Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint or denuncia filed with the Fiscal's Office interrupts the period of prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code; however, a physician's criticism of another physician's management of a particular case is not libelous per se, and an accused cannot be held liable for a co-accused's defamatory statements absent proof of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

Dr. Patrocinio Angeles was the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, while petitioner Dr. Emiliano Francisco had been a member of its Courtesy Medical Staff until his membership was cancelled on December 15, 1965 by the Credential Committee at a meeting called by Angeles. Petitioner Atty. Harry Bernardino, as counsel of a Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for Angeles's ouster as Director, a controversy that reached the Office of the President; during Bernardino's incumbency as Mayor of Morong, Rizal, he caused the passage of a resolution authorizing him to recommend all charity cases for admission to the hospital, which Angeles ignored in accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of Medical Services. Francisco was also Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society.

Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from vaginal bleeding since November 24, 1965. She consulted Dr. Custodio, who stopped the bleeding for two days, but the bleeding recurred; she then consulted Dr. Floreza, who advised that she should go to a hospital if the bleeding continued. On December 9, 1965, Lourdes entered the Morong Emergency Hospital and was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant. Her ailment was tentatively diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy," but an x-ray examination revealed that she was negative for pregnancy. She continued to lose blood and received a transfusion of fresh blood on December 11, 1965; as the bleeding did not stop, Dr. Angeles operated on her, removing her uterus which contained three dead foetal triplets. The operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested.

On December 26, 1965, at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino, together with Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo, went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal. The two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about her operation, and the couple informed them that they were satisfied with the operation. In the course of the interview, Dr. Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done, that Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on, and that if he were the one he would not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin). On the same occasion, Atty. Bernardino said that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, incompetent, and not surgeons, and told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless imprudence. The amended information alleged that these statements imputed to Dr. Angeles professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence and cast public contempt and ridicule upon his reputation.

According to the defense, Dr. Francisco, as Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, sought to find out what could be done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz by complainant Dr. Angeles, which resulted in the removal of triplets. He consulted Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take. Upon Bernardino's advice, Francisco, accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla, a committee member, and Bernardino, went on December 26, 1965 to Tanay, Rizal, the hometown of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz. They interviewed the spouses Romulo and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on Mrs. Cruz on December 13, 1965. In that interview, the two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision to conduct a fact-finding investigation. After the interview, Dr. Golla and Dr. Francisco went to Dr. Floreza, incoming president of the Rizal Medical Society, on December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with him, but they were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society, which they did.

The Court of Appeals concluded that while the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which were not only derogatory but constituted a crime that could be prosecuted de oficio. It ruled, however, that the defamation committed by the accused could not be considered grave under the circumstances, and that the worst that was said of the complainant was that he should not have performed the operation and that he could be prosecuted for murder through reckless imprudence. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of the case of Mrs. Cruz.

• Prescription: Francisco argued that because the Court of Appeals found the offense to be simple slander, which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the case should have been dismissed; the alleged remarks were committed on December 26, 1965, while the information for grave oral defamation was filed on May 3, 1966, more than four months later.
• Libelous Character: Petitioners raised whether the alleged defamatory remarks may be considered libelous.
• Conspiracy: Petitioners raised whether there was conspiracy, and Francisco maintained that he could not be held liable for Bernardino's statements.
• Allegation of Malice: Petitioners raised whether the failure to allege in the information that they acted with "malice" is fatal.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioners raised whether the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.

• Prescription: The Solicitor General contended that the proper prescriptive period should be determined by the offense charged in the information, grave oral defamation, not the crime actually committed, simple slander, and that the period should therefore be six months.
• Interruption by Filing with Fiscal's Office: The Solicitor General argued that the complaint was filed by the offended party before the Fiscal's Office on February 3, 1966, only thirty-nine days after the incident, and cited People vs. Olarte for the rule that filing the complaint even for preliminary examination or investigation interrupts prescription; Article 91 does not require filing in court.
• Conspiracy and Bernardino's Statements: The Solicitor General considered Bernardino's statements as "strong words that are evidently serious and damaging" and sought to hold Francisco liable for them on the ground of conspiracy.

• Prescription: Whether the crime of simple slander found by the Court of Appeals had already prescribed.
• Libelous Character: Whether the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioners may be considered libelous.
• Conspiracy: Whether there was conspiracy between petitioners.
• Allegation of Malice: Whether the failure to allege in the information that petitioners acted with "malice" is fatal.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.

• Prescription: No. The filing of the denuncia or complaint with the Fiscal's Office, even if not in the proper court, interrupted the period of prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code; the complaint was filed thirty-nine days after the incident.
• Libelous Character: No. Francisco's statements were not libelous per se; they were a harmless expression of opinion on the treatment of Mrs. Cruz and a comment that complainant committed a mistake in diagnosis and management.
• Conspiracy: No. Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals found conspiracy, and no evidence showed prior consultation on what each would say; mere togetherness at the time of the utterances is not proof of conspiracy.
• Allegation of Malice: Not reached. The Court found no further need to discuss the other issues after resolving prescription, libelous character, and conspiracy.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Not reached. The Court found no further need to discuss the other issues after resolving prescription, libelous character, and conspiracy.

