Fuentes vs. The Director of Prisons

The phrase “all the members of the said court” in subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104 refers to the justices actually constituting the court at the time of consideration, not to all justices legally entitled to sit. The requirement that the sentence be signed by all members is directory, not mandatory, and habeas corpus will not lie where the petitioner is confined under a lawful judgment that has not been reversed or modified.

Andres Fuentes was the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding against the Director of Prisons, the respondent custodian. The controversy required construction of subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104, which regulated the imposition of the death penalty and required that the Supreme Court’s consideration of a case on second instance be per curiam and that the sentence be signed by all members of the court, except that only the remaining justices’ unanimous vote and signatures were required when one or more were legally disqualified. The majority also considered the Organic Act’s guarantee of a speedy trial and the separation of powers in determining whether the statute could restrict the Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

Andres Fuentes was convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Cebu and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. On review by the Supreme Court, the sentence was affirmed in a decision promulgated January 29, 1923. Only eight justices took part in the review, the ninth being absent. The decision was written by one of the justices and concurred in by the other seven justices present. Fuentes was thereafter confined in Bilibid Prison in the City of Manila awaiting execution.

Fuentes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was illegally detained. He argued that because one justice was absent, the case was not considered per curiam; that the decision was written by only one justice and was not signed by the absent justice; and that it therefore had not been rendered in the manner provided for by subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104, rendering it null and void.

The petition relied on subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104, which governed the imposition of the death penalty and required, among other things, that the consideration of the case in the second instance be per curiam and that the sentence be signed by all the members of the Supreme Court. Fuentes contended that the absence of one justice and the lack of his signature meant the decision was not rendered in the manner required by that provision and was therefore null and void. The case reached the Supreme Court on Fuentes’s habeas corpus petition, which alleged illegal detention in Bilibid Prison.

• Validity of the Decision Under Act No. 3104: Petitioner argued that because one justice was absent, the case was not considered per curiam, and because the decision was written by only one justice and not signed by the absent justice, it had not been rendered in the manner provided for by subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104 and was therefore null and void.
• Meaning of “All Members of the Said Court”: Petitioner argued that the phrase “all the members of the said court” means all the justices who are legally entitled to sit on the court, not merely the members of the court present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the particular case was heard and decided.

• Validity of the Decision Under Act No. 3104: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision affirming the death penalty was null and void because one justice was absent, the case was not considered per curiam, and the decision was not signed by the absent justice as allegedly required by subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104.
• Meaning of “All the Members of the Said Court”: Whether the phrase “all the members of the said court” in Act No. 3104 refers to all justices legally entitled to sit on the court or to the members present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the case was heard and decided.
• Mandatory or Directory Nature of the Signing Requirement: Whether the requirement that the sentence be signed by all members of the court is mandatory or merely directory.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Whether habeas corpus lies where the petitioner is confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance that has not been reversed or modified.

• Validity of the Decision Under Act No. 3104: No. The decision was valid; the case was considered per curiam, there was a quorum, and all justices who sat in the case signed the decision.
• Meaning of “All the Members of the Said Court”: The phrase refers to the court as actually constituted at the time of the consideration of each particular case, not all justices legally entitled to sit.
• Mandatory or Directory Nature of the Signing Requirement: The requirement is directory, not mandatory; noncompliance does not invalidate a decision duly and formally rendered in another regular manner.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: No. Habeas corpus will not lie where the petitioner is legally confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance that has not been reversed or modified.

• Validity of the Decision Under Act No. 3104: The petition was denied because, even assuming Fuentes’s contention correct, he remained legally confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that had not been reversed or modified; in such cases, habeas corpus will not lie. On the merits, Act No. 3104 was enacted after the decision was promulgated. The decision was considered per curiam, a quorum was present, and all justices who sat signed it. Under the proper construction of the statute, no defect existed.
• Meaning of “All the Members of the Said Court”: The phrase “all the members of the said court” could mean all justices legally entitled to sit or the members present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the particular case was heard and decided. Petitioner’s interpretation would cause serious interference with the functions of the court and intolerable delays in the administration of justice, conflicting with the Organic Act’s guarantee of a speedy trial. Justices may be incapacitated by illness or legally absent on leave, and it has rarely happened that all justices were present for duty at the same time. The Legislature could not have intended persons sentenced to death to languish in prison until an absent justice returns. The presumption is that the Legislature intended to frame the law in conformity with the Organic Act. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is fixed by the Organic Act and cannot be restricted by the Legislature; while reasonable procedural changes may be made, a statute of procedure cannot prevent the court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction during lawful sessions. Citing Ocampo vs. Cabangis, the Court reiterated that the legislature has no power to establish rules depriving courts of constitutional authority to exercise judicial functions. To give validity to the provision, the Legislature must be presumed to mean the court as actually constituted at the time of consideration of each particular case. Thus, the decision was valid.
• Mandatory or Directory Nature of the Signing Requirement: Courts generally hold provisions similar to the one in question to be directory, not mandatory. In Ocampo vs. Cabangis, construing section 15 of Act No. 136, the Court explained that no legislature intends to impose conditions rendering courts incapable of performing their functions properly and efficiently; the results of strict compliance may be considered to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory. It should not be assumed, absent specific language, that the legislature intended the rights of parties to be seriously affected by a court’s or officer’s failure to comply strictly with statutory requirements as to the manner of official action. Procedure is secondary to substantive rights, and nonobservance of procedure should not affect substantive rights unless the legislature’s intention is clearly expressed. Strict literal compliance would often render it impossible for the court to decide a case. Act No. 3104 declares the manner in which the Supreme Court shall perform the judicial act of giving final expression to its decision, but it does not say that failure to comply renders the decision ineffective. The direction is not of the essence, and nothing suggests that strict compliance is essential to the validity of a decision duly and formally rendered in some other regular manner. Such statutes are merely directory, and compliance is not necessary to validity.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Even assuming petitioner’s contention correct, he is legally confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that has not been reversed or modified. In such cases the writ of habeas corpus will not lie. This independent ground required denial of the petition.

