Galvez vs. Court of Appeals

Territorial jurisdiction in estafa may be laid in the place where the check representing the money was delivered and accepted, because estafa is a continuing crime and the delivery and subsequent encashment form part of the body of the offense; denial of a postponement does not violate the right to be heard absent clear arbitrariness.

Sometime in early 1959, Jose T. Galvez offered the husband of complainant Feliciana Camara an exchange deal for the spouses’ car. About a week later, Galvez showed the Camaras a station wagon, but it made no impression on them. Galvez subsequently showed them another car at Clark Field air base, which they readily liked. Before consummating the purchase, the Camara spouses asked Galvez, whom they brought along to the air base, for an estimate of customs duties and other taxes they would have to pay upon acquisition. Galvez volunteered that he could settle the tax liabilities by applying mere backpay certificates that could be bought for the relatively small sum of P2,000.

On April 24, 1959, following the purchase of the car, Feliciana Camara delivered to Galvez a bank check payable to him in the sum of P2,000, representing the amount Galvez said would be required to buy backpay certificates to pay the car’s tax obligations. Galvez cashed the check shortly thereafter at the Ermita branch of the Philippine Trust Company in Manila. After some delay, Galvez gave Feliciana a certificate of registration supposedly issued by the Motor Vehicles Office and a set of plate numbers for the newly acquired car. Four months later, the Camaras learned that the taxes due on their car had not been paid. Verification showed that Information Entry 663582 in the MVO file of their car did not correspond to the proper entry number in the Bureau of Customs files. Mrs. Camara communicated with Galvez and demanded the return of her money; Galvez allegedly replied that he had given the money to another person.

Galvez was indicted for estafa before the Pasay City branch of the CFI of Rizal. The information alleged that on or about April 24, 1959, in Pasay City, Galvez induced Feliciana Camara through false manifestations and fraudulent representations that he could pay the full and legal taxes due on her car through backpay certificates, when he knew that P2,000 was not sufficient, and received P2,000 with the understanding that he would pay the taxes for her, but converted and misappropriated the amount to his personal use and refused to account for it despite demands. Upon arraignment on January 2, 1960, Galvez pleaded not guilty.

The trial was protracted for more than two years, interspersed with several postponements granted at the behest of both the Government and the defense. The prosecution closed its case only on February 6, 1962, with the presentation of its last three witnesses. The defense forthwith requested two weeks to ready its case, but the CFI denied the request because it had previously ordered a day-to-day hearing until termination of the trial. At the hearing on February 7, the defense reiterated its bid for time and was again rebuffed. Because the defense failed to present its case, the CFI ordered Galvez to appear the following day for pronouncement of judgment. On February 8, the defense filed a written motion for reconsideration, which was denied in open court; the defense then moved for deferment of the pronouncement until a remedy could be had from a superior court, but this was rejected. The judgment dated February 7 was then read, convicting Galvez and sentencing him accordingly. The CFI ordered his incarceration in the Pasay City jail, but he was freed after filing a notice of appeal and an appeal bond.

At the trial, the prosecution proved that the check for P2,000 was delivered to Galvez by Camara at the latter’s house in Pasay City, within the territorial jurisdiction of the CFI. Galvez admitted that he cashed the same check at the Ermita branch of the Philippine Trust Company in Manila. Galvez contended that the CFI’s order resetting the trial for February 6, 1962 and thereafter from day to day until the case would be fully terminated was given in open court on January 24, 1962 in the absence of counsel and without subsequent written notice to him. The record showed that the hearing scheduled for January 24, 1962 had been ordered cancelled at Galvez’s own instance due to the absence of his counsel, and that counsel appeared in court on the new date set.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the information charged conversion of P2,000 cash received in Manila, not a check; the only related transaction in Pasay was the delivery of the check, which he claimed was not an essential element of the estafa charged, so the action should have been commenced in Manila where the money was allegedly received in cash.
• Right to Day in Court / Postponement: Petitioner argued that the CFI’s denial of a two-week postponement after the prosecution closed its case was unreasonable and amounted to a denial of his right to be heard; he contended that the order resetting trial for February 6, 1962 and day-to-day was given in open court on January 24, 1962 in the absence of counsel and without written notice, so he could not anticipate his turn, and that he needed two weeks to organize evidence and secure witnesses and documents.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Whether the CFI of Rizal had territorial jurisdiction over the estafa charge where the check was delivered in Pasay City but cashed in Manila.
• Right to Day in Court: Whether the CFI’s denial of the defense’s motion for a two-week postponement after the prosecution closed its case denied Galvez his right to be heard.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Yes. The CFI of Rizal had territorial jurisdiction because the check was delivered and accepted in Pasay City and later cashed in Manila, and these acts formed part of the continuing crime of estafa.
• Right to Day in Court: No. The denial of the two-week postponement was not arbitrary; counsel had notice of the resetting, more than two years was enough to prepare, and no subpoena was requested.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: The SC rejected the petitioner’s hairline distinction between conversion of a check and conversion of cash. The information’s phrase “amount of P2,000” was broad enough to refer to either cash or a negotiable instrument. A check is not legal tender but is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit represented by it is property capable of appropriation under Article 417, par. (1), Civil Code. The petitioner’s assumption that he received the money only when and where he cashed the check was erroneous; under Article 1249, 2nd par., Civil Code, delivery of the check on April 24, 1959 in Pasay had the effect, when subsequently cashed, of transferring as of that date and place the sum from drawer to payee, although the change from check to public notes took place later and at another situs. Delivery and acceptance also created a fiduciary relation, an essential element of estafa by misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, subd. 1, par. (b), Revised Penal Code. Estafa is a continuing crime; receipt of the check in Pasay and cashing in Manila formed part of the events making up the body of the offense, satisfying Rule 110, Sec. 14, Revised Rules of Court and US vs. Santiago.
• Right to Day in Court: The SC found no denial of the right to be heard. Although the order resetting trial for February 6, 1962 and day-to-day was announced in open court in the presence of only Galvez, his counsel is presumed to have had actual notice because he appeared on the new date set. The January 24, 1962 hearing had been cancelled at Galvez’s own instance due to his counsel’s absence, and counsel had the duty to check the outcome of that hearing. As to preparation, more than two years was enough time for a simple estafa case; Galvez could anticipate his defense and evidence. His claim that he needed time to secure witnesses was contradicted by his failure to request a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum on February 6 or 7, 1962. His motion for new trial annexed an affidavit showing he intended to testify on matters within his personal knowledge, yet he did not come forward on the date set; while an accused is not bound to testify and his silence may not be taken against him, the belated attempt made his application for continuance not in good faith. Only clear arbitrariness justifies SC interference with the CFI’s discretion on postponement, and the SC found none, citing People vs. Mendez.

