Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals

Civil courts have jurisdiction to review ecclesiastical actions when such actions are taken in violation of the church's own constitution or when property rights are affected, and in a division (as opposed to a schism) of a religious congregation, the numerical majority controls the right to use church properties.

The Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), also known as the Aglipayan Church, was established in 1902 with Mons. Gregorio Aglipay as its Supreme Head. The church operated under a written constitution (Reglas Constitucionales) that defined the powers of the Obispo Maximo (Supreme Bishop), the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops), the Asemblea Magna, and the Curia de Apelaciones. Upon Aglipay's death, Santiago A. Fonacier was elected Obispo Maximo on October 14, 1940. The church's governance structure required the Obispo Maximo to share disciplinary authority with the Supreme Council and the Curia de Apelaciones, and provided for the election of his successor by the Asemblea Magna. The case arose from a power struggle within the church hierarchy following the Pacific War, which split the IFI into two factions—one led by Fonacier and the other by Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr.—each claiming legitimate leadership and control over the church's temporal properties.

Upon the death of Mons. Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente since 1902, Santiago A. Fonacier was elected Obispo Maximo on October 14, 1940, in accordance with the church constitution. His successor was to have been elected by the Asemblea Magna on September 1, 1943, but due to the Pacific War, the bishops stationed in Manila and neighboring provinces agreed on December 16, 1941 that Fonacier should hold over as Obispo Maximo for the duration of the emergency. After the liberation of the Philippines, an attempt was made on September 1, 1945 to convene the Asemblea Magna for the purpose of electing a new Obispo Maximo, but owing to lack of quorum, the bishops present agreed that Fonacier would continue for another year, or until September 1, 1946.

On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos convened and approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Mons. Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that Remollino had notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Fonacier wrote him a letter dated September 18, 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking possession of the diocese until Fonacier had approved the appointment, as required by the church constitution. Remollino replied that he had been appointed Bishop of Cavite by the late Mons. Aglipay, that the appointment was confirmed by the Supreme Council, and that he was ready to defend his position in court. Resenting this response as defiance and contempt, and suspecting Bishop Manuel Aguilar as the instigator, Fonacier prepared and signed a decree dated October 8, 1945 purporting to expel Bishops Aguilar and Remollino from the church. This decree was countersigned by the Secretary General and agreed to by six other bishops. On October 16, 1945, those six bishops approved a resolution decreeing the same expulsion. Fonacier later declared the decree effective on November 20, 1945, after Aguilar and Remollino allegedly refused to sign a letter of apology. No formal charges were filed against the two bishops, and no investigation or hearing was ever held.

On December 1, 1945, Bishop Aguilar filed charges against Fonacier as Supreme Bishop. On December 4, 1945, Aguilar issued a call for a meeting of the Asemblea General to be held on January 22, 1946, and on January 2, 1946, he issued a call for a meeting of the Supreme Council on January 21, 1946 to hear the charges. Fonacier answered through counsel on January 18, 1946, challenging Aguilar's authority to summon the council on the ground that Aguilar and Remollino had already been expelled. The Supreme Council convened on January 21, 1946, found the charges proven, and decreed Fonacier's forced resignation. Seven of the thirteen legitimate bishops attended, constituting a quorum. The decree was submitted to the Asemblea Magna (or Asemblea General) which convened on January 22, 1946 with thirty-one members present, exceeding the required quorum of twenty-five. Fonacier did not attend but sent a printed answer. The assembly unanimously approved the decree and elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca as Supreme Bishop.

When notified of his removal and required to turn over all funds, documents, and properties of the church, Fonacier refused. Instead, he organized a group that formed a rump Supreme Council on January 29, 1946, composed of himself and bishops he had consecrated without the sanction of the legitimate Supreme Council. This group elected Juan Jamias as President of the Supreme Council and, on January 30, 1946, decreed the ouster of Bishops De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, Quijano, and Tablante for alleged high treason. On September 1, 1946, the legitimate Asemblea Magna convened and elected Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as Obispo Maximo. On the same date, Fonacier and his followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop, creating two factions. The De los Reyes faction had nineteen bishops and 252 priests, while the Fonacier faction had ten bishops and only forty priests. By January 22, 1948, the De los Reyes faction had grown to 293 bishops and priests against sixty-four for the Fonacier group, and De los Reyes was duly registered as corporation sole for the administration of the temporalities of the IFI.

