Gallardo vs. Rimando

The filing of a petition to annul or suspend proclamation under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code suspends the ten-day period to file an election protest or quo warranto proceeding, and this suspension extends to the entire pendency of the pre-proclamation case, including the appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The period resumes only upon receipt of the Supreme Court’s final resolution. The finality and executory character of the COMELEC decision under Section 246 do not cut short or nullify the right to file an election protest; their sole effect is to authorize the prevailing party’s assumption of office pending the protest.

In the January 18, 1988 local elections, Gil C. Gallardo and Franco F. Rimando contested the office of Municipal Mayor of Naguilian, La Union. Rimando was proclaimed winner on January 19, 1988 by a margin of 12 votes. On January 22, 1988, Gallardo filed with the COMELEC a pre-proclamation petition to annul Rimando’s proclamation. COMELEC dismissed the petition on December 8, 1988. Gallardo elevated the dismissal to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 85974), which the Court denied in a final resolution dated May 30, 1989 and received by Gallardo on June 23, 1989. On June 30, 1989, Gallardo filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union. The trial court initially denied respondent’s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered and dismissed the protest as time-barred, prompting the present petition.

• The Election and Proclamation: In the January 18, 1988 local elections, Gil C. Gallardo and Franco F. Rimando were rival candidates for Municipal Mayor of Naguilian, La Union. Rimando was proclaimed the winner on January 19, 1988 by a margin of 12 votes.
• Pre-Proclamation Case: On January 22, 1988, Gallardo filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul Rimando’s proclamation. COMELEC dismissed the petition on December 8, 1988. Gallardo appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court in Gallardo v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 85974). The Supreme Court denied the petition in a final resolution dated May 30, 1989, which Gallardo received on June 23, 1989.
• Election Protest: On June 30, 1989, Gallardo filed an election protest (Case No. 4-Bg) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union. Rimando moved to dismiss on the ground that the protest was not filed within ten days after proclamation as required by Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code. The RTC initially denied the motion, but on reconsideration dismissed the protest, holding that the COMELEC decision became final and executory five days after its rendition under Section 246, and that the pendency of the Supreme Court appeal did not suspend the running of the ten-day period for filing an election protest.

• Suspension of Period under Section 248: Petitioner maintained that the ten-day period to file an election protest was suspended by his filing of a pre-proclamation petition under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that this suspension continued during the entire pendency of the pre-proclamation case, including the appeal to the Supreme Court. He argued that the period resumed only upon his receipt of the Supreme Court’s final resolution on June 23, 1989, leaving him eight days within which to file the protest; his filing on the seventh day, June 30, 1989, was therefore timely.

• Finality of COMELEC Decision under Section 246: Respondent contended that the COMELEC decision of December 8, 1988 became final and executory five days later under Section 246, and that the election protest, filed only on June 30, 1989, fell outside the ten-day reglementary period. He argued that the appeal to the Supreme Court did not suspend the period because no restraining order was issued against the COMELEC decision.

• Timeliness of the Election Protest: Whether the election protest filed on June 30, 1989 was timely under Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering the prior filing and appeal of a pre-proclamation petition to annul the proclamation.
• Effect of the Finality of the COMELEC Decision: Whether the final and executory character of the COMELEC decision under Section 246 barred the filing of an election protest after the lapse of five days from receipt of that decision.

• Timeliness of the Election Protest: The election protest was timely. Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code originally gave Gallardo ten days from January 19, 1988 to file the protest. When he filed the pre-proclamation petition on January 22, 1988, only two days had elapsed, leaving a balance of eight days. Section 248 explicitly suspends the running of the period to file an election protest upon the filing of a petition to annul or suspend proclamation. That suspension lasts for the entire pendency of the pre-proclamation case, including an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, because the appeal is part and parcel of the annulment proceeding. The period began to run anew on June 23, 1989 when Gallardo received the Supreme Court’s final resolution. The eighth day fell on July 1, 1989; filing on June 30, 1989 was therefore within the remaining period.
• Effect of the Finality of the COMELEC Decision: The final and executory nature of the COMELEC decision did not bar the election protest. Section 246 merely allows the prevailing party in a pre-proclamation case to be proclaimed and to assume office after the five-day period unless the Supreme Court issues a restraining order. It does not extinguish the right to file an election contest under Section 251. The issues resolved in a pre-proclamation controversy are limited to the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers and the integrity of election returns; the COMELEC does not determine who actually won the election. That determination belongs to the election protest, where the trial court may examine ballots and ascertain the true will of the voters. Gallardo did not seek to restrain the COMELEC decision because Rimando had already been proclaimed before the pre-proclamation case was filed, a fact that rendered the pre-proclamation petition dismissible but did not foreclose a subsequent election protest.

