Florido vs. Pasillao

A petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, must be filed within 30 days from notice of the COMELEC's decision, and the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts but does not restart the period; upon denial, the petitioner may file only within the remaining balance of the original 30-day period, which shall not be less than five days. The fresh-period rule under Rule 65 does not apply to petitions under Rule 64, which governs appeals from constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC.

Florido was a candidate for Representative for the Third District of Quezon Province in the May 12, 2025 National and Local Elections. Pasillao et al. were registered voters and residents of Buenavista, Quezon. The case involves the application of Section 261(a)(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, which defines and penalizes vote-buying, and Section 68(a) of the same Code, which provides for the disqualification of candidates who commit election offenses. The procedural framework is governed by Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, which allows decisions of constitutional commissions to be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof, and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which implements this period.

Matt Erwin V. Florido was a candidate for Representative for the Third District of Quezon Province in the May 12, 2025 National and Local Elections. Jan Raphael O. Pasillao, Manolo De Leon Panganiban, Norita C. Victor, Jay-Ar C. Victor, and Mark A. Pardiñas were registered voters and residents of Buenavista, Quezon.

On April 5 and 6, 2025, Ricky Anyayahan, Florido's representative, invited Pasillao et al. to attend a gathering in Catanauan, Quezon Province. Pasillao et al. were not informed of the event's purpose, but they were promised food and transportation. When they arrived, they signed an attendance sheet and were served meals and drinks. During the assembly, Florido delivered a speech explicitly soliciting votes and urging support for his candidacy. His staff, wearing red campaign shirts, also spoke and held a candle-lighting ceremony as a symbolic show of support. Subsequently, the attendees were called individually to receive a red campaign shirt and a brown envelope containing a PHP 1,000.00 bill. Florido personally greeted them and shook their hands. Pasillao et al. were transported back home after the event.

On April 11, 2025, Pasillao et al. filed a Petition for Disqualification against Florido, asserting that the provision of transportation, food, drinks, campaign shirts, and cash constituted vote-buying intended to influence their electoral choice. In response, Florido contended that Pasillao et al. were campaign volunteers attending an internal orientation and that the PHP 1,000.00 given was a cash advance for campaign-related expenses, held in trust and subject to liquidation. He denied providing transportation or meals, claimed that any food was leftover and shared among volunteers, and argued that the shirts were official volunteer uniforms and not election propaganda.

The COMELEC Division found substantial evidence that the event was not internal and exclusive to Florido's campaign staff and volunteers. The attendees were not part of his official volunteer group—they were not included in the group chat for volunteers, were excluded from meal provisions, and were treated merely as participants. The COMELEC Division emphasized that the event was clearly intended to secure electoral support, and to achieve this, material considerations such as free transportation, meals, drinks, t-shirts, and PHP 1,000.00 in cash were distributed. Florido also did not specifically deny that he campaigned and openly solicited votes during the event. The lack of proper record-keeping regarding the distribution of the cash further undermined his defense that the funds were operating expenses for volunteers. Based on these findings, the COMELEC Division concluded that Florido committed vote-buying in violation of the OEC, leading to his disqualification.

The COMELEC Division's dispositive portion granted the Petition to Disqualify Florido as candidate for the position of Member, House of Representatives, Third District, Quezon Province for the May 12, 2025 National and Local Elections, and forwarded the records to the Law Department for the conduct of preliminary investigation for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Florido received a copy of the Resolution via email on April 30, 2025. On May 5, 2025, Florido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the COMELEC En Banc denied in its Resolution dated May 9, 2025, affirming the COMELEC Division's Resolution. Florido received a copy of the En Banc Resolution via email on May 9, 2025. On May 15, 2025, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality and Entry of Judgment, declaring the Resolution final and executory. On June 9, 2025, Florido filed the present Petition for Certiorari. Pasillao et al. filed a Manifestation contending that the petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

• Timeliness of the Petition: Florido implicitly argued that his petition was timely filed, presumably relying on the fresh-period rule under Rule 65, which grants a fresh 60-day period from notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration.
• Vote-Buying Defense — Volunteer Status: Florido maintained that Pasillao et al. served exclusively as campaign volunteers, and that the material consideration extended to them was not intended to influence their electoral choices, but was instead held in trust for campaign expenses and subject to liquidation.
• Vote-Buying Defense — Nature of the Event: Florido contended that the event was an internal orientation for campaign volunteers, that he denied providing transportation or meals, that any food was leftover and shared among volunteers, and that the shirts were official volunteer uniforms and not election propaganda.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Florido asserted that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that he was guilty of vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the OEC.

