Fortuna vs. Republic of the Philippines

An applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant must present incontrovertible evidence of the alienable and disposable character of the land, such as a copy of the original classification declared by the DENR Secretary or proclaimed by the President. Mere notations in survey plans and certifications from the DENR-CENRO are inadequate proof of a positive government act reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable.

The spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter parcel of land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The land was claimed to have been originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, who was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. The application was filed under the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) and the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), specifically Section 48(b) as amended. The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, and only agricultural lands may be alienated, subject to classification by the Executive Department.

In December 1994, the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union, docketed as LRC No. 2372 with the RTC. The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death she was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in the lot in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot to Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975, who in turn sold it to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in quiet, peaceful, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years. They submitted as evidence the lot's survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. The Republic opposed the application but did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.

The RTC granted the application for registration in its decision dated May 7, 2001, declaring that the spouses Fortuna established possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest, as open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty years. The Republic appealed, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot had been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land, and that Tax Declaration No. 8366 showed possession only since 1948, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529.

The CA reversed the RTC decision, finding that although the spouses Fortuna established the alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failed to show compliance with the required length of possession since June 12, 1945. The CA agreed with the Republic that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that Pastora had been in possession since 1948. The spouses Fortuna filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

Before the Supreme Court, the spouses Fortuna contended that the applicable law was Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 1942, which required 30 years of possession. They argued that PD No. 1073, which changed the requirement to possession since June 12, 1945, was published only on May 9, 1977, and thus should be effective only on that date. They claimed that by that date, they had already satisfied the 30-year requirement because Pastora's possession dated back, at the latest, to 1947. They alleged that Tax Declaration No. 8366, made in 1948, did not contradict possession before 1948, and that the failure to present earlier documentary evidence was explained by the loss of records due to World War II. They also relied on the testimony of Macaria Flores in a separate registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373, who testified that she had passed by Pastora's lots since 1938 and knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter's family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon.

• Applicable Law: The spouses Fortuna contended that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942, which required 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over agricultural land of the public domain.
• Effectivity of PD No. 1073: They argued that PD No. 1073, which changed the requirement to possession since June 12, 1945, was published on May 9, 1977, and should be deemed effective only on that date, by which time they had already satisfied the 30-year requirement under RA No. 1942.
• Possession Prior to 1948: They alleged that Tax Declaration No. 8366, made in 1948, did not contradict the fact that Pastora possessed the lot before 1948, and that the failure to present earlier documentary evidence was explained by the loss of records due to World War II.
• Evidence of Prior Possession: They contended that evidence exists indicating Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948, including the absence of a statement that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new declaration, the annotation that it cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543, and the testimony of Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373.
• Admissibility of Macaria's Testimony: They claimed that Macaria's testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be considered to prove Pastora's possession prior to 1948, since it pertained to adjacent lots belonging to the same predecessor-in-interest, and they explained their failure to present her earlier by saying they only traced her identity after the reception of evidence.

• Reliance on CA Ruling: The Republic relied mostly on the CA's ruling, which denied the registration of title, and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

• Alienable and Disposable Character: Whether the spouses Fortuna sufficiently established that Lot No. 4457 is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
• Applicable Cut-off Date: Whether the applicable cut-off date for possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, is May 8, 1947, considering the publication date of PD No. 1073.
• Sufficiency of Possession Evidence: Whether the spouses Fortuna sufficiently proved that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied Lot No. 4457 since the applicable cut-off date.

• Alienable and Disposable Character: No. The spouses Fortuna failed to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain through a positive act of the Executive Department, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, or a declaration by the DENR Secretary.
• Applicable Cut-off Date: The applicable cut-off date is May 8, 1947. Since PD No. 1073 was published on May 9, 1977, the 30-year period of possession required under RA No. 1942 should be counted backward from that date, making May 8, 1947 the cut-off date.
• Sufficiency of Possession Evidence: No. The spouses Fortuna failed to prove that they possessed and occupied Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947, as their evidence did not establish the nature and duration of possession required under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

• Alienable and Disposable Character: The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, and only agricultural lands may be alienated. Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the classification and reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, or through the DENR Secretary. Jurisprudence requires an applicant to present incontrovertible evidence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act. The Court found that the notation in the survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification were not evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable. Mere notations in survey plans are inadequate proof, as they only establish that the land falls within an approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or proclaimed by the President. The offices that prepared the survey plan and certification are not the official repositories or legal custodians of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary.