• Suspension of the Period to File an Election Protest under Section 248 — Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that “[t]he filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.” This suspension is not lifted upon the COMELEC’s decision but continues throughout the appeal to the Supreme Court, as the certiorari review is an integral part of the annulment proceeding. The ten-day period resumes only upon receipt by the losing party of the Supreme Court’s final resolution.
• Limited Scope of Pre-Proclamation Controversy — Under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, a pre-proclamation controversy is confined to: (a) the legality of the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) whether the election returns are incomplete, materially defective, tampered with, falsified, or contain discrepancies; (c) whether the returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or are manufactured or non-authentic; and (d) whether substitute or fraudulent returns were canvassed. Because it does not determine the true winner, a final COMELEC decision in a pre-proclamation case does not bar a subsequent election protest.
• Effect of Executory COMELEC Decision under Section 246 — Section 246, which renders COMELEC decisions in pre-proclamation controversies executory after five days unless restrained by the Supreme Court, merely permits the winning candidate’s proclamation and assumption of office. It does not have the effect of shortening the period to file an election protest or rendering a subsequently filed protest untimely.

• “Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: ‘Sec. 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation. — The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.’” This statutory provision was the cornerstone of the Court’s ruling on suspension of the protest period.
• “The appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, which is a right secured to the defeated party under Section 7, Title A, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, is part of the annulment proceeding. The case is not over until the Supreme Court has given its verdict, hence, the computation of the ten-day-period for filing an election contest does not begin until that verdict has been handed down by the Supreme Court.” The passage clarifies that the entire appellate process is embraced within the suspension.
• “The right of the prevailing party in a pre-proclamation case to the execution of the COMELEC’s decision … after the lapse of five (5) days from receipt of said decision by the losing party, unless restrained by the Supreme Court, does not bar the losing party from filing an election contest within the ten-day period fixed in Section 251. The absence of a restraining order from the Supreme Court simply allows the prevailing party to be proclaimed and assume office.” This excerpt disentangles the executory clause from the right to an election contest.

• Casimiro, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 84462-63, March 29, 1989 — Cited for the rule that after a winning candidate has been proclaimed and has assumed office, a pre-proclamation petition does not lie. The Court invoked this to explain why Gallardo’s pre-proclamation case was properly dismissed and why he did not seek a restraining order against the COMELEC decision.
• Antonio, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 84678-79, March 29, 1989 — Cited alongside Casimiro for the same proposition.

• Section 251, Omnibus Election Code — Prescribes that a sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer must be filed with the proper regional trial court within ten days after the proclamation of the results. This established the basic reglementary period.
• Section 248, Omnibus Election Code — Declares that the filing of a petition to annul or suspend proclamation suspends the period to file an election protest or quo warranto proceeding. The Court applied this provision to hold the entire period in abeyance during the pre-proclamation litigation, including the Supreme Court appeal.
• Section 246, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that COMELEC decisions in pre-proclamation controversies become executory after five days from receipt by the losing party unless restrained by the Supreme Court. The Court interpreted this as enabling immediate assumption of office, not as cutting off the right to an election protest.
• Section 243, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates the limited issues cognizable in a pre-proclamation controversy. Referred to in explaining why a COMELEC decision does not determine the election outcome and thus does not preclude a protest.
• Section 7, Title A, Article IX, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to appeal COMELEC decisions to the Supreme Court via certiorari. The Court relied on this to treat the certiorari proceeding as an integral part of the annulment case, thereby extending the suspension of the protest period.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.