Gallardo vs. People

The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed under Rule 45; certiorari under Rule 65 lies only for grave abuse of discretion, and the Ombudsman’s disapproval of a special prosecutor’s recommendation to dismiss—even by a one-line note—does not constitute grave abuse, violate due process or equal protection, or bar trial where the defense of good faith is evidentiary.

Petitioners were public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur: Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang Bayan members Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita, and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional. The Public Health Workers of Bansalan claimed unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits from the Municipality. The controversy was prosecuted under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, which the Information invoked in charging the officials with causing undue injury through evident bad faith in the performance of official duties.

Petitioners were public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur: Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang Bayan members Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, and Noel Guinita, and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional. Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers of Bansalan, filed a sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint charged the officials with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the Municipality’s mandatory statutory obligations to the Public Health Workers, in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.

On 08 January 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution dated 26 November 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding probable cause to indict petitioners. On 13 January 1999, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. It alleged that sometime in or about January 1998, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao del Sur, the accused—public officers of the Local Government Unit of Bansalan—committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other, did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause undue injury to the Public Health Workers by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to perform their duties, including an appropriation in the municipal budget for payment of the mandatory statutory obligations due to the Public Health Workers in the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10, thus causing undue damage and injury through evident bad faith.

On 24 February 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted it on 27 April 1999 and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. In a resolution dated 26 July 1999, Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr. recommended dismissal of the case; Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil approved the recommendation, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos approved it, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo concurred. According to petitioners, the reinvestigation showed that insufficient funds were the reason for their failure to appropriate the money for the magna carta benefits of the Public Health Workers and that they acted in good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance.

Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation. In his own handwriting, he stated: “[l]et the court determine if indeed the evidence cannot stand the judicial scrutiny.” On 15 November 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the Information on the grounds that the facts charged did not constitute an offense, that they were denied due process, and that they were not accorded equal protection of the laws. They argued that the Ombudsman’s one-sentence disapproval of the Special Prosecutor’s recommendation was arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious because he failed to explain how he arrived at it, depriving them of their right to be informed of the facts and law on which the denial was based. They also claimed that the Ombudsman had dismissed sixteen previous cases similar to theirs.

On 06 January 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. It ruled that the averments in the Information sufficiently charged the offense and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed by the Ombudsman did not mean due process or equal protection of the law was denied to petitioners. The Sandiganbayan was convinced that there was adequate evidence against petitioners. Petitioners then filed the present petition.