• Applicable Cut-off Date: The Court addressed the issue of the applicable cut-off date despite the finding on alienability being sufficient to deny the petition. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as originally enacted, possession since July 26, 1894 was required. RA No. 1942 replaced this with a 30-year period of possession. PD No. 1073 then replaced the 30-year period with a requirement of possession since June 12, 1945. In Abejaron vs. Nabasa, the Court ruled that Filipino citizens who had been in possession for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, or at least since January 24, 1947, could apply for judicial confirmation. However, the Court noted that PD No. 1073 was published on May 9, 1977, not on January 25, 1977. Citing Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held that publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws, and effectivity begins fifteen days after publication unless a different date is fixed. Since Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that the decree shall take effect upon its promulgation, this should be understood to mean upon its publication, or May 9, 1977. This moves the cut-off date to May 8, 1947, meaning applicants must prove possession for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.

• Sufficiency of Possession Evidence: Even assuming the lot is alienable and disposable, the spouses Fortuna failed to prove possession since May 8, 1947. The Court observed that while the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new declaration, and the notation that it cancels Tax Declaration No. 10543, may indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that possession commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. The tax declaration also does not show the nature of Pastora's possession. Section 48(b) speaks of possession and occupation, and the word "occupation" serves to highlight that possession must not be a mere fiction. Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation or fencing, and the lot was described as "cogonal." The Court was not convinced that Macaria's testimony constituted the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature. The total land area of the adjoining lots claimed to have belonged to Pastora was 9,564 sq. m., too large for the Court to consider that Pastora's claimed acts of possession encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size, it was unlikely that Macaria, age 21 in 1947, could competently assess that the entirety belonged to Pastora. The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 did not tie the Court's hands, as those rulings did not show that the lots had been officially reclassified as alienable or that the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the Public Land Act. The Court reiterated the directive in Santiago vs. De las Santos that applications to private ownership of real estate must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.

• Incontrovertible Evidence Requirement for Public Land Registration — An applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable and disposable, established through a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act. Mere notations in survey plans and DENR-CENRO certifications are inadequate proof, as the applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or proclaimed by the President.

• Effectivity of Laws Upon Publication — All statutes shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Where a decree states it shall take effect upon its promulgation, this is understood to mean upon its publication. The Court applied this doctrine to PD No. 1073, moving the cut-off date for possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act from January 24, 1947 to May 8, 1947.

• Possession and Occupation Distinguished — Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the words "possession" and "occupation" are separated by the conjunction "and," indicating that one is not synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. The word "occupation" delimits the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession, and taken together with the words "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious," serves to highlight that for an applicant to qualify, possession must not be a mere fiction.

• "Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties' alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the evidence required to establish the alienable and disposable character of public land, which is central to the Court's denial of the application.

• "Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that '[the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,' the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. '[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.' Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977." — This passage establishes the applicable cut-off date of May 8, 1947 for possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, applying the publication requirement for laws.

• "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction." — This passage defines the distinction between possession and occupation under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which the Court applied to find the applicants' evidence insufficient.

• Tañada vs. Hon. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422 (1985) — Controlling precedent on the requirement of publication for the effectivity of laws, applied to determine the effectivity date of PD No. 1073 and consequently the cut-off date for possession.
• Abejaron vs. Nabasa, 411 Phil. 552 (2001) — Followed, with modification, regarding the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; the Court adjusted the cut-off date from January 24, 1947 to May 8, 1947 based on the actual publication date of PD No. 1073.
• Republic vs. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 51 — Controlling precedent on the requirement that the applicant prove that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and present a copy of the original classification.
• Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, 534 Phil. 181 (2006) — Cited for the proposition that mere notations in survey plans are inadequate proof of the alienable and disposable character of land.
• Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008) — Cited for the requirement that the applicant present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or proclaimed by the President.
• Republic vs. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607 (2004) — Cited for the distinction between possession and occupation under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
• Santiago vs. De las Santos, 158 Phil. 809 (1974) — Cited for the directive that applications to private ownership of real estate must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.

• Article XII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, forming the basis for the requirement that applicants prove the alienable and disposable character of the land.
• Article XII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Provides that only agricultural lands may be alienated among the four classes of public land, supporting the Court's analysis of the classification requirement.
• Section 6, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Grants the President the prerogative to classify and reclassify public lands, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942 and PD No. 1073 — Governs judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, requiring open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for the prescribed period.
• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, may apply for registration of title.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1073 — Amends Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act to require possession since June 12, 1945, which the Court interpreted in light of its publication date.
• Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1073 — States that the decree shall take effect upon its promulgation, which the Court interpreted to mean upon publication on May 9, 1977.
• Section 13, Presidential Decree No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code) — Empowers the DENR Secretary to declare lands as alienable and disposable, cited in support of the classification authority.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Del Castillo, J., Perez, J., and Perlas-Bernabe, J. concurred in the decision.