Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals

An amendment to an Information changing the material dates of the commission of the offense after arraignment is permissible as an amendment in form, provided it causes no prejudice to the rights of the accused — specifically, where the revised period is shorter and included within the original period, the nature of the offense and the imposable penalty remain unchanged, and no defense available under the original Information is rendered inapplicable.

Petitioner Dennis T. Gabionza was the president of Manila City Bus Corporation, an employer compulsorily covered under Republic Act No. 1161, the Social Security Law, as amended. The statute required covered employers to remit contributions to the Social Security System for SSS, Medicare, and Employee Compensation, and penalized willful failure or refusal to do so under Section 28, paragraph (e). The case concerned the procedural question of whether the prosecution could amend the Information to alter the period of the charged offense after the accused had already been arraigned, implicating the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

On 9 November 1993, an Information was filed charging petitioner Dennis T. Gabionza with violating Section 22, paragraphs (a) and (d), in relation to Section 28, paragraph (e), of Republic Act No. 1161, the Social Security Law, as amended. The Information alleged that "in and about or during the period from January 1991 to May 1993," petitioner, as president of Manila City Bus Corporation — a compulsorily covered employer — willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected, and refused to remit to the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare, and Employee Compensation amounting to ₱1,652,330.10, plus the 3% penalty of ₱541,417.87.

Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. Thereafter, pre-trial was held only on 11 November 1997, as petitioner had earlier moved for the suspension of trial to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the denial of his motion to dismiss. On 10 February 1998, approximately four years after arraignment, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, seeking to change the material dates from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the motion, contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature and would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, as well as negate defenses otherwise available to him.

On 31 March 1998, the trial court granted the motion, ruling that the amendment pertained only to matters of form and would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the prosecution's theory remained the same. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on 2 September 1998. Petitioner then elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which dismissed the petition on 9 June 1999, holding that the amendment could not be deemed one in substance as it would not impair whatever defense the accused could have interposed under the original Information. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45.

• Substantial Amendment: Petitioner argued that the proposed amendment changing the material dates was substantial in nature, and allowing it after arraignment would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.
• Prejudice to Defenses: Petitioner maintained that the amendment would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise available to him under the original Information.
• Laches: Petitioner contended that because of the lapse of approximately four years between the filing of the Information and the motion to amend, laches had set in, barring the prosecution from seeking the amendment.
• Reliance on Precedent: Petitioner invoked Wong vs. Yatco, People vs. Opemia, and People vs. Reyes in support of his position that changing the dates in an Information after arraignment was impermissible.

• Amendment in Form: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, countered that the amendment was one of form and not substance, as it merely refined the period of the offense without altering the nature of the charge or the prosecution's theory.
• No Prejudice: Respondent argued that the amendment would not prejudice the accused's rights, as the revised period was shorter and subsumed within the original period, and the penalty remained constant regardless of the duration of the offense.
• Laches Inapplicable: Respondent maintained that laches was inapplicable because Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly permits amendments as to form after arraignment or during trial, and the delay was attributable to petitioner's own procedural maneuvers, including the suspension of trial and multiple postponements.

• Nature of Amendment: Whether the amendment of the Information changing the material dates of the commission of the offense from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992" after arraignment constitutes an amendment in substance or in form.
• Prejudice to Accused: Whether the amendment prejudices the rights of the accused, particularly his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and his ability to interpose available defenses.
• Laches: Whether the prosecution's four-year delay in seeking the amendment bars the motion on the ground of laches.

• Nature of Amendment: The amendment is one of form, not substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form unless time is a material ingredient of the offense, and the revised period was shorter and included within the original.
• Prejudice to Accused: No. The amendment did not prejudice the accused's rights, as no defense available under the original Information was rendered inapplicable, the prosecution's theory remained unchanged, and the imposable penalty was constant regardless of the number or duration of infractions.
• Laches: No. Laches is inapplicable because the Rules expressly permit amendments in form after arraignment or during trial, and the delay was principally caused by petitioner's own procedural maneuvers and requests for postponement.

• Nature of Amendment: Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure governs amendments to an Information: before the accused pleads, amendments in substance or form may be made without leave of court; after plea, only amendments in form may be allowed, provided no prejudice results to the accused. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. Under Section 28, paragraph (e) of RA 1161, neither time nor duration is a material ingredient; the penalty is constant at six years and one day to twelve years, regardless of the number of infractions. The amended period (January 1991 to May 1992) was shorter than and entirely included within the original period (January 1991 to May 1993). The averment "in or about and during the period" provided sufficient approximation of the date of commission. The cases relied upon by petitioner — Wong vs. Yatco, People vs. Opemia, and People vs. Reyes — were distinguished: in Wong, the law punishing the act had not yet been published at the time of the original dates, so no crime existed in legal contemplation; in Opemia and Reyes, the disparities in dates were so great as to defy approximation of a single offense. Here, the revised period was subsumed within the original, producing no surprise or prejudice.