• Reinvestigation Findings and Good Faith: Petitioners maintained that the reinvestigation conducted by Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr. showed that insufficient funds were the reason for petitioners’ failure to appropriate the money to meet the magna carta benefits of the Public Health Workers and that petitioners acted in good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance; the Sandiganbayan should have considered these findings and the evidence supporting them, irrespective of the opinion of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
• Arbitrary Disapproval and Due Process: Petitioners argued that the one-sentence disapproval by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious because he failed to explain how such action was arrived at, thereby depriving petitioners of their right to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial was based.
• Equal Protection: Petitioners claimed that they were denied the equal protection of the laws because the Ombudsman, in sixteen previous cases similar to the case at bar, dismissed the same.
• Grounds for Motion to Quash: Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, that the accused were denied due process, and that the accused were not accorded the equal protection of laws.
• Good Faith as Defense to Indictment: Petitioners argued that they could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because they acted in good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits due the private complainants.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Appeal: Whether the denial of a motion to quash is a final order appealable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash.
• Due Process and the Ombudsman’s Disapproval: Whether the Ombudsman’s one-line disapproval of the Special Prosecutor’s recommendation to dismiss deprived petitioners of due process.
• Equal Protection: Whether the Ombudsman’s dismissal of sixteen allegedly similar cases while pursuing this case violated petitioners’ right to equal protection.
• Effect of the Special Prosecutor’s Findings: Whether the Sandiganbayan should have considered and adopted the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
• Good Faith as Defense: Whether petitioners’ claim of good faith in failing to appropriate funds is a proper ground for quashing the Information or a matter of defense for trial.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Appeal: No. The denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory, not a final order, and is not appealable under Rule 45; it leaves the case for trial on the merits.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash; the Ombudsman’s probable-cause determination is entitled to deference absent clear grave abuse.
• Due Process and the Ombudsman’s Disapproval: No. The Ombudsman’s one-line disapproval did not violate due process; he reviewed the investigating prosecutor’s findings and exercised constitutionally mandated discretion, and he was not required to conduct a new investigation.
• Equal Protection: No. The Ombudsman’s dismissal of other cases did not violate equal protection; the cases were not shown to be similarly situated, and reasonable classification is allowed.
• Effect of the Special Prosecutor’s Findings: No. In case of conflict between the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, the Ombudsman’s decision prevails because the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under his supervision and control.
• Good Faith as Defense: No. Good faith is evidentiary and a matter of defense to be raised in a full-blown trial, not a ground for quashing the Information.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Appeal: Rule 45 governs appeals from judgment or final orders. A final order disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something more to be done on its merits. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion to quash is interlocutory because it leaves the Sandiganbayan to resolve the case on the merits. It allows petitioners to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice to presenting the special defenses invoked in the motion, and, if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal via appeal by certiorari. Thus, the petition’s choice of remedy under Rule 45 is erroneous. Even if considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, no grave abuse of discretion appears.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. The Ombudsman’s order to file the Information was not a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence. The Ombudsman’s one-line note may appear to lack factual or evidentiary grounds, but it stemmed from his review of the findings of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor. Contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion, the Ombudsman was convinced petitioners were probably guilty of the offense charged. He was not required to conduct an investigation anew; he merely determined the propriety and correctness of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation—whether probable cause actually existed based on the latter’s findings of fact. He could agree fully or partly, or disagree completely. This was an exercise of discretionary powers based on constitutional mandate. Courts generally should not interfere, save for clear grave abuse of discretion, which was absent.
• Due Process and the Ombudsman’s Disapproval: The due process claim rested on the erroneous assumption that the Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence when he disapproved the recommendation to dismiss, and that his ruling was unsupported by evidence. Petitioners were not denied due process. The order to file the Information had factual and legal bases. The Ombudsman’s note, though brief, arose from his review of the investigating prosecutor’s findings. He was not obliged to conduct a new investigation. His disapproval was an exercise of discretion under the constitutional mandate of his office. The fact that he wrote his recommendation in a one-line note was not a sufficient basis to attribute arbitrariness or caprice, absent a clear showing of grave abuse. Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan held that a marginal note disapproving the investigating prosecutors’ recommendation is not enough to impute arbitrariness or caprice where the public respondents sincerely believed there was sufficient evidence to indict the accused.
• Equal Protection: The equal protection clause requires that the law operate uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, or that all persons be treated in the same manner where conditions are not different in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification; if the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another. The mere fact that the Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the present case did not suffice to impute arbitrariness or caprice, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in pursuing this case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial; he recommended the filing of the Information against petitioners because there were ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was exercising his power and discharging his duty under the constitutional mandate of his office. The circumstances in the previously dismissed cases were entirely divergent from those here existing.
• Effect of the Special Prosecutor’s Findings: The Sandiganbayan could not be faulted for not considering the findings of the Special Prosecutor because, in case of conflict between the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, the Ombudsman’s decision prevails. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is the court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the case; the court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The Sandiganbayan was convinced there was adequate evidence against petitioners. Absent proof of grave abuse of discretion, its conclusion in the assailed resolution would not be disturbed.
• Good Faith as Defense: The argument that petitioners could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because they acted in good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits is evidentiary in nature and a matter of defense. It may be raised in a full-blown trial on the merits. Deloso vs. Desierto held that public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of guilt; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors believe the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. There is a trial precisely for the reception of the prosecution’s evidence in support of the charges.

