Garayblas vs. Atienza, Jr.

A case should not be dismissed simply because one of the issues raised therein has become moot and academic by a supervening event when there are other causes of action which need to be resolved after trial. The non-renewal of the petitioner's faculty appointment did not moot his separate claim for damages arising from his alleged illegal ouster from the Board of Regents, which remained a justiciable controversy requiring trial.

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) is a non-stock, non-profit educational corporation created under Republic Act No. 4196. Its governing body is the Board of Regents, which includes a member representing the PLM faculty, appointed by the Mayor of the City of Manila. The faculty representative's term is fixed at six years under Section 4 of R.A. No. 4196, and vacancies arise only by resignation, death, or incapacity of a member. Petitioner Rafaelito M. Garayblas was a part-time Professorial Lecturer in the PLM College of Law and was appointed to the Board of Regents to represent the faculty. Respondent Jose L. Atienza, Jr. was the Mayor of the City of Manila who appointed respondent Raul I. Goco to the same faculty representative seat, precipitating the dispute.

Rafaelito M. Garayblas had served as a part-time Professorial Lecturer in the PLM College of Law since November 17, 1992. Raul I. Goco had been appointed by then Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim as the PLM faculty representative to the Board of Regents, with a term expiring August 13, 1998, confirmed by the City Council on November 12, 1992. In 1996, Goco was appointed Philippine Ambassador to Canada. On September 30, 1996, Mayor Lim appointed Garayblas as the PLM faculty representative to the Board of Regents, effective September 24, 1996 up to August 13, 1998, to serve the unexpired term of Goco. On January 5, 1998, Mayor Lim extended Garayblas's appointment up to August 13, 2004.

After Jose L. Atienza, Jr. was elected City Mayor of Manila, he appointed Goco as PLM faculty representative to the Board of Regents on April 26, 1999, for a six-year term effective April 26, 1999 to April 25, 2005. The records of the Office of the Secretary, however, still reflected Garayblas as the incumbent faculty representative, with his appointment set to expire on August 13, 2004. When informed of Goco's appointment, Garayblas, through counsel, wrote to Vice-Mayor Danilo V. Lacuna requesting that the City Council not confirm Goco's appointment. The matter was referred to the Office of the City Mayor. Garayblas followed up with a letter to Mayor Atienza dated October 5, 1999, inquiring about the action taken on the confirmation.

On December 15, 1999, Mayor Atienza issued a Special Order designating his Secretary, Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, as Acting PLM President. The Board of Regents approved Resolution No. 2233 on January 17, 2000, confirming Sison's designation. On January 28, 2000, the Board, by majority vote, resolved to recognize Goco as a board member. Garayblas filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Damages on February 10, 2000, alleging that Mayor Atienza's appointment of Goco was null and void because the position was not vacant, that the Board lacked authority to remove him, and that Goco was not qualified because he had not been an active PLM faculty member since 1993. He sought injunctive relief, declaration of his appointment as valid until 2004, nullification of Goco's appointment, and moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing lack of RTC jurisdiction, that the proper remedy was quo warranto, and that the petition had been mooted by the lapse of Garayblas's term. They later supplemented the motion, contending that his appointment was a mere "extension of services" beyond the Mayor's power, that it lacked City Council confirmation, and that he forfeited his Board seat upon his appointment as DILG Undersecretary. The RTC issued a TRO on February 29, 2000, and a writ of preliminary injunction on March 28, 2000. On October 24, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction under P.D. No. 902-A. Garayblas moved for reconsideration, arguing that PLM is a chartered institution, not a private corporation. Respondents countered in their Rejoinder that Garayblas had not been reappointed as Professorial Lecturer, rendering him unqualified to remain on the Board and mooting the case. On May 28, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the petition as moot and academic, concluding that the non-renewal of his faculty appointment disqualified him from remaining as the faculty representative to the Board.

