Gallardo vs. Borromeo

A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Republic Act No. 6389, which eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the landholding as a ground for ejecting a tenant, cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect; thus, it does not apply to ejectment cases already pending adjudication when it took effect.

The petitioner, Fernando Gallardo, was a government employee who had retired from his job as a letter carrier. He owned a landholding in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, which was cultivated by the respondent, Juan Borromeo, as an agricultural lessee. The relationship between the parties was governed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), which at the time allowed an agricultural lessor-owner to dispossess a tenant if the lessor or a member of his immediate family would personally cultivate the landholding. This statutory ground for ejectment was later amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which took effect on September 10, 1971.

Fernando Gallardo, a 65-year-old government retiree who had served as a letter carrier, filed a complaint on December 7, 1963 with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth District of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, to terminate the leasehold of his tenant, Juan Borromeo, so that Gallardo could personally cultivate the landholding himself. Gallardo alleged that his retirement from government service enabled and motivated him to till his own land.

The respondent tenant alleged that the petitioner had no knowledge of farming and that his only purpose was to eject the respondent from the landholding. The trial court dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to maintain the respondent in the peaceful possession of the landholding. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal in toto, applying Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 and holding that the landowner's desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant.

The applicable law when Gallardo filed his complaint was paragraph (1) of Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which provided that an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his disposition has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory, if after due hearing it is shown that the agricultural-lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital, or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes. However, this provision was amended on September 10, 1971, by Republic Act No. 6389, which eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the landholding as a ground for the ejectment of the tenant.

• Retroactivity of R.A. 6389: The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in giving retroactive application to Section 7 of R.A. 6389, which eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the land as a ground for ejectment, when the applicable law at the time he filed his complaint was Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which allowed such dispossession.

• Right to Personal Cultivation: The petitioner maintained that as a 65-year-old government retiree, he was entitled to terminate the tenancy and till his own land under Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which was the law in force when he filed his petition.

• Lack of Farming Knowledge: The respondent alleged that the petitioner has no knowledge of farming and that his only purpose is to eject the respondent from the landholding.

• Retroactivity of R.A. 6389: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly gave retroactive application to Section 7 of R.A. 6389, which eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the landholding as a ground for ejecting a tenant.

• Validity of the Ejectment Ground: Whether the petitioner, a government retiree, may terminate the tenancy of the respondent and till his own land under Section 36 of R.A. 3844, the applicable law at the time he filed his complaint.

• Retroactivity of R.A. 6389: No. Republic Act No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make R.A. 6389 retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts.

• Validity of the Ejectment Ground: Yes. The 65-year-old petitioner, who is a government retiree, may terminate the tenancy of the private respondent and till his own land as provided in Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which was the applicable law when he filed his petition.

• Retroactivity of R.A. 6389: The Court ruled that consonant with Article 4 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided," R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. The Court cited its rulings in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, and Castro vs. Castro, 128 SCRA 519, reiterated in Diga vs. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421, in support of this proposition. The Court quoted Nilo vs. Court of Appeals for the sound canon of statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make R.A. 6389 retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts.

• Validity of the Ejectment Ground: Because R.A. 6389 could not be applied retroactively, the applicable law was Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which allowed the agricultural-lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family to dispossess the tenant if they would personally cultivate the landholding. The petitioner, being a 65-year-old government retiree, was entitled to terminate the tenancy of the respondent and till his own land under this provision.

• Prospective Application of Statutes — A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that R.A. 6389, which eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the land as a ground for ejectment, could not apply to ejectment cases already pending when it took effect, because Congress failed to express an intention to make it retroactive.

• "A sound canon of statutory construction is that statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to threatened contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. ... No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. ..." — This passage, quoted from Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, states the controlling doctrine of prospective application of statutes and is the ratio decidendi of the Court's ruling that R.A. 6389 cannot be applied retroactively.

• "Since Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts." — This passage applies the doctrine of prospective application to the specific facts of the case, concluding that the amended law does not govern the pending ejectment case.

• "We, therefore, hold that the 65-year old petitioner, who is a government retiree may terminate the tenancy of the private respondent and till his own land as provided in Section 36 of R.A. 3844, which was the applicable law when he filed is petition." — This passage states the Court's final conclusion on the merits, affirming the petitioner's right to dispossess the tenant under the law in force at the time of filing.

• Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 — Controlling precedent cited for the doctrine that R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect; also quoted for the sound canon of statutory construction that statutes operate prospectively only.

• Castro vs. Castro, 128 SCRA 519 — Cited alongside Nilo vs. Court of Appeals for the same proposition that R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect.

• Diga vs. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421 — Cited as reiterating the ruling in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals and Castro vs. Castro that R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect.

• Article 4, New Civil Code — Provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." The Court applied this provision to hold that R.A. 6389, which contained no provision for retroactivity, could not apply to pending ejectment cases.

• Section 36, Republic Act No. 3844 — The Agricultural Land Reform Code provision that allowed an agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family to dispossess a tenant if they would personally cultivate the landholding. The Court held this was the applicable law at the time the petitioner filed his complaint.

• Section 7, Republic Act No. 6389 — The amendatory provision that eliminated the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the landholding as a ground for the ejectment of the tenant. The Court held this provision could not be given retroactive effect.

Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concurred.