Fran vs. Salas

A probate judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and may not be disturbed by a mere motion for reconsideration filed well beyond the reglementary period, as the court loses jurisdiction to alter or set it aside.

Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo died in 1972, leaving a will executed in April 1972. Her brother-in-law, Jesus Fran, filed a petition for probate. The private respondents, sisters of the deceased, initially filed a manifestation requesting time to study the petition but later filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition" expressly stating they had no objection to the will's allowance. The will was admitted to probate on November 13, 1972, and Fran was appointed executor. Subsequently, a project of partition based on the will was submitted and approved by the court on September 10, 1973, after which the proceedings were declared closed. Private respondent Concepcion M. Espina filed a certification stating she received a copy of the project of partition and the notice of hearing and had no objection to its approval. Private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the project of partition itself.

• Parties and Initial Proceedings: Jesus Fran, as executor named in the will of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, filed a petition for its probate. The private respondents, sisters of the deceased, initially manifested they needed time to study the petition but later filed a formal withdrawal of opposition, stating they had no objection to the will's allowance.
• Probate and Partition: The will was admitted to probate on November 13, 1972. Fran was appointed executor. A project of partition distributing the estate according to the will was later submitted. Private respondent Concepcion Espina filed a certification stating she received the project and notice of hearing and had no objection. Private respondent Maria Gandiongco signed the project itself. The court approved the partition and closed the proceedings on September 10, 1973.
• Belated Challenge: On October 1, 1979, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, seeking to reopen the case. They alleged the will was a forgery, they were not properly notified of hearings, and the reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court was void. The motion was filed over six years after the final orders.
• Lower Court's Action: The respondent Judge set the Omnibus Motion for hearing. Despite a petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, the judge proceeded to hear the motion and, on June 2, 1980, issued an order declaring the will a forgery, annulling the probate, and converting the proceeding to intestacy.
• Supreme Court Intervention: The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on the same day (June 2, 1980), but the respondent Judge's order was issued before its receipt.

• Finality of Judgment: Petitioners argued that the probate judgment of 1972 and the order of partition and closure of 1973 had long become final and executory. The lower court thus lost jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration filed nearly seven years later.
• Estoppel: Petitioners contended that private respondents were estopped from questioning the will, having voluntarily withdrawn their opposition, expressed conformity to the project of partition, and received their shares of the estate.
• Validity of Proceedings: Petitioners asserted that the delegation of evidence reception to the Clerk of Court was valid under prevailing jurisprudence at the time (Laluan vs. Malpaya), and the original will was submitted in evidence and available for examination.
• No Extrinsic Fraud: Petitioners maintained that any alleged fraud was intrinsic to the probate proceedings and not a ground for annulment of a final judgment.

• Forgery and Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondents argued the will was a forgery. They claimed the probate court never acquired jurisdiction because the original will was not attached to the petition, and they were deprived of the chance to examine it.
• Void Proceedings: Respondents contended the reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court was void per Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, and the clerk failed to take a separate oath as commissioner.
• Fraud and Lack of Notice: Respondents alleged petitioner Fran committed fraud by misleading them into withdrawing their opposition and signing the project of partition, and that they were not notified of material orders and hearings.

• Jurisdiction Over Motion: Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration of a final and executory probate judgment filed more than six years after its rendition.
• Validity of Probate Proceedings: Whether the probate proceedings were void due to the alleged failure to attach the original will to the petition and the delegation of evidence reception to the Clerk of Court.
• Grounds for Annulment: Whether the alleged forgery of the will and fraud in its probate constituted sufficient grounds to set aside the final probate judgment.

• Jurisdiction Over Motion: The lower court acted without jurisdiction. A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable. The motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading, filed long after the reglementary period for appeal or for a petition for relief had expired. The court lost jurisdiction to alter or set aside its final judgment.
• Validity of Probate Proceedings: The probate proceedings were valid. The attachment of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement; a copy suffices, and the original was submitted in evidence. The delegation of evidence reception to the Clerk of Court was permissible under the doctrine in Laluan vs. Malpaya, which was the prevailing rule at the time, not the later Lim Tanhu ruling which was applied prospectively and later overruled.
• Grounds for Annulment: The alleged grounds were unavailing. The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Any alleged fraud was intrinsic and not the kind that justifies annulment of a final judgment. The private respondents' actions (withdrawing opposition, signing the partition) demonstrated actual knowledge of and acquiescence to the proceedings.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable, and may not be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. This doctrine is grounded on public policy and the need for stability in judicial decisions.
• Probate Judgment as Conclusive — A decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except for fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
• Delegation of Evidence Reception — A court may validly authorize its Clerk of Court to receive evidence in an uncontested proceeding. This is a ministerial task, and the duty to render judgment based on that evidence remains with the judge. This rule was affirmed in Laluan vs. Malpaya and Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance.

• "Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. This is so even if the decision is incorrect."
• "The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery."

• Laluan vs. Malpaya, 65 SCRA 494 (1975) — Cited to uphold the validity of delegating the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court as a ministerial function.
• Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 157 SCRA 40 (1988) — Cited to show that Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete was overruled and that delegating evidence reception to a clerk of court is permissible.
• Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448 (1933) — Cited for the rule that a decree of probate is conclusive as to the will's due execution.
• Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416 (1977) — Cited to support the doctrine on the immutability of final judgments.

• Rule 38, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for relief from judgment. The Court noted that the private respondents' motion was filed far beyond the 60-day and 6-month periods prescribed by this Rule.
• Rule 76, Section 1, Rules of Court — Cited to show that a petition for probate may be filed by an executor or interested person, and it is not required that the original will be attached to the petition.
• Rule 90, Section 1, Rules of Court — Cited to explain that the probate court has jurisdiction to order an executor to deliver shares to heirs within the same proceeding.

• Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
• Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin
• Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero

• N/A — Justice Florentino P. Feliciano took no part. No dissenting opinion was noted in the text.