• Mootness: Petitioner maintained that the non-renewal of his appointment as Professorial Lecturer did not automatically discharge him as member of the Board of Regents, because under Section 4 of R.A. No. 4196, membership in the faculty roster at the time of appointment sufficed, and the term was fixed at six years. He alleged the non-renewal was a devious ploy by PLM officials to oust him from the Board.
• Justiciability: Petitioner insisted that his petition for injunction had not been mooted, as he had the right to pursue and regain the position from which he was ousted, and that there was a continuing violation of his right to security of tenure. He noted that the RTC had issued both a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, and that his claims for damages had yet to be proved at trial.
• Validity of Appointment: Petitioner argued that his appointment to the Board was valid and subsisting until August 13, 2004, that the position was not vacant when Goco was appointed, and that the Board of Regents lacked authority to remove him because Section 4 of R.A. No. 4196 limits vacancies to resignation, death, or incapacity.
• Qualifications of Goco: Petitioner contended that Goco was not qualified for the faculty representative seat because he had not been an active PLM faculty member since 1993, contrary to the requirement of R.A. No. 4196.
• Propriety of Rule 45: Petitioner asserted that the issue raised was purely one of law — whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as moot — and thus the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was proper.

• Improper Remedy: Respondents averred that petitioner's recourse was inappropriate because he raised factual issues, and that he should have appealed by writ of error to the Court of Appeals instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Injunction as Mere Ancillary Remedy: Respondents argued that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, injunction is merely an ancillary remedy to a principal action, not a cause of action itself, and that the proper remedy was a petition for quo warranto. Consequently, the issue of damages had also become moot.
• Mootness: Respondents insisted that the petition had been rendered moot and academic by the non-renewal of petitioner's appointment as Professorial Lecturer at the PLM College of Law, which disqualified him from remaining as the faculty representative to the Board.
• Invalidity of Petitioner's Appointment: Respondents contended that petitioner's appointment was a mere "extension of services" beyond the Mayor's power, that it lacked City Council confirmation, and that he forfeited his Board seat upon his appointment as DILG Undersecretary because he was barred from holding two offices simultaneously.
• Distinction from Ticzon: Respondents argued that petitioner could not rely on the ruling in Ticzon vs. Video Post Manila, Inc. because the cause of action in that case was for damages with injunctive relief as an ancillary remedy, unlike the present case.

• Propriety of Rule 45: Whether the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy, and whether the issue raised is one of law.
• Mootness: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for injunction on the ground that it had become moot and academic due to the non-renewal of petitioner's appointment as Professorial Lecturer.
• Causes of Action: Whether the petition included a separate cause of action for damages that survived the alleged mooting of the injunction claim.

• Propriety of Rule 45: Yes. The issue raised — whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as moot — is purely a question of law, determinable without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, making Rule 45 proper.
• Mootness: No. The trial court erred in dismissing the entire petition as moot. While the non-renewal of petitioner's faculty appointment may have affected his entitlement to the Board seat, it did not moot his separate cause of action for damages.
• Causes of Action: Yes. The petition contained two causes of action: one for injunction and another for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The damages claim remained a live controversy requiring trial, and dismissal of the entire case without resolving it would be a denial of due process.

• Propriety of Rule 45: The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Applied here, the issue — whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as moot merely because petitioner's faculty appointment was not renewed — could be resolved by examining the material allegations of the petition and the parties' pleadings, without reviewing evidence. It was therefore a question of law, and Rule 45 was the proper remedy. The May 28, 2001 Order was a final order because it disposed of the case completely, leaving nothing more to be done in the trial court.

• Mootness: An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, such that a declaration would be of no practical use or value. However, a case should not be dismissed simply because one issue has been mooted by a supervening event when there are other causes of action that need to be resolved after trial. Dismissal without resolving remaining substantive issues would be tantamount to a denial of due process. The non-renewal of petitioner's faculty appointment did not render the entire petition moot. Petitioner alleged that yearly reappointment of professorial lecturers was a matter of policy, and he had yet to adduce evidence that the non-renewal was a devious ploy to oust him and violate the preliminary injunction. The issues of whether respondents acted in bad faith in appointing Goco despite no vacancy, and whether the Board acted in bad faith in recognizing Goco, remained valid issues for the trial court.