Sometime in April 1947, Bishops De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, and Aguilar were consecrated as bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, purportedly for the purpose of conferring apostolic succession. On August 5, 1947, the De los Reyes faction amended the church constitution and restated its articles of religion. Fonacier later alleged, in a supplementary answer filed on January 10, 1948, that these acts constituted abandonment of faith and abjuration, causing De los Reyes and Bayaca to automatically cease to be members of the IFI. The Court of Appeals found that the present action, filed on February 9, 1946, preceded these doctrinal changes, which therefore could not have been the cause of the division and were irrelevant to the dispute.

• Legality of Ouster of Aguilar and Remollino: Petitioner argued that the ouster of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino was legal and valid because it was decreed by him as Supreme Bishop and sanctioned by the Supreme Council in accordance with the church constitution, as punishment for defying and slandering the Supreme Head and campaigning to destroy church unity. He further contended that the ousted bishops had the right to appeal to the Curia de Apelaciones but failed to do so, rendering the decree final and executory and not subject to collateral attack by civil courts.
• Illegality of His Own Removal: Petitioner claimed that the meetings of the Supreme Council and Asemblea General on January 21 and 22, 1946 were illegally constituted because they were called by Bishop Aguilar, whom petitioner had already expelled, and because the attendees did not constitute a quorum.
• Distinction Between Asemblea General and Asemblea Magna: Petitioner contended that the Asemblea General and the Asemblea Magna were two different bodies with different compositions, functions, and convening authorities, and that the body that met on January 22, 1946 was not properly constituted.
• Invalidity of De los Reyes' Election: Petitioner argued that the election of De los Reyes, Jr. as Supreme Bishop on September 1, 1946 was invalid because Bayaca, who called the meeting, was not legally elected Supreme Bishop and had been expelled, and because there was no quorum.
• Validity of Jamias' Election: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the election of Bishop Jamias invalid.
• Abandonment of Faith and Abjuration: Petitioner argued that De los Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca, having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines, practices, and constitution of the IFI by joining the Protestant Episcopal Church and adopting doctrinal amendments, automatically ceased to be members of the IFI and consequently had no personality to maintain the action. He invoked the rule that in case of schism, church properties should remain with the faction adhering to original doctrines.
• Ecclesiastical Matters Not Reviewable: Petitioner contended that the consecration of bishops was an ecclesiastical matter that civil courts could not revise.

• Factual Nature of Issues: Respondent argued that the issues raised by petitioner called for factual conclusions requiring examination of oral and documentary evidence, and that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals were conclusive and could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court in a petition for review.
• Illegality of Fonacier's Ouster of Bishops: Respondent contended that Fonacier's expulsion of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino was not issued in accordance with the procedure laid down in the church constitution, as no formal charges were filed, no notice was given, and no hearing was held, thus warranting civil court intervention.
• Validity of Fonacier's Removal: Respondent maintained that the Supreme Council and Asemblea Magna that met on January 21 and 22, 1946 were legally constituted, with a quorum present, and that Fonacier's forced resignation was validly decreed.
• Ecclesiastical Matters: Respondent argued that the alleged doctrinal changes, abandonment of faith, and abjuration were purely ecclesiastical matters outside the province of civil courts, and that the consecration of bishops by the American Protestant Episcopal Church was merely for conferring apostolic succession without any obligation to that church.