• Dismissal for Late Filing: Pasillao et al. contended that the present Petition for Certiorari should be dismissed outright for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

• Timeliness of the Petition: Whether the present Petition for Certiorari was filed within the reglementary period under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Matt Erwin V. Florido is guilty of vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the OEC.

• Timeliness of the Petition: No. The petition was filed out of time. Under Rule 64, Section 3, the 30-day period is interrupted by a motion for reconsideration, but upon denial, the petitioner may file only within the remaining balance of the original period, which must not be less than five days. The fresh-period rule under Rule 65 does not apply to petitions under Rule 64.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Its finding of vote-buying was supported by substantial evidence, and certiorari is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment.

• Timeliness of the Petition: The applicable legal framework includes Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each constitutional commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. Rule 64, Section 3 states that the petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, and that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the period; if the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days, reckoned from notice of denial. In Pates vs. COMELEC, the Court clarified that Rule 64 is distinct from Rule 65, and the fresh-period rule under Rule 65 does not apply to petitions under Rule 64. In Mayor Villanueva vs. Commission on Elections, the Court underscored that the fresh-period rule does not apply to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, and that the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration is not the operative decision contemplated by the Constitution but merely a denial of a preliminary recourse. Applying these rules, the computation of the period began on April 30, 2025, when Florido received the COMELEC Division's Resolution. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 5, 2025, by which time five days had elapsed, leaving 25 days remaining. On May 9, 2025, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion, and Florido received notice on the same day. The remaining 25-day period resumed from May 9, making June 3, 2025 the last day to file the petition. Florido filed on June 9, 2025—six days beyond the reglementary period—rendering the petition fatally defective and meriting outright dismissal. A decision becomes final and executory by operation of law once the reglementary period lapses, and it is immutable and unalterable, subject only to recognized exceptions, which the petitioner failed to show.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, the main issue is whether the respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is not present when the tribunal's decision is supported by a legal basis and substantial evidence, and when it acts within its jurisdiction. Certiorari is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment. The Court took judicial notice that Florido did not win in the 2025 NLE, but nonetheless resolved the substantive issue. Vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the OEC requires the following elements: (1) an act of giving, offering, or promising money, employment, franchise, or any material consideration, whether directly or indirectly; (2) such act must be committed for the purpose of inducing a person or the public to vote for or against any candidate, or to withhold their vote altogether; (3) the act must occur within the election period as defined by law; (4) the intent to influence the electoral choice must be evident; and (5) the recipient of the inducement must be a registered voter or any person capable of influencing the vote of others. The COMELEC Division found that Pasillao et al. were not campaign volunteers based on several indicators: they were not part of the volunteers' exclusive group chat; they were invited only on the day of the event; and they were excluded from logistical provisions such as meals. The petitioner's own witness confirmed that the food given to them was merely leftover lunch intended for actual volunteers. The distribution of red t-shirts and PHP 1,000.00 cash was neither documented nor subjected to liquidation, contrary to the petitioner's claim that these were campaign-related advances. The absence of records, such as logbook entries or receipts, undermined the petitioner's defense and suggested that the funds were given to influence electoral choices. The COMELEC emphasized that the petitioner's presence and active participation in the event, including delivering a campaign speech and engaging with the recipients during and after the distribution, demonstrated his knowledge and tacit consent. These acts, coupled with the timing and undocumented nature of the distributions, supported the finding that vote-buying occurred. The COMELEC laid out a clear factual and legal basis for its conclusion, and the absence of grave abuse of discretion is manifest where a tribunal adheres to applicable laws and anchors its findings on substantial evidence.

