Gacad, Jr. vs. Corpuz

Courts may not motu proprio dismiss a petition for probate on the ground of improper venue, because the residence of the decedent under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction; venue is procedural and waivable, and objections thereto must be timely raised by the parties, failing which they are deemed waived.

Petitioner Juan M. Gacad, Jr. sought the probate of the last will and testament of the late Ermelinda Gacad, who passed away on May 30, 2013 in Quezon City. Her Certificate of Death indicated Marikina Heights, Marikina City as her residence at the time of death. Petitioner filed the probate petition with the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, where the decedent's property was allegedly located. The dispute centers on whether the RTC properly dismissed the probate petition motu proprio on the ground that venue was improperly laid, given that the decedent's death certificate showed Marikina City as her residence.

Petitioner Juan M. Gacad, Jr. filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Ermelinda Gacad with the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, which was raffled to Branch 27. The petition alleged that the testator passed away on May 30, 2013 in Quezon City. Her Certificate of Death indicates Marikina Heights, Marikina City as her residence at the time of her death.

On July 1, 2014, the RTC issued an Order directing petitioner to show cause within ten days from receipt why the petition should not be dismissed for violation of the rule on venue. The trial court opined that Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court fixes jurisdiction for special proceedings for the settlement of estates based on the place of residence of the decedent, and that since the decedent's death certificate states Marikina City as her residence, it is the RTC of Marikina City that has exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for probate.

Petitioner filed a Comment assailing the July 1, 2014 Order, contending that the trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss the petition for probate on the ground of improper venue, that the location of the decedent's property is in Nueva Vizcaya, and that improper venue is not one of the grounds for dismissal of an action under the Rules of Court. The trial court treated the Comment as a motion for reconsideration and, in its September 23, 2014 Order, dismissed the petition for probate for violation of the rule on venue, finding petitioner's arguments insufficient and noting that it had not motu proprio dismissed the petition since it had first directed petitioner to show cause.

Petitioner then filed the instant Petition for Certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction when it motu proprio dismissed the petition without any motion from the other heirs or interested parties. Petitioner argued that venue can be waived if not raised by the parties through a motion to dismiss, and that the domicile of the testator affects only venue, not jurisdiction. Public respondent countered that petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts and that the dismissal did not constitute grave abuse of discretion since the court first directed petitioner to show cause, asserting that the fact of death and residence are foundational facts relating to the trial court's jurisdiction.

• Improper Venue as Waivable: Petitioner maintained that venue can be waived if not raised by the parties through a motion to dismiss, and until such objection is raised, venue cannot be said to have been improperly laid.
• Jurisdiction vs. Venue: Petitioner argued that the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and that the domicile of the testator only affects venue, not the jurisdiction of the court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction when it motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate without any motion coming from the other heirs or any party having an interest.
• Futility of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner asserted that filing a motion for reconsideration against the Assailed Order would be an exercise in futility since the RTC already treated his Comment as a motion to reconsider.
• Justification for Direct Filing: Petitioner invoked the Court's original jurisdiction on the ground that the heirs are already above 50 years of age and that potential delay by the Court of Appeals would prejudice the estate's settlement.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Respondent asserted that petitioner violated the rule on hierarchy of courts by filing the Petition directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.
• Proper Venue Under Rule 73: Respondent maintained that the venue for settlement of the estate of a deceased person who was a resident of the Philippines is the proper court of the place of residence of the deceased at the time of death, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent argued that the dismissal did not constitute grave abuse of discretion because the court first directed petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for violation of the rule on venue.
• Residence as Foundational Fact: Respondent averred that the fact of death of the decedent and her residence are foundational facts relating to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

• Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Assailed Order before seeking recourse with the Supreme Court.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition directly before the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Motu Proprio Dismissal for Improper Venue: Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of improper venue.

• Motion for Reconsideration: No. Petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration is excused because the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings were duly raised and passed upon by the trial court, which falls under a recognized exception to the requirement.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Technically yes, petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts; however, relaxation of the rule is warranted given the pure question of law involved, the passage of over eight years since the decedent's death, and the absence of prejudice to other parties.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Motu Proprio Dismissal for Improper Venue: Yes. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by confusing jurisdiction with venue and motu proprio dismissing the petition for improper venue, as venue is procedural and waivable, and courts may not dismiss a case on this ground without a party objection.

