Gallego vs. People of the Philippines

A person may not resist or disobey a lawful order of an agent of a person in authority on the ground that the order is debatable or that the actor invokes constitutional freedom of assembly, where the regulation underlying the order is a reasonable exercise of police power. The exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and assembly is not absolute and may be regulated by the State through police power, including through municipal ordinances requiring permits for public meetings.

Florentino Gallego was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who sought to hold a religious meeting in a public place in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo. The Municipality of Lambunao had enacted Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, requiring a prior permit for the holding of religious meetings in public places. The chief of police of Lambunao, Avelino Larrosa, was tasked with enforcing local ordinances and maintaining public order. The case required the Court to reconcile the constitutional right of peaceable assembly with the State's police power to regulate the use of public streets and places.

On the morning of March 10, 1957, Florentino Gallego and his companions were about to hold a meeting of the Jehovah's Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo. The chief of police, Avelino Larrosa, approached Gallego and inquired whether he had a permit to hold the meeting. When Gallego could not produce any, the chief of police enjoined him from proceeding with the meeting.

Instead of desisting, Gallego, in a challenging vein, addressed his followers: "You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of police and his policemen) can do for us." The chief of police then warned Gallego that if he continued with the meeting, he would place him under arrest. Disregarding the warning, Gallego continued the meeting for at least thirty more minutes, whereupon he was arrested and charged accordingly.

At the time of the incident, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, of the Municipality of Lambunao was in force, providing for a prior permit for the holding of religious meetings in public places. The trial court convicted Gallego of slight disobedience, sentencing him to a fine of P10 and costs, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that disobedience was self-evident from Gallego's immediate reaction to the chief of police's warning and his overt act of continuing the meeting for at least thirty minutes thereafter.

• Absence of Proof of Ordinance: Petitioner contended that there was no proof of the existence of an ordinance in force on March 10, 1957, requiring a permit for the holding of a meeting, and assailed the Court of Appeals for taking judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, when the trial court itself allegedly did not take cognizance of the ordinance.
• Illegality of the Chief of Police's Order: Petitioner argued that the order of the chief of police was illegal and therefore not entitled to obedience because the ordinance applies only to meetings held in places where traffic is heavy, and there was no proof that traffic where the meeting was held was heavy. He added that he was given a permit by the mayor, although at the time he could not produce it because it was given orally.
• Constitutional Freedom of Assembly: Petitioner invoked the constitutional guaranty of free assembly to justify his act of disobeying the chief of police's order.

• Judicial Notice of Municipal Ordinance: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, of the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo.
• Legality of the Order and Justification for Disobedience: Whether the alleged illegality of the chief of police's order justified petitioner's disobedience.
• Freedom of Assembly vs. Police Power: Whether the constitutional guaranty of freedom of assembly exempts petitioner from compliance with a reasonable municipal permit requirement and justifies his disobedience of a lawful order.

• Judicial Notice of Municipal Ordinance: No. The Court of Appeals did not err in taking judicial notice of the ordinance, as Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters capable of unquestionable demonstration, and the trial court itself had referenced the ordinance.
• Legality of the Order and Justification for Disobedience: No. Even if petitioner had legitimate reason to protest the order, he was not justified in disobeying the chief of police, as the illegality of the order was not clearly manifest but at most a debatable legal question.
• Freedom of Assembly vs. Police Power: No. The exercise of the right to peaceable assembly is not absolute and may be reasonably regulated under the State's police power, including through municipal ordinances requiring permits for public meetings.

• Judicial Notice of Municipal Ordinance: Nothing in the law prohibits an appellate court like the Court of Appeals from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters capable of unquestionable demonstration, which is precisely what the Court of Appeals did in holding that Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, was existing at the time. Moreover, it was not true that the trial court did not take notice of the ordinance, as the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to secure the necessary permit" with obvious reference to the ordinance. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, the Court held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and it must have been in compliance with this ruling that the trial court took notice of the ordinance.

• Legality of the Order and Justification for Disobedience: The prosecution was for slight disobedience, not for violation of the ordinance. Although petitioner may have had legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of police, he was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to proceed with the meeting. Citing Justice Malcolm's formulation in People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, the Court reiterated that to authorize resistance or disobedience to agents of authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest, but no case of excessive violence to enforce a debatable legal question.

• Freedom of Assembly vs. Police Power: The rights to freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble are fundamental personal rights recognized and guaranteed by democratic constitutions, but their exercise is not absolute. It is a settled principle that the exercise of these rights may be regulated so that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such constitutional rights is the sovereign police power — the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. This power may be delegated to political subdivisions such as municipalities and cities through their legislative bodies. The ordinance in this case was a reasonable regulation of the use of public streets; there was no claim that it gave the authorities arbitrary power to grant or deny a permit, nor that petitioner was arbitrarily denied a permit.

• Police Power as Limitation on Constitutional Rights — The exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly is not absolute and may be regulated by the State under its police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. This power may be delegated to political subdivisions such as municipalities and cities through their legislative bodies. The Court applied this doctrine by sustaining Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, as a reasonable regulation of the use of public streets, finding no arbitrariness in the permit requirement.

• Judicial Notice of Municipal Ordinances — Courts should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters capable of unquestionable demonstration. The Court applied this doctrine by affirming the Court of Appeals' taking of judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, and by noting that the trial court itself had referenced the ordinance.

• Standard for Justifying Disobedience to Authority — To authorize resistance or disobedience to agents of authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest; a merely debatable legal question does not justify disobedience. The Court applied this standard by holding that petitioner's challenge to the chief of police's order, even if colorable, did not rise to the level of clearly manifest illegality required to justify disobedience.

• "But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of these rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society." — This passage articulates the Court's foundational rationale for subjecting constitutional freedoms to reasonable regulation under police power.

• "To authorize resistance (also disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive violence to enforce defendant's idea of a debatable legal question." — Quoted from Justice Malcolm in People vs. Veloso, this formulation sets the standard for when disobedience to authority is justified, and was applied to reject petitioner's defense.

• "It should not be lost sight of that this is a prosecution for slight disobedience, not for violation of the ordinance." — This passage clarifies the distinction between the offense charged and the underlying ordinance, explaining why the validity of the ordinance was not the central question but rather whether petitioner's disobedience was justified.

• People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727 — Controlling precedent establishing that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. Followed by the Court to support both the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' cognizance of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957.

• People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 — Cited for Justice Malcolm's formulation of the standard that disobedience to agents of authority is justified only when the illegality of the official act is clearly manifest, not merely debatable. Applied to reject petitioner's defense of illegal order.

• Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 — Cited for the doctrine that the exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and assembly may be regulated under the State's police power, which may be delegated to political subdivisions. Applied to sustain the reasonableness of the municipal permit ordinance.

• Article 151, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. The second paragraph provides that when the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from P10 to P100 shall be imposed. Petitioner was convicted under this provision for slight disobedience.

• Section 5, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters capable of unquestionable demonstration. Relied upon to sustain the Court of Appeals' taking of judicial notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957, of the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred. Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.