Frianela vs. Banayad

Jurisdiction over probate proceedings, testate or intestate, depends on the gross value of the estate alleged in the petition, and where no such value is alleged, jurisdiction cannot be determined and the case must be dismissed. Because the original petition contained no statement of gross value, the Regional Trial Court perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction it was not shown to possess, rendering all proceedings therein null and void.

Moises F. Banayad died without issue, leaving petitioner Apolonia Banayad Frianela, his niece, named as devisee in a holographic will, and respondent Servillano Banayad, Jr., petitioner's cousin, as oppositor and counter-petitioner. At the time the allowance proceeding was instituted on June 3, 1991, Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 were in force, conferring exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts only where the gross value of the estate exceeds ₱20,000.00, and on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts where the demand does not exceed that amount.

Moises F. Banayad, an inhabitant of the Philippines residing at 2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City, died on March 27, 1991 at the Pasay City General Hospital without issue. On June 3, 1991, petitioner Apolonia Banayad Frianela, named devisee in his November 18, 1985 holographic will, filed Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for allowance of that will. The petition described the properties left as (a) a parcel of land in Pasay City described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741, (b) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown, and (c) all personal belongings, all bequeathed to petitioner, and alleged that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at execution.

Thereafter respondent Servillano Banayad, Jr., petitioner's cousin, opposed the petition and counter-petitioned for allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989. After trial on the merits, the trial court found the September 27, 1989 holographic will duly executed and that it revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowed the September 27, 1989 will, directed issuance of a certificate of allowance and letters, and appointed respondent as administrator with the will annexed upon oath and a ₱20,000.00 bond. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found partial revocation only as to the real property, allowed both the November 18, 1985 and September 27, 1989 wills consistent with that modification, and affirmed the lower court's other rulings.

• Validity under Article 783: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals disregarded Article 783 of the New Civil Code in finding the September 27, 1989 will valid.
• Testamentary Capacity under Article 799: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider Article 799 and erred in sustaining the September 27, 1989 will despite the alleged incapacity of Moises Banayad to execute it.
• Formalities under Articles 804, 814 and 812: Petitioner maintained that the September 27, 1989 will was invalid for non-compliance with Articles 804, 814 and 812 of the New Civil Code.
• Revocation under Article 831: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals misapplied Article 831 when it declared that the September 27, 1989 will revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of real property was concerned.
• Undue Influence under Article 839(4): Petitioner maintained that Article 839(4) should have been applied because the September 27, 1989 will was allegedly procured through undue and improper pressure and influence.
• Appointment of Administrator: Petitioner argued that the affirmance of respondent Servillano Banayad, Jr. as administrator of the estate was erroneous.

• Jurisdiction over Probate Proceedings: Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City validly exercised jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P where the petition for allowance contained no allegation of the gross value of the estate.
• Estoppel by Laches: Whether the doctrine of estoppel by laches under Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy bars dismissal for lack of jurisdiction after the case had been pending for around 18 years.

• Jurisdiction over Probate Proceedings: No. Jurisdiction could not be determined and was not validly exercised, the petition having failed to allege the gross value of the estate as required by Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• Estoppel by Laches: No. The Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy exception does not apply, having been limited to exceptional cases where lack of jurisdiction was raised only during execution of a final and executory decision.