• Validity of Ouster of Aguilar and Remollino: Whether the ouster of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino by Fonacier was legal and valid under the church constitution.
• Status of Bishop Vega: Whether Bishop Irineo C. de Vega had resigned from the church and therefore could not participate in the proceedings affecting Fonacier's removal.
• Validity of Consecration of Seven Bishops: Whether the seven bishops consecrated by Fonacier without Supreme Council approval were validly consecrated and could be considered members of the church's governing bodies.
• Legality of Meetings on January 21–22, 1946: Whether the Supreme Council and Asemblea General/Magna that met on January 21 and 22, 1946 were legally constituted and whether Fonacier's ouster was valid.
• Identity of Asemblea General and Asemblea Magna: Whether the Asemblea General and the Asemblea Magna are one and the same body.
• Validity of De los Reyes' Election: Whether the election of Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as Supreme Bishop on September 1, 1946 was valid.
• Validity of Jamias' Election: Whether the election of Juan Jamias as Supreme Bishop by the Fonacier faction was valid.
• Ecclesiastical Matters and Civil Court Jurisdiction: Whether the alleged doctrinal changes, abandonment of faith, and abjuration were ecclesiastical matters outside the province of civil courts.
• Validity of Constitutional Amendments: Whether the amendments to the church constitution and restatement of articles of religion were legally and validly adopted.
• Loss of Membership: Whether De los Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca, by reason of their consecration by the Protestant Episcopal Church and adoption of doctrinal changes, had ceased to be members of the IFI and lost personality to maintain the action.

• Validity of Ouster of Aguilar and Remollino: No. The ouster was null and void for violating the church constitution, which requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones before the Supreme Bishop may punish an erring member.
• Status of Bishop Vega: No. The alleged resignation of Bishop Vega was not established by clear and convincing evidence; he remained a bishop and could participate in church proceedings.
• Validity of Consecration of Seven Bishops: No. The seven bishops were consecrated by Fonacier without the approval of the Supreme Council and in violation of the church constitution, and could not be considered members of the church's governing bodies.
• Legality of Meetings on January 21–22, 1946: Yes. The Supreme Council and Asemblea Magna were legally constituted with a quorum present, and Fonacier's forced resignation was validly decreed.
• Identity of Asemblea General and Asemblea Magna: Yes. The two bodies are one and the same, or at least the distinction does not affect the validity of the proceedings.
• Validity of De los Reyes' Election: Yes. The election of De los Reyes, Jr. was valid, Bayaca having been legally elected Supreme Bishop and a quorum having been present.
• Validity of Jamias' Election: No. The election of Jamias was illegal because it was conducted by rebels not authorized to organize the Asemblea Magna.
• Ecclesiastical Matters and Civil Court Jurisdiction: Yes. The doctrinal changes, abandonment of faith, and abjuration are ecclesiastical matters outside the province of civil courts.
• Validity of Constitutional Amendments: Yes. The amendments were legally and validly adopted by the duly constituted Consejo Supremo and Asemblea Magna composed of legitimate members of the IFI.
• Loss of Membership: No. De los Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca remained members of the IFI, the consecration by the Protestant Episcopal Church having been merely for apostolic succession without any obligation to that church.

• Validity of Ouster of Aguilar and Remollino: The church constitution (Reglas Constitucionales) provides that the Obispo Maximo cannot punish anyone without first going to the accused and giving him means to justify himself, and must hear the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, and in grave cases, the Supreme Council of Bishops. Bishops who commit offenses are to be judged by the Supreme Council under the sanction of the Obispo Maximo. Those who believe themselves unjustly condemned may appeal to the Curia de Apelaciones, whose decision is final. The Court found that no procedure similar to that followed in the ouster of Bishops De los Reyes and others—where formal charges were filed, notice given, a hearing held, and the opinion of the Curia de Apelaciones obtained—was ever adopted for Aguilar and Remollino. No formal charges were filed, no investigation or hearing was held. The ouster was therefore null and void for violating the church constitution. Civil courts may review ecclesiastical actions when they violate the church's own organic law, particularly when property rights are involved, as held in 45 American Jurisprudence, pages 751–754.

• Status of Bishop Vega: The Court of Appeals found, after examining the evidence, that Vega never resigned as bishop but only asked for a vacation due to his parish church in Paco having been burned during the war. Vega himself testified that he never resigned and continued to exercise the powers and privileges of his position. He was assigned to the diocese of Tayabas, Marinduque, Batangas, and Mindoro by the Supreme Council on September 2, 1945, and Fonacier, though present, never protested. This factual finding was conclusive and could not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in a petition for review.

