Francisco vs. Zandueta

Support pendente lite cannot be ordered where the civil status from which the right to support is derived is denied and remains in issue, until that status is established by legal proof or final judgment.

Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged two years and represented by his natural mother and guardian ad litem Rosario Gomez, claimed to be the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco. Under Article 143 of the Civil Code, the duty of mutual support rests upon specified civil statuses or juridical relations, including parents and acknowledged natural children.

Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, then two years old, instituted through his natural mother and guardian ad litem Rosario Gomez an action for support against Luis Francisco in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Case No. 47238. The complaint alleged that the child was the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and as such was entitled to support. Francisco answered with a general denial of every material allegation and specially defended that he never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son, that he was not present at the plaintiff's baptism, and that he was married at the time the plaintiff was allegedly born.

While the support case was pending, proceedings occurred concerning the trial setting. Case No. 47238 had been set for trial on April 29, 1935. On April 22, 1935, defendant's attorney moved to transfer the trial, with hearing on that motion set for April 27, 1935. On the day set for hearing the transfer motion, the minor's attorney moved that the minor be granted P30 per month by way of support pendente lite, which the guardian ad litem supported while opposing the transfer. According to respondents, after discussion, petitioner's attorney agreed that his client would pay the minor a P30 monthly pension during the pendency of the case in order to secure a transfer. According to petitioner's counsel, under oath both as attorney in Case No. 47238 and in the certiorari proceeding, the statements in the answer and supporting affidavits that he so agreed were absolutely false.

Notwithstanding the denial of paternity, the respondent judge issued the order of May 2, 1935 granting the minor a monthly pension of P30 pendente lite, stating that the petition was well founded. On May 11, 1935, petitioner moved for reconsideration on the ground that the order was issued in excess of jurisdiction because the civil status of the plaintiff was placed in issue by the pleadings, that plaintiff had no right to monthly support until his status as defendant's child was finally determined in his favor, and that recovery of advances would be impossible since the guardian ad litem admitted lack of means to defray even ordinary expenses of existence. The motion was denied, prompting the filing of the special proceeding for certiorari.

• Excess of Jurisdiction — Civil Status in Issue: Petitioner argued that the May 2, 1935 order was issued in excess of jurisdiction because the pleadings placed the plaintiff's civil status in issue, and plaintiff had no right to monthly support until his status as defendant's child was finally determined in his favor.
• Irrecoverability of Advances: Petitioner maintained that relief was warranted because the guardian ad litem admitted lack of means to defray even ordinary expenses, making it impossible for defendant to recover amounts advanced as support pendente lite should paternity ultimately be disproved.
• Denial of Alleged Agreement: Petitioner, through counsel under oath, argued that the respondents' claim that counsel agreed to payment of P30 monthly support to secure transfer of trial was absolutely false.

• Agreed Support in Exchange for Transfer: Respondents countered that after discussion of the motion to transfer trial set for April 27, 1935 and the minor's motion for P30 monthly support pendente lite, petitioner's attorney agreed that his client would pay the minor P30 per month during the pendency of Case No. 47238 in order to secure a transfer.
• Procedural Context and Corroboration: Respondents maintained that the sequence — trial set April 29, 1935, transfer motion filed April 22, 1935, support motion filed on the hearing date, and opposition to transfer by the guardian ad litem — supported the order, as corroborated by affidavits of the respondent judge and two deputy clerks of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

• Support Pendente Lite Where Filiation Denied: Whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to order P30 monthly support pendente lite where the defendant's answer denied paternity and thus placed the plaintiff's civil status as son in issue.
• Consent as Source of Jurisdiction: Whether the alleged consent of defendant's attorney to pay support pendente lite could confer jurisdiction upon the trial judge if such jurisdiction was otherwise lacking.

• Support Pendente Lite Where Filiation Denied: No. Support pendente lite cannot be granted upon mere allegation of sonship while that civil status, from which the right derives, is denied and in litigation.
• Consent as Source of Jurisdiction: No. Consent of parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction over subject matter excluded by law, so alleged agreement could not validate the void support order.

• Support Pendente Lite Where Filiation Denied: Under Article 143 of the Civil Code, mutual support is owed by reason of specified civil statuses or juridical relations, including parents and acknowledged natural children. Following Yangco vs. Rohde, a mere allegation of the qualifying status — there marriage, here sonship — must not be confounded with an established right recognized by final judgment or based on legal presumption. Because paternity was denied and filiation remained to be proved by legal evidence, nothing could be taken for granted on the point in issue, and no effect could be given to the claim until an authoritative declaration of the cause existed. The substantial difference between capacity after final judgment declaring status and capacity when only a suit or claim to be declared in such status exists precluded the P30 award.
• Consent as Source of Jurisdiction: Resolution of the jurisdictional defect made it unnecessary to resolve the factual dispute over whether counsel actually agreed to interim support. Even assuming the alleged consent, want of jurisdiction over subject matter renders judgment void as to all persons, and consent can never impart the vitality that a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state acting through a court constituted by law as its agent. Hence the alleged bargain to secure transfer could not authorize adjudication of the support claim against defendant.

• Civil status as basis of support — The right to support under Article 143 of the Civil Code rests on a civil status or juridical relation, such as marriage or relationship, including that of parent and acknowledged natural child. Applied here, alleged sonship had to be proved because it was the very source of the support claim.
• Mere allegation vs. established right — A simple fact in issue, consisting only of an allegation of qualifying status, must not be confounded with an established right recognized by final judgment or based on legal presumption or legal proof. Applied here, the child's bare claim to be an acknowledged son, denied by defendant, could not support interim relief in the same manner as proved sonship.
• No jurisdiction by consent over subject matter — Parties cannot by consent give a court jurisdiction over a matter excluded by law; where subject-matter jurisdiction is wanting, the judgment is void and consent cannot supply validity. Applied here, the alleged agreement of defense counsel to pay P30 monthly could not empower the judge to order support pendente lite.

• "In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship." — States the controlling premise that support depends on the underlying status or juridical relation, framing why disputed filiation barred interim support.
• "There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son." — Articulates the distinction between mere allegation and legally proved status that defeats support pendente lite while filiation is litigated.
• "It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land." — States the canonical bar against conferring subject-matter jurisdiction by agreement, rejecting reliance on counsel's alleged consent.

• Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil., 404 — Followed as controlling authority; its reasoning denying alimony pendente lite where marriage was alleged but denied and unproved was paraphrased and applied to deny support pendente lite where sonship was alleged but denied and unproved.

• Article 143, Civil Code — Enumerates persons bound to support each other, including husband and wife, legitimate ascendants and descendants, parents and acknowledged natural children with legitimate descendants of the latter, parents and illegitimate children without natural-child status, and brothers and sisters. Applied to hold that the minor's claim depended on proving the status of acknowledged son before support could be ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur. Vickers, J., concurred in the result, stating disagreement with Yangco vs. Rohde and reasoning that denial of marriage should not alone defeat alimony pendente lite where conclusive evidence of marriage may be presented, but that here no evidence was presented to sustain interim support and affidavits outside the May 2, 1935 order could not be considered to show agreement, making the order arbitrary and a manifest abuse of discretion without adequate remedy by appeal.

• Malcolm and Butte, JJ. — Dissented, with no reasoning reproduced in the text provided.