• Habeas Corpus; Lawful, Unreversed Judgment — A petition for habeas corpus will not lie where the petitioner is legally confined under a lawful judgment of a lower court that has not been reversed or modified. Applied: even if the Supreme Court decision were defective, the Court of First Instance of Cebu judgment remained lawful and unmodified, so release could not be granted.
• Construction of “All Members of the Court” — Where a statute requires action by “all the members of the court,” the phrase may refer to the court as actually constituted at the time of consideration, not to all justices legally entitled to sit. The Court adopted this construction to avoid serious interference with judicial functions, intolerable delays, and conflict with the Organic Act’s speedy-trial guarantee.
• Directory vs. Mandatory Procedural Statutes — Statutory provisions regulating the manner in which a court performs official action are generally directory, not mandatory, unless the legislature clearly intends strict compliance to be essential to validity. Noncompliance does not affect substantive rights or invalidate a decision duly and formally rendered in another regular manner. Applied to the requirement that all members sign the death-penalty decision.
• Separation of Powers and Judicial Jurisdiction — The legislature may make reasonable changes in court procedure but cannot, by a statute of procedure, prevent a court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction during lawful sessions. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is fixed by the Organic Act and cannot be restricted by the Legislature. Applied: petitioner’s interpretation of Act No. 3104 would impermissibly restrict the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
• Presumption of Constitutionality / Harmonious Construction — To give validity to the provision, the Court presumed that the Legislature meant the court as actually constituted at the time of consideration, consistent with the Organic Act.

• “The phrase “all the members of the said court,” as employed in the subsection quoted, may have two different significations: It may mean all the justices who are legally entitled to sit on the court, or it may mean the members of the court present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the particular case is heard and decided.” — States the central ambiguity in Act No. 3104 and frames the construction issue.
• “In order to give validity to the provision in question we must therefore presume that in speaking of the Supreme Court the Legislature means the court as actually constituted at the time of the consideration of each particular case to which subsection 2, supra, may apply.” — States the ratio for upholding the decision: the statute refers to the court actually constituted, not absent justices.
• “The courts have generally held that provisions of a nature similar to that of the one here under consideration are directory and not mandatory.” — States the alternative ratio: even if the signing requirement applied, it is directory and noncompliance does not invalidate the decision.
• “It is, for instance, clear that even assuming that the petitioner's contention is correct, it still appears that the petitioner is legally confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which has not been reversed or modified. In such cases the writ of habeas corpus was not lie.” — States the independent ground for denial: habeas corpus does not lie where confinement rests on a lawful, unreversed judgment.

• Ocampo vs. Cabangis, 15 Phil., 626 — Cited for the doctrine that the legislature has no power to establish rules that deprive courts of their constitutional authority to exercise judicial functions; also relied on for the rule that statutory provisions similar to the signing requirement are directory, not mandatory, and that procedure is secondary to substantive rights.
• Flanigan vs. Guggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N. J. Law, 647 — Cited in support of the proposition that the legislature cannot, by a statute of procedure, prevent a court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction during the lawful sessions of the court.

• Subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No. 3104 — Provided that the death penalty shall be imposed except when in the consideration of the case in the second instance there is not a unanimous vote of all the members of the Supreme Court as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty; that the consideration shall always be per curiam and the sentence signed by all members; and that if one or more Justices are legally disqualified, the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required. The Court construed “all members” as the court actually constituted and the signing requirement as directory.
• Organic Act — Vouchsafed the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a speedy trial and fixed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which cannot be restricted by an act of the Legislature. The Court invoked it to reject a construction of Act No. 3104 that would cause delays and interfere with the Court’s functions.
• Section 15 of Act No. 136 — Construed in Ocampo vs. Cabangis as a similar statute whose requirements were directory, not mandatory, because strict compliance could render it impossible for the court to decide a case and would subordinate procedure to substantive rights.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion. Street, J., issued a separate concurring opinion. He concurred in the result but not in all of the majority’s reasoning. He observed that the original judgment imposing the death penalty was rendered before Act No. 3104 was passed, so the Act could not render ineffectual a decision previously promulgated. He also noted that the absent justice was in the United States on leave and was therefore “disqualified” within the meaning of the Act, or “inhibited” as expressed in the Spanish version. In his view, however, Act No. 3104 was clearly invalid for contravening section 3 of the Jones Law, which required that no bill enacted into law embrace more than one subject and that the subject be expressed in the title; the Act stated two distinct subjects in its title and treated two distinct matters in its body, with the mode of execution of the death penalty being foreign to the subject-matter of the statute amended in the first part.