• Validity of Consecration of Seven Bishops: The seven individuals were consecrated by Fonacier without the approval of the Supreme Council and in violation of the church constitution. One of the charges that culminated in Fonacier's forced resignation was his consecration of bishops without the consent or approval of the Consejo Supremo, and over its express objection in the case of P. Evangelista. While civil courts ordinarily leave ecclesiastical matters to church authorities, they may intervene when church authorities have acted outside the scope of their authority or in violation of their organic law.

• Legality of Meetings on January 21–22, 1946: The claim that Bishop Aguilar had no authority to convene the Supreme Council was rejected because his prior ouster by Fonacier was void for violating the church constitution. Aguilar had been elected president of the Supreme Council on September 2, 1945, and it was in this capacity that he issued the calls. Seven of the thirteen legitimate bishops attended the Supreme Council meeting on January 21, 1946, constituting a quorum. The Asemblea Magna on January 22, 1946 had thirty-one members present, exceeding the required quorum of twenty-five out of forty-eight allowed delegates (sixteen dioceses multiplied by three). These factual findings by the Court of Appeals were conclusive.

• Identity of Asemblea General and Asemblea Magna: While the trial court and Court of Appeals found the two bodies to be one and the same, the Supreme Court noted that the constitution's ambiguity regarding the composition of the Asemblea General accounted for confusion among church authorities. The Court declined to nullify the actuations of the assembly called by Bishop Aguilar simply because it was called Asemblea Magna rather than Asemblea General, as the change in the constitution regarding the composition of the Asemblea Magna was merely nominal and did not affect the substance.

• Validity of De los Reyes' Election: Since the election of Bayaca was valid and his ouster by the Fonacier faction was null and void, Bayaca acted within his authority in calling the Asemblea Magna meeting on September 1, 1946. The Court of Appeals found that a quorum was present, a factual finding that could not be disturbed.

• Validity of Jamias' Election: The election of Jamias was conducted not by a quorum of qualified and legitimate members of the IFI but by rebels who were not authorized to organize the Asemblea Magna. The Supreme Council convened by Fonacier was illegal, being composed merely of himself and bishops he had consecrated without the sanction of the legitimate members of the Supreme Council. This factual finding was conclusive.

• Ecclesiastical Matters and Civil Court Jurisdiction: The amendments to the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and alleged abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom, and rule of a church, are ecclesiastical matters outside the province of civil courts. Moreover, the present action was filed on February 9, 1946, before the doctrinal changes of August 1947, meaning those changes could not have caused the division and were irrelevant. The dispute was a division, not a schism: a division means "no more than a separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or ulterior relations," while schism involves diversity of opinion on religious subjects. Since the case involved a division, the rule of doctrinal adherence did not apply, and the numerical majority controlled the right to use church properties.

• Validity of Constitutional Amendments: The amendments were legally and validly adopted by the duly constituted Consejo Supremo and Asemblea Magna composed of legitimate members of the IFI, headed by De los Reyes, Jr., and duly empowered by the Reglas Constitucionales to take such action. The bishops who participated in the adoption were validly acting for the IFI, as their alleged ouster by the Fonacier faction was null and void. The Oficio Divino itself stated that it was an "ensayo" and did not close the way for changes that the progress of religious science might demand.

• Loss of Membership: The preponderating weight of evidence revealed that the consecration of De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, and Aguilar as bishops of the American Protestant Episcopal Church was merely for conferring apostolic succession. The American Episcopal Church did not acquire any authority over the IFI or over the consecrated bishops, who were not required to take any oath nor accepted as bishops of that church. There was no factual basis for alleged abjuration or separation from the IFI, and De los Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca remained members with personality to maintain the action.

• Civil Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical Actions — Civil courts will ordinarily leave ecclesiastical matters to church authorities, but may intervene when it is shown that church authorities have acted outside the scope of their authority or in a manner contrary to their organic law and rules. Where an ecclesiastical decision plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by civil courts. Expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon civil courts when a property right is involved. In this case, the Court applied this doctrine to invalidate Fonacier's ouster of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino, which was done without notice, hearing, or compliance with the church constitution's disciplinary procedures.

