Galacgac vs. Bautista

A complaint for unlawful detainer based on tolerance must allege and prove that the plaintiff's act of tolerance was present right from the start of the defendant's possession; absent such proof, the complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The disputed property is a 180-square-meter portion of Lot No. 10973 in Laoag City, originally owned by Ines Mariano. Her heirs — Cirila Dannug-Martin, Maxima Dannug-Dannug, Arcadia Dannug-Pedro, and Isabel Dannug-Bulos — were involved in civil litigation over the property, for which Benigno M. Galacgac rendered legal services. Pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, the heirs allegedly partitioned and adjudicated the disputed portion in favor of Benigno in 1993. Saturnino Bautista served as the heirs' caretaker on the land. Reynaldo Bautista is Saturnino's son, who later claimed to have acquired shares over the same lot from Maxima and Arcadia. The competing claims of adjudication and sale over the same portion form the backdrop of the ejectment dispute.

In 1993, the heirs of Ines Mariano — Cirila Dannug-Martin, Maxima Dannug-Dannug, Arcadia Dannug-Pedro, and Isabel Dannug-Bulos — allegedly partitioned and adjudicated a 180-square-meter southwestern portion of Lot No. 10973 in Laoag City in favor of Benigno M. Galacgac, pursuant to a contingency fee agreement in consideration of his legal services in a civil case involving the property. According to Benigno, he allowed the heirs' caretaker, Saturnino Bautista, to occupy the disputed area on the condition that Saturnino would construct a house of light materials and surrender possession when needed. Benigno later learned that Saturnino's son, Reynaldo Bautista, had begun constructing a house of strong materials on the land. Benigno thereafter sent demand letters to Reynaldo asking him to defer the construction and vacate the premises.

Reynaldo, for his part, claimed ownership of the disputed portion, averring that Maxima and Arcadia had sold him their respective undivided 90-square-meter shares over Lot No. 10973 on September 10, 2000, as confirmed by a Confirmation of Sale dated March 12, 2012. Reynaldo further argued that the adjudication of the property to Benigno was void because Benigno, as a lawyer involved in the litigation, was prohibited from acquiring properties in litigation, and that the contingency fee agreement and partition were not recorded in the Register of Deeds and could not affect third persons.

On June 29, 2012, the MTCC of Laoag City, Branch 02, dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint. The MTCC found that Saturnino had been the caretaker of the Dannug sisters even before the litigation and was already living on the lot under their authority; thus, Saturnino had no reason to ask Benigno's permission to possess the land. The MTCC concluded that Reynaldo's authority to possess emanated from the heirs of Ines Mariano, not from Benigno, and that no implied tolerance existed that would give rise to an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Benigno appealed to the RTC, which reversed the MTCC on May 30, 2013, ordering Reynaldo to vacate. Benigno died during the proceedings and was substituted by his heir, Marvin A. Galacgac. The CA then reversed the RTC on May 18, 2015, reinstating the MTCC dismissal on the ground that Benigno failed to prove his supposed act of tolerance from the start of Reynaldo's occupation. Marvin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• Elements of Unlawful Detainer: Petitioner maintained that his father, Benigno, alleged and proved all the elements of an action for unlawful detainer, particularly that Reynaldo's possession was by tolerance and that such possession became illegal upon demand to vacate.

• Claim of Ownership: Respondent argued that he owned the disputed portion, having purchased the shares of Maxima and Arcadia over Lot No. 10973, and that his possession was in the concept of an owner, not by tolerance of Benigno.
• Void Adjudication: Respondent averred that the adjudication of the property to Benigno was void because Benigno was prohibited from acquiring properties in litigation.
• Unregistered Instrument: Respondent contended that the contingency fee agreement and the deed of partition and adjudication were not recorded in the Register of Deeds and could not affect third persons.

• Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer: Whether the complaint for unlawful detainer was properly dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove that his supposed tolerance of the defendant's possession existed from the start.

• Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer: Yes, the dismissal was proper. The plaintiff's supposed act of tolerance was not proven to have been present from the start of the defendant's possession, which is an essential jurisdictional fact in unlawful detainer cases based on tolerance.

• Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer: A complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove four jurisdictional facts: (1) initial possession by the defendant by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession becoming illegal upon notice of termination of the right to possess; (3) the defendant remaining in possession and depriving the plaintiff of enjoyment; and (4) the complaint filed within one year from the last demand to vacate. It is essential that the plaintiff's acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. Here, the complaint alleged that Benigno permitted Saturnino — not Reynaldo — to occupy the land in 1993. The supposed permission was unsubstantiated: Saturnino died before the filing of the case, rendering testimony on matters occurring before his death inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute (Rule 130, Section 23). Moreover, Saturnino was the caretaker of the heirs of Ines Mariano and occupied the land based on their express permission, giving him no reason to seek Benigno's consent. Critically, Benigno never extended any tolerance to Reynaldo, with whom he had no agreement and against whom he asserted opposing claims of ownership. Because the facts proved did not sustain the alleged cause of action, the complaint was properly dismissed. The Court agreed with the CA and MTCC that evidence was wanting to establish Benigno's supposed tolerance from the time Reynaldo started occupying the property, and that it would be dangerous to deprive Reynaldo of possession through a summary proceeding merely because Benigno used the word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.

• Tolerance in Unlawful Detainer — For an unlawful detainer action based on tolerance to prosper, the plaintiff's act of tolerance must be present right from the start of the defendant's possession. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's permission or tolerance, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. However, if tolerance is not established from the beginning, the action cannot be categorized as unlawful detainer; it may instead be a disguised forcible entry action intended to evade the one-year prescriptive period. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the complaint because Benigno failed to prove that he tolerated Saturnino's — much less Reynaldo's — occupation from the outset, Saturnino having occupied the land under the authority of the heirs of Ines Mariano.

• Dead Man's Statute (Survivorship Disqualification Rule) — Under Rule 130, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, parties or assignors of parties cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of a deceased person against the executor, administrator, or representative of the deceased's estate. The Court invoked this rule to exclude testimony regarding any agreement between Benigno and Saturnino, who had died before the case was filed.

• Possession De Facto vs. Possession De Jure in Ejectment — The only issue in ejectment proceedings is who between the parties is entitled to physical or material possession (possession de facto), not possession de jure. Issues of ownership are not involved; evidence on ownership is admissible only to determine the issue of possession. The Court stressed that even a registered owner cannot simply wrest possession from an actual possessor through summary ejectment where the occupation was not obtained through the means or circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

• "It is dangerous to deprive Reynaldo of possession over the land by means of a summary proceeding just because Benigno used the word 'tolerance' without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it." — This passage articulates the Court's core rationale: mere allegation of tolerance, without evidentiary support, is insufficient to sustain an unlawful detainer action and cannot be used to dispossess a defendant through summary proceedings.

• "A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word 'tolerance' confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry." — Quoted from Sarona vs. Villegas (1968), this is the canonical formulation of the tolerance doctrine, explaining why tolerance from the outset is essential to distinguish unlawful detainer from forcible entry and to prevent evasion of the one-year prescriptive period.

• "the only issue in ejectment proceedings is who between the parties is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure." — This defines the limited scope of ejectment proceedings and clarifies that ownership disputes must be resolved in a separate appropriate action, not through summary ejectment.

• Sarona vs. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968) — Controlling precedent on the tolerance doctrine. The Court quoted it extensively for the proposition that tolerance must exist from the start of possession to categorize a cause of action as unlawful detainer rather than forcible entry, and that allowing otherwise would permit forcible entry actions to evade the one-year prescriptive period.
• Zacarias vs. Anacay, 744 Phil. 201 (2014) — Cited for the four jurisdictional facts required in a complaint for unlawful detainer.
• Rivera vs. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404 (2003) — Cited for the rule that a person occupying land by tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand.
• Spouses Valdez, Jr. vs. CA, 523 Phil. 39 (2006) — Cited for the requirement that tolerance must be present from the start of possession sought to be recovered.
• Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5 (1952) — Cited for the principle that the only issue in ejectment is possession de facto, not de jure.
• Sarmiento vs. CA, 320 Phil. 146 (1995) — Cited for the rule that even a registered owner cannot simply wrest possession from an actual possessor outside the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

• Rule 130, Section 23, Rules of Court (Dead Man's Statute) — Provides that parties or assignors of parties cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of a deceased person, against the executor or administrator of the deceased's estate. Applied to bar testimony regarding any alleged agreement between Benigno and Saturnino, who had died before the case was filed.
• Rules on Summary Ejectment (Unlawful Detainer) — The four jurisdictional facts required for unlawful detainer were applied: (1) initial possession by contract or tolerance; (2) possession becoming illegal upon notice of termination; (3) defendant remaining in possession; and (4) complaint filed within one year from last demand. The complaint failed on the first element because tolerance was not proven from the start.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier, and Rosario, JJ., concurred.