Fule vs. Court of Appeals

The term "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court refers to the decedent's actual residence — personal, physical habitation — at the time of death, not legal residence or domicile, and venue for the settlement of estate proceedings must be laid in the province where the decedent actually resided at the time of death.

Amado G. Garcia, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna and a property owner in Calamba, Laguna, died intestate on April 26, 1973 in the City of Manila, leaving real and personal properties in Calamba and elsewhere. Two women claimed entitlement to administer his estate: Virginia G. Fule, who alleged she was nominated by the decedent's surviving spouse Carolina Carpio, and Preciosa B. Garcia, who claimed to be the decedent's lawful surviving spouse. The dispute centered on where the estate proceedings should be conducted and who should serve as special administratrix pending appointment of a regular administrator.

Amado G. Garcia, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna and a property owner in Calamba, Laguna, died intestate on April 26, 1973 in the City of Manila, leaving real and personal properties in Calamba and other places. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging that Amado G. Garcia was "a property owner of Calamba, Laguna" who "died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." On the same date, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix, which Judge Malvar granted forthwith.

Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the appointment on May 8, 1973, contending that the order was issued without jurisdiction because no notice had been served upon all persons interested in the estate, that there was no delay or cause for delay warranting a special administrator, that as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia she should be preferred, and that Virginia G. Fule was a debtor of the estate. She prayed that she be appointed special administratrix in lieu of Fule and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While this motion was pending, she filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix, alleging that the appointment was obtained through misleading representations, that Fule had adverse interests against the estate, and that she had shown herself unsuitable. On June 6, 1973, Fule filed a supplemental petition modifying the original in four respects: alleging that the decedent's last place of residence was Calamba, Laguna; deleting the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs; alleging that Carolina Carpio was the surviving spouse who had renounced her preferential right to administration in favor of Fule; and praying that Fule be appointed regular administratrix.

During the hearings before Judge Malvar, Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of death was Quezon City. Preciosa B. Garcia, for her part, presented the decedent's residence certificate for 1973, likewise showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death and that he was a Constitutional Convention delegate for the first district of Laguna. Despite these conflicting indications, Judge Malvar denied the motion for reconsideration and admitted the supplemental petition on July 2, 1973, holding that the failure to allege the decedent's place of residence in the original petition was cured, and that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by praying to be appointed administratrix.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP, to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar or, alternatively, to vacate four questioned orders. On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the Laguna proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. Fule's motion for reconsideration was denied on March 31, 1975, prompting her to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court via appeal by certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. L-40502. Even before Fule could receive the Court of Appeals' decision, however, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a new petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same estate. On February 10, 1975, Judge Vicente G. Ericta appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of ₱30,000.00. On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, who succeeded Judge Ericta, granted Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations," ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver ₱48,874.70 to her as special administratrix. Fule filed a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. L-42670, to annul the Quezon City proceedings; a restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: Virginia G. Fule maintained that the decedent's last place of residence was Calamba, Laguna, as alleged in her supplemental petition, and that venue was properly laid in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
• Status of Preciosa B. Garcia: Fule disputed the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of Amado G. Garcia, contending that Carolina Carpio was the decedent's surviving spouse who had renounced her preferential right to administration in favor of Fule.
• Validity of Quezon City Proceedings: Fule argued that the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, should be annulled, as the Court of Appeals' decision annulling the Laguna proceedings had not yet become final and was still under review by the Supreme Court.

• Improper Venue: Preciosa B. Garcia assailed Fule's original petition for failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirements and for improper laying of venue, arguing that the statement "a property owner of Calamba, Laguna" did not allege the decedent's residence or domicile and that the death certificate showed his last residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
• Preference as Surviving Spouse: Preciosa B. Garcia claimed preference to appointment as special administratrix as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, asserting that Fule had no relation whatsoever with the decedent or was merely an illegitimate sister incapable of successional rights.
• Disqualification of Fule: Preciosa B. Garcia contended that Fule's appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading, and incomplete misrepresentations, that Fule had adverse interests against the estate, that she was a debtor of the estate, and that she had acted outside her authority as special administratrix.

• Meaning of "Resides": Whether the term "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court refers to the decedent's actual residence or to his legal domicile at the time of death.
• Proper Venue: Whether venue for the settlement of the estate of Amado G. Garcia was properly laid in the Court of First Instance of Laguna at Calamba.
• Appointment of Special Administratrix: Whether Preciosa B. Garcia, as the prima facie surviving spouse, is entitled to preference over Virginia G. Fule in the appointment as special administratrix.

• Meaning of "Resides": The term "resides" means actual residence — personal, physical habitation — not legal residence or domicile. In the application of venue statutes and rules, residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
• Proper Venue: No. Venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Laguna at Calamba, the death certificate and other documentary evidence establishing that the decedent's last place of residence was 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
• Appointment of Special Administratrix: Yes. Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to appointment as special administratrix, the overriding consideration being the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate, and the surviving spouse having at least as much interest in administering the estate correctly as any other next of kin.

