Gandionco vs. Peñaranda

A civil action for legal separation grounded on concubinage may proceed independently of, and need not be suspended pending, a criminal action for concubinage, because it is not an action "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; furthermore, a decree of legal separation may issue upon preponderance of evidence without need of a prior criminal conviction.

Petitioner Froilan C. Gandionco and private respondent Teresita S. Gandionco are spouses. Private respondent instituted two parallel proceedings against petitioner: a civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, and a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The legal question arises from the interplay between these proceedings under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which amended the former Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and narrowed the scope of the suspension rule to civil actions "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense."

Petitioner Froilan C. Gandionco and private respondent Teresita S. Gandionco are legally married spouses. On May 29, 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636 and was presided over by respondent Judge Senen C. Peñaranda.

On October 13, 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on October 23, 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. Thereafter, on November 14, 1986, private respondent applied in the civil case for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation.

On December 10, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order directing petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private respondent and their child. Petitioner subsequently moved to suspend the hearings in the legal separation case, contending that the civil action and its incidents should await the outcome of the criminal case for concubinage. Petitioner also moved to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing the case, alleging manifest partiality. On August 5, 1987, respondent Judge denied both motions, finding that the civil action for legal separation was not one to enforce civil liability arising from the offense and that the governing rule under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure did not require suspension.

Petitioner then filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the December 10, 1986 order granting support pendente lite and the August 5, 1987 order denying his motions to suspend and to inhibit. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge and dismissed the petition.

• Suspension of Civil Action: Petitioner argued that the civil action for legal separation and all incidents consequent thereto, including the application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage, citing Section 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Court's decision in Jerusalem vs. Zurbano.
• Legal Separation as Arising from the Offense: Petitioner maintained that the civil action for legal separation, being grounded on concubinage, arises from or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, such that all proceedings related to legal separation must await conviction or acquittal in the criminal case.
• Requirement of Criminal Conviction: Petitioner argued that his conviction for concubinage must first be secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
• Resistance to Support Pendente Lite: Petitioner resisted payment of support pendente lite to his wife, implying that the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Disqualification of Judge: Petitioner sought to have respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, contending that the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings demonstrated a disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing manifest partiality to private respondent.

• Suspension of Civil Action: Whether the civil action for legal separation and incidents consequent thereto should be suspended pending the criminal action for concubinage filed by private respondent.
• Requirement of Criminal Conviction: Whether a criminal conviction for concubinage is a prerequisite before a decree of legal separation can be issued.
• Support Pendente Lite: Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of support pendente lite.
• Disqualification of Judge: Whether the respondent Judge should be disqualified from hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality.

• Suspension of Civil Action: No. A civil action for legal separation is not an action "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" under Section 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and therefore need not be suspended upon the filing of a criminal action for concubinage.
• Requirement of Criminal Conviction: No. A decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation; no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
• Support Pendente Lite: No grave abuse of discretion was found. Support pendente lite is a remedy available in an action for legal separation, granted at the discretion of the judge; if the amount is too onerous, a motion to modify or reduce may be filed.
• Disqualification of Judge: No. Divergence of opinions between a judge and a party's counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge for bias and manifest partiality.

• Suspension of Civil Action: The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically Section 3, Rule 111, govern civil actions "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense." This language is narrower than the former Section 1(c), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which referred broadly to "civil action arising from the same offense." Under the old rule, the Court in Jerusalem vs. Zurbano had stated that suspension of an action for legal separation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relying on the broader language of the old rule. The 1985 amendment, however, limits the suspension rule to civil actions seeking to enforce civil liability arising from the offense. An action for legal separation is not such an action; it is intended to obtain the right to live separately, with legal consequences such as dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offspring, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Because the action for legal separation does not seek recovery of civil liability arising from the offense, it may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, the criminal action for concubinage. The respondent Judge correctly applied the amended rule.

• Requirement of Criminal Conviction: A decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. The doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao, which required that the guilt of the defendant spouse be established by final judgment in a criminal action, was decided under Act No. 2710, when absolute divorce was allowed and had the same grounds as legal separation under the New Civil Code. That requirement was not reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco vs. Tayao. Petitioner himself admitted in his rejoinder that concubinage in a case for legal separation may be proved based on preponderance of evidence.