• Causes of Action: The material allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action. A review of the petition revealed two causes of action: one for injunction and one for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Injunction may be a main action or a provisional remedy. The main action for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction; the former seeks a final judgment, while the latter merely preserves the status quo. Petitioner's injunctive claim sought to prevent his ouster and nullify Goco's appointment, while his damages claim sought redress for injury allegedly caused by respondents' bad faith. Even if the injunction claim had been mooted by the expiration of petitioner's term on August 13, 2004, the damages claim remained a substantial issue requiring trial. The RTC therefore erred in dismissing the entire petition.

• Moot and Academic Doctrine — An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. However, a case should not be dismissed simply because one of the issues has become moot by a supervening event when there are other causes of action which need to be resolved after trial. Dismissal without resolving remaining substantive issues is tantamount to a denial of due process. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that even if the injunction claim was mooted by the expiration of petitioner's term, his damages claim survived and required trial.

• Injunction as Main Action vs. Ancillary Remedy — The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction. The main action seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction, while the preliminary injunction merely preserves the status quo until the merits can be heard. The Court relied on this distinction to confirm that petitioner's petition for injunction was a proper main action with its own cause of action, separate from the ancillary TRO and preliminary injunction he also sought.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence; if so, it is a question of law, otherwise a question of fact. The Court applied this test to conclude that the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as moot was a question of law, reviewable under Rule 45.

• "However, a case should not be dismissed simply because one of the issues raised therein had become moot and academic by the onset of a supervening event, whether intended or incidental, if there are other causes which need to be resolved after trial. When a case is dismissed without the other substantive issues in the case having been resolved would be tantamount to a denial of the right of the plaintiff to due process." — This passage articulates the controlling ratio decidendi: that partial mootness does not justify wholesale dismissal where independent causes of action remain justiciable.

• "The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding." — This defines the canonical distinction between injunction as a cause of action and as a provisional remedy, a distinction central to the Court's finding that petitioner had two separate causes of action.

• "The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact." — This is the standard formulation for distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact, frequently cited in procedural jurisprudence.

• Ticzon vs. Video Post Manila, Inc., 389 Phil. 20 (2000) — Cited by petitioner to support his contention that the case remained justiciable despite alleged mootness. The Court noted that in Ticzon, the cause of action was for damages with injunctive relief as an ancillary remedy, which respondents distinguished from the present case.
• Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123 — Cited for the proposition that the May 28, 2001 Order of the trial court was a final order because it disposed of the case completely.
• China Road and Bridge Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 590 (2000) — Cited for the test distinguishing a question of law from a question of fact.
• Vda. de Dabao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91 — Cited for the definition of when an issue becomes moot and academic.
• Bacolod City Water District vs. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004, 446 SCRA 110 — Cited for the definition of injunction as a judicial writ and the distinction between the main action for injunction and the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction.

• Section 4, Republic Act No. 4196 (PLM Charter) — Provides that the Board of Regents includes a member representing the PLM faculty, appointed by the Mayor of Manila for a term of six years, and that vacancies arise only by resignation, death, or incapacity. Petitioner relied on this provision to argue that his term was fixed by law and that the Board lacked authority to remove him.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 4196 — Enumerates the powers and functions of the Board of Regents. Petitioner argued that the power to oust or remove a member is not among those enumerated.
• Section 454(d), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs the referral of matters to the Office of the City Mayor for appropriate action, cited in connection with the referral of petitioner's letter regarding Goco's confirmation.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court, applicable where only questions of law are raised. The Court held this was the proper remedy.
• Rule 41, Section 2, Rules of Court — Read in relation to Rule 45, provides that the remedy from a final order is by writ of error to the CA or a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court where only questions of law are involved.
• Presidential Decree No. 902-A — The RTC relied on this decree to rule that the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy as a corporate matter. The Supreme Court did not directly rule on this jurisdictional issue, as it focused on the mootness ground.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairperson), Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.