• Continuing Crime / Estafa — The SC treated estafa as a continuing crime; the receipt of the check in Pasay City and its cashing in Manila formed part of the events making up the body of the offense.
• Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases — Criminal prosecution shall be instituted in the place where the offense or any of its essential ingredients was committed; because the check was delivered and accepted in Pasay, the CFI of Rizal had jurisdiction.
• Check as Substitute for Cash / Property — A check is not legal tender but is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash; the credit it represents is property capable of appropriation. The SC applied this to hold that the information’s allegation of receiving “amount of P2,000” covered the check.
• Payment Through Bills of Exchange — Under Article 1249, 2nd par., Civil Code, delivery of a check has the effect, when subsequently cashed, of transferring the sum as of the date and place of delivery. The SC applied this to fix receipt in Pasay on April 24, 1959.
• Fiduciary Relation in Estafa — The existence of a fiduciary relation in the form of trust, commission or administration is an essential element of estafa by misappropriation or conversion. The SC held that delivery and acceptance of the check created such relation.
• Discretion to Grant Postponement — Only clear arbitrariness justifies SC interference with a trial court’s grant or denial of postponement. The SC found no arbitrariness in the CFI’s denial of Galvez’s two-week request.
• Notice to Counsel — Counsel has the duty to check the outcome of a hearing he failed to attend, and actual notice is presumed when counsel appears on the new date set. The SC applied this to hold Galvez’s counsel had notice of the February 6, 1962 resetting.

• “A check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted, under commercial usage, as a substitute for cash.” — The SC used this to treat the information’s allegation of receiving “amount of P2,000” as broad enough to cover a check.
• “To put it elsewise, estafa is a continuing crime and the receipt by the accused of the check in Pasay City and his cashing of the same shortly thereafter in Manila form part of the events that make up the body of the offense.” — This was the SC’s basis for holding that the CFI of Rizal had territorial jurisdiction.
• “The existence of such relation either in the form of a trust, commission or administration, is, of course, an essential element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation or conversion.” — The SC held that delivery and acceptance of the check created a fiduciary relation, an essential element of estafa.
• “As a rule, it is only in cases of clear arbitrariness that this Court will interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting or denying a motion for postponement.” — The SC applied this standard in rejecting Galvez’s claim that the denial of postponement denied him his day in court.

• US vs. Santiago, 27 Phil. 408 — Followed for the rule that a criminal prosecution is instituted in the place where the offense or any essential ingredient was committed.
• People vs. Mendez, L-27348, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 880 — Followed for the rule that only clear arbitrariness justifies SC interference with the trial court’s discretion on postponement.

• Article 417, par. (1), Civil Code of the Philippines — The SC cited it to treat the credit represented by a check as property capable of appropriation.
• Article 1249, 2nd par., Civil Code of the Philippines — Applied to hold that delivery of the check in Pasay had the effect, when cashed, of transferring the sum as of that date and place.
• Article 315, subd. 1, par. (b), Revised Penal Code — The SC cited it for estafa by misappropriation or conversion and the essential fiduciary relation.
• Rule 110, Sec. 14, Revised Rules of Court — Applied for venue: prosecution instituted where the offense or essential ingredient was committed.
• Article III, sec. 1, par. 18, Philippine Constitution — Cited to note that an accused is not bound to testify and his silence may not be taken against him.
• Rule 115, sec. 1, par. (d), Revised Rules of Court — Cited with the constitutional provision on the accused’s right not to testify.