Gan vs. Reyes

A judgment in an action for support is immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal, by express provision of Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which makes no distinction between appealed and non-appealed judgments for support.

Bernadette S. Pondevida, mother of three-year-old Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, claimed that petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan was the father of her child and demanded support. Petitioner denied paternity, noting that the child's birth certificate listed the father as "UNKNOWN." Bernadette thereafter filed a complaint for support on behalf of her daughter before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City, presided over by Executive Judge Antonio C. Reyes. The case was governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 4, Rule 39, which provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.

Bernadette S. Pondevida, concerned that she would not be able to send her three-year-old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida to school, wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner denied paternity in his reply, prompting Bernadette to file a complaint on behalf of her daughter for support with a prayer for support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, arguing that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. The trial court denied the motion.

Despite the denial, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. On 19 January 2000, private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which the trial court granted, noting that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety days after the expiration of the reglementary period and only after private respondent moved for default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and the trial court received private respondent's evidence ex parte. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize Francheska Joy as his illegitimate child and to support her with ₱20,000.00 every month, payable on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Petitioner was likewise ordered to pay accumulated arrears of ₱20,000.00 per month from the day the child was born, ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees, ₱25,000.00 for litigation expenses, and ₱20,000.00 monthly as alimony pendente lite should he pursue further remedies.

Private respondent immediately moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted on 2 June 2000 by issuing a writ of execution, citing the child's immediate need for schooling. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a Honda City with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City. Petitioner meanwhile appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals and, on 9 June 2000, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the same court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering immediate execution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on 31 August 2000, holding that under Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition before the Supreme Court.

• Immediate Execution Requires Good Reasons: Petitioner argued that under the rules, a judgment for support subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate execution, insisting that the judgment had not yet attained finality and thus required an exceptional reason to warrant execution.
• Lack of Notice and Hearing: Petitioner asserted that the writ of execution was issued without notice to him, claiming he received a copy of the motion for immediate execution two weeks after its scheduled hearing, thus violating his right to notice and hearing.
• Meritorious Defense of Adultery: Petitioner maintained that the default order and judgment rendered thereafter should be set aside, arguing that if allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would likely be denied, as the child would be a fruit of adulterous relations and therefore not his.
• DNA Testing: Petitioner consented to submit to DNA testing to resolve the issue of paternity, claiming the test has a reputation for accuracy.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Support Judgments: Whether a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal can be executed absent any good reason for its immediate execution.
• Validity of the Writ of Execution: Whether the writ of execution was issued in violation of petitioner's right to notice and hearing.
• Default Order and Judgment: Whether the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter should be set aside to allow petitioner to prove his defense of adultery.
• DNA Testing: Whether DNA testing should be ordered to settle the issue of paternity.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Support Judgments: No. Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which makes no distinction between appealed and non-appealed support judgments.
• Validity of the Writ of Execution: No, the writ was not invalid. While the right to notice of hearing cannot generally be disregarded, petitioner's dilatory tactics — surrendering a vehicle that did not belong to him and failing to deposit support amounts as promised — justified sustaining the writ in the interest of substantial justice and speedy disposition.
• Default Order and Judgment: N/A. The Court declined to review the default judgment, as doing so would pre-empt the decision of the Court of Appeals in the pending main case for support.
• DNA Testing: N/A. The Court declined to rule on DNA testing for the same reason — it would pre-empt the Court of Appeals' decision in the main case.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Support Judgments: Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule that the taking of an appeal stays execution. The provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those subject of an appeal and those which are not. To accept petitioner's argument that "good reasons" must exist for advance execution would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule. The maxim Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget — a clear sentence needs no expositor — applies. The interpretation petitioner advances would lead to absurdity, negating the plain meaning of the provision.

• Validity of the Writ of Execution: While the right to notice of hearing cannot be disregarded in every case, the records show that petitioner had engaged in excessive temporizing to delay execution of the writ. He surrendered a sedan that was not his, which was later released to a third party. He filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite before the Court of Appeals, promising to deposit the monthly support, but never deposited any amount. He further delayed proceedings by appealing to the Supreme Court with questions characterized as flimsy and trivial. Voiding the writ on the ground of lack of notice alone would allow procedural rules — primarily drafted to protect parties — to become instruments of injustice. A technicality should aid justice, not hinder it. The constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases must not be thwarted by dilatory tactics.

• Default Order and Judgment: No useful purpose would be served by dwelling on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the default judgment. It is not for the Supreme Court at this instance to review or revise the trial court's decision, as doing so would pre-empt the decision the Court of Appeals may render in the main case for support, which was still pending on appeal.

• DNA Testing: For the same reason, the Court declined to order DNA testing. The futility of petitioner's arguments on this point is apparent, as ruling on paternity would likewise pre-empt the Court of Appeals' decision in the main case.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Judgments for Support — Under Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule that an appeal stays execution. The provision makes no distinction between appealed and non-appealed support judgments; no "good reason" beyond the nature of the judgment itself is required for immediate execution. The rationale is that the welfare of the child is paramount, and delay in payment of support cannot be cured by belated payment, however large the accumulated amount.

• Procedural Rules as Aids to Justice — Technicalities should serve as aids to justice, not as instruments of delay or injustice. Where a party has engaged in dilatory tactics, the courts will not allow procedural rules to be wielded to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases and the substantive rights of the opposing party, particularly a child's right to support.

• Paramount Welfare of the Child — In all cases involving a child, the child's interest and welfare are the paramount concerns. The Court cited De Leon vs. Soriano for the principle that money adjudged for support and education must be given presently and without delay, because belated payment cannot cure the evil of hunger or the loss of years in school.

• "Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the statutory basis for the immediate executory character of support judgments and its status as an exception to the general rule on execution pending appeal.

• "The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not." — This sentence establishes that the rule's application is absolute and not subject to judicial qualification by requiring "good reasons."

• "A technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy." — This formulation encapsulates the Court's approach to procedural rules in the context of dilatory tactics, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the equitable application of procedural rules.

• "The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds." — Quoted from De Leon vs. Soriano, this passage articulates the policy rationale for immediate execution of support judgments, emphasizing the irreparable harm caused by delay.

• De Leon vs. Soriano, 95 Phil. 806 (1954) — Cited for the principle that support and education funds must be given presently and without delay, as belated payment cannot cure the damage of hunger or lost schooling. The Court quoted extensively from this case to underscore the policy basis for immediate execution of support judgments.

• Pallada vs. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, 364 Phil. 81 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy, supporting the Court's refusal to void the writ of execution on the ground of lack of notice alone.

• Section 4, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. The Court held that this provision peremptorily mandates immediate execution of all support judgments without distinction between appealed and non-appealed cases, and that requiring "good reasons" for such execution would violate the rule's plain language.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concurred.