• Motion for Reconsideration: While certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration to allow the lower court to correct its errors, this rule admits exceptions, including where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. The trial court was already given the opportunity to reconsider its findings when petitioner filed his Comment to the July 1, 2014 Order, which the RTC treated as a motion to reconsider. The principal issues in the certiorari proceedings — whether the trial court can motu proprio dismiss the petition for probate on the ground of improper venue — are the same as those raised and passed upon in the September 23, 2014 Order. Thus, petitioner's failure to file a separate motion for reconsideration is not a sufficient ground to warrant dismissal.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The direct filing of the petition was in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons. Petitioner's justification — that the heirs are above 50 years of age and that the CA may cause delay — are not sufficiently special or important. However, the doctrine is not ironclad; direct resort may be allowed when what is raised is a pure question of law, or when compelling circumstances justify it. Here, at least seven years had lapsed from the filing of the probate petition and more than eight years since the decedent's death. The fundamental issue is a pure question of law on jurisdiction and venue over probate proceedings, of which the Supreme Court is the final arbiter. Considering the merits of the case, the absence of prejudice to other parties, and the need to prevent further delay in the settlement of the estate, the Court relaxed the strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Motu Proprio Dismissal for Improper Venue: At the crux of the controversy is Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the petition for probate of a will should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of death. As held in Fule vs. Court of Appeals, this provision merely relates to venue, not jurisdiction; the caption of the Rule itself reads "Venue and Processes." The provision appears in a law of procedure dealing with procedural matters, and the power of the court over the subject matter exists independently of the place of residence of the deceased. The trial court confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue when it asserted that the residence of the decedent is a foundational fact relating to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits, while venue deals with the locality where the suit may be had. Rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties, not to restrict access to courts. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional; a party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. As ruled in Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, courts may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of improper venue — the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to improper venue. In Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. vs. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque City, the Court instructed that a trial court may only motu proprio dismiss an action in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription — not improper venue. This ruling has been applied to special proceedings in Cabrera vs. Philippine Statistics Authority. The trial court's premature dismissal before publication of notice of hearing and notice to the heirs prevented the proper procedural course and pre-empted the parties' prerogative to object on venue. As held in Eusebio vs. Eusebio, dismissing motu proprio before the defendant was summoned, on the ground that the parties were not residents of the city where the court sat, constituted grave abuse of discretion, as the court overlooked the distinction between jurisdiction and venue.

• Venue vs. Jurisdiction in Probate Proceedings — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which refers to the place of residence of the decedent in settlement of estates, probate of wills, and issuance of letters of administration, is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction over the subject matter. The power of the court over the subject matter exists independently of the decedent's residence; the provision merely fixes the place where the case shall be brought for convenience. The Court relied on Fule vs. Court of Appeals for this distinction.

• Prohibition on Motu Proprio Dismissal for Improper Venue — Courts may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of improper venue. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived expressly or impliedly. Objections to venue must be raised by the parties at the earliest opportunity, either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. A trial court may only motu proprio dismiss an action on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. This doctrine, established in Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and reaffirmed in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. vs. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque City, applies to special proceedings as confirmed in Cabrera vs. Philippine Statistics Authority.

• Exceptions to Motion for Reconsideration in Certiorari — While certiorari under Rule 65 requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, exceptions include: (a) where the order is a patent nullity; (b) where the questions raised in certiorari have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c) where there is urgent necessity for resolution; (d) where a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process; (f) where relief from an order of arrest is urgent in a criminal case; (g) where proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte; and (i) where the issue raised is purely of law or public interest is involved.

• Relaxation of Hierarchy of Courts — The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not ironclad. Direct resort to the Supreme Court may be allowed when there are compelling reasons, when what is raised is a pure question of law, when issues are of transcendental importance, when there are cases of first impression, or when the time element cannot be ignored. Circumstances that may merit relaxation include: matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; special or compelling circumstances; the merits of the case; a cause not entirely attributable to the party's fault; lack of showing that the review is frivolous or dilatory; and absence of unjust prejudice to the other party.

• "The court a quo confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue when it asserted that the residence of the decedent is a foundational fact relating to jurisdiction, and it motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate on the ground of improper venue under Rule 73, Section 1. Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the trial court's fundamental error in conflating jurisdiction with venue, which led to its improper motu proprio dismissal.

• "Thus, it is settled that courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine prohibiting motu proprio dismissal for improper venue, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts. It simply arranges for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional; a party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived." — This passage defines the nature and function of venue rules and the waiver mechanism, central to the Court's ruling.

• "The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." — This quotation, drawn from Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court as adopted by the Court, encapsulates the procedural principle that venue objections belong to the parties, not the court.

• Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785 (1976) — Controlling precedent establishing that Section 1, Rule 73 relates to venue, not jurisdiction, in estate proceedings. The Court relied on this case to hold that the residence of the decedent does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but is merely constitutive of venue.

• Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 273 Phil. 1 (1991) — Controlling precedent holding that courts may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of improper venue, as venue may be waived and objections must be raised by the parties. The Court applied this ruling directly to the probate context.

• Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. vs. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque City, 398 Phil. 626 (2000) — Followed precedent instructing that a trial court may only motu proprio dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription — not improper venue.

• Cabrera vs. Philippine Statistics Authority, G.R. No. 241369, June 3, 2019 — Followed precedent applying the Dacoycoy doctrine to special proceedings, where the Court ordered reinstatement of a petition motu proprio dismissed for improper venue.

• Eusebio vs. Eusebio, 162 Phil. 378 (1976) — Followed precedent holding that a court commits grave abuse of discretion when it motu proprio dismisses a petition before the defendant is summoned, on the ground that the parties are not residents of the city where the court sits, thereby confusing jurisdiction and venue.

• Barnes vs. Hon. Quijano Padilla, 500 Phil. 303 (2005) — Cited for the enumerated circumstances that may justify relaxation of procedural rules, including special or compelling circumstances, the merits of the case, and absence of prejudice to the other party.

• Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Provides that the estate of a deceased person who is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of death shall be settled in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of death. The Court held that this provision is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction, and that the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate" is in reality a venue provision.

• Section 4(a), Rule 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs objections to venue, requiring that such objections be raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. The trial court cited this provision in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 73 in dismissing the petition; the Supreme Court held that venue objections under this rule belong to the parties and may be waived, and that courts cannot motu proprio dismiss on this ground.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari. The Court discussed the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari and its exceptions, ultimately excusing petitioner's failure under the exception where questions raised have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concurred.