Francisco vs. Puno

The Court held that notice to a party’s counsel of record constitutes notice to the party for purposes of computing the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3, Rule 38, and that the remedies of a motion for new trial and a petition for relief are mutually exclusive. Because the private respondent previously filed and exhausted a motion for new trial, she could no longer resort to a petition for relief after its denial, and the filing period commenced upon service of the decision to her counsel, rendering her petition untimely.

Private respondent Josefina D. Lagar initiated a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages against the petitioners, alleging that the property was originally conjugal but was fraudulently titled to her father as a widower following her mother’s death and subsequently sold to the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. The petitioners filed an answer interposing defenses of lack of legal personality, prescription, and status as buyers in good faith. When the petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court declared them in default. The private respondent presented her evidence ex parte, but the trial court dismissed the complaint on January 8, 1980, for insufficiency of evidence.

• On August 29, 1979, private respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages, asserting that a parcel of land titled solely to her father was actually conjugal property and that he unlawfully sold it to the petitioners' predecessor.
• Petitioners filed their answer, interposing defenses of lack of legal personality to sue, prescription, and status as buyers in good faith.
• The trial court scheduled the case for pre-trial. Petitioners failed to appear, prompting the trial court to declare them in default upon the private respondent's motion.
• The private respondent presented her evidence ex parte. On January 8, 1980, the trial court dismissed the complaint, finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action.
• The decision was served on the private respondent's counsel. On February 16, 1980, through new counsel, the private respondent filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, which she personally signed and verified, alleging excusable neglect by her previous counsel in presenting unprepared evidence.
• The trial court denied the motion on April 28, 1980, for being filed 32 days after service, exceeding the 30-day reglementary period under the Rules of Court.
• On May 7, 1980, the private respondent, through another counsel, filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, claiming excusable neglect and mistake, and asserting that she only acquired actual knowledge of the decision on March 17, 1980.
• The trial court granted the petition on October 8, 1980, computing the 60-day filing period from the date of alleged actual knowledge rather than from service on counsel, citing Cayetano v. Ceguerra.

• Petitioners argued that the petition for relief was filed out of time under Section 3, Rule 38, which mandates filing within 60 days after learning of the judgment and within six months after its entry.
• Petitioners maintained that no excusable negligence was established, noting the private respondent's deliberate attempt to capitalize on their default during the ex-parte presentation of evidence.
• Petitioners contended that the private respondent was deemed to have knowledge of the decision upon service to her counsel of record or when she signed and swore to the motion for new trial on February 16, 1980, thereby starting the computation of the 60-day period well before the May 7 filing.

• Private respondent argued that her failure to present vital evidence during the ex-parte hearing stemmed from excusable neglect and mistake, as she was unprepared, testifying for the first time, and misunderstood the proceedings.
• Private respondent maintained that she only learned of the adverse decision on March 17, 1980, when she personally secured a copy from the court, and that the 60-day period under Rule 38 should be computed from that date of actual knowledge.
• Private respondent asserted that the petition for relief was timely filed on May 7, 1980, within the 60-day window from her alleged actual knowledge and well within the six-month outer limit prescribed by the Rules.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in entertaining a petition for relief from judgment filed after the denial of a motion for new trial.
• Substantive Issues: Whether notice to counsel constitutes notice to the party for computing the 60-day period to file a petition for relief under Section 3, Rule 38, and whether the remedies of a motion for new trial and a petition for relief are mutually exclusive.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for relief. The trial court's resolution granting the petition was null and void. Consequently, the original decision of January 8, 1980 was reinstated and declared final and executory, with execution ordered. The Court reasoned that because the petition was filed out of time and sought an unavailable remedy, the trial court lacked authority to set aside the final judgment. All proceedings stemming from the void resolution were consequently invalidated.
• Substantive: The Court held that notice to counsel of record constitutes notice to the party for purposes of Section 3, Rule 38. The period for filing a petition for relief begins to run from service to counsel, not from the party's alleged actual knowledge. The Court further ruled that a motion for new trial and a petition for relief are mutually exclusive remedies. Because the private respondent previously filed a motion for new trial, she was statutorily barred from subsequently filing a petition for relief upon its denial. The petition was consequently filed out of time, and the trial court erred in granting it based on a self-serving claim of delayed actual knowledge.

• Mutual Exclusivity of Motion for New Trial and Petition for Relief — A motion for new trial and a petition for relief from judgment are alternative and incompatible remedies. A party who elects to file a motion for new trial cannot subsequently resort to a petition for relief after the motion is denied. The Court applied this doctrine to bar the private respondent's petition, emphasizing that the latter is a remedy of last resort available only when a party has been unable to file a motion for new trial through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
• Notice to Counsel as Notice to Party — Service of a judgment, order, or pleading upon a party's counsel of record constitutes valid notice to the party for computing reglementary periods. The Court applied this principle to Rule 38, Section 3, holding that the 60-day period to file a petition for relief runs from notice to counsel, as the lawyer is duty-bound to monitor procedural steps and protect the client's rights.

• "The relief provided for by this rule is not regarded with favor and the judgment would not be avoided where the party complaining 'has, or by exercising proper diligence would have had, an adequate remedy at law, or by proceedings in the original action, by motion, petition, or the like to open, vacate, modify or otherwise obtain relief against, the judgment.' ... Being in the position of one who begs, such party's privilege is not to impose conditions, haggle or dilly-dally, but to grab what is offered him." — The Court invoked this principle to underscore that a petition for relief is an extraordinary remedy of last resort, not to be extended where an adequate alternative like an appeal or motion for new trial was available but mismanaged.
• "In any event, We hold that notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that notice to the party, when he is represented by a counsel of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for the very same reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed to know the next procedural steps or what ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection of the rights of the client, and not the latter." — This passage establishes the doctrinal basis for computing the 60-day period from service upon counsel rather than from the party's alleged actual knowledge, reinforcing the lawyer's duty to safeguard procedural timelines.

• Cayetano v. Ceguerra — Cited by the trial court to support computing the 60-day period from actual knowledge. The Supreme Court distinguished and rejected its application in this context, reaffirming that notice to counsel controls when a party is represented, and actual knowledge cannot be invoked to extend reglementary periods where counsel was duly served.
• Fajardo v. Judge Bayona — Cited to establish that a petition for relief is not favored and is unavailable when the aggrieved party already possesses an adequate remedy at law or in the original action.
• Alquesa v. Cavoda — Cited alongside Fajardo to reinforce the principle that relief from judgment is an extraordinary remedy reserved for instances of excusable neglect where no other procedural recourse remains.
• Palomares v. Jimenez — Cited to illustrate that a petition for relief is an act of grace and a remedy of last resort, requiring the petitioner to act promptly and without delay once the opportunity is presented.

• Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Governs the filing period for a petition for relief from judgment, requiring it to be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six months after its entry. The Court interpreted this provision to mean that "learns" refers to notice to counsel of record, and applied it to deem the petition filed out of time.

• Justices Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, and De Castro — Concurred in the decision without separate opinions, aligning fully with the ponencia's strict application of procedural rules on the mutual exclusivity of remedies and the computation of reglementary periods from notice to counsel.