• Prescription: Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. People vs. Tayco had held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 must be filed in the proper court, not a denuncia or accusation lodged in the Fiscal's Office. However, People vs. Olarte set at rest conflicting views and held that the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Court, even if merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. The reasons are that Article 91 does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or for action on the merits; the court's actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender; it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays not under his control; and proceedings in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal, like preliminary investigation. Thus, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if in the Fiscal's Office, thirty-nine days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed or discovered, interrupted the period of prescription. The rule that an accused found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed did not apply because the lesser offense had not prescribed.
• Libelous Character: Francisco's statements — that Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on, that if he were the doctor he would only have done a curretage raspa, and that the operation was unusual — were clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of the case. The remarks were a harmless expression of Francisco's opinion on what should have been done in treating Mrs. Cruz if he were the doctor managing her; they were nothing more than a comment that complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient. An impartial observer would readily note that such remarks do not degrade the competency of a doctor, for a doctor, because of human limitations, cannot be expected to be accurate at all times. Blende vs. Hearst Publications held that a physician is only required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the methods recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in the profession. To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an individual case is not more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skillful physician or surgeon may make a mistake on the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general professional skill or learning. To stigmatize Francisco's statements as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal liability for slander. The Solicitor General's brief quoted and stigmatized only Bernardino's statements as defamatory and said nothing regarding Francisco's statements, yet sought to hold Francisco liable for Bernardino's utterances on the ground of conspiracy. Assuming Bernardino's statement was libelous, Francisco could not be held liable for it.
• Conspiracy: Neither the lower court nor the Court of Appeals found that Francisco and Bernardino conspired with each other to commit the alleged crime. No evidence was offered to show that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words; each accused spoke spontaneously and individually. Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a finding of guilt for the crime itself, which must be upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals' finding that the statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision is obviously incompatible with the notion that petitioners had gone to the residence of the Cruz spouses pursuant to a conspiracy to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to Tanay, Rizal having been accepted as a fact by the Court of Appeals, it was incongruous to allege that Bernardino and Francisco had conspired to slander Dr. Angeles.
• Allegation of Malice: Not reached. After resolving the foregoing matters, the Court found no further need to discuss the other issues raised in the case.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Not reached. After resolving the foregoing matters, the Court found no further need to discuss the other issues raised in the case.

• Interruption of Prescription by Filing with Fiscal's Office — Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. Following People vs. Olarte, the filing of a complaint or denuncia with the Fiscal's Office, even if that office cannot try the case on the merits, interrupts the period; the doctrine in People vs. Tayco requiring filing in the proper court was disregarded. Applied: the complaint filed thirty-nine days after the alleged defamatory remarks interrupted prescription.
• Lesser Included Offense and Prescription — An accused found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed; otherwise the law on prescription could be circumvented by charging the graver offense. In this case, the lesser offense of simple slander had not prescribed because the complaint was filed within the period.
• Libel Per Se and Criticism of Professional Mismanagement — A charge that a physician mismanaged or made a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not libelous per se; it imputes only the mistakes incident to fallible human nature and does not impair his general professional competency. Applied: Francisco's remarks about the operation were a harmless expression of opinion and not libelous.
• Conspiracy Requires Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt — Conspiracy must be established by the same quantum of proof as the crime itself, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere presence or togetherness at the time of the utterances, without prior consultation or common design, is insufficient. Applied: no conspiracy was proved to hold Francisco liable for Bernardino's statements.

• "Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense." — States the rule on lesser included offenses and prescription, though the Court found the lesser offense here had not prescribed.
• "Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription." — Holds that a complaint filed with the Fiscal's Office interrupts prescription, applying the Olarte doctrine.
• "It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the mismanagement of the making of a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not of itself actionable." — Defines why Francisco's remarks were not libelous per se.
• "The fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words." — States the conspiracy ruling, rejecting liability based on mere simultaneous presence.

• People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 — Cited by the Solicitor General and relied on by the Court; established that the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Court, even merely for preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription, even if that court cannot try the case on the merits. The Court applied this doctrine to a complaint filed with the Fiscal's Office.
• People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509 — Prior ruling that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 must be filed in the proper court, not a denuncia in the Fiscal's Office; its basis was disregarded in Olarte and not followed here.
• People vs. del Rosario, 110 Phil. 476 — Earlier view requiring filing in the proper court for interruption; cited as part of the conflict set at rest by Olarte.
• Blende vs. Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733 — American case cited for the rule that a physician is required only to possess ordinary knowledge and skill and is not liable for mistakes if he uses methods recognized by those reasonably skilled in the profession; used to support the holding that Francisco's remarks were not libelous per se.
• People vs. Portugueza, 20 SCRA 901 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be proved with the same degree of proof required for the crime itself.
• People vs. Tividad, 20 SCRA 549 — Cited for the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in establishing conspiracy.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides the prescriptive period for simple slander, which Francisco invoked as two months. The Court did not apply it to bar the prosecution because the period was interrupted.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, authorities, or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The Court applied it to hold that the denuncia or complaint filed with the Fiscal's Office interrupted prescription.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concurred. Aquino, J., concurred in the result.