• Rule 64 vs. Rule 65 distinction — Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is distinct from Rule 65, especially in the prescribed period for filing petitions for certiorari from decisions of constitutional commissions. Under Rule 64, the period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling, with the intervening period used for filing a motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally granted 30 days. In contrast, Rule 65 provides a 60-day period, and under the fresh-period rule, the entire 60 days commences from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fresh-period rule does not apply to petitions under Rule 64. The Court applied this doctrine in dismissing Florido's petition as filed out of time.

• Elements of vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the OEC — The offense of vote-buying is committed when the following elements concur: (1) there must be an act of giving, offering, or promising money, employment, franchise, or any material consideration, whether directly or indirectly; (2) such act must be committed for the purpose of inducing a person or the public to vote for or against any candidate, or to withhold their vote altogether; (3) the act must occur within the election period as defined by law; (4) the intent to influence the electoral choice must be evident; and (5) the recipient of the inducement must be a registered voter or any person capable of influencing the vote of others. The Court applied these elements in affirming the COMELEC's finding that Florido committed vote-buying.

• Grave abuse of discretion standard — Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. It arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion is not present when the tribunal's decision is supported by a legal basis and substantial evidence, and when it acts within its jurisdiction. Certiorari is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment. The Court applied this standard in declining to interfere with the COMELEC's resolution.

• "Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two — [i.e.,] the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to — is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides)." — This passage from Pates vs. COMELEC articulates the controlling distinction between Rule 64 and Rule 65, which is the basis for the Court's dismissal of the petition as filed out of time.

• "The period cannot be reckoned from the date of notice of the second assailed resolution as this is merely a denial of the preliminary recourse (identified in Rule 64, Section 3 as the 'motion for new trial or reconsideration') from the initial ruling, which is the 'decision, order, or ruling' contemplated by the Constitution. This is precisely the reason why Rule 64, Section 3 suspends the running of the thirty-day period upon the filing of such preliminary recourse, and restarts the period once the aggrieved party is notified of the action thereon." — This passage from Mayor Villanueva vs. Commission on Elections clarifies that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is not the operative decision, and the remaining period resumes from notice of denial.

• "The term 'grave abuse of discretion' is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the COMELEC unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper." — This passage defines the standard of review for petitions under Rule 64, which the Court applied in finding that the COMELEC's resolution was supported by substantial evidence.

• Pates vs. COMELEC, 609 Phil. 260 (2009) — Controlling precedent on the distinction between Rule 64 and Rule 65, particularly the special 30-day period for filing petitions for certiorari from COMELEC decisions and the inapplicability of the fresh-period rule. The Court relied on this case in computing the reglementary period for Florido's petition.

• Mayor Villanueva vs. Commission on Elections, 944 Phil. 356 (2023) — Followed. This case underscored that the fresh-period rule does not apply to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64, and that the resolution denying a motion for reconsideration is merely a denial of a preliminary recourse, not the operative decision contemplated by the Constitution. The Court applied this in determining that the remaining 25-day period resumed from notice of the denial.

• Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections, 932 Phil. 1143 (2023) — Controlling precedent on the elements of vote-buying under Section 261(a)(1) of the OEC, which the Court applied in affirming the COMELEC's finding of vote-buying.

• Brgy. Chairman Chua vs. COMELEC, 838 Phil. 619 (2018) — Cited for the rule that a decision becomes final and executory by operation of law once the reglementary period to file an appeal or the appropriate remedy lapses, and that a final decision is immutable and unalterable.

• Albania vs. COMELEC, 810 Phil. 470 (2017) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the standard of review in Rule 64 petitions.

• Article IX-A, Section 7, Constitution — Provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each constitutional commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court applied this provision in determining the reglementary period for filing the petition.

• Section 261(a)(1), Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Defines and penalizes vote-buying as the act of giving, offering, or promising money or anything of value, or making or offering to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, to induce anyone to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote. The Court applied this provision in affirming the COMELEC's finding that Florido committed vote-buying.

• Section 68(a), Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Provides for the disqualification of candidates who commit election offenses. The COMELEC Division relied on this provision in disqualifying Florido.

• Rule 64, Section 3, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari from a decision of a constitutional commission shall be filed within 30 days from notice, and that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the period, with the remaining balance resuming upon denial, but not less than five days. The Court applied this rule in computing the reglementary period and dismissing the petition as filed out of time.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.

N/A — The case text does not contain any dissenting opinion.