Gachon vs. Devera, Jr.

The provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure prescribing a ten-day period for filing an answer, prohibiting motions for extension of time, and authorizing judgment upon failure to answer are mandatory and non-extendible; they cannot be relaxed through a liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court on grounds of oversight or the alleged absence of prejudice to the adverse party. The mandatory character arises from the statutory mandate in Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which expressly authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt special rules making the periods for filing pleadings “non-extendible.”

A complaint for forcible entry was instituted by Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities of Iloilo City. Summons was served on petitioners on August 25, 1993. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, they had ten days, or until September 4, 1993, to file an answer. Instead of answering, petitioners filed an urgent motion for extension of time — a prohibited pleading under the Rule. They attributed the misstep to “oversight.” The MTCC denied the motion, and petitioners thereafter moved to admit their answer, which was attached to the motion and filed outside the original period. The MTCC refused admission, considered the case submitted for decision, and eventually ruled against petitioners. Petitioners sought relief from the Regional Trial Court via certiorari, but the RTC dismissed the petition, holding that the MTCC correctly applied the mandatory rule. They then elevated the matter directly to the Supreme Court.

Nature: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by private respondent Susana Guevara, through her attorney-in-fact Rosalie Guevara, against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the MTCC of Iloilo City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 130-93 and fell squarely under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Service and Expiry of Period: Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993. Under Section 5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, they had ten days, or until September 4, 1993, within which to file their answer. Patricio Guevara was abroad; the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

Procedural Missteps: On September 4, 1993, within the original period, petitioners filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer — a pleading expressly prohibited under Section 19(a) of the Rule. They attributed the error to “oversight.” The MTCC denied the motion on September 7, 1993. On September 8, 1993, now beyond the ten-day period, petitioners filed an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached to the motion. Two days later, they filed another motion seeking admission of an amended answer. The MTCC denied these motions on September 23, 1993, and considered the case submitted for resolution. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on October 27, 1993.

MTCC Decision: On November 26, 1993, the MTCC, presided by Judge Jose R. Astorga, rendered a decision resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of private respondent. Petitioners did not appeal; instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the RTC, praying that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and conduct further proceedings. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order.

RTC Dismissal: Respondent Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. of RTC Branch 24, Iloilo City, dismissed the certiorari petition. The RTC held that the ten-day period to answer is mandatory and that no reason can excuse non-compliance. The MTCC judge was not at fault in strictly applying the Rule on Summary Procedure. The temporary restraining order was lifted, and double costs were imposed on petitioners.

Subsequent Case: Pending the certiorari proceedings, Victoria Guevara-Gachon, Patricio Guevara, and others filed a petition for quieting of title and partition, with damages, covering the same parcel of land (Cadastral Lot No. 709) against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 21618.

• Liberal Interpretation of Summary Procedure Rules: Petitioners argued that the provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure regarding the period for filing pleadings should be liberally, not strictly, construed. Invoking Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, they contended that technical rules must yield to the higher interest of justice, particularly where no prejudice to the adverse party had been claimed or alleged due to the short delay.

• Oversight and Prompt Corrective Action: Petitioners explained that the prohibited motion for extension was filed due to “oversight.” They emphasized that immediately upon receiving the denial, they filed a motion to admit the answer, which was later verified and amended — all within five days from the lapse of the reglementary period. This display of good faith and absence of dilatory intent, they maintained, warranted relaxation of the rule.

• Substantial Defense: Petitioners asserted that their defense in the forcible entry action was based on substantial grounds: they claimed prior physical possession of the premises, as their houses had long stood on the land, which they alleged was common property of the parties. Denying the admission of their answer would effectively foreclose a meritorious defense and impair substantial justice.

• Precedents on Liberal Application: Petitioners cited Rosales v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 300) and Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 112), arguing that similarly mandatory-sounding provisions in the Rules of Court had been liberally applied by the Supreme Court to promote substantial justice.

• Strict Construction: Private respondent countered that the provisions in question must be strictly construed to avoid delay, consistent with the Rule on Summary Procedure’s objective of inexpensive, expeditious, and summary determination of cases. Any other interpretation would encourage dilatory tactics.

• Forum-Shopping: Private respondent additionally argued that the petition could be dismissed for violation of Revised Circular 28-91 on forum shopping, because three months after the RTC’s dismissal, petitioners (and others) filed a petition for quieting of title and partition, with damages, involving the same parcel of land and substantially the same parties. She contended that the subsequent case was the proper forum to thresh out ownership issues, implying that the ejectment suit was pursued in bad faith.

• Interpretation and Effect of Mandatory Periods: Whether the provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure governing the period for filing pleadings should be applied strictly or liberally, and what legal effect follows from a belated answer filed after the mandatory period.

• Forum-Shopping: Whether petitioners’ filing of a separate action for quieting of title and partition, pending the ejectment case, constituted forum-shopping warranting dismissal of the petition.

