Ganila vs. Court of Appeals

In unlawful detainer cases, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary; it is enough that the plaintiff has a better right of possession, and the defendant's possession becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.

Private respondent Violeta Herrera owned Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters, which she inherited from her parents. She tolerated the petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. The petitioners occupied portions of the lot under this arrangement of tolerance, which formed the basis of the subsequent unlawful detainer action when Herrera withdrew her tolerance and demanded that they vacate.

Private respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints on March 19, 1997 before the 16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan, Guimaras, alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated the petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996, private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove their houses and other improvements thereon. The petitioners refused, despite an offer of money by way of assistance. After the barangay conciliation failed, private respondent filed the complaints.

In their Answers, eight of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area.

At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to designate two geodetic engineers as commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a relocation survey of Lot 1227 and to identify who among the petitioners have houses within the lot. The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil Case No. 288-J, is almost outside Lot 1227; (2) the house of Ludovico Amatorio, defendant in Civil Case No. 289-J, diagonally traversed the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227. Eight months after the petitioners' failure to comment on the manifestation of private respondent to terminate the preliminary conference, the MCTC terminated the preliminary conference. Thereafter, petitioners' counsel Atty. Nelia Jesusa L. Gonzales failed to file her clients' position papers and affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same.

The MCTC decided the cases in favor of the plaintiff, ordering each of the 21 defendants to vacate Lot 1227, pay ₱200.00 per month from October 1996 as compensation for the use of the property until the same is vacated, and pay ₱2,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which affirmed the MCTC decision in the cases against the 19 petitioners but set aside and dismissed the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio, whose houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227 and who believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was part of the seashore. The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227, as her position paper, affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations, and the commissioners' report and sketch plan showed that indeed the petitioners occupy Lot 1227, while the petitioners failed to present evidence showing that they are entitled to possess the lot.

The 19 petitioners filed a joint petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition. The petitioners moved for reconsideration and filed an amended petition, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of merit, also denying the motion for reconsideration.

• Improper Remedy (Accion Publiciana): Petitioners insisted that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, because they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners, and there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.
• Lack of Preliminary Conference Order: Petitioners cited Bayubay vs. Court of Appeals and argued that the MCTC's decision was without jurisdictional or legal basis because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order, and that the 10-day period to file position papers and affidavits only starts after the parties had received a preliminary conference order.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioners insisted they were denied due process when the MCTC decided the cases based merely on private respondent's Complaints and affidavit, without considering their Answers.
• Insufficient Proof of Ownership: Petitioners averred that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not evidence of ownership, and that their possession of the lot was not and could not be by mere tolerance.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Private respondent stated that the allegations in her Complaints make out a clear case of unlawful detainer which is cognizable by the MCTC, and that the complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of the defendants.
• Substantial Compliance with Rules: Private respondent maintained that there was substantial compliance with the rules in the MCTC's conduct of the preliminary conference, hence there was no violation of due process nor disregard of its proper jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction of the MCTC: Whether the MCTC erred in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the ejectment cases.
• RTC's Sustaining of the MCTC Judgment: Whether the RTC erred in sustaining the MCTC's judgment.
• CA's Denial of the Petition for Review: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected.

• Jurisdiction of the MCTC: No. The MCTC properly exercised jurisdiction over the ejectment cases, as private respondent's allegations in her Complaints sufficiently presented a case of unlawful detainer cognizable by the municipal trial court under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
• RTC's Sustaining of the MCTC Judgment: No. The RTC correctly affirmed the MCTC's decision, as the evidence — including the commissioners' report and sketch plan — showed that the 19 petitioners occupy Lot 1227, and the petitioners failed to present evidence showing that they are entitled to possess the lot.
• CA's Denial of the Petition for Review: No. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition, as the petitioners' defenses were unsubstantiated and disproved by the plaintiff's evidence.