• Jurisdiction over Probate Proceedings: Jurisdiction is conferred by the law in force at institution and is determined by the allegations in the complaint or petition. Under then-applicable Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Regional Trial Courts had exclusive original jurisdiction in probate matters only where the gross value of the estate exceeds ₱20,000.00, with the Metropolitan Trial Courts and other lower courts exercising jurisdiction where the demand does not exceed that amount. The original petition alleged only petitioner's residence, decedent's death and residence, attachment of the will and title, description of real and personal properties, and soundness of mind, without any statement of gross value. From such pleading, the court of proper jurisdiction could not be identified. The Regional Trial Court therefore grossly erred in perfunctorily assuming jurisdiction instead of dismissing motu proprio, and the Court of Appeals should likewise have dismissed on the same ground, jurisdiction being raisable at any stage even on appeal without loss by waiver or estoppel.
• Estoppel by Laches: Despite approximately 18 years of pendency, estoppel by laches could not be invoked against the jurisdictional defect. As a general rule, estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government, and no injustice to parties or third persons would result from dismissal. Most importantly, Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy involved delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction only during the execution stage of a final and executory judgment, after full trial, appeal to the Court of Appeals, and a second motion for execution against a surety bond. Figueroa vs. People clarified that estoppel supervenes only in exceptional cases similar to that factual milieu. Here the unauthorized assumption of jurisdiction was discovered during appeal of the main case, not during execution of a final and executory decision, so the exceptional rule is inapplicable. Without jurisdiction, all proceedings including the decision rendered are null and void, making resolution of the will-validity issues unnecessary.

• Jurisdiction Conferred by Law at Institution — Jurisdiction to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of institution of the action unless the statute provides for retroactive application. Applied to hold that Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in force on June 3, 1991, governed Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations — Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petition. Applied to hold that the applicable law requires the gross value of the estate to be alleged, and absent such allegation the proper probate court cannot be determined.
• Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction Motu Proprio — A court should dismiss motu proprio a case over whose subject matter it lacks jurisdiction shown by the initiatory pleading. Applied to fault the Regional Trial Court for perfunctorily assuming jurisdiction instead of dismissing at the outset.
• Jurisdiction Raisable at Any Stage — The issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any party or reckoned by the court at any stage, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or estoppel. Applied to require dismissal by the appellate court and to permit the Supreme Court to dismiss on review despite the issue having been overlooked below.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy Estoppel by Laches, as Clarified in Figueroa vs. People — Estoppel by laches against invoking lack of jurisdiction applies only in exceptional cases similar to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, where objection was raised only during execution of a final and executory ruling after prolonged participation. Applied to reject estoppel where the defect was discovered on appeal of the main case and the general rule that laches does not lie against the government prevailed.
• Nullity of Proceedings Without Jurisdiction — Where the court has no jurisdiction over the action, all proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. Applied to nullify the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals dispositions on the competing holographic wills.

• "The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof." — States the temporal rule for determining which jurisdictional statute governs the probate petition filed in 1991.
• "Jurisdiction is moreover determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petition." — States the pleading-based test that made the omission of gross estate value fatal to jurisdiction.
• "Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel." — Justifies sua sponte dismissal on appeal despite the lower courts' oversight and long pendency.
• "Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void." — States the consequence of the jurisdictional defect, obviating resolution of the will-validity issues.

• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 131 Phil. 556 — Cited as the exceptional estoppel-by-laches precedent; distinguished because lack of jurisdiction there was raised only at execution of a final and executory judgment, unlike discovery on appeal here.
• Figueroa vs. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63 — Cited as clarifying that Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy estoppel supervenes only in exceptional cases with a similar factual milieu; followed to reject estoppel.
• Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815 — Cited for the requirement that gross value be determinable from the petition and for nullity of proceedings conducted without jurisdiction.
• Lim vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000, 380 Phil. 61 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction over probate proceedings depends on the gross value of the estate under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• Villacastin vs. Pelaez, G.R. No. 170478, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 189 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or petition.

• Section 19(4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Confers on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds ₱20,000.00; applied as the jurisdictional threshold the petition failed to invoke.
• Section 33(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Confers on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over probate proceedings where the demand does not exceed ₱20,000.00; applied as the alternative forum that could not be excluded absent a value allegation.
• Republic Act No. 7691 — Noted as amending Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to increase jurisdictional amounts, approved March 25, 1994 and effective April 15, 1994; noted as inapplicable because the petition was filed in 1991 under the prior amounts.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justices, concurred. No separate concurring opinions with additional reasoning appear in the text.