• Interpretation and Effect of Mandatory Periods: The provisions were applied strictly. The word “shall” in Sections 5, 6, and 19 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, read together with the entire framework and the statutory mandate of Section 36 of B.P. 129, was held imperative and mandatory. Rules prescribing the time for performing procedural acts are indispensable to preventing needless delays and ensuring orderly and speedy judicial business. The Rule on Summary Procedure was specifically designed by the Supreme Court, pursuant to legislative authorization, to achieve expeditious and inexpensive disposition of cases, and the law itself vests the Court with authority to make periods for filing pleadings “non-extendible.” To give the provisions a directory application would subvert the Rule’s nature and defeat its objective of curbing dilatory maneuvers. “Oversight” equates to negligence or ignorance, neither of which excuses non-compliance. The general principle of liberal construction under Rule 1, Section 2, cannot override the specific mandatory tenor of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Rosales v. Court of Appeals and Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court were distinguished as cases involving substantial compliance or mislabeled pleadings filed within the reglementary period, not a late filing. Consequently, the MTCC’s refusal to admit the belated answer and its rendition of judgment under Section 6 was proper.

• Forum-Shopping: No forum-shopping was found. For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances, and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. An ejectment suit has a different cause of action from an action for quieting of title and partition. In ejectment, the sole issue is physical or material possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership; prior possession may be recovered even from the owner. The institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid ground to defeat the summary remedy of ejectment. Hence, the pendant action did not taint the ejectment proceeding with forum-shopping.

• Mandatory Character of “Shall” in the Rule on Summary Procedure — The word “shall” in Sections 5, 6, and 19 of the Rule on Summary Procedure is imperative and indicates the mandatory nature of the provisions. Rules that prescribe the time for doing certain acts or taking certain proceedings are indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business, and by their nature are regarded as mandatory. Section 36 of B.P. 129 explicitly authorizes the Supreme Court to make the periods for filing pleadings non-extendible. The ten-day period to file an answer in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases cannot be extended, and a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. The trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, render judgment upon the defendant’s failure to answer.

• Liberal Construction Cannot Override Mandatory Summary Procedure Rules — The general directive in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court to construe the rules liberally does not empower courts to disregard the explicitly mandatory and non-extendible periods under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Liberal construction cannot be invoked to give the provisions merely directory application, as that would subvert the Rule’s core objective of preventing dilatory maneuvers and achieving the expeditious adjudication of suits. “Oversight” by counsel is not a valid justification for relaxing the rule.

• Distinction Between Ejectment and Actions Involving Ownership for Purposes of Forum-Shopping — An ejectment suit (forcible entry or unlawful detainer) and an action for quieting of title and partition have distinct causes of action. In ejectment, the only issue is physical or material possession de facto, independent of ownership; one who proves prior possession de facto may recover possession even from the owner. The pendency of a quieting-of-title case does not constitute forum-shopping absent identity of causes of action, subject matter, and issues, and does not bar or defeat the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.

• “The word ‘shall’ ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.” — This passage articulates the analytical framework for determining the mandatory character of procedural time limits and is the central rationale for the strict construction applied.

• “Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers — the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.” — This excerpt distills the policy rationale behind the non-extendible period: any relaxation would incentivize the delay the Rule was crafted to eliminate.

• “In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself.” — This reiterates the fundamental distinction between possessory and ownership actions, pivotal to the forum-shopping ruling.

• Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 300 (1991) — Distinguished. The defendant in Rosales filed a mislabeled motion to dismiss within the reglementary period, and the Court treated it as an answer based on substantial compliance and liberal construction. It did not involve an attempt to extend the period to file pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

• Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 112 (1990) — Distinguished. The Court excused the use of registered mail instead of personal service for a notice to vacate because there was substantial compliance, the defendant had evaded personal service, and the facts showed actual receipt. It did not concern the filing of a prohibited pleading for extension of time to answer.

• Bersabal v. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176 (1978) and Dizon v. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714 (1963) — Cited for the rule that the word “shall” in a statute ordinarily connotes a mandatory, imperative command.

• De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 (1966) — Cited for the principle that the mandatory or directory character of “shall” ultimately depends on the entire provision’s nature, object, and consequences of a particular construction.

• Valdez v. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929 (1960) and Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428 (1946) — Cited as authority that rules prescribing time for procedural acts are, by their nature, mandatory.

• Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 (1995) — Cited for the public policy that speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, which applies with equal force to forcible entry cases.

• International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 389 (1995) — Cited for the definition of forum-shopping, requiring identity of transactions, essential facts, circumstances, causes of action, subject matter, and issues.

• Somodio v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 307 (1994) — Cited for the doctrine that in ejectment cases, the only issue is physical possession de facto, and the one with prior possession may recover even from the owner.

• Oblea v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 101 (1995) — Cited for the rule that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason to defeat the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.

• Section 36, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Mandated the Supreme Court to adopt special summary procedures in specific cases to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination, and expressly authorized that “the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.” This statutory command was the foundation for the strict, mandatory interpretation of the periods in the Rule on Summary Procedure.

• Sections 5, 6, and 19(a), Rule on Summary Procedure — Section 5 commands that the defendant “shall” file an answer within ten days from service of summons. Section 6 empowers the court, motu proprio or on motion, to render judgment should the defendant fail to answer within that period. Section 19(a) categorically prohibits a motion for extension of time to file pleadings. The Court read the word “shall” in these provisions as mandatory and non-extendible, consistent with the statutory mandate.

• Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court — Provides that the Rules “shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” The Court held that this general principle cannot override the specific mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which themselves aim at speedy and inexpensive determination.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., and Melo, JJ., concurred. Justice Francisco was on leave.