• Jurisdiction of the MCTC: The Court held that in unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary; it is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. The jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Private respondent's allegations sufficiently presented a case of unlawful detainer: she alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners' continued possession became unlawful. The Court distinguished unlawful detainer from accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria, noting that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. It is not up to defendants to dictate upon plaintiff what her initial recourse should be; her choice of an action for ejectment against so-called squatters is well within her rights.
• RTC's Sustaining of the MCTC Judgment: The Court found that the petitioners' contention regarding the lack of a preliminary conference order was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC, and raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel. They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. The issue was a mere afterthought when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the petitioners for the first time on appeal. Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTC's Order dated February 19, 1999, when they moved for an extension of time to file their position papers and affidavits. They wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days set by the MCTC, which strictly should have been 10 days only. The Court distinguished Bayubay, noting that in that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and affidavits. The Court also noted with dismay petitioners' insistence that the MCTC conduct a second preliminary conference, as the summary character of ejectment suits would be disregarded if further delay were allowed. Ejectment cases are summary proceedings designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved.
• CA's Denial of the Petition for Review: The Court held that the lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. The commissioners' report and sketch plan show that the 19 petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate private respondent's allegation and disprove petitioners' defense that Lot 1227 is a shoreline or a social forest area. While not a conclusive evidence of ownership, private respondent's tax declaration constitutes proof that she has a claim of title over the lot. The Court quoted the principle that tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, but they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, and constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Mere absence of title over the lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. The policy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what she claims is hers. The petitioners could not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, but they should show that they are entitled to possess Lot 1227. If they had any evidence to prove their defenses, they should have presented it to the MCTC with their position papers and affidavits. But they ignored the court's order and missed the given opportunity to have their defenses heard, the very essence of due process. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.

• Unlawful Detainer vs. Forcible Entry — In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary; it is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioners' possession became unlawful when they refused to vacate the lot upon private respondent's demand.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations of the Complaint — In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not the allegations of the defendants. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that private respondent's allegations — that she owns Lot 1227, that she tolerated petitioners' occupation, that she withdrew her tolerance, and that petitioners refused to vacate — sufficiently presented a case of unlawful detainer cognizable by the MCTC.
• Tax Declaration as Indicia of Possession — Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that private respondent's tax declaration, while not conclusive evidence of ownership, constituted proof that she has a claim of title over Lot 1227.
• Possession by Tolerance Creates Implied Promise to Vacate — A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioners' continued possession after demand became unlawful, and the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
• Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal — Basic rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by a party for the first time on appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to bar the petitioners' contention regarding the lack of a preliminary conference order, which was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC, and was deemed a mere afterthought when the MCTC decided against them.

• "In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess." — This passage articulates the core distinction between unlawful detainer and forcible entry, which is the controlling doctrine for determining the propriety of the ejectment remedy in this case.
• "Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property." — This passage defines the evidentiary weight given to tax declarations in ejectment cases, supporting the Court's conclusion that private respondent had a better right to possess the lot.
• "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the legal basis for the ejectment action against the petitioners and the reckoning of the period of unlawful withholding.

• Rivera vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 154203, 8 July 2003, 405 SCRA 466 — Cited as authority for the distinction between unlawful detainer and forcible entry, specifically that prior physical possession is not necessary in unlawful detainer cases.
• Heirs of Demetrio Melchor vs. Melchor, G.R. No. 150633, 12 November 2003, 415 SCRA 726 — Cited for the principle that in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
• Custodio vs. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 500 — Cited for the distinction between unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, and accion reinvindicatoria, and that unlawful detainer is limited to the question of possession de facto.
• Bayubay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105866, 6 July 1993, 224 SCRA 557 — Distinguished by the Court; in that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and affidavits, unlike in the present case.
• Villaranda vs. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 571 — Cited for the rule that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and that raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel.
• Don Tino Realty and Dev't. Corp. vs. Florentino, G.R. No. 134222, 10 September 1999, 372 Phil. 882 — Cited for the principle that ejectment cases are summary proceedings designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property involved.
• Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an, G.R. No. 128568, 9 April 2003, 401 SCRA 84 — Cited for the doctrine that tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
• Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 492 — Cited for the policy behind ejectment suits: to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone.
• Tubiano vs. Razo, G.R. No. 132598, 13 July 2000, 390 Phil. 863 — Cited for the principle that a party who ignores the court's order and misses the opportunity to have defenses heard cannot claim denial of due process.
• Boy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125088, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 196 — Cited for the doctrine that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand.

• Rule 70, Section 1, Rules of Court — The provision governing who may institute ejectment proceedings and when. The Court applied this provision to hold that the MCTC properly took jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer cases, as the complaints were filed within one year from the date of the demand to vacate, and the allegations sufficiently presented a case of unlawful detainer.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.