Gago vs. Mamuyac

The governing principle is that when an original will last in the testator’s possession cannot be found after death, a rebuttable presumption arises that the testator cancelled or destroyed it with the intent to revoke. The Court held that this presumption, while variable in strength depending on the circumstances, requires the proponent to present affirmative proof that the will was lost or destroyed without revocatory intent. Absent such proof, a mere carbon copy of the will cannot be admitted to probate.

Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922, having executed a will on July 27, 1918, and a subsequent will on April 16, 1919. Francisco Gago initially sought to probate the 1918 will, but the Court of First Instance denied the petition upon finding that Mamuyac had executed the 1919 instrument as a later testament. In 1925, Gago filed a new petition seeking probate of the 1919 will, presenting only a carbon copy of the original. The opponents contested the petition, alleging that the testator had cancelled and revoked the 1919 will in 1920 and had executed a subsequent testament. The trial court heard evidence regarding the cancellation and the subsequent execution of a new will before denying the petition.

• On April 16, 1919, testator Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament, the original of which remained in his personal possession.
• Following Mamuyac’s death on January 2, 1922, petitioner Francisco Gago filed a petition in 1925 to probate the 1919 will, submitting only a carbon copy designated as Exhibit A.
• The opponents opposed the petition, asserting that the submitted document was merely a copy, that the original had been affirmatively cancelled and revoked during the testator’s lifetime in 1920, and that the instrument did not constitute his final testament.
• At trial, witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will, and Carlos Bejar, who purchased a house and lot from the testator, testified that Mamuyac physically cancelled the original will in December 1920. The testator informed Bejar that the sale of the property necessitated the cancellation and the execution of a new will.
• Narcisa Gago, the testator’s sister and co-resident, corroborated that the original 1919 will was kept by Mamuyac, could not be located after his death, and that he executed another will in 1920.
• The trial court found the evidence sufficient to establish that the testator had cancelled the original will in 1920 and consequently denied the petition for probate.

• Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in concluding that the will had been revoked or cancelled in 1920, arguing that the evidence failed to establish revocation.
• Petitioner contended that the will was executed with all formalities required by law and that the submitted carbon copy should be admitted to probate.
• Petitioner argued that the burden to prove revocation was not satisfied by the opponents and that the lower court improperly relied on circumstantial inferences rather than conclusive proof.

• Respondents countered that the instrument presented for probate was only a carbon copy of the second will executed by the testator.
• Respondents argued that the original will had been affirmatively cancelled and revoked by the testator in 1920, as established by direct eyewitness testimony and the testator’s own statements.
• Respondents maintained that the petitioner failed to prove the continued existence of the will and that the subsequent execution of a new testament further confirmed the revocation of the 1919 instrument.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the burden of proof regarding the revocation of a missing will shifts to the proponent once the original cannot be found, and whether a carbon copy may be admitted to probate absent proof of non-revocation.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the presumption of revocation arising from the unavailability of the original will last in the testator’s possession was properly applied, and whether the trial court correctly denied the petition for probate based on evidence of cancellation.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the proponent bears the initial burden to establish both the due execution and the continued existence of the will. Once execution is proven, the burden shifts to the contestant to demonstrate revocation. However, when the original will cannot be located and was last in the testator’s possession, a presumption of cancellation or revocation arises, effectively requiring the proponent to present competent evidence to rebut it before a copy may be considered.
• Substantive: The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of probate, finding that positive and undisputed evidence established the testator’s cancellation of the original will in 1920. The Court emphasized that the presumption of revocation is rebuttable but never conclusive, and may only be overcome by affirmative proof that the will was destroyed without the testator’s revocatory intent. Because the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption and only produced a carbon copy, the Court held that copies of wills must be admitted with great caution and cannot substitute for a lost original when revocation is affirmatively established.

• Presumption of Revocation by Destruction — When an original will last seen in the testator’s possession cannot be found after death, the law presumes that the testator cancelled or destroyed it with the intent to revoke. The Court applied this doctrine to conclude that the missing 1919 will was presumed revoked, particularly in light of testimonial evidence confirming the testator’s act of cancellation and subsequent execution of a new will. The presumption remains rebuttable but requires the proponent to present clear evidence demonstrating the absence of revocatory intent.
• Burden of Proof in Probate Proceedings — The proponent bears the initial burden to prove both the due execution and the continued existence of the will. Once execution is established, the burden shifts to the contestant to prove revocation. The Court clarified that the disappearance of the original from the testator’s control triggers a practical shift in the evidentiary burden, compelling the proponent to affirmatively demonstrate that the instrument was lost or destroyed without revocatory intent to secure probate of a copy.

• "Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed." — The Court invoked this principle to establish the foundational rule governing missing wills, emphasizing that the presumption arises from the testator’s exclusive control over the instrument and the subsequent inability to locate it post-mortem.
• "The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it." — This passage delineates the rebuttable nature of the presumption, underscoring that the proponent must present competent evidence showing the absence of revocatory intent to admit a copy to probate.

• Borromeo v. Casquijo, G.R. No. L-26063 — Cited for the rule that duplicate copies of wills may be admitted to probate only when it is proven that each copy was executed with all legal formalities and when the original is shown to have been lost and not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. The Court relied on this precedent to reinforce the strict evidentiary standard required for admitting copies of wills and to justify the denial of probate in the present case.