conspiracy means that all the accused are deemed to have "consented to and adopted as their own, the offense [of the other accused]." Co-conspirators are answerable collectively and equally, regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime, because it is the common scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts of each of the accused. The common scheme was to make it appear that part of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside Fort Magsaysay as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, and hence, alienable, disposable, and can be the subject of a compromise. While it is true that Solis was not the party who entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the government, it was his recommendation in his February 12, 1998 Letter that served as the basis for its execution. Without this recommendation, there would be nothing to compromise on in the first place. Solis' recommendation was indispensable for the existence of the second element. It was also his recommendation that caused the existence of the third element. The segregation of 4,689 hectares of land of the public domain, to be registered in the name of a private person, was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. It is immaterial that the registration in the name of Garcia-Diaz did not push through. Solis remains liable because "the core element" of Section 3(g) is that the "engagement in a transaction or contract . . . is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government." Section 3(g) is unlike Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which requires actual injury to the government. Solis' other arguments — that Fabian prepared his February 12, 1998 Letter and that he routinely affixed his signature in it, and that he did not personally know Solicitor General Galvez and Garcia-Diaz — are factual in nature and cannot be raised in the present Petition. In any case, it was never established that Fabian or any other of Solis' subordinates prepared his February 12, 1998 Letter. The Sandiganbayan found that the Letter did not pass through the usual procedure, not being signed by an assistant director, a director, and a deputy administrator; that it appears to have been drafted even before the routing slip reached Basa on February 16, 1998; and that Solis testified on direct examination that he studied the Letter and its attachments. Solis ordered the relocation survey, so it is impossible that he did not peruse the survey report or the field notes. It is incredible that he only signified his conformity without bothering to examine the attachments, unless such decision had been a foregone conclusion. It is immaterial that Solis knew Solicitor General Galvez and Garcia-Diaz personally; their collective acts nevertheless show the common purpose of giving the Compromise Agreement a semblance of legitimacy.
• Falsification — Legal Obligation to Disclose Truth: Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes falsification by a public officer. The elements of Article 171 are: first, "the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public"; second, he or she takes advantage of his or her official position; and third, he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171. Specific to the fourth mode, making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the elements are: first, "the offender makes in a [public] document untruthful statements in a narration of facts"; second, the offender "has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him [or her]"; and, third, the facts that he or she narrated are absolutely false. Further, the public officer must have taken advantage of his or her official position to commit the falsification either because "he [or she] has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document," or because he or she has the official custody of the falsified document. Contrary to Solis' argument, he did not make a mere opinion but deliberately made an untruthful statement in his February 12, 1998 Letter. He wrote that "finding[s] disclose that the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237," referring to the findings of Valencia and Viernes in their Summary Report. Nothing in the Summary Report, however, indicates that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the military reservation as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. After re-surveying Fort Magsaysay, Valencia and Viernes actually confirmed that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of corners 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay; they found that the Bureau of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as earlier computed and plotted in the topographic map referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, indicating that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay conformed with the technical description. It is ridiculous to say that Solis had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated in his February 12, 1998 Letter. On the contrary, inherent in the very nature and purpose of the document was Solis' obligation, as NAMRIA Administrator, to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated. NAMRIA is the government agency responsible for conducting geophysical surveys as well as managing resource information needed by both the public and private sectors. Because of the agency's special competence, Solis was requested by the Republic, through the Solicitor General, to conduct a re-survey of Fort Magsaysay; he was informed at the outset that his agency's findings would determine whether or not the government would enter into a compromise with Garcia-Diaz. To allow Solis to claim that he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth in his letter will be contrary to NAMRIA's functions and will erode the public's confidence in NAMRIA and all its issuances and research findings. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan said that "all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who . . . enter into negotiations," but it was never established that a subordinate prepared the February 12, 1998 Letter and that Solis merely signed it perfunctorily. The Sandiganbayan even found that it did not pass the usual procedure, not being signed by an assistant director, a director, and a deputy administrator. Solis testified on direct examination that he examined it and its attachments. It must be presumed that Solis prepared it, not a subordinate. Arias, therefore, does not apply. All told, Solis is guilty of falsification of public document. The indeterminate penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prisión correccional medium as minimum to six years and one day of prisión mayor medium as maximum is in order.