• Division vs. Schism in Religious Organizations — A division means "no more than a separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or ulterior relations," while schism is "a division or separation in a church or denomination of Christians, occasioned by diversity of opinions, breach of unity among people of the same religious faith." In a division, the doctrinal adherence rule does not apply, and the numerical majority controls the right to use church properties. In this case, the Court found that the dispute was a division, not a schism, because the doctrinal changes occurred after the action was filed and after the church had already split into two factions.

• Watson vs. Jones Rule on Church Property Disputes — In cases involving property held by a religious congregation of an independent or congregational organization, where a schism leads to separation into distinct bodies, the rights to the property are determined by ordinary principles governing voluntary associations. If the principle of government is majority rule, the numerical majority controls the right to use the property. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who comprise the legal organization. The Court classified the IFI as falling under the second class described in Watson vs. Jones—a religious congregation—and awarded properties to the De los Reyes faction as the numerical majority.

• Conclusiveness of Court of Appeals Findings of Fact — In a petition for review, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Only questions of law may be raised. The Court applied this principle throughout, declining to disturb the Court of Appeals' factual findings on quorum, Vega's resignation, the validity of elections, and other factual matters.

• "Where, however, a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil courts. * * * In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the church." — This passage, quoted from 45 American Jurisprudence, articulates the controlling doctrine on civil court intervention in ecclesiastical matters and was the basis for invalidating Fonacier's ouster of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino.

• "The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." — This passage, quoted from the Court of Appeals and adopted by the Supreme Court, defines the boundary of civil court jurisdiction over internal church disputes and was central to rejecting Fonacier's claims of abjuration and abandonment of faith.

• "The question which have come before the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies, may as far as we have been able to examine them, be profitably classified under three general heads..." — This extensive quotation from Watson vs. Jones sets forth the three classes of church property disputes and the principle that in congregational or independent churches, the numerical majority controls property rights in case of schism, without inquiry into religious opinions. The Court applied the second class to the IFI.

• "Schism is a 'division or separation in a church or denomination of Christians, occasioned by diversity of opinions, breach of unity among people of the same religious faith... while division means no more than a separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or ulterior relations.'" — This passage distinguishes schism from division and was the basis for holding that the doctrinal adherence rule did not apply, since the IFI dispute was a division precipitated by a power struggle, not by doctrinal disagreement.

• Watson vs. Jones, 20 Law Ed. 666 — Cited by both parties and relied upon by the Court as the controlling authority on church property disputes. The Court applied the second class described in Watson—that of a religious congregation of independent organization—holding that the numerical majority controls the right to use church properties, without inquiry into religious opinions.

• De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. The Court of Appeals, 90 Phil. 689; Monfort vs. Aguinaldo, L-4104, May 2, 1952 — Cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals in an appeal by certiorari, and that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review.

• 45 American Jurisprudence, pp. 748–755, 764–765, 775 — Extensively cited as the primary secondary authority on civil court jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters, the distinction between schism and division, and the rights of factions in church property disputes.

• Shannon vs. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511 — Cited within the Watson vs. Jones quotation as a representative case applying the doctrine that in an independent congregation, the majority controls property rights.

• Section 2, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court — Provides that in a petition for review, "only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth." The Court applied this provision to confine its review to questions of law and to affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

• Sections VI, VII, and VIII, Cap. III, Part II, pp. 39–40, Reglas Constitucionales (Church Constitution) — These provisions of the IFI constitution define the disciplinary powers of the Obispo Maximo and the procedures for punishing erring members. Section VI provides that the Obispo Maximo cannot punish anyone without giving the accused an opportunity to justify himself and must hear the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, and in grave cases, the Supreme Council. Section VII provides that bishops who commit offenses shall be judged by the Supreme Council under the sanction of the Obispo Maximo. Section VIII provides that those who believe themselves unjustly condemned may appeal to the Curia de Apelaciones, whose decision is final. The Court relied on these provisions to invalidate Fonacier's summary expulsion of Bishops Aguilar and Remollino.

• Articles 154–164 of the Corporation Law — Pursuant to these provisions, De los Reyes, Jr. was duly registered as corporation sole for the administration of the temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, reinforcing his status as the legitimate head of the church.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.