Funa vs. Villar

A promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman in a Constitutional Commission is not a prohibited "reappointment," but such appointment is void if the vacancy arose from the expiration of the predecessor's term, as the Constitution mandates a full seven-year term for such vacancies, and the appointing authority cannot shorten the term to comply with the aggregate seven-year limit.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman for a seven-year term ending February 2, 2008, and Reynaldo A. Villar as COA Commissioner for a seven-year term ending February 2, 2011. Upon Carague's retirement, Villar was designated Acting Chairman and subsequently appointed Chairman on April 18, 2008, with his term set to end on February 2, 2011, corresponding to the unexpired portion of his original commissioner term. Evelyn San Buenaventura was appointed to fill Villar's commissioner seat for the same unexpired period.

• Original Appointments: Carague was appointed COA Chairman (2001-2008). Villar was appointed COA Commissioner (2004-2011).
• Vacancy and Promotion: Upon the expiration of Carague's term in 2008, Villar was designated Acting Chairman and then appointed Chairman. His appointment papers indicated a term ending February 2, 2011, rather than a fresh seven-year term.
• Replacement Commissioner: San Buenaventura was appointed Commissioner to serve Villar's unexpired term ending February 2, 2011.
• Villar's Claim: Villar initially asserted that his appointment as Chairman entitled him to a fresh seven-year term ending in 2015.
• Intervening Event: Villar resigned in 2011, and Chairman Pulido-Tan was appointed.

• Prohibition on Reappointment: Villar's promotional appointment constitutes a prohibited "reappointment" under Section 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution, as it required a second appointment and confirmation.
• Matibag Doctrine: The prohibition on reappointment covers any second appointment, relying on Matibag v. Benipayo.
• Independence of the Commission: Allowing promotional appointments compromises the independence of constitutional commission members, who may curry favor with the appointing authority in hopes of promotion.

• Locus Standi: Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the appointment.
• Proper Remedy: The proper remedy is quo warranto or declaratory relief, not certiorari.
• Validity of Promotion: A promotional appointment is not a prohibited reappointment.
• Fresh Term: Villar contended that his appointment as Chairman entitled him to a fresh seven-year term ending in 2015.

• Mootness: Whether the case should be resolved despite being rendered moot by Villar's resignation.
• Standing and Remedy: Whether petitioner has locus standi and whether certiorari is the proper remedy.
• Reappointment vs. Promotion: Whether a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman constitutes a prohibited "reappointment" under Section 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution.
• Validity of the Appointment: Whether Villar's appointment as Chairman is valid given that the vacancy arose from the expiration of the predecessor's term and Villar had already served part of his seven-year term as Commissioner.

• Mootness: The case was resolved despite mootness because it involves a grave violation of the Constitution, paramount public interest, the need for controlling principles, and is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• Standing and Remedy: Locus standi was relaxed given the transcendental importance of the issue. Certiorari is proper under the expanded judicial review to determine grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of the appointing power.
• Reappointment vs. Promotion: "Reappointment" refers to a second appointment to the same office. A promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman involves a different office and constitutes a new appointment, not a prohibited reappointment. The constitutional ban on reappointment does not per se preclude promotional appointments, provided the aggregate period of service does not exceed seven years.
• Validity of the Appointment: Villar's appointment was declared unconstitutional. A vacancy arising from the expiration of a term must be filled for a full seven-year term. The President cannot shorten this fixed term to comply with the aggregate seven-year limit. Since Villar had already served four years as Commissioner, a full seven-year appointment would exceed the aggregate limit, and a shorter appointment violated the fixed term requirement. Consequently, a sitting commissioner cannot be promoted to fill a vacancy caused by the expiration of a term if it requires a term shorter than seven years. The fourth situation in Matibag v. Benipayo, which barred reappointment even if it would not exceed seven years, was abandoned insofar as it proscribed promotional appointments.

• Exceptions to the Mootness Rule — Courts will decide moot cases if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue requires formulation of controlling principles; or (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The Court applied these exceptions to resolve the constitutionality of the appointment despite Villar's resignation.
• Relaxation of Locus Standi — The requirement of legal standing is relaxed for taxpayers, voters, or concerned citizens when the issues raised are of transcendental importance.
• Reappointment vs. Promotional Appointment — "Reappointment" refers to a movement to one and the same office. A movement to a different position within the commission (Commissioner to Chairman) constitutes a new appointment, not a reappointment, and is not per se prohibited.
• Fixed Term and Aggregate Limit — Members of constitutional commissions must be appointed for a fixed term of seven years when the vacancy results from the expiration of the predecessor's term. The appointing authority cannot shorten this term to comply with the aggregate seven-year limit. A promotional appointment is valid only if the vacancy results from death, resignation, disability, or impeachment, and the aggregate service does not exceed seven years.

• "The word 'reappointment' means a second appointment to one and the same office... Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment."
• "Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides... He or she cannot split terms."

• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo — Cited for the exceptions to the mootness rule and the relaxation of locus standi.
• Gaminde v. Commission on Audit — Cited for the principle that the terms of the first commissioners must start on a common date to ensure the regular recurrence of intervals between expirations.
• Republic v. Imperial — Cited for the two conditions indispensable to the rotational plan: terms starting on a common date and vacancies filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
• Matibag v. Benipayo — Distinguished and partially abandoned. The Court rejected the fourth situation outlined in Matibag which barred any reappointment even if it would not result in serving more than seven years, clarifying that promotional appointments are not prohibited reappointments.
• Nacionalista Party v. De Vera — Cited for the interpretation that the prohibition against "reappointment" refers to a second appointment to the same office.
• Visarra v. Miraflor — Cited for the definition of reappointment as a second appointment to the same office.

• Section 1(2), Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Chairman and Commissioners of the COA shall be appointed for a term of seven years without reappointment, with staggered terms for the first appointees, and that appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. The Court applied this provision to rule that a vacancy from an expired term requires a full seven-year appointment, invalidating Villar's shortened term.

Renato C. Corona (CJ), Antonio T. Carpio, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.

• Carpio, J. — Asserted that Villar's promotional appointment is a prohibited reappointment. The framers intended to prohibit "any reappointment of any kind," including promotions, to safeguard the independence of the commission. The repetition of "without reappointment" in the second sentence of Section 1(2) was intended to reject the Visarra ruling that allowed promotions. Furthermore, Villar's appointment for a three-year term violated the mandatory seven-year fixed term.
• Mendoza, J. — Concurred that a promotion is not a prohibited reappointment and that the aggregate service must not exceed seven years. Dissented from the majority view that a commissioner can only be promoted if the vacancy arises from death, resignation, disability, or impeachment. Argued that a commissioner can be promoted even upon the expiration of the predecessor's term, serving only the unexpired portion of his original term, as such promotion has historical precedent and no explicit constitutional prohibition exists against it.