• Interlocutory Order; Rule 45 and Rule 65 — A denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory because it does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something more to be done on the merits. It is not appealable under Rule 45, which governs appeals from judgment or final orders. The proper remedy is to proceed to trial, raise the defenses, and appeal from an adverse decision; certiorari under Rule 65 lies only upon grave abuse of discretion.
• Ombudsman’s Discretion to Determine Probable Cause — The Ombudsman may approve, disapprove, or modify the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation based on his review of the findings of fact. He is not required to conduct an investigation anew. His action is an exercise of discretionary powers under the constitutional mandate of his office, and courts generally should not interfere absent clear grave abuse of discretion.
• Due Process and the Ombudsman’s One-Line Disapproval — A one-line disapproval of a recommendation to dismiss does not violate due process where it stems from the Ombudsman’s review of the investigating prosecutor’s findings and is not a total absence of factual and legal bases. Brevity alone does not establish arbitrariness or caprice.
• Equal Protection and Reasonable Classification — Equal protection requires uniform treatment under similar circumstances but permits reasonable classification based on real and substantial differences. The dismissal of other cases allegedly similar to the accused’s case does not establish a violation absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in pursuing the case.
• Ombudsman’s Control over the Special Prosecutor — In case of conflict between the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, the Ombudsman’s decision prevails because the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
• Court’s Full Control Once Information Is Filed — Once a case has been filed with the court, it is the court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the case; the court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
• Probable Cause versus Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Good Faith as Defense — Public prosecutors determine only whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Good faith is an evidentiary defense to be raised in a full-blown trial.

• "It is basic that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set aside is not in any sense judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting the Rule 45 remedy and establishes the interlocutory character of an order denying a motion to quash.
• "The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew. He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter." — This defines the scope of the Ombudsman’s review power and supports the holding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the disapproval of the Special Prosecutor’s recommendation.
• "The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the filing of the information against petitioners in a one-line note is not a sufficient basis for this Court to attribute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent." — This is the canonical statement that brevity in the Ombudsman’s disapproval does not, by itself, amount to arbitrariness or caprice.
• "Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors believe that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charges." — This passage states the probable-cause standard and explains why petitioners’ good-faith defense must be litigated at trial rather than resolved on a motion to quash.

• Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, 04 October 1995, 248 SCRA 700 — Cited to support the rule that a marginal note disapproving a recommendation is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion; the Ombudsman’s one-line note did not vitiate probable cause.
• Deloso vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129939, 09 September 1999, 314 SCRA 125, 134 — Cited for the probable-cause standard and for treating good faith as a defense for trial, not a ground to quash the Information.
• Kuizon vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140619, 09 March 2001, 354 SCRA 158, 178 — Cited for the rule that in a conflict between the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, the Ombudsman’s decision prevails because the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the Ombudsman’s supervision and control.
• Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462 — Cited for the rule that once a case is filed in court, the court has full control and is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case.
• Basa, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 152444, 16 February 2005 — Cited for the definition of a final order and the interlocutory nature of an order denying a motion to quash.
• Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, 19 October 2004 — Cited for the equal protection requirement and the allowance of reasonable classification.
• Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, 27 December 1993, 228 SCRA 718; Venus vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 130319, 21 October 1998, 298 SCRA 196 — Cited for non-interference with the Ombudsman’s discretionary exercise absent grave abuse.
• Alba vs. Nitorreda, G.R. No. 120223, 13 March 1996, 254 SCRA 753 — Cited for the Ombudsman’s initiative and independence.
• Odin Security Agency vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135912, 17 September 2001, 365 SCRA 351; Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, 24 October 1994, 237 SCRA 685 — Cited for the court’s control of the case after the Information is filed.
• Nava vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 136470, 16 October 2001, 367 SCRA 263, 271 — Cited for the evidentiary nature of the good-faith defense.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs appeals from judgment or final orders; the denial of a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable under this rule.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Certiorari; even if the petition were considered under this rule, no grave abuse of discretion was shown.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The offense charged; petitioners allegedly refused to appropriate funds, causing undue injury through evident bad faith. The Court held that the good-faith defense is evidentiary and must be raised at trial.
• Equal Protection Clause — Invoked by petitioners; the Court held that no violation occurred because reasonable classification is allowed and the prior dismissals were not sufficient to show arbitrariness absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Due Process Clause — Invoked by petitioners; the Court held that no violation occurred because the Ombudsman reviewed the investigating prosecutor’s findings and exercised his discretionary power under his constitutional mandate.
• Constitutional Mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman — The Ombudsman’s power to approve or disapprove the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation is an exercise of discretionary authority based on constitutional mandate; courts should not interfere absent clear grave abuse of discretion.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.