• Private Person's Liability Under the Anti-Graft Law — A private person may be charged and convicted under Section 3 of RA 3019 when the information alleges conspiracy with a public officer. The information is sufficient in form and substance when it alleges that a public officer "conspires," "confederates," "connives," or "colludes" with a private person, or when the allegation of basic facts constituting conspiracy is made in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended. Applied here, Garcia-Diaz was validly convicted because the Information alleged that she conspired with public officers in executing the Compromise Agreement.
• Conspiracy — Act of One is the Act of All — A finding of conspiracy means all accused are deemed to have consented to and adopted as their own the offense of the other accused; co-conspirators are answerable collectively and equally regardless of the degree of their participation, because it is the common scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts of each accused. Applied here, Solis was liable under Section 3(g) even though he was not a party to the Compromise Agreement because his February 12, 1998 Letter was indispensable to its execution.
• Elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019 — The elements are: (a) the accused is a public officer; (b) he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Section 3(g) does not require actual injury to the government, unlike Section 3(e); the core element is that the engagement in a transaction or contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Applied here, all elements were established.
• Elements of Falsification Under Article 171(4), RPC — The elements are: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; and (c) the facts narrated are absolutely false. Additionally, the public officer must have taken advantage of his or her official position. Applied here, Solis' February 12, 1998 Letter was a public document, he had a legal obligation to disclose the truth, and the narration was absolutely false.
• Malum Prohibitum — Good Faith Not a Defense — Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is malum prohibitum where good faith is not a defense. Applied here, Garcia-Diaz could not claim good faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement.

• "Co-conspirators are liable collectively and equally for the common design of their criminal acts." — The opening statement of the decision, articulating the core principle applied to hold Solis liable despite not being a party to the Compromise Agreement.
• "However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer." — The rule that allowed Garcia-Diaz, a private person, to be convicted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
• "A finding of conspiracy means that all the accused are deemed to have 'consented to and adopted as their own, the offense [of the other accused].'" — The basis for the collective and equal liability of co-conspirators, applied to hold Solis liable for the acts of his co-conspirators.
• "It is ridiculous to say that petitioner Solis had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated in his February 12, 1998 Letter." — The rejection of Solis' defense that he merely expressed an opinion, establishing the second element of falsification.

• Go vs. Sandiganbayan, 603 Phil. 393 (2009) — Relied on for the rule that a private person may be held liable under RA 3019 if there is an allegation of conspiracy with a public officer, and for the elements of Section 3(g).
• Meneses vs. People, 237 Phil. 292 (1987) — Relied on for the essence of conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all.
• Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan, 272-A Phil. 486 (1991) — Relied on for the rule that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may also be convicted jointly with them, and for the principle that co-conspirators are answerable collectively and equally.
• Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, 510 Phil. 691 (2005) — Relied on for the rule that co-conspirators are answerable collectively and equally regardless of the degree of their participation.
• United States vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379 (1911) — Cited as one of the cases establishing the rule on conspiracy.
• Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 160-A Phil. 832 (1975) — Relied on as the prior ruling that the possessory information title under Padilla was unreliable, and that the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 was part of Fort Magsaysay; used to establish the gross disadvantage to the government.
• Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989) — Cited by Solis for the rule that heads of offices may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates; distinguished because it was never established that a subordinate prepared the Letter and that Solis merely signed it perfunctorily.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, 585 Phil. 1 (2008) — Relied on for the rule that the core element of Section 3(g) is that the engagement in a transaction or contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes a public officer's entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. Applied to convict both Garcia-Diaz (as co-conspirator) and Solis.
• Section 1, Republic Act No. 3019 — States the policy "to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." Used to justify the conviction of a private person.
• Section 4(b), Republic Act No. 3019 — Prohibits any person from knowingly inducing or causing any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3. Cited by Garcia-Diaz as the only provision under which a private person may be penalized; the SC held it was not the exclusive provision.
• Article 171, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes falsification by a public officer by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Applied to convict Solis.
• Section 9(a), Republic Act No. 3019 — Provides the penalty of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government. Used to justify the penalty imposed on both accused.
• Section 1, Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Provides for the imposition of an indeterminate sentence. Used to justify the penalties imposed.
• Rule 45, Section 4, Rules of Court — States that the petition shall state the full name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents. Cited by respondent against Garcia-Diaz's petition.
• Rule 45, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides for appeal by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law. Used to reject Solis' factual arguments.
• Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 — States that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.