Francisco L. Gonzales vs. Erminda F. Gonzales

Under Article 147 of the Family Code, where a marriage is void, properties acquired by the parties during their union are presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and are owned by them in equal shares, unless proof to the contrary is shown; a party who did not participate in the acquisition is deemed to have contributed jointly if that party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and household. The presumption applied because the marriage was void and petitioner did not contest that declaration, and it was not overcome by petitioner’s own testimony and admissions regarding respondent’s work in the pizza business.

Francisco L. Gonzales and Erminda F. Gonzales began living together in March 1977 and married on February 4, 1979, during which union they had four children and acquired real and personal properties while operating a pizza business. Their marriage was later declared void ab initio on the ground of Francisco’s psychological incapacity. The dispute concerns the property regime applicable after that declaration, specifically Article 147 of the Family Code, which governs the property relations of a man and woman living together under a void marriage. Section 48 of the Family Code also required the public prosecutor to certify that no collusion existed in the nullity proceeding.

Before they began living together, Francisco L. Gonzales offered Erminda F. Gonzales to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its operations. Erminda started managing the business in 1976, handling the daily operations, managing personnel, and meeting people during inspection and supervision of outlets; she reported for work every day, including Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance. In March 1977, Francisco and Erminda started living as husband and wife, and on February 4, 1979, they married. Four children were born from their union: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica, and Marco Manuel. During their life together, they acquired real and personal properties, and Erminda managed their pizza business and worked for its development.

On October 29, 1992, Erminda filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111. She alleged that Francisco was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage; that he beat her for no justifiable reason, humiliated and embarrassed her, and denied her love, sexual comfort, and loyalty; and that she managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. She prayed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage and for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. In his answer, Francisco averred that it was Erminda who was psychologically incapacitated; he denied that she managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owned the properties existing during their marriage. In her reply, Erminda alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza, representing 80% of its total management, and that all income from the business was conjugal. The public prosecutor certified, pursuant to Section 48 of the Family Code, that no collusion existed between the parties and that he would appear for the State to ensure that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

At trial, evidence showed that Francisco used to beat Erminda without justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of people and even their children. He was afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by indiscriminate womanizing. The trial court found the evidence adduced by Erminda overwhelming to prove that Francisco, by inflicting injuries on his wife and by his excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, was at the time of the celebration of marriage psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, although the incapacity became manifest only after solemnization. Francisco’s evidence on Erminda’s alleged psychological incapacity was found doubtful, unreliable, unclear, and unconvincing.

Each party submitted a list of properties with their valuations. Francisco sought to have the White Plains and Greenmeadows lots classified as non-conjugal assets. The trial court agreed as to the White Plains property because it was purchased by Francisco before he started living with Erminda, but disagreed as to the Greenmeadows lot, declaring it conjugal because, although purchased before they started living together, payment of the purchase price was completed only after their marriage. In dividing the properties, the trial court took the average of the parties’ valuations for each property. It fixed the total value of the conjugal real properties at ₱95,250,000, excluding White Plains, and divided them equally, with each spouse to receive one-half or ₱47,625,000. The personal properties—vehicles—were valued at ₱2,200,000, with each party to receive ₱1,100,000. The trial court also ordered Erminda to pay Francisco ₱2,196,125 and ordered Francisco, who had actual possession of the conjugal properties, to deliver Erminda’s share and execute the necessary documents conveying title and ownership to her.

The trial court found that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business; that Francisco himself testified Erminda was not a plain housewife and helped him manage the business; and that in a handwritten letter dated September 6, 1989, he admitted, “You’ve helped me for what we are now and I won’t let it be destroyed.”

• Property Classification: Petitioner sought to have the White Plains and Greenmeadows lots classified as non-conjugal assets.
• Equal Division: Petitioner challenged the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the properties should be divided equally between the parties.
• Ownership and Management: In his answer, petitioner claimed that he exclusively owned the properties existing during the marriage and denied that respondent managed the pizza business.
• Non-Contest of Nullity: Petitioner did not contest the declaration of nullity of marriage; his appeal was limited to the manner of property division.

• Psychological Incapacity: Respondent alleged that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage, citing beatings, humiliation, embarrassment, and denial of love, sexual comfort, and loyalty.
• Conjugal Nature of Business Income: Respondent alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza, representing 80% of its total management, and that all income from the business was conjugal in nature.
• Management and Contribution: Respondent claimed she managed the pizza business and worked hard for its development.