• Prejudice to Accused: The test for prejudice is whether a defense available under the original Information would no longer be available after amendment, and whether evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the Information as amended. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating how the amendment would adversely affect his rights. The prosecution's theory remained the same, and no defense was rendered unavailable. Jurisprudence permits amendments so long as they do not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription, do not alter the nature of the offense, do not change the basic theory of the prosecution, do not expose the accused to a higher penalty, and do not cause surprise or deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet the new averment — none of which was violated here.

• Laches: Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. Section 14, Rule 110 expressly allows amendments in form after arraignment or during trial, so the amendment was filed seasonably notwithstanding the four-year lapse. Moreover, the delay was satisfactorily explained: petitioner had moved for suspension of trial to file a petition for certiorari, pre-trial was held only on 11 November 1997, and trial was again suspended during the pendency of petitioner's recourses to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The many postponements and resettings were likewise requested by petitioner. The prosecution could not be faulted for not filing the amendment earlier, and petitioner should not bewail a delay principally occasioned by his own behest.

• Amendment of Information — Form vs. Substance — An amendment is one of form if it merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original Information and adds nothing essential for conviction. After arraignment, only amendments in form may be allowed, provided no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test for prejudice is whether a defense under the Information as originally stood would no longer be available after amendment, and whether any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the Information as amended. Applied here: changing the material dates from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992" was an amendment in form because the revised period was shorter and subsumed within the original, and no defense or evidence was rendered inapplicable.

• Five-Guideline Test for Permissible Amendments — Jurisprudence allows amendments to an Information provided: (a) it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription; (b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged; (c) it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense; (d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty; and (e) it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. All five conditions were satisfied in this case.

• Time as a Matter of Form — The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor; it is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date as the Information will permit.

• "The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as amended." — This passage states the canonical test for determining whether an amendment prejudices the accused's rights, and is the controlling standard for evaluating post-arraignment amendments.

• "The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense." — This formulation articulates the rule that temporal allegations are generally matters of form, which was the decisive basis for permitting the amendment here.

• "a comparison of the amended Information (January 1991 to May 1992) and the original one (January 1991 to May 1993) shows that the period stated in the former is even shorter than and is included within the latter." — This passage explains why the specific amendment at issue caused no surprise or prejudice, distinguishing the case from precedents where date changes were so disparate as to defy approximation.

• People vs. Montenegro, No. L-45772, 25 March 1988, 159 SCRA 236 — Cited as the source of the test for determining when an amendment prejudices the rights of the accused, and for the definition of an amendment in form as one that merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original Information.

• Wong vs. Yatco, 99 Phil 791 (1956) — Distinguished. The Court disallowed an amendment changing dates because the law punishing the act had not yet been published at the time of the original dates, meaning no crime existed in legal contemplation. This crucial fact was absent in the present case.

• People vs. Opemia, 98 Phil 698 (1956) — Distinguished. The Court disallowed an amendment where the period of almost five years between the original and amended dates was so long that it suggested a different offense, violating the accused's right to be informed of the specific charge. The present case involved a shorter, subsumed period.

• People vs. Reyes, No. L-32557, 23 October 1981, 108 SCRA 203 — Distinguished. The disparity of time between 1964 and 1969 was so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense. The present case presented no such disparity.

• Vega vs. Panis, No. L-40842, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 269 — Cited for the proposition that an amendment must not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription and must not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged.

• People vs. Casey, No. L-30146, 24 February 1981, 103 SCRA 21 — Cited for the proposition that an amendment must not expose the accused to a higher penalty and must not cause surprise or deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet the new averment.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, 29 March 1996, 255 SCRA 438 — Cited for the definition of laches as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.

• Section 14, Rule 110, Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the amendment of an Information or complaint: amendments in substance or form may be made without leave of court before the accused pleads; after plea, only amendments in form may be allowed by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. Applied to permit the post-arraignment amendment of dates as one of form.

• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material ingredient; it is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date as the Information will permit. Applied to support the conclusion that the temporal allegation was a matter of form.

• Section 22, paragraphs (a) and (d), in relation to Section 28, paragraph (e), Republic Act No. 1161 (Social Security Law), as amended — Penalizes the failure or refusal of a compulsorily-covered employer to remit SSS contributions. The penalty is constant at six years and one day to twelve years, regardless of the number or duration of infractions, confirming that time is not a material ingredient of the offense.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.