• Meaning of "Resides": The clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate" in Section 1, Rule 73 is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates — "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define jurisdiction over the subject matter, because it appears in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. The Judiciary Act of 1948 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased; the Rules of Court fix the venue. The term "resides" is elastic and should be interpreted in light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes, residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile," it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. "Resides" should be understood in its popular sense — the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode, signifying physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Residence requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence plus an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time is required, though the residence must be more than temporary.

• Proper Venue: The death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, presented in evidence by both Fule and Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. This was corroborated by the decedent's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death, the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971, the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, and certificates of title covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna. The conclusion was imperative that venue for Fule's petition was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The Court of Appeals correctly held that in asking to substitute Fule as special administratrix, Garcia did not waive her objection to jurisdiction or venue but availed of a mere practical resort to an alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse while insisting on enforcement of the Rule fixing proper venue at the last residence of the decedent. Under the doctrine in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, decreed that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City.

• Appointment of Special Administratrix: Section 1 of Rule 80 allows appointment of a special administrator when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause. The discretion to appoint lies in the probate court, but that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle — not personal likes or dislikes. The same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should be taken into account in appointing a special administrator, the overriding consideration being the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate. Under the law, the widow has the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent besides her share in the conjugal partnership, giving her as much if not more interest in administering the estate correctly than any other next of kin. Preciosa B. Garcia's prima facie status as surviving spouse was supported by a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the decedent on January 8, 1973 indicating he was married to her, and by his certificate of candidacy for Constitutional Convention delegate filed September 1, 1970 naming Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio), Garcia could be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse. The appointment of a special administrator is temporary and does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate; the issue of heirship is to be determined in the decree of distribution.

• Actual Residence vs. Domicile in Venue Statutes — The term "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." It should be understood in its popular sense — the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode, signifying physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Residence requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence plus an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time is required, though the residence must be more than temporary. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the decedent's last place of residence was Quezon City, as shown by his death certificate, not Calamba, Laguna as alleged by Fule.

• Venue vs. Jurisdiction in Estate Settlement — The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter; it is merely constitutive of venue. The Judiciary Act confers jurisdiction over probate cases upon Courts of First Instance independently of the place of residence of the deceased. The Rules of Court fix the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Objection to improper venue is subject to waiver under Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Preference in Appointment of Special Administrator — The same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. The overriding consideration is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate. The widow, having the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent besides her share in the conjugal partnership, has as much if not more interest in administering the estate correctly than any other next of kin. The appointment is temporary and does not determine heirship, which is resolved in the decree of distribution.

• Presumption in Favor of Marriage — Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court relied on this presumption, supported by documentary evidence, to hold that Preciosa B. Garcia could be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia.

• "We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.'" — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the central legal question, establishing the canonical formulation of the distinction between actual residence and domicile for purposes of venue in estate settlement proceedings.

• "In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat." — This passage elaborates the doctrinal definition of "resides" in its popular sense, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on venue and residence.

• "The consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent." — This passage articulates the controlling principle for appointment of a special administrator, establishing beneficial interest as the paramount criterion over order of preference.

• "The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution." — This passage defines the limited scope of a special administration appointment, clarifying that it does not adjudicate heirship but is confined to determining who is entitled to administration.

• Diez vs. Serra, 51 Phil. 286 (1927) — Cited for the proposition that the fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death and left no assets, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
• Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 377 (1973) — Cited as the doctrinal basis for the Supreme Court's supervisory authority to decree transfer of venue and authorize the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the estate settlement, while disauthorizing the Laguna court from continuing with the case.
• Roxas vs. Pecson, 92 Phil. 410 (1948) — Cited for the principle that the widow has as much if not more interest in administering the estate correctly than any other next of kin, and that good or bad administration may affect the fruits rather than the naked ownership of property.
• Ozaeta vs. Pecson, 93 Phil. 419 (1953) — Cited for the principle that the probate court's discretion to appoint a special administrator must be based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle, and that the same fundamental principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should be considered in appointing a special administrator.
• Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, 9 SCRA 113 (1963) — Cited for the rule that the appointment of a special administrator does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate; the issue of heirship is to be determined in the decree of distribution.

• Section 1, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the venue for the settlement of estate of deceased persons, providing that the will shall be proved or letters of administration granted in the Court of First Instance in the province in which the decedent resides at the time of his death. The Court construed "resides" as meaning actual residence, not domicile, and held that the provision is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction over the subject matter.
• Section 2, Rule 79, Revised Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for letters of administration affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, including the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence and situs of assets, intestacy, and the right of the person seeking administration. The Court applied this to find that Fule's original petition was deficient for failing to allege the decedent's place of residence.
• Section 1, Rule 80, Revised Rules of Court — Authorizes the appointment of a special administrator when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause. The Court applied this provision to uphold the appointment of Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix, emphasizing that the beneficial interest of the appointee is the overriding consideration.
• Section 4, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that when improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived. The Court noted this rule but found that Garcia did not waive her objection to venue by seeking substitution as special administratrix.
• Article 992, Civil Code — Provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Cited in connection with the claim that Virginia G. Fule, as an alleged illegitimate sister, had no successional rights with respect to the decedent.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concurred. Muñoz Palma, J., took no part.