• Support Pendente Lite: Support pendente lite is a remedy that can be availed of in an action for legal separation and is granted at the discretion of the judge. The Court found no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite too onerous, he may file a motion to modify or reduce the same, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, which directs the court to determine provisionally the pertinent facts and render such order as equity and justice may require.

• Disqualification of Judge: Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is especially so where the judge's disposition of the party's motions is found to be sound and well-taken, as in this case.

• Independence of Civil Action for Legal Separation from Criminal Action — Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (Section 3, Rule 111), only civil actions "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" are suspended upon the commencement of a criminal action. A civil action for legal separation, even if grounded on concubinage, is not such an action because it seeks the right to live separately and the consequential effects on conjugal rights — dissolution of the conjugal partnership, custody, support, disqualification from inheriting — rather than recovery of civil liability arising from the offense. The action may therefore proceed independently of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage. This doctrine modified the earlier ruling in Jerusalem vs. Zurbano, which had been decided under the broader language of the old Rule 107.

• Preponderance of Evidence Sufficient for Legal Separation — A decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the civil action itself. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. This principle modified the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao, decided under Act No. 2710, which had required that the guilt of the defendant spouse be established by final judgment in a criminal action. The framers of the Civil Code omitted that requirement, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule.

• Judicial Discretion in Support Pendente Lite — Support pendente lite in an action for legal separation is granted at the discretion of the trial judge, and the order may be modified or reduced upon motion of the adverse party if the amount is found too onerous. Grave abuse of discretion must be shown to warrant annulment of such an order.

• Divergence of Legal Opinion Not Ground for Disqualification — A mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a party's counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence does not constitute bias or manifest partiality sufficient to disqualify the judge from hearing a case.

• "In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one 'to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense' even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense." — This passage articulates the central ratio decidendi: the 1985 amendment narrowed the suspension rule to civil actions enforcing civil liability, thereby excluding legal separation actions from its scope.

• "A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary." — This statement establishes that the standard of proof in legal separation proceedings is preponderance of evidence, and that a prior criminal conviction is not a prerequisite, expressly modifying the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao.

• "Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." — This defines the principle that disagreement over legal interpretation does not amount to judicial bias warranting inhibition.

• Jerusalem vs. Zurbano, G.R. No. L-11935, April 24, 1959, 105 Phil. 1277 — Distinguished. The Court clarified that Jerusalem relied on the old Section 1(c), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which broadly referred to "civil action arising from the same offense." The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure amended this language to refer specifically to civil actions "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense," thereby limiting the suspension rule's scope and rendering Jerusalem inapplicable to actions for legal separation.

• Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42 (1927) — Modified. Decided under Act No. 2710, this case required that the guilt of the defendant spouse be established by final judgment in a criminal action before a decree of legal separation could issue. The framers of the present Civil Code omitted that requirement, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule.

• Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 (1956) — Cited as authority that support pendente lite is a remedy available in an action for legal separation, granted at the discretion of the judge.

• Section 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that when the offended party has instituted a civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, after a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding. The Court held that this provision applies only to civil actions enforcing civil liability, not to actions for legal separation.

• Section 1(c), Rule 107, old Rules of Court — The predecessor provision, which broadly referred to "civil action arising from the same offense" without the limiting phrase "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense." The Court contrasted this with the 1985 amendment to show that the scope of the suspension rule was narrowed.

• Article 334, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of concubinage, which is both the ground for the legal separation action and the basis of the criminal complaint filed by private respondent.

• Article 97, New Civil Code — Identified concubinage on the part of the husband as a ground for legal separation under the Civil Code. The decision noted that under Article 55(6) of the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209, as amended), soon to take effect, sexual infidelity or perversion of either spouse would replace adultery and concubinage as defined by the Revised Penal Code as grounds for legal separation.

• Section 5, Rule 61, Rules of Court — Governs the order for support pendente lite, directing the court to determine provisionally the pertinent facts and render such order as equity and justice may require, having due regard for the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and other relevant circumstances.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.