• Equal Division of Properties: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally between the parties.

• Equal Division of Properties: No. The Court of Appeals did not err. Because the marriage was void and petitioner did not contest that declaration, Article 147 of the Family Code governed the parties’ property relations, under which properties acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and owned in equal shares. The presumption was not rebutted.

• Equal Division of Properties: The Court began from petitioner’s non-contest of the nullity, so Article 147 of the Family Code applied. It quoted Article 147 and explained that the provision covers two instances: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when they live together under a void marriage. Under this co-ownership regime, properties acquired during the union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and are owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other is deemed to have contributed jointly if that party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. The Court found that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business; that petitioner himself testified respondent was not a plain housewife and helped him manage the business; and that in his handwritten letter dated September 6, 1989, he admitted her help. Before they lived together, petitioner had offered respondent to be his partner in the pizza business and to take over its operations; she started managing the business in 1976, handling daily operations, personnel, and inspections, and worked every day, including Saturdays and Sundays, without salary or allowance. Thus, the presumption of joint efforts and equal ownership was not rebutted. The Court also applied Rule 45: only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, and the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding when in complete accord with those of the trial court, as in this case; it is not the Court’s function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. The equal division was therefore affirmed.

• Article 147 Family Code Co-ownership Regime — When a man and a woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries are owned by them in equal shares, and property acquired by both through their work or industry is governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together are presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts, work, or industry and are owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other is deemed to have contributed jointly if that party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. The Court applied this regime because the marriage was void and petitioner did not contest the declaration of nullity.
• Presumption of Joint Efforts and Equal Shares — Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during cohabitation were acquired through the parties’ joint efforts, work, or industry and are owned in equal shares. The presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. The Court found the presumption unrebutted because petitioner himself testified that respondent helped manage the pizza business and admitted her contributions in a handwritten letter.
• Binding Effect of Appellate Court’s Factual Findings in Rule 45 Petitions — In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding on the Supreme Court, especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court. The Court does not analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. The Court applied this rule because the appellate court’s factual findings were in accord with those of the trial court.

• “ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” — This is the controlling provision applied by the Court because the parties’ marriage was void and petitioner did not contest the declaration of nullity.
• “In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.” — This passage states the presumption of joint efforts and equal shares, including the deemed contribution of a party whose efforts consisted in caring for the family and household.
• “While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he admitted that "You’ve helped me for what we are now and I won’t let it be destroyed."” — This passage shows the factual basis for the Court’s conclusion that the Article 147 presumption was not rebutted.
• “In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the Appellate Court are generally binding on, especially this Court, when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court, as in this case.” — This passage states the standard of review that constrained the Court from re-examining the factual findings on property acquisition and contribution.

• Vicente vs. Planters Development Bank, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 282 — Cited for the general rule in Rule 45 petitions that only questions of law may be raised and passed upon by the Supreme Court.
• Almira vs. Court of Appeals, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 351 — Cited for the same Rule 45 limitation on questions of law.
• Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 1960 — Cited for the Rule 45 limitation and for the binding effect of factual findings of the appellate court when in accord with the trial court.
• Lantin vs. Court of Appeals, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 202 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding when in complete accord with those of the trial court.
• Sevilla vs. Sevilla, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 501 — Cited for the same rule on the binding effect of factual findings.
• Potenciano vs. Reynoso, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA 391 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court does not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.

• Article 147, Family Code — Governs the property relations of a man and woman who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. It creates a co-ownership regime under which wages and salaries are owned in equal shares, and properties acquired through work or industry are governed by co-ownership rules; absent proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together are presumed obtained through joint efforts and owned in equal shares. The Court applied this provision because the parties’ marriage was void and petitioner did not contest the declaration of nullity.
• Article 50, Family Code — Mentioned in the trial court’s order requiring the parties to deliver the children’s legitimes pursuant to Article 50, in relation to Article 51.
• Article 51, Family Code — Mentioned in relation to Article 50 in the trial court’s order on the children’s legitimes.
• Section 48, Family Code — Requires the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State in annulment or declaration of absolute nullity cases to prevent collusion and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The public prosecutor certified that no collusion existed between the parties.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari. Under it, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon, and factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding when in complete accord with those of the trial court. The Court applied this rule in declining to re-weigh the evidence.

Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairman), Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Cancio C. Garcia.